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Argument : The definition of the term Personality and its 
differentiation from the ego and character, depends on a 
realization of its comprehensive make -up from factors, 
both physical and mental, which are partly inherent and 
partly acquired, before and after birth. If we trace the 
evolution of man's thought on this subject from earliest 
times to the present day, we find a gradual change from 
vague dualistic and animistic ideas to a more monistic 
conception of personality culminating in the theories of 
" Gestalt " psychology and Emergent evolution. 
CHAPTER II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF BODY AND 
MIND 15 
Argument : The six possible views of this relationship held by 
r 7th and r 8th century philosophers have been amplified 
in various ways by rgth century thinkers, but the general 
scheme adopted here is that of Spinoza, as developed by 
Huxley and Lloyd Morgan, with special reference to the 
influence of modern advances in physics and psychology 
in abolishing the fundamental difference between mind 
and matter, and in establishing the contention that the 
psychoses and neuroses are different aspects of the same 
function. Personality is evolved on increasingly higher 
emergents, developed from the structural basis of reflex 
arc, conditioned reflex and engram. 
CHAPTER III. THE PRINCIPLE OF EMERGENCE 30 
Argument : One of the chief criticisms of the monistic stand- 
point is, that it is, absurd to say, that high -grade mental 
processes are nothing but compounds of reflexes and 
tropisms. The principle of emergence answers this 
criticism, in so far as it postulates 'that new developments 
have a character and unity of their own, quite apart from 
their component parts. This depends on the relatedness 
existing between the components and the structural form 




out the evolution of the universe, but the principal land- 
marks in the process are the appearances of life, of mind 
and of reflective thought. The gradual increase in com- 
plexity of function must be studied side by side with the 
increase in complexity of structure. Personality is 
essentially an emergent and must be considered as such. 
CHAPTER IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF BODILY 
FUNCTION 47 
Argument : Organization depends on the activity of the nervous 
system and its progressive complexity as demonstrated in 
the hierarchy of the animal kingdom. The units of this 
system are the neurones and these are grouped into 
engrams of greater or less complexity emerging from the 
simple reflex, through conditioned reflexes, to those sub - 
serving consciousness and reflective thought. At these 
higher levels inhibition and facilitation are important in 
modifying the " form " of the engrams. These phenomena 
are closely related to pleasure and unpleasure and may 
be to a certain extent interdependent. The organiza- 
tion of the nervous system as a whole depends on the 
superimposition of the reflex arcs which can be most 
readily demonstrated in the study of the physiology of 
movement, sensation and feeling. 
CHAPTER V. THE TEMPERAMENTAL FACTOR IN 
PERSONALITY 63 
Argument : The function of the nervous system, while it 
controls the general activity of the organism, is in turn 
modified by the function of bodily organs. Chief among 
these from this point of view are the endocrine glands 
whose true influence is still imperfectly understood. Over - 
action or deficiency in the individual secretions are known 
to exert certain influences on bodily and mental character- 
istics, while certain abnormalities of personality are known 
to be due to anomalies in the functions of these glands, 
hence their importance in the general study of personality. 
CHAPTER VI. THE INHERENT ORGANIZATION OF 
MENTAL FUNCTION 82 
Argument : As the structure of engrams becomes too compli- 
cated to follow at the higher levels it is more profitable to 
study function from the psychical aspect and to follow 
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the hierarchy of mental processes. Starting from the 
" appetites " arranged in pairs of opposites, we may trace 
the emergence of instincts and emotional dispositions. 
The discussion of the latter in accordance with McDougall's 
treatment of them is helpful, but certain modifications of 
his views seem desirable. 
CHAPTER VII. THE FURTHER ORGANIZATION OF 
MENTAL FUNCTION 98 
Argument : Above the level of the emotional dispositions it is 
more convenient to study separately, those processes 
presenting a dominant cognitive, affective or conative 
phase respectively, not forgetting that any mental process 
presents all three phases, though all may not be equally 
obvious. The higher emergents of the dominantly affective 
processes are the compound and derived emotions and the 
process. of belief. On the cognitive side we have to con - 
sider the growth and influence of language and the processes 
of imagery and perception. From these we pass to 
concepts and reason, culminating in beliefs and the philo- 
sophy of life. On the conative side we study the growth 
and organization of sentiments with the self -regarding 
sentiment as the ultimate emergent. The. combination of 
this in turn with the philosophy of life results in the 
emergence of the mental aspect of the personality. 
CHAPTER VIII. VARIATIONS IN PERSONALITIES I22 
Argument : Having considered the organization of the emergent 
we must ask how and why individual personalities differ, 
Many factors have to be considered ; environmental, such 
as climate, race and social heritage ; hereditary, such as 
retardation and precocity, the possession of talents, 
intelligence or genius on the cognitive side and of tempers 
and moods on the affective -conative side. This study 
has led many observers to attempt to divide individuals 
into groups, especially in respect of the particular disposi- 
tion which seems to be responsible for conduct. The ten - 
dencies of the modern psycho -analytic schools show how 
the results of such investigations tend to be coloured by 
the personality of the observer and a critical study of the 
contributions of Freud, Jung and Adler exemplifies both 
different points of view, and also the essential variations 
between groups- of personalities. 
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CHAPTER IX. THE CONTRIBUTION OF FREUD TO 
THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY 138 
Argument : The history of the psycho -analytic movement 
shows how the concepts of conflict and repression arose 
and how the study of neurotics throws light on the 
psychology of everyday life, as does a cartoon. Leaving 
aside the ultra- sexual veneer of the Freudian doctrine 
certain of his observations are of great value to the study 
of personality. More especially the concepts of the cona- 
tive unit the " wish " and the inhibition of the inco- 
ordinated " unconscious " processes which he terms the 
censor. The processes of regression and fixation are 
instructive and all these factors may be illustrated by the 
study of forgetting of the various symptoms of the 
psychoneuroses and of dreams. His observations on the 
omnipotence of thought and the ambivalence of the emotions 
are of interest as are his conclusions as to the fundamental 
" set " of individual behaviour and the behaviouristic 
types into which individuals may be divided. Criticism 
of his terminology is very necessary, but his fundamental 
principles do not seem so very much at variance with 
physiological as at first sight appears. 
CHAPTER X. THE CONTRIBUTION OF JUNG TO THE 
STUDY OF PERSONALITY 174 
Argument : Jung's general attitude is prospective and creative 
rather than analytical, and is therefore in some respects 
more in accordance with our general scheme than that of 
Freud. The two main contributions attributable to Jung 
are those of the collective unconscious and the formulation 
of psychological types. The former is not incompatible 
with the general concept of engraphic modification, if we 
can accept the possibility of transmission of acquired 
characters under certain conditions. As to the types the 
further differentiation of extravert and introvert into 
thinking, feeling, intuitive and sensational types is interest- 
ing and useful, but it is suggested that the two former 
are on a higher level than the latter. 
CHAPTER XI. THE CONTRIBUTION OF ADLER TO 
THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY 200 
Argument : Adler considers that the modifications of Person- 
ality are determined by " the end in view " and that this 
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end in view is " complete masculinity." Moreover he 
regards the temperamental factor as of great importance 
since he traces many mental processes to bodily imper- 
fections or maldevelopments. For him the sense of 
inferiority with the compensatory will to power is the 
chief agent in determining the behaviour of the individual, 
and in Adler's view the will to power is in the direction 
of masculinity, and away from femininity. This leads to 
an interesting comparison between the two character 
traits which may be present in the same individual and 
present conflicting motives. This may be true of the 
normal as well as of the neurotic, and hence the value of 
his work in the study of Personality. 
CHAPTER XII. THE CONTRIBUTION OF KEMPF TO 
THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY 215 
Argument : 'Kempf more than the rest of the psycho -analytic 
school lays stress on the influence of body on mind since 
he regards tensions in the " autonomic segments " as the 
agents which determine behaviour. He suggests that the 
whole central nervous system and projicient apparatus 
have been evolved so as to satisfy these cravings and his 
theory involves the whole- hearted acceptance of the 
James -Lange theory of the emotions. While neither of 
these premises can be accepted as readily as does Kempf, 
the insistence on the existence of these autonomic tensions 
in the cycle of mental processes is an important contribu- 
tion to our subject, and the recognition of these tensions 
may be of some assistance in the problem of vocational 
guidance. 
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adaptation to his environment. This is due to conflict 
within himself, so that there is too wide a gap between 
what he would like to be and what he recognizes that he 
is.. This leads to various expedients whereby he disguises 
this discrepancy from himself. These may be recognized as 
symptoms in the neurotic, but also as peculiarities of 
behaviour in the normal person. Such expedients are pro- 
jection, identification, phantasy formation and regression. 
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The importance of symbolism in connexion with these 
phenomena is obvious and the r6le of amnesia and sug- 
gestion both in " abnormal " and " normal " behaviour 
merit full discussion. The influence of physical factors 
such as toxins, especially that of fatigue, must not be lost 
sight of, and the way in which these poisons interfere with 
full cortical function throws much light on the study of 
behaviour. A comparison of the neurotic with the 
artistic personality illustrates how the normal and the 
abnormal merge into one another. 
CHAPTER XIV. THE INSTABLE PERSONALITY, THE 
DELINQUENT 249 
Argument : Goring's work on the criminal showed that there 
are no physical characteristics which definitely mark off 
the criminal classes, but the delinquent would seem to 
be an instable personality whose difficulty of adaptation to 
the environment depended not so much on conflict within 
himself, as on conflict between him and that environment. 
Instability may be due to backwardness with a secondary 
sense of inferiority and compensatory will to power, or on 
the other hand to misdirected precocity and inequalities 
in the disposition. Physical illnesses, especially epilepsy, 
congenital syphilis and encephalitis lethargica are respon- 
sible for interference with proper cortical function and 
consequently for the instability. In attempting to remedy 
or prevent delinquency, we must either change the environ- 
ment or the child or both, but to do this full understanding 
of and sympathy with the individual problem presented is 
essential. 
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emotion illustrates this, and the instability of the self 
regarding sentiment is an all too common phenomenon. 
This dissociation may be studied in any individual, but the 
examination of cases of somnambulisms, fugues and true 
multiple personalities gives greater prominence to its 
varieties. The cause of the changes in inhibitions and 
facilitations which determine dissociations is obscure, but it is obvious that endocrine activity plays a part. 
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present scheme the recognition of a soul involves the levels 
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functions tend towards analytical reasoning, but it may be 
that the soul is not to be sought by analysis, but by 
synthesis. It is suggested that the soul is the ultimate 
emergent of the whole personality possessed of an essential 
form in virtue of which a certain freedom and power of 






THE publication of this book seems to need some 
explanation. Why should a practising physician write 
on personality ? Should not this task be undertaken 
by an erudite psychologist, who is au fait with all 
the intricacies of mental science. The answer may be, 
that Personality is essentially a practical entity and not 
a theoretical composition. Moreover, the physician, 
especially if he practise amongst those who are instable 
in body and mind, is constantly brought up against 
all sorts and conditions of personalities. He must 
sfudy these personalities with care, he must analyse, 
to find out what are the symptoms of ill- health, yet 
he must never lose sight of the total synthesis. To 
treat individual symptoms is futile, to treat the patient 
as a whole, in all his relations, individual and social, 
is essential. Thus a conception of personality is gained, 
which is rather different from that of the professional 
psychologist. It is in the hope that this conception, 
however inadequately expressed, may be of some in- 
terest and use, that this task has been undertaken. 
Only in a few cases have quotations from authorities 
been inserted verbatim, but many ideas and opinions 
have been borrowed from the writings of others. So 
far as possible, these have been acknowledged, by the 
references to their works at the end of the book. These 
references may also enable those, who find certain 
passages obscure, to pursue the subject further, as the 
reader's general acquaintance with the more modern 
neurological and psychological literature has been 
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assumed, in order to keep the book with a reasonable 
compass. 
But for the influence of certain men who taught me 
Neurology and Psychology, this task would have been 
quite impossible, and I would like to express my in- 
debtedness, especially to Sir Byrom Bramwell, to Pro- 
fessors Lloyd Morgan and T. H. Pear, and to Drs 
A. F. Hurst, the late R. G. Rows, and Bernard Hart. 
Also the suggestions and criticisms of Drs R. W. 
Lang Todd, L. G. Irvine, and other friends have been 
of the greatest value. 
Finally, I am indebted to the painstaking care and 
patience of Miss Bickerstaff, for the preparation of the 




MANY psychologists have endeavoured to present an 
adequate explanation of Personality, but it still remains 
a somewhat vague conception, such as is beloved by the 
journalist, since he may twist it to fit any meaning he 
chooses. To define the term is a matter of difficulty, for 
Personality is one of those concepts which all of us take 
for granted as having a concise meaning, until we try to 
express that meaning in words. One reason of this diffi- 
culty is that most definitions are given in terms of the 
component parts of the whole, whereas Personality can 
only have a meaning if thought of in terms of a synthesis. 
The first and most general impulse of mankind when he 
wants to understand is to take the watch to pieces, to see 
how the wheels go round. It is only later and in certain 
cases that there is any enthusiasm to put it together 
again and understand its construction. Apart from this, 
however, few people, except those who have given special 
study to the subject, are at all clear as to what they wish 
to define when they talk of Personality. The difference 
between such terms as the ego, the character, and the 
personality, is not realized, and they are apt to become 
interchangeable. Before proceeding further it would be 
well to distinguish between these terms. 
The term ego is not a strictly scientific expression, and 
it is used somewhat loosely even in scientific works. How- 
ever it is constantly met with in psychological literature, 
and a definition must be attempted. It is used to describe 
the purely personal attributes of any individual, which 
mark him off from other objects in his environment and 
other selves in the community. In Chapter VII reference 
is made to McDougall's work i and to the concept of the 
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self -regarding sentiment.* The development of this senti- 
ment and the attendant functions of self -consciousness and 
reflective thought are the essential factors in the establish- 
ment of the ego, as a conscious entity in the life of the 
individual. By the organization of this sentiment the 
subject is contrasted and marked off from his objective 
environment, and at the same time is related to his sur- 
roundings. The contrast is appreciated, between what 
I am and what you are, between what I feel and what 
you feel, and the term ego also has reference to the aims 
and tendencies of the individual in relation to his environ- 
ment. These aims have an intimately personal purpose. 
Thus we may talk of ego impulses and ego ideals when 
we mean activities and goals which shall redound to the 
greater glorification and intensity of pleasure of the indi- 
vidual himself, or which may bring about that position in 
respect .to his environment which he himself wishes to 
occupy, quite apart from his altruistic or social commit- 
ments. 
By the term character we mean the dominant senti- 
ments and beliefs of an individual at any given time, 
whereby his attitude to himself and his environment is 
determined. It is abundantly clear that these dominant 
sentiments and beliefs by no means constitute the whole 
personality and that character may change according to 
the environment, whether temporal or spatial, in which 
the individual finds himself. A sudden access of wealth, 
the loss of a loved one, or the mere passage of years, may 
totally change the character of the man. Indeed, he may 
present two characters coincidently, for his character at 
home may be that of a model husband and father, while 
abroad he may be quite the reverse. Nor need this be a 
wholly hypocritical state of affairs, for in the environment 
of home his dominant sentiment may be love of family 
for the time being, while abroad other sentiments may 
take the lead. Inasmuch as character is the source of 
behaviour which can be observed by others, it is com- 
paratively easy to infer. Hence we may rightly talk of 
giving a person a character. The accuracy of such a 
character will depend on whether our observation is 
* A sentiment is an organization of emotional dispositions in relation to 
an object and will be discussed in Chapter VII. Sentiments may be ex- 
emplified by love for a person, hate of a person, keenness on golf, etc. The 
self -regarding sentiment has the self for the object and involves the function 
of self -consciousness. 
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reliable, and whether we have had a reasonable oppor- 
tunity of watching the person's behaviour under a variety 
of circumstances and over a long period of time. Even 
so, we cannot guarantee that the character we give will be 
accurate, unless the person is likely to be in an environ- 
ment similar to that in which we have watched him. 
Personality, on the other hand, is a much more complex 
matter, and includes the ego and the character. It in- 
volves all the heredity of the individual ; that is, all the 
bodily and mental dispositions, both actual and potential, 
with which he is equipped at birth. The factor of heredity 
is at present somewhat out of the picture in psychology. 
The reason for this is that the interest in the study of the 
subject, which was so prominent at the end of last century, 
revealed so many problems and difficulties that a quiescent 
period of further experiment was required to prove or 
disprove the theories advanced. Except in so far as any 
characteristic can be definitely recognized as a Mendelian 
dominant, it is hard to predict its transmissibility. The 
recognition of such dominants is hard enough in bodily 
structure, but in mental function it is almost impossible to 
elucidate them. Moreover, in the generality of mankind 
the stock is so mixed that in a few generations even the 
most transmissible characters are soon swamped, and it is 
difficult to trace any continuity of succession with any 
scientific exactitude except in certain royal or aristocratic 
families such as the Hapsburgs, Stuarts and others, in whom 
a special bodily characteristic can be recognized through 
several generations. Yet, although transmissibility of 
bodily and mental character cannot be predicted or even 
recognized with certainty, every individual does owe a great 
deal to his forebears. In the first place, it will be gener- 
ally conceded that race is of great importance. However 
similar the environment, the personalities of the Aryan, 
the Mongol and the Negro can never be the same. 
Secondly, such factors as stature, bodily strength and 
resistance to disease, both generally and particularly, are 
unquestionably transmissible and make all the difference 
to the individual in his contact with his environment. 
Thirdly, there are factors in character, the impulses that 
dominate the behaviour of the personality, which are 
transmitted from father to son. Although such an idea 
as that contained in Mr. Buchan's Path of the King 2 may 
not be scientific, undoubtedly it contains a great deal of 
4 PERSONALITY 
truth. In this book " he sees the younger sons carry the 
royal blood far down among the people, down even into 
the kennels of the outcast.... Some rags of greatness 
always cling to it, the dumb faith that, sometime and some- 
how, that blood drawn from kings it never knew will be 
royal again. Though nature is wasteful of material things 
there is no waste of spirit." In Chapter VI attention will 
be drawn to the dispositions which constitute the equip- 
ment, with which each individual starts out in life, but 
though these may be qualitatively common to all humanity, 
they are not so quantitatively, and their variations are 
determined by heredity. Abnormalities in their relative 
proportion are of great importance in determining be- 
haviour, and as will be seen later, character may be so 
constituted as a result of such abnormalities that the 
adjustment to the environment is impossible. 
To the inherited factors in personality must be added 
all the modifications which have been impressed upon the 
individual from his environment. Some of these are 
brought about before birth, but the full nature and extent 
of prenatal influences are still obscure. The developing 
embryo is peculiarly well protected from external influence, 
except through the circulating blood of the mother. 
Legend and popular belief hold it possible that the 
mental processes of the mother may influence the child, 
apart from the hereditary transmission of the dispositions ; 
and that various mal- formations, birth marks and so forth, 
are to be accounted for by her perceptions and emotions 
during pregnancy. The materialistic science of the i9th 
century denied the possibility of this, and attributed all 
cases cited in support of such a theory, to coincidence. 
In the light of more modern research on the effect of 
emotional states on the activity of the endocrine glands, 
and through them on the composition of the blood, it 
behoves us to be less dogmatic and accept any such theories 
as being at present unproven. For it may be that the 
subtle changes induced by these reactions in the mother's 
blood may have more effect on the malleable tissues of 
the foetus than could be induced in the more stable 
tissues of the adult. Be that as it may, there can be no 
doubt that more crude and permanent defects or excesses 
of these secretions in the mother do affect the child, 
while the transmission of various infections from mother 
to child is of everyday occurrence. Certain recent work 
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tends to show that the most important period for the 
transmission of modifications is during the first six 
weeks of foetal life. At this period the function of the 
adrenal glands has not commenced in the embryo, and in 
consequence resistance to extraneous chemical substances 
is at a minimum ; for the products of these glands seem 
to exercise a definite protective influence against foreign 
toxins. After the sixth week modifications are much 
less frequent and extraneous agencies much less potent. 
Unfortunately, it is just in the first six weeks that it is 
most difficult to protect the embryo from harm since the 
mother often does not know that she is pregnant and 
therefore does not take the precautions she might other- 
wise exercise. Nor is it easy in these early stages to 
establish exactly what changes do occur and what poisons 
or endocrine modifications are significant. In the present 
state of our knowledge therefore we must keep an open 
mind as to the effects of maternal perceptions and 
emotions in the early stages of pregnancy, but we are 
probably right in adopting a sceptical attitude towards 
the effects of impressions in the later months. 
Relatively to influences after birth however, prenatal 
modifications of the personality are not important. 
These other influences continue to act on the individual 
with greater or less effect all through life. The nature 
of these will depend on the race and the social position 
of the individual, on the composition of his family, on 
his educational menage, on the career he chooses, or 
which is chosen for him, on marriage, on children, and 
on the whole gamut of his social relationship. Still, the 
most striking and lasting modifications will occur in 
childhood and adolescence. At this time he is malleable 
both in body and mind. An illness may permanently 
affect his growth, an alarming experience may permanently 
modify his attitude towards a whole series of his reactions. 
If he is the object of too persistent love, indifference, or 
cruelty, his emotional attitudes may be so warped that 
he can never free himself from these early influences. 
The older he grows, the more violent must the accidents of 
fortune be if they are to make a lasting impression, and 
as life progresses and habits of thought and action become 
more fixed, the more difficult is it to influence the 
personality for good or ill. Personality also involves all 
the subtle relationships between the individual and the 
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environment in so far as his actions modify the latter. 
That is to say, we are concerned, not only with the 
incoming impressions, but also with the outgoing impulses 
of the individual, which depend not only on the organiza- 
tion of the personality, but also on the situation in the 
environment which he requires to meet. We see, there- 
fore, that so far as this study is concerned, a much more 
comprehensive purview is required than when the ego 
alone is dealt with. Indeed, we may say that to define 
a man's personality adequately, we must describe his 
parentage and race, his bodily structure, his intellectual 
attainments, his emotional reactions, his practical achieve- 
ment, and all the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune 
that have fallen upon him from birth to death. We 
must know the answer to the riddles whence man came, 
what he is and whither he is going. In other words we 
should require an encyclopdia of all the sciences and 
philosophies to serve our ends completely. Since it is 
impossible to accomplish such a task in full, no more 
than a brief sketch can be attempted, but we may 
describe in outline how his bodily structure is correlated 
with his mental reactions and how each relates to the 
environment. From these is established that unity which 
we recognize as personality. If this sketch, inadequate 
though it may be, serves to clarify to some extent the 
hazy ideas on the subject which are current, something 
will have been achieved. 
What man is and how man became what he is 
were questions so vital, once self -consciousness was evolved, 
that they were bound to exercise the human mind from the 
earliest times. Long before the era of history, primitive 
man in his folk -lore and fairy tales attempted to ex- 
plain his origin and existence. As Laing 3 has pointed 
out, there were three possible explanations of how man 
took his place in the world ; that he was formed from 
inanimate objects, that he was descended from animals, 
or that he was created by supernatural agencies. The 
attribution of magical qualities to stones and trees made 
it feasible to the primitive mind that these sticks and 
stones might be changed into men and women, and con- 
versely human beings might be changed to stones. The 
myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha illustrates this. The story 
is the Greek version of the Biblical flood. The aged 
Deucalion and Pyrrha built themselves a stout ship, whereby 
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they survived the deluge. But when the water had sub- 
sided they found themselves stranded in a gorge at the 
mouth of a cave which was afterwards known as Delphi. 
In spite of their relief at their salvation they grieved that 
they, old and childless, were the sole survivors of man 
on earth. However, in the midst of their despair, Themis 
appeared in a dream and bade them have courage. " If 
you would see human faces about you once more, O 
Deucalion and Pyrrha, then take and cast behind you the 
bones of your Great Mother." On waking, they were 
perplexed at first as to what this oracle meant, but soon 
they understood that by bones of the Great Mother were 
meant the rocks of earth. So each gathered a lap -ful of 
stones and cast them behind them. Each stone that 
Deucalion threw changed into a man and each of Pyrrha's 
into a woman and so the whole earth was repeopled. 
Somewhat similar was the story of Cadmus. Expelled 
from his father's house to find his lost sister Europa, who 
had been carried off by Zeus, in the guise of a bull, he 
and his two slaves came to a cave where dwelt a dragon. 
Cadmus sent the slaves to search, the cave, but they never 
returned, for they were slain by the dragon. However, 
Cadmus himself overcame and killed the beast, but finding 
himself alone, despaired of obeying the oracle who had 
commanded ' him to build a city. Minerva thereupon 
appeared and told him to plough up the place and sow 
the dragon's teeth. From each there quickly grew a 
warrior in full armour. These turned on each other and 
fought desperately, tilt all were slain but five, who, deeming 
it wiser to desist, made friends with Cadmus and helped 
him to build the city, which was afterwards known to fame 
as Thebes. The reverse transformation of men and women 
into stones, is illustrated by the myth of Daphne., changed 
into a tree -the laurel of Apollo-by her father, the river - 
god, to protect her from the amorous pursuit of her lover ; 
by the story of Lot's wife turned to a pillar of salt for 
looking back at the burning cities, and by the Cornish 
maidens who became a circle of stones in punishment 
for dancing on the Sabbath. 
The origin of man from animals is found in the totem 
beliefs so common among primitive man. " It is a step 
in advance of the pure fetish worship of stocks and stones, 
to conceive of animals, as having thought and language, 
and being in fact men under a different form. From this, 
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it is a short step to endowing them with magical attributes 
and supernatural powers, adopting them as patrons of 
tribes and families and finally considering them as 
ancestors."' The totem ancestor of the tribe -the fox, 
the beaver, the bear, the eagle and so on,- distinguishes 
it from all other clans and is supposed to endow its 
members with the wisdom, strength, courage or other 
attributes of the ancestral animal. Marriage with another 
member of the totem is incestuous, and many taboos have 
direct reference to relationship with the animal ancestor 
of the tribe. The transformation of men into animals 
and animals into men is too common in myth and fairy 
story to necessitate the quotation of examples ; for the 
frogs and birds and other animals who were really hand- 
some princes or beautiful princesses are familiar to 
everyone from the nursery. 
The belief in the supernatural origin of man may be 
exemplified by the legend of Bel, who made men out of 
clay and moulded them with his own blood, and of 
Jehovah, who fashioned them from the dust and breathed 
into their nostrils the breath of life. 
Primitive man accepted his body as he found it, and 
strove to explain his mind by reference to the character 
of his ancestors or creators. In the legends built up on 
these beliefs we find a firm conviction of the duality of 
body and mind. To the primitive it seemed obvious 
common sense that the flesh and the spirit must be two 
different beings. His stones and rude weapons would 
not move or work without some agency to make them do 
so, and why should it be supposed that the body could 
work unless something or someone is there to work it ? 
We find that he commonly explains the processes of 
inanimate nature by supposing that they are produced 
by living beings, working in and behind the phenomena. 
So a man lives and moves because of the presence of a 
little man within him, who directs the process. This soul 
is generally regarded as being fashioned in the likeness 
of a man. He is supposed to be able to depart from 
the body, temporarily in sleep and sickness, and perma- 
nently in death. The control of bodily structure and 
function is taken as a matter of course, all deviations from 
the normal being attributed to the action of the soul. 
The desire to prevent the departure of the soul from the 
body was responsible for many of the taboos which 
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surrounded individuals, especially those who were im- 
portant to the tribe, such as the chiefs and priests. In 
the belief of many primitives, souls may escape or be 
lured away from their bodies, by demons or enemies. 
Certain sorcerers make a living by snaring lost souls, 
and retailing them at a price to those who had lost them 
and consequently were sick. It does not seem to matter 
whether the souls which are purchased are the originals 
or not, for so long as some soul was returned to the body, 
recovery from sickness would ensue. Similarly, shadows 
and reflections were supposed to be the souls of the 
originals, and damage to the former meant death to the 
latter. This accounts for the very general fear of the 
camera met with amongst the lower races of man, since 
they supposed that the reflections on the plate represent 
their souls, and that these being taken away they will 
surely die. The primitive thinks of the personality in 
terms of this duality. There is his body, of which he is 
aware, but of whose structure he has only the haziest 
idea and in which he takes no special interest. This body 
functions in virtue of its life, which depends on the soul 
which has a more or less material nature. He cannot 
conceive of life in abstract terms, but thinks of it some- 
thing which can be handled and shut up in a box. He 
does not think that it need always be actually retained in 
a body, but it may absent itself therefrom and exert its 
influence from a distance, provided it remains secure and 
unharmed ; but should it suffer injury, there results sick- 
ness and perhaps death of the body. 
As we pass from primitive lore to historical philosophy, 
we find that the dual idea of an essentially separate body 
and soul still exists. If we take Plato and Aristotle as 
the culmination of Greek philosophy, we find that their 
conceptions of personality are essentially dualistic. Plato 
the idealist, like Socrates, was not interested in nature, so 
that his conception was necessarily general rather than 
particular. He insisted on the desirability of a healthy 
body, which should be trained by music and gymnastics. 
The soul, however, is divine in origin, but requires contact 
with the body to find expression. The divine attribute of 
the universal soul is reason, whose function it is to control 
the sensuous appetites of the bodily individual soul. To- 
gether with these two attributes there exists a third, 
courage or spirit, by which intermediate link the divine 
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and the bodily functions are brought into relationship. 
The ideal personality for Plato, then, is he who by means 
of divine intellect and reason controls the bodily greeds 
and lusts. The attitude of Plato towards personality is 
essentially ethical and not scientific. He is not interested 
in the nature and constitution of personality in itself, as it 
concerns us here. Such a conception is more in sympathy 
with the philosophy of Aristotle, who went to nature for 
his facts and strove to correlate these in one comprehensive 
philosophy. He realized the essential unity of the universe 
and the relation of man to the rest of living beings. He 
describes nutrition as the function of plants, sensation as 
that of animals, and locomotion as the function of the 
higher animals, in an ascending scale. Each of the higher 
functions involves those below it, and his explanation of 
the soul is that it is the unification of these various 
functions of organic life into a single common volitional 
activity. This soul is inconceivable without the body and 
the body inconceivable without the soul, while the latter is 
related to the body as form is to matter. But his dualism 
emerges in his conception of a fourth power which is quite 
immaterial and essentially separate from the body. This 
is the vows, the divine intellect which guides the behaviour 
of the body and is immortal and eternal. This conception 
of vouç again leads on to the ethical consideration and 
away from the pure study of personality. We have in 
the teachings of these two the foundations of idealism and 
realism in philosophy, but there was no real advance in 
the study of personality till modern philosophy began 
with Descartes. The Romans were essentially a non - 
philosophic people and made no independent contributions 
to this study, simply adopting the theories of the Greeks 
and largely depending on Greeks for most of their culture. 
Nor was an inquiry into the nature of personality en- 
couraged under the influence of mediaeval thought or 
scholastic philosophy, except in so far as the study of the 
ideal personality of Christ, as an example for all believers, 
may be held to belong to the subject. Again however, we 
find that the interest was centred, not on the make up of 
the personality, but on his ethical value. The philosophic 
aspect of the subject in more modern times is discussed 
in outline in the next chapter which deals with the re- 
lationship of body and mind, both of which are essential 
in the synthesis under consideration. With the gradual 
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growth of the sciences of anatomy and physiology during 
the last three centuries we cannot deal from considerations 
of space, but their essential contribution to the study of 
personality is obvious. This is specially the case since 
the work of Sherrington b and others has shown how the 
nervous system controls and integrates all the functions of 
the body, and therefore no complete conception of Person- 
ality can be arrived at without a knowledge of the structure 
and function of this system. None the less, it is only 
recently that the psycho -physical approach has been re- 
garded as desirable or even possible. For the biologist 
and the physician became more and more materialistic 
with the advance in knowledge and the apparent simplifi- 
cation of previously abstruse philosophical problems by 
the work of such men as Darwin and Huxley. On the 
other hand, philosophers and psychologists have been too 
prone to stand aloof from the maelstrom of scientific dis- 
covery, and, in the seclusion of their studies spin theories 
from their introspective experiences. Lately, however, 
the revolt from a priori reasoning and the return to the 
empirical study of facts, has led to an altered relationship 
between psychology and physiology. On the one hand, 
the American school of behaviourists and on the other the 
Austrian and Swiss schools of psycho -analysis have sought 
to deduce physiological and psychological explanations 
from observed facts, and have thus been driven towards the 
necessity of correlating the knowledge of body with that 
of mind. Moreover, still more recently, a halt has been 
called in the tendency to seek the explanation of every- 
thing by analysis into its component parts, valuable as this 
method has been. From all sides, in Neurology, Psychology 
and Philosophy, authorities have begun to study the tend- 
ency of a subject as a whole, and to study the complete 
structure, rather than the elements from which it is com- 
posed. In neurology the work of Hughlings Jackson,' 
Sherrington, Head,' Rivers,8 and others has shown how the 
nervous system works as a whole, organized and integrated 
together and finally controlled by the cerebral cortex.* 
They have found that the functions of certain reflex arcs 
are totally suppressed so far as manifest activity is con- 
cerned, yet there can be no doubt that their presence and 
collaboration are essential to the movement of the whole. 
Again other reflexes are obviously fused so that the contri- 
* Vide, Chapter IV. 
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bution of each to the total function is easily determined. 
In fact the activity of no part of the nervous system 
can be considered as having a meaning except in relation 
to the rest. Thus, when we talk of cortical function, 
what we really mean is that such and such differences are 
made in the reactions of the nervous mechanism when 
the animal develops a cortex. These differences may 
be studied in man, if the cortex is thrown out of action. 
But it has no function except in relation to the rest. 
When the cortex of an animal is removed we have to deal 
with a new entity, the decerebrate animal, which differs 
from the complete entity in certain particular respects and 
is not merely a part of the former. In fact the complete 
nervous system and the decerebrate nervous system are 
both unities which react as they do, not in respect of the 
various nervous arcs into which they can be analysed, but 
in respect of the relationship of these various arcs to each 
other and of the constitution of the whole. 
In psychology the " Gestalt " theory originated by 
Wertheimer s and developed by several psychologists 
especially in Germany, prominent among whom are 
Kohler" and Koffka,' emphasizes the principle that 
structural totalities must be the units of mental activity. 
The chief work of these observers has been done on per- 
ception and they have striven to show that perception is 
not and cannot be merely a bundle of elements of ex- 
perience, but must possess a unity and structure of its 
own. For example, suppose we draw a line thus 
an observer would perceive this as an incomplete circle. 
That is to say that the circle would be perceived as a 
whole and then its attribute of incompleteness added. 
They insist that all perceptions are structural totalities 
having a definite structure before they can be perceptions. 
So with all mental processes, they lay stress on the para- 
mount importance of the whole, rather than of the component 
parts of the organization. This applies to personality 
with special force, for it is not a mere bundle of sensations, 
images, wishes, emotions, sentiments, nerve cells, gland 
activities and so on, but a structural totality, depending 
not only on these component parts, but on their related- 
ness to each other and to the whole. 
In philosophy, the theories of Alexander '2 and Lloyd 
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Morgan " tend in the same direction. They direct 
attention to the importance of the new emergent in 
evolution, as opposed to the constituents into which it 
may be analysed. The doctrine of emergence, which we 
shall study in Chapter III does much to overcome the 
objections which the Animists, such as McDougall," raise 
to the so- called materialists, viz., that it is absurd to say 
that a personality is nothing but a collection of tropisms* 
and conditioned reflexes.t All these enter into the con- 
struction of the personality, but the whole nature and life 
of the latter depend on their organization and relatedness 
to each other. In virtue of such relatedness, there emerges 
something new, something distinct, with an individuality 
of its own. However similar the elements of the person- 
ality, their relatedness is certainly different and that is 
why each individual emerges as a separate unique being. 
But a personality is not only an emergent from the com- 
bination of his.bodily and mental attributes, for he cannot 
exist, except in relation to his environment, in the widest 
sense of the term. Hence a human being must always 
be considered in relation to his surroundings if we are to 
get a comprehensive view. For these reasons the follow- 
ing scheme has been followed in presenting a study of 
personality. We have to consider the units of which it is 
made up,' and yet always keep in view that these units 
act as a whole, in virtue of their relatedness to each other 
and their organization, and that they have no real meaning 
and little importance as individual entities. Personality 
might therefore be defined as the emergent synthesis of 
the bodily and mental attributes of the individual in 
relation to the environment in the most comprehensive 
sense. 
The relationship of body and mind is the first theme 
for -discussion, with special reference to the theory of 
emergence which explains how a fresh unity arises. Then 
the special bodily integration of nervous system and endo- 
crine glands, which forms the purely physical aspect of the 
study, is dealt with. Similarly the psychological integra- 
tion which makes up the psychical aspect. Next it seems 
profitable to discuss the contributions of the psycho- analytic 
* A tropism is an inherent tendency to be attracted or repelled by a given 
stimulus. These are most clearly seen in unicellular organisms, but may also 
be exemplified by the tendency of a flower to turn towards the sunlight. 
t Conditioned reflexes are explained in Chapter II. 
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schools, who have done much to throw light on the inter- 
relationships of various physical and mental environmental 
factors, which contribute towards the total personality, 
and consider their applicability and limitations. Further 
sidelights on these inter -relationships are afforded by brief 
discussion of certain abnormal personalities. Finally the 
spiritual aspect of Personality is discussed, wherein it 
becomes fully organized and significant. Again, let it be 
emphasized that our central thesis is, that however much 
we study, however much we analyse any personality, he 
remains one, indivisible and unique. 
CHAPTER II 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF BODY AND MIND 
ACCORDING to the definition proposed in the last chapter, 
the term Personality signifies the total mental and bodily 
constitution of a human being, at all stages of develop- 
ment, both in relation to himself and to his environment. 
In setting out to study Personality as a whole, it is 
essential to formulate a definite concept as to the relation- 
ship of Body and Mind. Many theories have been 
advanced to this end, but an attempt to prove the truth of 
the particular hypothesis adopted is beyond the scope of 
a work such as this. Indeed it is a task which is as futile 
as it is difficult. In Chapter X there will be occasion to 
notice in what different ways individuals react in their 
thoughts and feelings to events, theories and objects ; 
and how impossible it is for those of different types to 
appreciate each other's point of view. Moreover, we must 
recognize that there is considerable variation in such 
reactions, even in the same individual, at different periods 
of life. Such being the case, it is inevitable that there 
must be differences in the way in which the relationship 
of Body and Mind appeals to the various types of persons. 
In the present state of our knowledge, our appreciation 
of the facts is all too imperfect, and, with no absolute 
standard in this respect, any theory must be open to 
criticism. Each will follow the presentation which attracts 
him, and all that can be done is to accept some definite 
conception of the problem on one hypothesis or other and 
use it to explain our observations as best it may. 
It was during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
that this question first came to be seriously discussed, in 
all its bearings, by philosophers of the Christian era. The 
Greeks had dealt with this fundamental problem according 
to their lights, while the schoolmen had taken an animistic 
standpoint as a matter of course ; but both were chiefly 
concerned with the ethical aspect of the problem, as has 
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already been pointed out. During these centuries, six 
great philosophers were found to champion the six possible 
ways of dealing with the relationship.' 
First in chronological order, comes the animistic 
dualism of Descartes, who distinguished sharply between 
the extended material substance of body and the un- 
extended immaterial substance of soul. He considers the 
body to be entirely mechanical, while the soul, the think- 
ing rational ego, is a separate creation which acts on the 
body and is acted on by it, during the life of the body, 
with causal relationship between them. But since the 
soul is unextended, it cannot be destroyed and so is im- 
mortal. Mind and Body, therefore, are two separate 
creations, and in spite of their interaction, are essentially 
distinct. 
Secondly, there was the parallelistic animism of Leib- 
nitz, who held that body and soul are two separate 
entities, entirely independent, but always acting in relation- 
ship, because of the pre -established harmony of their 
nature invested in them by God at the moment of their 
creation. As he described it, Body and Soul are like two 
chronometers which, having been started together, always 
keep in time with each other, in virtue of their essential 
accuracy. 
Thirdly, we have the identity hypothesis of Spinoza, 
who considered Body and Mind as identical but present - r 
ing two aspects for examination, one physical and the 
other psychical. Thus, we might consider the time 
registered by a chronometer from the visual standpoint, 
by looking at its face, or from the auditory standpoint by 
listening to its chime. 
Fourthly, there was the thoroughgoing materialism of 
Hobbes, who described everything in terms of Body and 
Motion, and regarded the soul as a figment of the 
imagination. 
In contrast to this, was the fifth view, that of Berkeley, 
who denied the reality of everything except the soul, 
holding that material things had no existence whatever, 
apart from their presentation to the soul. He based his 
argument, on the fact that the only evidence he had of 
these material things was through his senses, and, inas- 
much as the senses are an attribute of the soul, there is no 
reality but the soul. 
This led to the sixth and last possible thesis, the corn- 
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plete scepticism of Hume. He agreed. with Berkeley as 
to the absence of reliable evidence of material things, but 
pointed out that there was no more reliable evidence for 
the soul. He was therefore led to the view that both 
Body and Soul are fictitious. 
Kant attempted to strike a balance, between several of 
these hypotheses, especially the last two, by postulating 
two realms of reality. Firstly, the empirical reality or 
reality of experience, which comprises all material objects, 
including the body and the concepts of space and time. 
All phenomena pertaining to this realm were only real in 
so far as they were known . to the soul, which itself belonged 
to a higher realm of reality, independent of space and 
time 
From these theses have originated the . more recent 
doctrines, which have sought to explain the relationship 
we are considering. Animism, essentially dualistic, insists 
that some outside power intervenes in the ordered evolution 
of material things, especially at such points . as the origin 
of life and of mental activity, and that this intervention 
must be presumed if these phenomena are to be adequately 
explained. This theory lost ground on the whole, in spite 
of the rather mixed support given to it by James,2 till it 
gained a new lease of life from the . brilliant philosophical 
tour de force, of Bergson.8 Of recent years however, in 
spite of the advocacy of McDougall,1 it does not receive 
so much support from philosophers as formerly. Of the 
parallelistic doctrines founded on the teaching of Leibnitz, 
strict epiphenomenalism and psycho -physical parallelism, 
find few adherents. On the other hand, some form of 
derivative of the identity- hypothesis of Spinoza would 
seem to find increasing favour in the eyes of the scientific 
and philosophic world. This is largely due to the work of 
Huxley,` who insisted on the principle that there is no 
psychosis without a neurosis. That is to say, that every 
mental process is accompanied by, and is a function of 
the activity of nervous structure, arranged in greater or 
less complexity. 
At first sight, common sense seems to tell us that 
immaterial mind cannot be identical with material body, 
but this idea of strict correlation between, and essential 
identity of Mind and Body, has become more easy to 
accept, in view of the advances in physical science which 
have taken place in the last 25 years. These have tended 
B 
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to show that material mass is less fundamental than was 
supposed, and that such concepts as energy and matter 
are not so different as at first sight appears. These 
researches have led natural philosophers back to the 
doctrine of Spinoza, which is the standpoint adopted in 
this presentation of personality. Metaphysical argument 
has no place in a naturalistic scheme, but it is suggested 
that, as Holt' and Russell' have pointed out, the con- 
ceptions of mental and bodily substance, of mind stuff and 
body stuff, are misleading. What we are concerned with 
is a common process involving the function of certain 
anatomical structures. On the one hand, this function 
may be studied according to psychological laws, and in so 
doing we examine the psychoses in Huxley's sense. On 
the other hand, this function may be examined according 
to physiological laws, when we observe the neuroses 
in the same connotation. As to what it is that char- 
acterizes mind as opposed to matter, or, to state the 
same problem in other terms, how is psychology to be 
distinguished from physics, Mr. Bertrand Russell gives 
the answer, that psychology and physics are distinguished 
by the nature of their causal laws, an- d not by their subject - 
matter. Seeking to find what constitutes mind, Mr. Russell 
rejects consciousness, the power of acquiring experience, 
and memory, as characteristic of mental activity, because 
none of them are broad enough to comprise the whole. 
He suggests that subjectivity is a characteristic which more 
approximately satisfies the requirements of the definition. 
Those particulars which constitute the physical world can 
be collected into sets, in two different ways. One of 
these makes a bundle of all those particulars, that are 
appearances of a given thing from different places. This 
is the objective view, and the "given thing" is treated as 
an object, and studied according to physical laws, which 
deal with its weight, its colour, its hardness, etc. The 
other makes a bundle of all those particulars which are 
appearances of different things from a given place. A 
bundle of this latter sort, at a given time, is called a per- 
spective ; taken throughout a period of time, it is called a 
biography, and the "given thing" in this case is a subject 
to be studied according to psychological laws, which may 
describe its feelings, its cognitions, etc. Subjectivity is 
the characteristic of perspectives and biographies, the 
characteristic of giving the view of the world from a 
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certain place. Subjectivity is not in itself a sufficient 
definition of Mind, since perspectives and biographies do 
not necessarily involve consciousness, experience, memory 
and the other characteristics of mental phenomena which . 
are much more than mere subjectivity. But subjectivity 
is an essential in the definition of Mind, for this is the 
aspect of " things with which psychology has to deal. 
As has been said above, matter as usually understood 
is only a " logical fiction ", invented because it gives a con- 
venient method of stating causal law. But matter, as we 
know it, is inferred from its appearances ; and although, 
according to certain metaphysicians, these appearances are 
of the same sort in ultimate analysis as are those from 
which the psychologist infers his data, yet, for physics the 
aspect is the objective one. The physicist is concerned 
with how his "piece of matter" looks, from every point 
of view, and by the comparison of these view -points, he 
verifies his physical laws and defines his matter. The 
causal laws of physics differ from those of psychology, in 
that they connect a particular aspect of the same 
piece of matter with its other appearances, instead of con- 
necting several pieces of matter with each other in the 
same perspective. For example, suppose I stand in a 
room containing a chair, a table, a desk and a couch, the 
psychical aspect of this arrangement of "Me" is how the 
chair, table, desk and couch appear to me. The physical 
aspect of Me is how I appear from the chair, table, desk 
and couch, respectively. From this it follows that mental 
processes comprise functioning of the organism, arranged 
and integrated, from the subjective standpoint according 
to psychical laws while bodily phenomena are the same 
functions arranged and integrated from the objective 
standpoint according to physical laws. Thus John Brown 
is walking along a path. Suppose first, that I am Tom 
Smith minutely observing John Brown. I may describe 
the action of his muscles, which are involved in the 
rhythmical movements of his legs, arms and body, the 
secretion of his various glands, the rate of his pulse and 
respiration, and so on, according to the means at my dis- 
posal for accurate observation. Such is the attitude of the 
extreme behaviourist who treats John Brown as an object, 
and neglects any question of consciousness on the part of 
the latter as uninteresting, since it cannot be observed and 
recorded. But all these records and observations are 
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physiological and not psychological. But now suppose, 
that I am not Tom Smith, but am John Brown, then my 
observations may be quite different. I take the subjective 
attitude, and cease to be interested in excursions of muscles 
and secretions of glands, but am concerned with feelings of 
pleasure or otherwise, depending on perceptions of heat 
or fatigue, with images of former walks, with perceptions of 
present objects, and perhaps with prospective images of the 
end of the walk. This is the attitude of the introspective 
psychologist whose records are essentially psychological. 
However, as Koffka' has pointed out, introspection alone 
cannot be adequate for two reasons. Firstly, there is no 
criterion that the observations of introspection are correct, 
since any two persons may not describe the subjective 
experience of an object, even such as a primary colour, in 
the same terms. Secondly, only those mental processes 
which are "in the focus of attention" can be examined 
introspectively, and this limits and distorts the mental 
content to an unwarrantable extent. Nor is " strict be- 
haviourism " in better case. All it can do, if it remains 
true to its own principles, which fortunately it has never 
done, is to learn new special facts about the physiology of 
the muscles and the glands. And, again, this method 
demands a specific attitude of the observer. He is not to 
trust to his first impression, which lets him see a clever 
dog searching for a hidden piece of food, or the slow 
deliberating glance of a chimpanzee, wanting a banana 
out of his reach. He does not see rage or fear or joy, but 
only movements of limbs and secretions. To get over 
these limitations of the two attitudes we must regard any 
situation as a whole, and realize that, when we try to 
analyse, we destroy the significance of the whole. John 
Brown's walk is only significant when both his muscular 
actions and his subjective experiences are taken into ac- 
count, and to divorce one from the other is to destroy the 
significance of the walk. As Semon 8 pointed out, if we 
allow that behaviour is a response to stimuli, the nature of 
that response is determined by the structural organiza- 
tion of the organism, and this structural organization, he 
termed an engram. Any given engram owes its form 
partly to heredity, that is to inherent constitution de- 
pendent on mnemic influences* on the germ -plasm; 
By mnemic influences we mean lasting modifications impressed on the 
organism as a result of activation on some previous occasion. 
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partly to previous environmental influences, that is, to 
mnemic influences on the neuro- muscular and glandular 
systems and partly to the effect of the present stimuli, 
none of which can have significance except in virtue of 
their relationship with the other two. We may say then, 
that any behaviour is the result of activation of an engram. 
When such an engram is activated, certain results 
ensue. When examined objectively, we describe muscular 
contractions and glandular secretions. When examined 
subjectively, we describe cognitions or reception of im- 
pressions, affects or feelings, and conations or impulses to 
action. Thus we may take the same process of activation 
and describe it in terms of physiology, or in terms of 
psychology, but we are, in fact, talking of different aspects 
of the same process. Moreover, that process must be con- 
sidered as a whole in all its aspects, if it is tó retain its 
full significance. John Brown is walking along a path in 
virtue of a complicated engram established in his neuro- 
muscular system, and he walks in the way he does in 
virtue of the organization of that engram. If this organiza- 
tion was altered, his behaviour would be altered, and he 
might run or walk backwards ; and in that case different 
objective physiological observations would be recorded by 
Tom Smith, and different subjective psychological ex- 
periences would be recorded by John Brown. 
This distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, as 
characteristic of mental and physical respectively, has been 
stated in another way by Lloyd Morgan .° He distinguishes 
the " ings" from the "eds." All that constitutes minding 
is mental, but everything that is minded is physical. 
Similarly, all that is concerned with remembering is mental, 
and all that is remembered is physical, and so with hearing 
and heard and the rest. Lloyd Morgan would not, of 
course, deny that the things minded exist in mind, and it 
may be argued, going back to Berkeley, that there is no 
proof that that which is minded exists outside what Mr. 
Russell would call the biography of the individual who is 
minding. Yet it is pragmatically useful to regard those 
things which are minded as having an independent 
material existence "out there" in space and time. If we 
accept this position we must always remember that there 
is, in the complex relationship between the minding and 
the minded, what Lloyd Morgan terms an advenient 
physical influence from the material object, and a pro- 
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jicient psychical reference from our own minds, which, 
together with intervenient influences from the environ- 
ment and ourselves, go to make up the complex of how 
we mind the things minded. For example, appreciation 
of a sunset depends on the advenient influence of the light 
waves on the retina -the sensitive portion of the eye ; on 
the projicient reference, out there in the sky ; of the effect 
of these light waves on our nervous system ; together with 
the intervenient influence of various factors from the en- 
vironment, such as the refraction of the atmosphere, and of 
other factors from ourselves such as the influence of as- 
sociation with images of previous sunsets. This complex 
constitutes an entity of which the sunset is the physical 
aspect and the subject's appreciation of the sunset is the 
psychical aspect. The latter is only significant when the 
whole complex is taken into account. So, if we apply 
this distinction, substituting bodily reactions of muscles 
and glands for separate entities " out in space," we arrive 
at the physiological reactions as things minded and the 
psychological reactions as the minding. 
At this point to avoid confusion, we must distinguish 
clearly what we mean by Mind and Mental. These words 
have at least two connotations. The first will represent 
an activation of en grams, which have reached a 
certain complexity, considered from the subjective aspect 
and according to psychological laws of engraphic activity. 
The limits of this order will be found to vary according 
to the views of different authorities ; for to some, mental 
phenomena are synonymous with conscious phenomena, 
while to others the term mental comprises a great deal 
more. However, in general, when people talk of certain 
phenomena being in mind they mean that these pheno- 
mena are dependent on the activation of engrams of a 
certain complexity of organization. The subjective aspect 
of that activity involves experiences whose upper limit is 
full consciousness, and whose lower limit is ill defined and 
varying, but which has its place somewhere above the 
order of purely reflex phenomena. 
The second connotation which is given to the word 
mental is of much wider significance. This is the psycho- 
logical aspect of any engram, however simple. This use 
of the word mental corresponds to the subjectivity of 
Russell, and to the psychosis of Huxley. In the lower 
orders of the hierarchy of mental processes, this aspect is 
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not obvious, and cannot be appreciated by introspection. 
Yet we must accept the fact that it exists. If we are to 
be strict correlationists we must allow that if there is no 
psychosis without a neurosis, then there is no neurosis 
without a psychosis, and even the simple spinal reflex 
must have a mental correlate of some sort. However, as 
this is so far below the level of consciousness, we can have 
no idea of its nature. As for the individual, so also for 
the species. In this sense of the word we must admit 
mental phenomena, not only in man and the higher 
animals, but also in the lower animals down to the very 
simplest forms of life. Some have even sought to extend the 
parallel to inanimate objects, though this is stretching the 
connotation beyond a point where it is pragmatically useful. 
Our standpoint in this study of personality is to be 
one of strict correlation. Every mental process how- 
ever complicated, however abstract, is correlated with an 
activation of certain nerve cells, arid of certain muscles 
and glands. Every activation of a group of neurones, 
however simple, is correlated with a mental reaction. One 
aspect of such an activation is the mental aspect, and is 
described in terms of experience, though this experience 
need not be conscious. The other aspect is bodily, and 
is described in terms of activity either of glands or muscles, 
together with biochemical and electrical changes in 
the neurones themselves. These aspects may not be 
equally obvious, either to the subject himself or to the 
observer. Take as instances purposive activity, feeling 
and thought. In the first, the physiological aspect of 
muscular activity is obvious both to the subject and to 
the observer. No mental aspect can be obvious to the 
observer, and is therefore of little account to the strict 
behaviourist. None the less such mental aspect exists 
and can be detected by introspection. In purposive 
activity, the observer sees the movements and the effects 
of the movements of the striped muscles, and may be able 
to detect various glandular activities, and the electrical 
changes which are induced by activation of the neurone. 
The subject also sees this movement, but the conation, 
the setting towards and carrying out of these movements, 
is present as a definite and generally quite conscious 
mental phenomenon which is an essential part of the whole 
complex. So in feeling, the bodily activity takes the 
form of secretion of glands and contraction of unstriped 
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muscles which can be detected by the observer, by special 
methods, though less readily than in the case of purposive t 
activity. The mental activity takes the form of feeling, 
whether in the primitive form of the pleasure -unpleasure 
relationship, or in the form of the more complex deriva- 
tives, the simple and compound emotions. Thought has 
also these two aspects ; the mental aspect is obvious by 
introspection, but the bodily aspect is much more difficult 
to detect. However, even in the case of thought, there is 
L. 
much evidence to support the view that appreciable bodily 
activity does take place. This consists of slight move- 
ments whether in the striped or unstriped muscles, and 
possibly also some secretory activity of glands. In 
addition to this there are the electrical changes in the 
neurones themselves which are demonstrable in all these 
processes. 
As the essential basis, determining the production of 
both mental experience and bodily activity, we postulated 
the activation of systems of neurones grouped as engrams, 
and it is necessary to return to this concept and define it 
further. By the word engram, Semon 8 denotes "the per- 
manent change wrought by a stimulus on the irritable 
tissue of the organism." The irritable tissue with which 
we are concerned at present, is that of the nervous system. 
What happens when a stimulus is applied to a sense 
organ may be illustrated by the following example. If 
light waves impinge upon the retina, they produce certain 
biochemical changes in the specialized cells which are 
sensitive to light, and which are termed rods and cones. 
As a result of these biochemical changes, activity proceeds 
along the optic nerve. This activity can be demonstrated 
as a difference of electric potential, spreading along the 
nerve. Still, though we can demonstrate this activation 
as an electrical energy change, it does not necessarily 
follow that the actual form of energy transmission is 
electrical. As Myers 10 has pointed out, the demonstrable 
form may not be identical with the actual form of energy, 
for there may be some higher type of energy, which we do 
not yet understand. The activity having reached the 
synapses, or points of contact between the separate nerve 
cells or neurones it will traverse a more or less complicated 
series of neurones to emerge finally in a common motor 
path, such as Sherrington 11 has described. (See opposite 
page.) 
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Thus a simple engram may involve nothing more than 
the blinking of the eyes in response to the flash of light. 
But the pattern of neurones so traversed by the activation, 
will depend on various factors and the engram may become 
Complex connection with central and 
Vegelahve neurones 
The whole comprises an engram whose activation determines a 
specific behaviour response 
very complex. For instance, the response of the neurones 
in the visual system which are activated as a result of the 
retinal stimulation, may be integrated with the response of 
neurones whose activation proceeds from other receptors 
if these normally respond to specific stimuli, associated in 
the same stimulus pattern. This integration may be suf- 
ficiently complex to involve a conscious experience, or a 
perception ; and the response may be likewise complicated, 
so as to involve movements of all the limbs for a prolonged 
period. For example, suppose that the light stimulus re- 
ferred to has been afforded by a flash of lightning, then im- 
mediately afterwards there will occur as a rule an auditory 
stimulus of thunder. The ocular stimulus of the lightning 
and the auditory stimulus of the thunder may be said to 
belong to the same pattern of stimuli, so that they will be 
associated together, and an engram will be formed in- 
volving perception of a thunder storm, perhaps fear or 
awe, and perhaps complicated behaviour with the object 
of seeking shelter. The mental and physical response to 
these stimuli, thus associated, may be induced in the 
presence of one only ; so that if lightning is seen, thunder 
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will be inferred, even if it does not occur, and behaviour 
appropriate to lightning and thunder will ensue. Thus, on 
the supposition that the reaction induced on first seeing 
lightning and hearing thunder, was to experience fear and 
to run and hide, an engram has been established involving 
the optic nerve and its connexions, the auditory nerve and 
its connexions, vegetative and central neurones, which 
subserve the emotion of fear, and motor nerves, setting in 
motion the muscles necessary for running and hiding. 
All this complicated arrangement of neurones becomes a 
unity, and acts as a whole ; either lightning or thunder, or 
both, will set it off, and the activity will always proceed 
through the common motor path involving the muscles 
which induce the movements of running and hiding. At 
the same time other activities are aroused which induce 
the sweating and shaking which accompany fear. But 
in addition to all this, is a mental aspect of seeing the 
lightning, hearing the thunder, feeling the fear and the 
impulse and striving to run and hide. So we see that 
the engram is an organized grouping, whose activity in- 
volves physical phenomena on the one hand, and psychical 
activity on the other. Similarly, the visual stimulus of a 
small tabby animal, the auditory stimulus of a purr, the 
tactile stimulus of soft fur, and perhaps a less pleasing 
olfactory stimulus, belong to the same pattern of stimuli. 
The activation of neurones started by any of these various 
stimuli are eventually grouped together, and from the 
psychical aspect a mental response emerges, which is 
symbolized by the name cat, and this may involve actions 
of stroking or kicking as the case may be. 
How these stimuli come to be associated into such 
patterns, and how the systems of neurones activated by 
them are integrated into a definite engram, can be under- 
stood by reference to the law of the conditioned response 
which will be fully described in Chapter IV. The re- 
searches of Pawlow 12 demonstrated the nature of the 
conditioned reflex response. To take a very simple case 
as an illustration. He noted the production of salivation 
in a dog on being shown food. Eventually he found that 
the stimulus induced by the ringing of a bell had been 
so associated with food that salivation ensued directly 
the bell was rung, even in the absence of food. This 
showed that when one stimulus is continually associated 
with another, the activations of the corresponding neurones 
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become integrated, and pass over to the efferent side, to 
issue by the same motor path, whichever stimulus starts 
the activation. Such a grouping of neurones so that they 
react together, represents a permanent influence on the 
irritable nervous tissue, and this type of neurone complex, 
as has been said, is called an engram by Semon. Such 
engrams may be simple or extremely complex. This 
complexity may be arrived at by the gathering in of other 
engrams, which are correlated with associated cognitions, 
affects or conations. Moreover it is maintained, that 
however complex an engram may be, its constitution may 
be explained on the basis of the conditioned response. 
McDougall" pours scorn on the idea that complicated 
mental processes can be analysed into conditioned re- 
sponses ; and to say that an abstract mathematical concept 
is nothing but a conditioned response, does seem absurd 
on the face of it. An attempt will be made in Chapters 
IV, V, and VI to trace the connexion existing be- 
tween the simple reflex, only describable from the physical 
aspect, and the more complex mental responses, which can 
only be described from the psychical aspect. It is sug- 
gested that the principle of emergence, to be dealt with in 
the next Chapter, will do something to remove McDougall's 
difficulty. 
These engrams, once established, are subject to change 
in the course of life. They may be reintegrated or dis- 
integrated, and their constitution and history has been 
thus expressed by - Semon, in what he terms his 
Mnemic laws. " All simultaneous excitations within an 
organism form a coherent simultaneous excitation -com- 
plex, which acts engraphically, that is it leaves behind it 
a coherent engram -complex, constituting a definite unit," 
such as that described above for the lightning -thunder 
pattern. That is to say, when two or more systems of 
neurones are activated together, according to any of the 
types of association familiar to the psychologists, a new 
and more or less permanent grouping will result. The 
partial recurrence of the excitation -complex, which left 
behind it a simultaneous engram -complex, acts ecphori- 
cally on the latter, whether the recurrence be in the form 
of original or mnemic excitations. By acting ecphorically 
we mean, that any one stimulus results in the activation of 
the whole engram. For example, the hearing of a purr, or 
even the memory of a purr brings up into consciousness 
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the whole complex cat. " Association depends on the con- 
junction of single engrams ; it makes its appearance during 
their relatively isolated activation and originates simply 
from the presence of the respective components in the 
same simultaneous complex. From this it follows, that if 
a new stimulus arises which is similar to the original 
stimulus, the new group of neurones so activated, and the 
old group which has already formed an engram, will tend 
to be activated as a whole and result in the formation of 
a more complex engram." 
We may picture the growth of personality on the basis 
of increasing complexities of engrams, which become 
integrated and associated, in the way which Sherrington 
has shown to be typical of the nervous system. This 
applies both to the individual and to the species. In the 
individual, to begin with, the arrangement of neurones 
is simple, chiefly on the basis of the reflex response. 
Soon, with the continual conditioning of these responses, 
more complicated engrams are successively formed, which 
have, for the mental aspect of their response, the more 
complicated phenomena of ideation and emotion, senti- 
ments and beliefs and so on, which we shall have occasion 
to examine at a later stage, and for their bodily aspect, 
various complicated muscular and glandular responses. 
So with the species, in the lower animal the arrangements 
of neurones are simple in the extreme, but with the rise 
in evolutionary complexity, they group themselves into 
more and more complex engrams, till in man, with a great 
increase of nervous tissue, they become extremely com- 
plicated. 
As has been said already, however complex, or how- 
ever simple an engram may be, two manifestations present 
themselves for description as a result of its activation. A 
subjective mental activity will be experienced, and if at 
the conscious level, can be detected and described by 
introspection ; and even if below this level, it may be 
investigated by special methods such as hypnosis. Also 
an objective physical behaviour can be detected by an 
observer, as the second aspect of the process. This differ- 
ence of aspect in recording the activation of an engram is 
the difference between body and mind, so that, while for 
descriptive purposes they are different, they are essentially 
the same thing. We therefore accept the metaphysical 
standpoint, which makes no distinction between Body and 
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Mind except in respect of the causal laws, by which we 
explain the phenomena observed, in each sphere respec- 
tively. We take as a basis of both, the activation of groups 
of neurones, and describe the mental phenomena which 
ensue, according to psychological laws, and the bodily 
phenomena, which may be observed, according to physio- 
logical laws. Our next task must be to discuss how, in 
the course of this increasing evolutionary complexity, new 
forms arise, whether bodily or mental. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EMERGENCE 
IN our consideration of personality, it will be necessary to 
study the bodily and mental components which go to 
make up the whole, and it is very necessary to make quite 
clear how the synthesis from the simple to the complex 
takes place. As has been noted in the last Chapter, 
the statement that any complex process is nothing but 
such and such simpler components, into which it can be 
analysed, is neither accurate nor even plausible. The same 
difficulty applies to any synthetic conception, and one of 
the features of Darwinism which failed to bring conviction, 
was that evolutionary progress could emanate from nothing 
but infinitesimal concept of 
evolution is no longer acceptable, and nature does not 
seem to proceed in that smooth course, but rather by a 
series of leaps and bounds. As Lloyd Morgan 1 says, " The 
orderly sequence of evolution, historically viewed, appears 
to present from time to time, something genuinely 
new. Salient examples are afforded in the advent of life, 
in the advent of mind, and in the advent of reflective 
thought." In the study of personality this conception of 
emergence is of great importance. 
Let us take a simple example from the realm of 
chemistry. Under certain environmental conditions, 
Hydrogen and Oxygen combine to form the compound 
water. This water is a new emergent, it has no resem- 
blance either to Hydrogen or Oxygen, but is a fresh entity 
of itself. It is not true to say, that water is nothing but 
Hydrogen and Oxygen. Yet water involves these two 
elements ; and in the absence of either of them it cannot 
exist. If water is not only Hydrogen and Oxygen, some- 
thing else must be involved in its production. This 
something else is a special relatedness of the component 
elements to each other and to the environment. Hydrogen 
and Oxygen can be mixed in all sorts of ways, subjected 
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to all sorts of influences from the environment, thermal, 
electrical, etc. ; but unless and until the requisite specific 
relatedness is achieved, there is no integration of the ele- 
ments into water. Further, water does not disintegrate 
into its components, except in special conditions of the 
environment, because under the above circumstances the 
molecules are arranged in a new form or structure which 
is inherently stable. This special relatedness is the secret 
of new emergence, and goes far to overcome the difficulty 
of the `nothing but' hypothesis. The causal agency which 
brings about the special relatedness is a metaphysical 
question which does not concern us here. That it happens 
is all that we need to know, and whether brought about 
by an intervenient Deity, by the laws of the universe, or 
what not, is no concern of ours. 
It is advisable to trace the process of emergence 
throughout evolution, to supplement our study of body - 
mind relationship, and to support the thesis that all 
phenomena, mental and physical, evolve without the inter- 
vention of any outside agency, from the simplest to the 
most complex. For the sake of clarity, however, it is as 
well not to go back beyond the modern physical con- 
ception of the atom, for such units as Alexander's space - 
time elements are hard to grasp and are necessarily 
speculative. Physicists have shown that the atom con- 
sists of systems of protons and electrons, that is of positive 
and negative electrical charges, in relation to each other. 
This is true for all atoms, and brings out the importance 
of relatedness, more than any other example could. Gold 
and Oxygen are both composed' of protons and electrons, 
differing only in their relation to each other. Hence this 
relatedness is the variable factor in the composition of 
these utterly different elements. The same is true of the 
combination of atoms into molecules in respect of the 
importance of relatedness in determining differences. 
Thus, given different forms of relatedness and different 
environmental conditions, the combination of the same 
component atoms may result in different emergents. For 
instance, to return to the combination of hydrogen and 
oxygen ; under certain conditions, water emerges, but 
under other conditions hydrogen peroxide emerges. This 
is a substance entirely different, not only from the com- 
ponent elements, but also from the other emergent, water. 
This difference is due, not only to the quantitative pro- 
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portion of atoms in the molecules, but also to the structural 
form taken by the molecule. In the organic chemical 
compounds this variation in emergents from the same 
elements is still more noticeable, for the varieties of carbon, 
hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen combinations are legion. 
Indeed, carbon by itself is capable of the most various 
manifestations depending on the relatedness of its atoms. 
Molecular structure seems to be chiefly responsible for the 
properties of substances, and this is best exemplified by 
the various types of crystals, which are dependent on the 
form taken in the arrangement of the atoms within the 
molecules. It was the discovery of the significance of 
" form " in molecular structure, that led to the greatest 
advances in chemistry, the realization of the importance of 
the ring form in the benzine group being, perhaps, the best 
known and most fruitful of such advances. So far we may 
have a clear idea of the environmental conditions, and the 
special relatedness which determine the emergence of the 
new entity ; but at the next stage, that of the emergence 
of life from the organic chemical compounds, this factor is 
beyond our knowledge. It is at this point, above all 
others, that the animists claim that all the rival philo- 
sophical theories have failed. They say that it is absol- 
utely necessary to postulate an influence coming in from 
outside, to induce this absolute change between living and 
dead tissue, which completely evades all our attempts at 
discovery. This argument, however, only seems to obscure 
the issue still further. In formulating our explanations of 
any problem, there is considerable pragmatic sanction for 
postulating that all concepts, scientific and philosophical, 
should be as simple as possible, should be expressed in 
terms of the known rather than the unknown, should work 
along the lines of laws already established, rather than by 
the manufacture of new laws. After all, the laws which 
have served us to understand what we know of the structure 
of the universe, are relatively simple and relatively few. 
The advances which have been made have been rather in 
the nature of amplifications and fresh orientations of the 
old laws, than of complete refutations of them ; witness the 
relationship between Newton and Einstein, in their con- 
ception of the universe. The apparent complete change 
of outlook introduced by the latter does not depend on the 
total abandonment of any of Newton's principles, but 
rather on a new orientation. The animistic concept of 
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something coming in anew, from the outside, leaves much 
unexplained. For example, what exactly is this new thing 
and where is this outside and what resides there. It seems 
more reasonable to postulate that the new thing is the 
special relatedness, and that that makes the difference 
between protoplasm dead and protoplasm alive. Because 
we do not know what this relatedness is, it does not 
follow that we shall never know it. Moreover, it is quite 
possible that although this special relatedness is potenti- 
ally knowable, actually it is unknowable, because the 
requisite conditions of environment can never be arti- 
ficially produced on this earth. It is suggested that 
the animistic doctrine of an influence coming from outside 
is less valuable as a concept to explain the origin of life 
than the doctrine of life as an emergent, depending on an 
unknown relatedness, at least analogous to other forms of 
relatedness which, we have seen, are necessary for the 
emergence of new entities. If the exact relatedness which 
constitutes the difference between living and dead proto- 
plasm still escapes us, recent work on cellular physiology 
and chemistry does point the way for further research. 
For example, Lillie s remarks that " it is a peculiarity of 
living matter, as distinguished from non -living matter, that 
it is never found in a diffuse, unorganized or formless 
state, but always composing definite individualized systems 
or organisms." It may not be true to say that life cannot 
exist independently of cellular structure and organization, 
but this structural form exerts a profound influence on 
life. Not only this, but the various proteins which make 
up the protoplasm of various species present definite com- 
position and stereo -chemical configuration, which differ- 
entiates them from the proteins of other species, suggesting 
that the variations in life activity, and hereditary character- 
istics of different species, depend on variations in the 
molecular structure of their protoplasm. This is analogous 
to the variations in crystalline form, and although proteins 
are colloidal, under certain conditions crystals of these 
compounds may be produced. Thus working with the 
haemoglobin of various species, Reichart and Brown 4 have 
shown that the crystals produced are morphologically 
distinct. This principle of molecular structure is, there- 
fore, likely to comprise the important factor in the special 
relatedness we call life. As Lillie says "living systems 




order of synthesis, and it is to be expected, that they 
should exhibit properties and activities which are absent 
in non -living systems. Hence the existence of a sharp 
contrast between the living and the non-living-i.e., between 
organism and environment -is not in itself surprising. We 
know, however, that continuous transitions from the one 
to the other have existed and still exist ; life has evolved 
from non -living matter in the past ; and in the present, 
every living organism is the seat of a continual trans- 
formation of non -living into living matter. The chief 
problem of general physiology, is to trace the steps of 
this transition ; i.e., to determine the nature of the syn- 
thesis by which the living matter, protoplasm, is built up 
from the non -living material, which it incorporates from 
the surroundings. Living organisms may be distinguished 
from dead organisms by several characteristic processes-. 
metabolism, growth, automatic self -maintenance, reproduc- 
tion and heredity, irritability, regulation and adaptation, 
and spontaneous activity. Metabolism is the constant 
chemical activity of living structure, whereby substances 
are continuously being broken down and rebuilt by a 
series of chemical changes which never cease. The re- 
building series of changes constitute the nutritive function 
of the organism, while the breaking -down series constitute 
its energy yielding function. These chemical changes are 
by no means all peculiar to organisms, though some only 
occur under the special relatedness which involves life. 
One of the consequences of constructive metabolism is 
growth. This is a definitely specific process, whereby new 
substance is built up to replace outworn or lost substance, 
or a general increase in size of the organism is attained. 
Again, a specialized part of the organism may be separated 
from the parent, to grow into a new organism. Whether 
the growth be individual for the purpose of self -maintenance, 
or reproductive, the new tissue is built up on the same plan 
as the old. This may be due to the specific molecular 
form, which we have seen to be characteristic of different 
species. If this specificity of molecular form could be 
proved, it would explain many of the problems of heredity 
more satisfactorily than can be done at present. 
Irritability is the characteristic of living organisms, 
whereby they respond to changes in the environment 
(stimuli) by changes in themselves (response). This 
means that the processes of metabolism are capable of 
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modification by slight changes in the environmental media, 
a phenomenon not confined to living organisms. How- 
ever, with the higher degrees of relatedness, this irritability 
becomes regulated and adapted, and in this way the 
organism becomes better and better adjusted to the en- 
vironment. By adaptation the reciprocal relations of 
stimulus and response are so organized, that the species 
is enabled to survive. Further, this adaptation and organ- 
ization proceeds, not only between the organism and its 
environment, but also within the organism itself by the 
process known as integration. By this means the animal 
is enabled to act as a whole, and the structural form of 
the organization is so adapted to the environment that 
spontaneous activities, directed to some definite end, 
become possible. 
Life having once emerged, the process of evolution goes 
on by the emergence of new qualities, whose components 
can be studied without great difficulty, and the laws of 
whose relatedness, and the environmental conditions 
necessary for whose existence, have in large measure been 
worked out. A differing relatedness of very similar con- 
stituents determines the distinction between plant and 
animal, the one characterized by a dominant vegetative 
function, and the other by a dominant motor function. 
In our present study we are concerned with the 
animal kingdom, and especially the emergence of the 
nervous system. This system would seem to be evolved 
from a gradual specialization of certain functions, char- 
acteristic of living protoplasm. These are the negative 
and positive tropisms, met with in the lowest forms of 
living organisms such as the Amoeba. Certain mechanical 
thermal and electrical stimuli, applied to such living 
protoplasm, induce motion of the whole organism towards 
the source of these stimuli. Other stimuli of a different 
mode, or different intensity, result in the motion of the 
whole organism away from the source of the stimulus. 
These processes are chiefly of a chemical nature at this 
stage of existence. When the stage of the unicellular 
organism has been passed the cellular organization of 
protoplasmic structure modifies its reaction to a remark- 
able extent. Division of labour and differentiation of 
function are the chief characteristics of further growth. 
The researches of Parker a and others, on the elementary 
types of nervous reaction, demonstrate how the neuro- 
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muscular system is developed in the progress of evolution. 
In the sponges the earliest differentiation is towards con- 
tractile tissue, which is capable of direct response to 
stimuli without the intervention of tissue differentiated 
to subserve receptive and conductive function. In certain 
coelenterates we find the next differentiation of a receptor 
cell in close contact with the effector cells. Then, between 
the outer and inner layers of cells -the ectoderm and the 
entoderm -there develops the nerve net. This is con- 
ductive tissue, which conveys activation from the point 
of stimulus all over the animal in any direction. In the 
higher coelenterates some polarization of the nerve net 
is already met with, so that the activation is inhibited 
from passing in any direction, except by the one specific 
route from the receptor to the corresponding effector. 
From this polarization is derived the nerve fibre of the 
higher animals, which can only conduct in one direction. 
These nerve fibres and cells are then further differentiated 
so as to serve special functions, and concentrated in certain 
regions of the body. From this specialized structural 
arrangement are derived the central and peripheral nervous 
systems, characteristic of all animals higher in the evolu- 
tionary scale. As Sherrington s has shown, the nervous 
system gradually takes on the directive and integrative 
control of the whole body, so that every activity, of what- 
ever nature, must be considered in relation to this system, 
and all activity, if not immediately initiated by it, is under 
nervous control. The primitive chemical activities are 
superseded so far as pre- eminence is concerned, but they 
persist as a reinforcing agent in the form of the endocrine 
system, to be studied in Chapter V. It does not follow 
from this that any given bodily function has no direct 
influence on another bodily function, without central 
nervous intervention, but it is mainly in relation to the 
elaboration and differential development of the nervous 
system, that evolutionary progress takes place. The basis 
from which this developmental progress is derived, is the 
reflex response. This response depends on certain differ- 
entiated structures in the body of the animal. Firstly, 
we get a specialized area of tissue, a receptor, which is 
sensitive to stimuli from the environment of the animal, 
or from other parts of its own body. These stimuli induce 
biochemical changes in this specialized tissue, resulting 
in a liberation of some form of energy, which is observed 
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as a change in electrical potential. Secondly, we get a 
specially differentiated tissue whose function it is to 
conduct the activation induced by the response of the 
receptor. Thirdly, we get a specialized structure within 
the body, whose function it is to receive this afferent 
activation from one or more receptors, and distribute it 
to efferent conductive tissue, which forms the fourth link 
in the chain of the response. This conductive tissue con- 
veys the activation to one or more end -organs, which 
determine the contraction of muscles or secretion of glands, 
the emergent from whose composite action constitutes the 
behaviour of the organism. 
sKmul aFferenr conductor 
reee,tor 
efferent. corductor 
Such a description of the reflex response is incomplete, 
for even the simplest response involves not only the 
sequence described above, but also, as has been pointed 
out in Chapter II, a mental accompaniment, involving a 
low grade of cognition or awareness of stimulus and cona- 
tion or striving for activity, along with affect or feeling, 
if any neurones of the vegetative nervous system are 
involved. The word mental is here used in the second of 
the two connotations, as described above. To describe 
the nature of the mental accompaniment of this response 
is impossible, so far is it below the level of conscious 
awareness. Hence the importance of using such technical 
terms as cognition, which does not necessarily involve 
awareness or imply consciousness. Indeed, this difficulty 
of appreciating these low level mental phenomena is a 
very serious handicap to psychology, especially as we 
have no everyday words in the language to describe 
them. They may be inferred, in a vague way, and modern 
psycho -pathology has shown that much which previously 
had seemed far below this level of conscious awareness is 
available for examination ; but they cannot be observed 
with that precision which is possible with physical 
phenomena. The clearer understanding of the lower 
reflexes which have become suppressed, such as the mass 
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reflex, has been of great assistance in the progress of 
neurology ; but we are still groping in the dark for the 
suppressed and fused elements in the march of psycho- 
logical evolution, and inference, which is all too probably 
erroneous, is all that we can use. For example, we may 
observe the amoeba protrude its pseudopodia and engulf 
the diatom, and we must infer that this activity is ac- 
companied by some sort of psychical experience, but what 
sort of low grade cognition and affect and conation this 
experience may be, must be a matter of pure conjecture. 
The terms suppression and fusion which we owe to 
Rivers' are important, and require definition. By suppres- 
sion is meant that an activity, which at one stage of evolution 
was useful in everyday life, has, with the march of progress, 
not only become useless but has ceased to make any 
obvious contribution to the total behaviour of the organism. 
An example of this is the mass reflex in man, which is 
only disclosed by complete division of the spinal cord. 
As a result of this operation, only the relatively low level 
nervous structure of the lumbo- sacral cord is able to 
function. Any stimulus applied to the lower limb causes 
defensive withdrawal of the limb by action of the flexor 
muscles, certain vasomotor changes, sweating and voiding 
of the bladder. In the healthy man there is no sign what- 
ever of the existence of this reflex. It has been totally 
suppressed, but that such a defensive reaction may have 
been quite useful at some stage of animal evolution is 
obvious. 
By fusion is meant that an activity, which has been 
useful and normal at one stage of evolution, is no longer 
dominant but still contributes to the total behaviour of 
the organism. A good example of this is the prespinal 
motor system in man, which, though dominated by the 
cortical motor system, still contributes to the tone of the 
muscular system. This is evident from the interference 
with muscular tonus and resultant power of posture and 
locomotion, which results from lesions destroying the 
functional activity of this system. 
The next recognizable stage in the evolutionary process 
is the emergence of the conditioned reflex response from 
the combination of one or more reflexes, with fusion or 
suppression of certain of the component parts. These will 
be explained more fully in the next chapter and Pawlow's 
classical bell- ringing -salivation experiment has already 
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been referred to. Experimental work has shown that 
many forms of behaviour may be explained in terms of 
the conditioned reflex. We must, however, guard against 
the suggestion that all sorts of behaviour are nothing but 
conditioned reflexes. The principle of emergence, with . 
the advenience of something new depending on different 
relatedness, is essential. With the integration and elabora- 
tion of the conditioned reflex, there emerges the instinctive 
reaction. The word " instinct " has received so many con- 
notations in these days of journalism, that a man is even 
said to have an instinct for salmon fishing. In this way it 
has almost lost its usefulness as a scientific term, but I use 
it in the sense originally applied to it by Lloyd Morgan .8 
A true instinctive response is one which is inherent in --- 
the disposition of the organism, and owes nothing to ex- 
perience ; such a response is seen in the swimming move- 
ments of the young duckling when put into water for the 
first time, or the pecking of the newly hatched chick at 
bright objects. Moreover, a true instinctive response is 
one which is not adapted to circumstances in the course 
of the animal's life, and is not modified by experience. 
Directly the behaviour of the animal is so adapted or 
modified, it is no longer purely instinctive. The loose use 
of this word "instinctive" has led to its extension both 
upwards and downwards in the scale. It is absurd, as has 
been said, to talk of an instinct for salmon fishing, but it 
is equally absurd to talk of the fission, and even the con- 
jugation of unicellular animals as a reproductive instinct. 
It would seem more useful to retain the word " instinct " 
for a new emergent in evolutionary progress at a stage 
referred to by Lloyd Morgan as the advent of mind. This 
is one of the sudden advances which corresponds to that of 
the appearance of life lower in the scale, and the appear- 
ance of reflective thought at a higher level. Considered 
from the neurological aspect, reflex reactions are the 
function of a purely segmental nervous system, where 
there is no specialization between one segment and another. 
Instinctive reaction essentially depends on the specializa- 
tion of certain segmental nervous structures to form a 
brain. This is a new departure in anatomical structure, 
and therefore it is only reasonable to expect a new de- 
parture in psychological reaction. Instinctive reaction will 
develop in intensity and potentiality with the increasing 
specialization and integration of the nervous system. This 
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may reach a considerable degree of complexity in more 
than one type of nervous structure, as witnessed by the 
instinctive reactions of insects, whose neurological evolu- 
tion takes a completely different form from that of 
vertebrates ; but it should be noticed that in the case 
of insects there is remarkable rigidity of instinctive 
behaviour. The higher progress of evolution is in the 
direction of freedom of reaction, and with this comes the 
greater size and complexity of the brain tissue of verte- 
brates and finally the development of the cortex from 
the forebrain. 
The exact neurological levels involved in instinctive 
action are extremely hard to determine. The so- called 
all -or- none * reaction of the instinct is generally supposed 
to be characteristic of thalamic behaviour, that is to say, 
the behaviour of an animal deprived of the cortical 
control exercised over the thalamus. Unfortunately, how- 
ever, there is no zoological specimen which is normally 
"thalamic "t and so we cannot tell whether such an 
animal would exhibit pure instinctive reaction as here de- 
fined. Even the elasmobranch fishes have well -developed 
olfactory lobes, which are developments of the forebrain. 
Certain experiments of Sherrington on decerebrate dogs 
suggest that instinctive reaction involves cortical function, 
though this may be of a primitive type. Even such a 
universal instinctive action as the performance of the 
sexual act can only be carried out by the decerebrate 
dog if he is placed in position. He never goes to seek 
or initiate the act of his own accord. Such behaviour is 
reflex rather than fully instinctive ; and there seems little 
doubt that instinct, as exhibited in the vertebrates, is 
dependent on some forebrain development. McDougall 
has attempted to show that many activities, which pre- 
viously have been regarded as purely instinctive, and there- 
fore owing nothing to experience, such as nest -building in 
birds, are capable of modification and owe their fully 
developed form partly to adaptation. His examples are 
* By "all -or- none" reaction is meant that if a response to stimulus is 
observed at all, that response is carried out at full intensity and with no 
grading either qualitative or quantitative. 
t A " thalamic " animal would be one, whose nervous system was devel- 
oped to the level of the basal ganglia: the structures which represent a 
stage in evolution, midway between the segmental nervous system, comprising 
spinal cord and brain stem, and the nervous system with a more or less 
developed forebrain or cortex. 
A 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EMERGENCE 41 
hardly conclusive, and in many cases are definitely con- 
tradicted by the observations of experienced naturalists. 
For this reason, what McDougall calls the instincts of man 
would be better called by another name, or they do 
not come within this definition, though de ved from and 
founded on instincts. They might be termed emotional 
dispositions. None the less, he is certainly right in insist- 
ing, that the behaviour of man is based on instinct and 
not on reason, as held by the older philosophers ; but this 
is the sole justification for retaining the word " instinct, 
as applied to these higher emergents. It is at the level 
of instinctive response that the Mneme as described by 
Semon" becomes of importance for the psychologist. 
Semon's mnemic laws have already been referred to, and 
have to do with the influence of previous activation of the 
neurone paths involved in the present response. Our 
definition of instinctive response precludes any mnemic 
effect during the lifetime of the individual, but Semon 
postulated a mnemic effect on the germ plasm, as well as 
on the nervous system ; and whether by the incidence of 
natural selection, or other selective influences, instinctive 
responses may well owe their nature to certain mnemic 
effects which have become manifest during the history of 
the race. It must be. remembered, however, that although 
a previous activation of a pattern in germ plasm or nervous 
system exercises a profound influence on the result of a 
new activation, these two influences, the new and the old, 
enter into a special relatedness, and the resulting behaviour 
is a true emergent, with a unique character of its own. 
Directly we pass to the emergence of adapted behaviour, 
depending on new relatedness of instinctive types of 
behaviour, mnemic influence becomes of the greatest im- 
portance. Behaviour and mental experience in the broad 
se*se, not only depend on the pattern of stimuli presented 
to the receptors, but on the engraphic effects of previous 
activations. Directly this factor comes in, we have a re- 
lationship of the present activity or experience to the past. 
Behaviour becomes linked up, one pattern of behaviour 
depending on another, and not appearing as an isolated 
phenomenon with no connexion with what has gone 
before. Mental phenomena, therefore, cannot be held to 
be static, but represent a stream, each item being indis- 
solubly blended with what has gone before and what comes 
after. Considering the process from the psychical aspect, 
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we must recognize a new relatedness of present sensation 
with images and the knowledge previously gained as a 
result of engraphic reactions. This results in the emerg- 
ence of a perception, and the giving of meaning to the 
sensory impression. Such a perception is a quite definite 
new emergence, and is a structural totality which is ap- 
preciated as such, as the Gestalt theory has shown, and 
is not merely a bundle of images and sensations. This 
leads us to consciousness. This plane of consciousness and 
reflective thought involves a relatedness, which involves 
another definitely new emergence, such as that of life and 
mind. As with the case of instinct, this depends on a 
definite advance in the progress of structural evolution in 
the nervous system, namely, that of the full development 
of the forebrain into a definite cortical system of greater 
or less complexity. It is the function of the cortex which 
enables man to indulge in reflective thought, and so acquire 
his great ascendancy over the animals. As in the case 
of instinct, the complexity of conscious phenomena will 
depend on the complexity of brain structure, and it is not 
easy to define exactly what is conscious and what is not. 
Under these circumstances, it would not be correct to 
insist that the psychical aspect of all cortical function is 
conscious in the ordinary sense of the term. For example, 
dreams and somnambulisms certainly involve consciousness 
of a sort, and certainly involve cortical function, yet they 
are not usually referred to as conscious phenomena ; and 
we have already seen that instinctive action involves some 
cortical function. Later we shall have occasion to examine 
in more detail these complexities of consciousness. An 
important feature of this level of emergence is that con- 
sciousness is characterized, amongst other things, by the 
property of continuance, as noted above. Here it is cer- 
tainly no longer legitimate to talk of isolated occurrences, 
but only of a stream. Although it may be convenient to 
examine a cross section of this stream, it must be re- 
membered that no unit in the stream has any significance 
except in relation to what has gone before, and to what is 
coming after. Certain upholders of animistic doctrines 
declare that their opponents fail because their explanations 
lose sight of this stream of consciousness. But in the 
present treatment of the problem, this difficulty does seem 
to be overcome, and an adequate explanation given of the 
waxing and waning of these processes. From both physical 
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and psychical aspects, any process in consciousness may 
be described in three phases. Thus we have postulated 
that any mental process depends on the activation of an 
engram, or a series of neurones, determined in accordance 
with mnemic laws. This activation spreads from certain 
other neurones (the engram previously in action), reaches 
a maximum of intensity within the engram concerned, and 
passes away as the activation proceeds to another engram, 
viz., that successively in action. From the mental aspect, 
this process is experienced as a feeling of comingness, 
leading into a feeling of " passingawayness ", as Lloyd 
Morgan has described it. Such a sequence results in a 
continuous stream of processes occurring in consciousness, 
and characteristic of it. This does not mean that such 
waxing and waning of activity in the engrams do not occur 
below the level of consciousness, but it is only at this level 
that there is sufficient integration of activity to give rise 
to the continuous stream of recognizable processes in 
which each event leans back towards the past and bends 
forward towards the future. As life emerges from matter 
as a new relatedness, whose exact nature and the con- 
ditions of environment requisite for whose appearance, 
are still shrouded in mystery, so consciousness emerges 
from life under conditions and with a relatedness which 
are only less obscure than those involved in the appearance 
of the latter. With full consciousness we have reached a 
plane in which the variation of relatedness of the individual 
is capable of enormous increase. At this plane we have 
possibilities of organized actions, organized feelings, and 
organized thought. From these emerged language, the 
step which, above all others, widens the radius of activity 
of mankind, when compared to the animals. Man ceases 
to be an individual, in the strictest sense, on the plane of 
life, for he cannot exist except in relation to his environ- 
ment, and we cannot get a picture of his complete self, his 
personality, without taking into consideration that relation- 
ship. Directly we get to the plane of instinct, this radius 
of relatedness widens enormously. Sex, gregariousness, 
maternity, all bring him into closer, and at the same time, 
wider contact with others of his species, but it is only when 
language emerges, that the widest potentiality becomes 
apparent. Moreover the end is not yet. Man has not 
only acquired language and organized thought, but has 
freed his upper limbs from the duty of posture and loco- 
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motion. This has permitted all the advance in manipu- 
lative dexterity, which has meant so much in the march 
of progress. As knowledge has increased, so have the 
mechanical means of intercommunication, till we have 
arrived at the stage of aeroplanes and wireless telegraphy, 
with a promise for the future of a still greater expansion 
of man's radius of action. This means a greater and 
greater complexity of personality, which is indeed at present 
in a stage of instability due essentially to that rapidly 
increasing differentiation and growth. 
But with this advance, which is making for new 
emergents, to what is the world progressing? Professor 
Alexander has described the goal as Deity, an emergent 
quality which is only so far being foreshadowed by what 
is best in human achievement. But with this future we 
are not concerned, except in so far as we postulate that 
the laws which direct man's progress in the evolutionary 
scheme are directed to a higher and better end, to har- 
mony from chaos, and that we may therefore believe in 
the essential progress of humanity, in spite of apparent 
retrogressions. 
In this scheme of emergent evolution, it is very im- 
portant to notice, how the higher planes involve the lower 
planes. The atom cannot exist without the electrical 
charges whose special relatedness constitute that atom. 
The molecule cannot exist without atoms. Life is im- 
possible without the phenomena belonging to the realms 
of chemistry and physics, and consciousness is inconceiv- 
able without life, and all that it involves. So at whatever 
level we are examining personality, we must remember 
that the particular type of relatedness we are concerned 
with involves all other forms of relatedness below it in 
the evolutionary scale. But it is not a mere summation 
of these, but a definite new entity of its own, different 
from its components and from everything else. This may 
be illustrated by a further reference to instinctive be- 
haviour. All higher types of behaviour and especially 
human behaviour involve and are dependent on instinctive 
reactions, and not on higher "faculties" such as reason, 
memory, will and the like. But, inasmuch as in human 
behaviour these instinctive reactions have assumed a new 
relatedness, such behaviour is no longer pure instinct, but 
something else, which is instinctive but not instinct. Our 
chief concern will be with certain of the higher types of 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EMERGENCE 45 
relatedness, discussed from the mental aspect, according 
to the laws of psychology, and with patterns of behaviour 
of the individual ; and we must avoid the idea that the 
more complex processes are nothing but a combination 
of the less complex, and realize that they are something 
new, with a quality of their own. Another feature, which 
we noticed at the lower levels in the scale, operates also 
at the higher levels, and that is, that the same components 
do not always enter into the same relatedness to produce 
the same emergents. The importance of this is very 
great when we come to consider the patterns of behaviour 
of those who are abnormal, especially of the psycho - 
neurotics, but it also explains the differences between 
individual personalities. Behaviour depends on much the 
same components, whether we consider normal or abnormal 
individuals, but these differ in their relatedness, and so 
the emergents are quite distinct from each other. That 
the emergent behaviour depends on the integrity of nervous 
structure must be insisted upon and may be illustrated by 
the action of an anaesthetic. When the patient is waiting 
for the anæsthetist, he is behaving as a self -conscious 
reflective being. He thinks of himself in relation to the 
environment, and perhaps to the universe ; he reflects on 
life and death, if he is of a philosophical turn of mind, or 
may merely be afraid he will choke. Then as he begins 
to breathe the gas, and his stream of thought becomes 
incoherent, he can no longer reason or reflect. He loses 
his grasp on the fact of his own existence, and loses that 
relatedness which involves reflection and self- conscious- 
ness. For the time being, he has ceased to exist as a 
being enjoying these functions. Next he loses all aware- 
ness, he is no longer a conscious person, all cortical 
function is abolished, as a result of the poisoning of the 
cortical cells. As the anaesthesia becomes deeper, various 
reflexes are lost and finally, if the poisoning is too intense, 
the molecular form involving life itself is disturbed and 
the patient dies. If the anaesthetising process stops short 
of this however, the poison gradually passes off, and with 
the recovery of cortical cells the functions of the patient 
recover " enjoyment" of the requisite relationships in an 
ascending scale, and awareness, self -consciousness, and 
reflection are in turn resumed. 
This brings us to a position, in which it is possible 
to define more clearly, what is meant by personality. 
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Every personality is an emergent, and in virtue of its 
emergence, something quite new and quite distinct. 
Every personality is an emergent from a variety of com- 
ponents. These components group themselves into certain 
divisions which present themselves for study : 
t. The various organs and systems of the body, and 
their respective functions. In view of its integrative and 
controlling function, the nervous system is by far the most 
important. The other organs and systems are chiefly of 
significance in the study of personality, in respect of their 
relation to this system, and in so far as they are modified 
by it and, in turn, modify its structure and function. 
2. The component parts of the nervous system itself, 
especially the engraphic grouping of the neurones, and 
the response of these engrams to stimuli. 
3. The mental correlates of these activations of engrams. 
4. The relatedness of these mental and physical corre- 
lates with the environment, both in so far as the environ- 
ment modifies them, and in so far as they modify the 
environment. 
Further be it noted, that however similar these com- 
ponents may be in different personalities, their relatedness 
always varies, and therefore every personality is individual 
and is quite distinct from every other personality, just as 
every chemical compound is distinct from every other 
chemical compound. As we ascend in the evolutionary 
scale, the more complex is the pattern of unities in relation 
to each other, and the more subtle are the differences of 
the resultant product, even though these unities themselves 
are similar. Indeed, in dealing with human individuals, 
we might well reverse the adage and say, 
" Plus c'est la même chose plus Ça change." 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ORGANIZATION OF BODILY FUNCTION 
As has been said above, the whole of the body of the 
higher vertebrates is under the direction and control of 
the nervous system. Quite apart from the relationship of 
the body to the environment, the heart, lungs, digestive 
system and the rest, take their time from, and owe their 
activity to the action of this system, in such a way that 
the organization of bodily function entirely depends on it. 
Destruction of those nervous centres which are responsible 
for the regulation of these organs, seriously interferes with 
their action and, in the case of the heart and lungs, results 
in death. Similarly all activity of muscles, which are 
responsible for the movements of the body, depend on 
the influence of the nervous system and are entirely sub- 
servient to it. On the other hand, every activity of the 
muscles and internal organs results in the stimulus of 
nerves, whose business it is to convey messages back to 
the nervous centres. In this way there is a continuous 
interchange of messages and influences from nervous 
system to organs and from organs to nervous system, 
by the intervention of the peripheral nerves. At the 
same time, the various organs produce chemical sub- 
stances which circulate in the blood and influence all 
other organs and especially the activity of the nervous 
system. With this question of " temperament " we shall 
deal in the next chapter. For the present, it is proposed 
to discuss the organization of the nervous system itself, 
since upon it depends the organization of the whole body. 
This system consists of a central part concerned with the 
reception and transmission of messages, analogous to the 
exchange in a telephone system, and of a peripheral part 
composed of the nerves which convey messages between 
the nervous system and the end organs. These nerves 
are analogous to the wires of the telephone. The end 
organs are the structures by means of which messages 
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are received from the organs, or in the case of the special 
senses, from the environment, and transmitted to the central 
exchange, and are analogous to the instruments belong- 
ing to the various subscribers to the telephone system. 
That part of the system which is concerned with re- 
ceiving messages from the organs and transmitting them 
to the centres is the afferent part, while that concerned 
with transmission of messages from the centres to the 
organs is the efferent part. 
The nervous system consists of two parts, the central 
nervous system proper and the vegetative system. These 
in turn are each divided into two parts.. The vegetative 
system is made up of an autonomic and sympathetic 
system which are complementary to each other, and which, 
between them, organize all the functions of the body con- 
cerned with nutrition in the widest sense of the term. 
The central system is divided into a spinal part, including 
the brain -stem and the brain proper. Between them these 
organize both physical and psychical activity. The term 
brain -stem is applied to that part of the nervous system 
which, although included in the skull, functions in respect 
of the nerves of the face and head, in the same way as 
the spinal cord functions in relation to the nerves of the 
trunk and limbs. The spinal part is concerned chiefly 
with reflex actions initiated by activations originating in 
end organs, which respond to stimuli actually impinging 
on them. These end organs receive all the stimuli start- 
ing from the organs and tissues themselves, and also those 
of common sensation, including touch, pain, heat and cold 
and the like. Such reflex responses are direct single 
reactions to stimuli of a simple nature, and incapable of 
variation outside their special inherent character. That 
is to say, the reflex response, if not interfered with by 
disease processes, is always the same to a given stimulus. 
Therefore it is entirely predictable, and in itself cannot 
be altered by the individual, except in the case of those 
reflexes which have secondarily become subject to cortical 
control. Given the stimulus, the reaction is certain, but 
when over, that cycle of activity is finished, and only in 
exceptional circumstances leads on to a further cycle of 
activity. Though the response may involve several 
muscles and muscular groups it never results in complex 
behaviour. The brain proper, which is of later evolu- 
tionary development than either the spinal part or the 
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vegetative system, and consists of all structures above the 
brain -stem, is, as Sherrington 1 has demonstrated, built 
up round the distance receptors. That is to say, it is 
concerned with the reception and elaboration of messages, 
coming from those end organs which receive stimuli from 
a distance, more particularly with the organs of sight and 
hearing. The end organs concerned with these senses 
are activated by " waves," which emanate from objects 
not in contact with the sense organs themselves. In 
addition to this, the functions of the brain are concerned 
with all the higher processes of thought, feeling and action. 
The brain, may be divided into two essential parts, the 
subcortical region and the cortex. The subcortical 
part is concerned with the more complex reflexes, and 
perhaps with the `simpler instincts. That is to say, the 
reaction may result in very complicated behaviour, and 
there may be some variation in the possible reaction, but 
this is very strictly limited. Consequently the reactions 
are fairly predictable, and are not in their natural state 
under the control of the individual. Such reactions may 
lead to a series of cycles of behaviour which may be hard 
to discriminate, but when once started, such an action, 
under its natural conditions, and when not controlled by 
the higher functions of the cortex, is carried out to the 
full with constant and invarying intensity. In other words, 
the function of the subcortical region obeys the "all -or- 
none" principle. The cortex, on the other hand, is con- 
cerned with what is usually known as voluntary action, 
and also with the association, correlation and integration 
of all sorts of messages from all sorts of end organs, so 
as to make possible the higher grades of mental process, 
which have to be considered later. 
The essential element of the nervous system is the 
neurone or complete nerve cell. These cells vary in 
their characters in different parts, but all have the same 
structural plan. Together with special supporting cells - 
the neuroglia, which act as scaffolding -they constitute 
the whole mass of the central nervous system. The 
neurone consists of three parts, the receiving part or the 
dendrite, the central part or cell body, which is essential tc 
the life and nourishment of the rest of the neurone, and 
the transmitting part or neuraxon. The dendrite is, as a 
rule, a much branched structure which enables the neurone 
potentially to receive messages from very numerous other 
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neurones. The axon is, as a rule, less freely provided with 
branches ; but in many cases, collaterals exist, whereby 
the messages may be side -tracked along paths other than 
that served by the main axis cylinder. In some cells, 
especially the association cells, within the central nervous 
system, the dendrite and axon are short, but in the case of 
the sensory cells and motor cells, serving the extremities 
of the limbs, these may be very long. The peripheral 
nerves proceed to all parts of the body, and are bundles of 
dendrites of afferent cells, and axons of efferent cells, 
belonging to the central and vegetative nervous systen». 
In addition to the strictly afferent and efferent cells of the 
nervous system, there are very numerous association cells 
within the central nervous system, whose function is to 
establish communications between the cells of different 
groups. Each nerve cell is a unity and is not structurally 
connected with its neighbours, though functionally no one 
neurone is independent of the rest. The point of contact 
is called a synapse, and there is much evidence to show 
that the synapses vary in the readiness with which they 
permit the transmission of activation. There is always 
more delay at this point than anywhere else in the course 
of the nervous path and under certain conditions, which 
are only dimly understood, the delay may be extended or 
diminished. When there is abnormal delay, or where the 
activation cannot pass over the synaptic junction, inhibition 
is said to occur. When there is abnormal hastening of 
transmission of the impulse, facilitation is said to occur. 
Inhibition and facilitation may be due to modifications 
induced in the pattern by the nervous activation itself, or 
more likely by modification of the fluid in which the 
synapses are constantly bathed. The constitution of this 
fluid is constantly altered, in relation to the altering con- 
stitution of the blood, depending on the activity, or other- 
wise, of the various organs of the body, and especially of 
the endocrine glands. It is probable, that when a synapse 
is reached in the course of activation, biochemical changes 
ensue which set up renewed activity in the next neurone, 
These biochemical changes naturally vary with the medium 
in which they take place. The exact nature of the acti- 
vation of a neurone is still in doubt, but it may be observed 
as a change in electrical potential, " a wave of negativity," 
passing through the nerve cell and its processes. Although 
all the nerve cells which are going to function throughout 
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the life of any individual, are present at birth, any given 
nerve cell cannot function unless and until its processes are 
provided with an insulating covering called the medullary 
sheath. Those neurones which are more recent develop- 
ments in the course of evolution acquire this medullary 
sheath late in development. For example, the pyramidal 
motor system, which subserves the highest type of muscular 
movement, does not function for some time after birth in 
the human infant. This is because, the fibres of this 
system have not yet acquired their medullary sheath. Nor 
is the child capable of the highly specialized discriminated 
movements which depend on this system, until such time 
as the medullary sheaths are complete. The various 
neurones, although structurally independent, are not 
functionally independent ; and it is found that even at 
birth, certain groups are so inherently constituted that the 
passage of activation across their synapses is facilitated. 
Such a group has been termed by Semon 2 an engram, 
which corresponds to the " schema " of English writers. 
After birth these engrams are modified and amplified, as 
the infant finds touch with, and is influenced by his 
environment. This occurs in such a way that inhibitions 
may arise within the inherited engram, so as to restrict 
activity in certain directions, or new facilitations may be 
produced so that the engram may join up with others, 
forming groups of great complexity. On the constitution 
of these engrams depends the behaviour of the individual. 
The new grouping may be temporary, or of a more or less 
permanent nature. In the latter case, well established 
habits of behaviour are formed which are difficult to alter 
whatever the circumstances. The new grouping depends 
on what is termed conditioning. 
Reference has already been made to this process at the 
reflex level ; let us take an example at a higher 
level. Certain of the inherited engrams subserve the 
reactions which McDougall a calls "instincts," but which 
we prefer to term emotional dispositions. Let us take 
two, the sexual and the fear -flight dispositions. Suppose 
a small girl has her sex impulse activated for the first time, 
by the assault of a tramp, in circumstances which produce 
extreme fear. The two engrams may be conditioned in 
such a way, that in future, sex can never be aroused with- 
out fear following in its train. If o- represents the sex 
stimulus, and S sex activity, and 0 represents fear stimulus, 
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and F fear -flight activity, normally a results in ( =) S and 
0 =F quite independently of each other but in the case 
cited, on one occasion o and 0 occurred together. There- 
fore (o 0) = (S F) or sex activity may become inhibited 
altogether, and it may so develop that 6= F. This process 
is by no means uncommon, as has been shown by many 
psychopathological studies. 
The simplest form of engram is the reflex, consisting 
of a motor response to a sensory stimulus, as has been 
described in the last chapter. Such reflexes may subserve, 
and their demonstration depend on the phenomenon of 
muscular tone, in virtue of which a muscle is held in 
readiness for action. Thus, if the tendon of the extensor 
muscle of the knee is tapped, the muscle contracts. This 
comprises the familiar knee jerk. The importance of the 
maintenance of tone in this muscle is manifest when we 
consider that it is the main agency in holding the leg 
rigid so that the erect posture can be maintained. On 
the other hand, certain reflexes have a more definite end 
in view, as for example the immediate blinking of the eye 
when a foreign body comes in contact with the sensitive 
cornea. This reflex preserves the delicate surface of the eye 
from damage. Reflexes also exist in relation to the 
vegetative system, as for example the relaxation of the 
sphincter of the bladder when the internal pressure in the 
organ has reached a certain degree. The fact that we have 
acquired a certain amount of control over this reflex is a 
secondary matter and has nothing really to do with the 
reflex, inasmuch as in certain spinal lesions, as a result of 
which all voluntary control is lost, the condition of auto- 
matic bladder is established, in which the bladder empties 
only when pressure has increased to a definite constant 
point, and always responds to this particular stimulus. 
Other reflexes have to do both with the spinal system and 
the vegetative system, and so reach a considerable degree 
of complexity, but it is characteristic of all reflexes that 
they do not enjoy a sufficiently complicated relatedness to 
involve consciousness, which is equivalent to saying in 
neurological terms that they are not represented on the 
cortex of the brain. 
Mention has been made before of the Mass reflex which 
has been suppressed in man and is only demonstrated 
when the lower part of the spinal cord is freed from the 
suppressing effect of the higher centres. This reflex con- 
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sists of a somewhat complicated response to any noxious 
stimulus of the lower limb. The leg is drawn up, away 
from - the stimulus, sweating of the part occurs and the 
bladder is emptied. It will be seen at once, that in this 
case a somewhat complicated engram involving both 
vegetative and central nervous system neurones is con- 
cerned, but the engram, as such, is never active in a normal 
healthy man. It probably represents a low grade form of 
motor activity which was appropriate to some far distant 
ancestor which lived in water, but has become quite in- 
appropriate to the human being. Yet the engram is still 
in being, and is able to manifest itself as a unity under 
very special circumstances. This retention of engraphic 
arrangement, while being totally suppressed because of 
its failure of adaptation to the requirements of the organism, 
is of great importance for psychology, as will be seen later, 
and its demonstration in the field of neurology gives 
important corroboration to what must otherwise have 
been somewhat speculative psychological theories. Con- 
sideration of such a reflex leads us to a principle in the 
working of the nervous system which is of importance, 
namely the principle of control, and the release phenomenon 
resulting from loss of control. This depends on the inter- 
vening neurones, at a, higher level in the evolutionary 
hierarchy, between the afferent and efferent cells. In the 
lowest types of nervous system there is no such inter- 
vention, and consequently the response must always be 
"specific." That is to say, there can be no variation from 
a definite movement following a definite stimulus. Such 
stereotyped response is only possible when the nervous 
system and the requirements of the animal are of extreme 
simplicity. Very soon in the progress of evolution, the 
number of stimuli coming from within and without the 
animal become so numerous that a set of stereotyped 
movements of one muscle group for each stimulus would 
lead to inextricable confusion. Hence, the actions of the 
stimuli must be so arranged that several can be grouped 
together to activate a common motor path, and so pro- 
duce an organized series of movements. In the lower 
animal, such as the earth worm, and primarily in the 
human embryo, the nervous system is segmentally arranged, 
so that a segmental stimulus normally evokes a correspond- 
ing movement in the same segment. Thus, Stimulus 
S induces an activation, which passes by afferent 
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neurone A, through intermediate neurone I, to efferent 
neurone E, and so results in contraction of muscle M. 
But the activation may also spread along path I', into the 
next segment, so that the muscle of this segment M' is 
also activated. Again the activation may pass altogether 
from segment I, to segment I I, so that M, the muscle of 
segment I, remains quiescent, while M', that of segment II, 
contracts. This process may continue right up to the 
head end of the worm, until the neurones in the principal 
ganglion are activated. These have a controlling action 
on all the other neurones, in virtue of their organization 
and response to stimuli spreading from other neurones. 
As a result of this organization, the worm can move as 
a whole, the muscles of certain segments relaxing while 
others contract, so that the whole body wriggles along the 
ground; or, all the longitudinal muscles contract at once, 
so that the body is shot back into its hole on the approach 
of danger. These movements do not involve any con- 
sciousness or awareness, though, as is shown in the second 
chapter, they may be said to have their mental correlates. 
They are complicated patterns of response to certain more 
or less complicated patterns of stimuli. This process of 
side -tracking activation from one segment to the next 
involves the establishment of secondary arcs on the primary 
reflex arcs, such as have already been described, and the 
intervention of more neurones. As these processes be- 
come more complicated a whole series of arcs may thus 
be superimposed one on the other. 
SUPERPOSITION OF ARCS 
A= afferent neurone, I= intermediate neurone 
E= efferent neurone, M= muscle 
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The passage of the activation through these higher series 
of arcs induces certain modifications. Firstly, there is 
delay in the response. This may be due to the neces- 
sity of passing a greater number of synapses, at which, 
as experiment has shown, definite delay does occur. 
Secondly, diminution in intensity of the response, since 
direct reflex response is always more violent than con- 
trolled response. This is true at all levels. For instance, 
the movements of the epileptic fit are movements in 
response to stimuli under conditions in which the control 
of the higher cortical levels is absent. Such movements 
are more violent, though less efficient than voluntary 
movements. The diminution of intensity of the response 
may also be due to passage through a greater number of 
synapses, if we compare the latter to a series of resistance 
boxes in an electric circuit. Thirdly, the intervention of 
higher arcs involves control and , modification of response, 
owing to the possibility of "choice" of more numerous 
motor paths, which can act together or antagonistically or 
in series. This "choice" is not free but inherent in the 
engraphic arrangement of the neurones, either in accordance 
with original inherent dispositions, or as these are modified 
by contact with the environment. This brings us to 
discussion of a principle which illustrates the integrative 
and controlling function of higher levels. This principle 
is known as the law of reciprocal innervation of antagon- 
istic action. We have to note that no action in the 
properly organized healthy individual is merely negative. 
Take for example a simple movement, such as extension 
of the wrist. At rest, the muscles supporting the wrist 
are not in a state of simple relaxation. On the contrary, 
they are maintained in a condition of static contraction, 
termed tone, whereby the . wrist is held slightly extended 
and the fingers semiflexed. If the wrist is to be extended, 
not only are the extensor muscles contracted, but there is a 
definite inhibition of tone or relaxation in the flexors. 
This antagonistic action is well seen in the vegetative 
nervous system, in which the two divisions, the autonomic 
and sympathetic, are in every case reciprocal and antagon- 
istic, the sympathetic accelerating the heart, while the 
autonomic slows it, the sympathetic dilating the bronchial 
tubes, while the autonomic contracts them, and so on. 
It is by this reciprocal action that such complicated 
mechanisms are involved, as that concerned with empty- 
- -..... 
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ing the bladder. In this process while the muscles of the 
wall of the bladder contract, the sphincter, or closing muscle 
at the exit of the organ relaxes. It should be noticed, that 
efficient action is only possible when these antagonistic 
activities are properly integrated and balanced and this in- 
tegration is one of the functions of the higher centres, 
especially of the cortex of the brain. This process of reci- 
procal action is of importance from the psychical aspect at 
higher levels, as will be seen when we come to consider such 
phenomena as the ambivalence of emotion. It is clear, that 
with the development of function of these higher levels, the 
original engrams are considerably changed in structure. 
How engrams which are inherently laid down at birth 
are modified is still obscure, but this modification un- 
questionably involves facilitation and inhibition. The 
innervation of vegetative neurones, and their resultant 
changes in the organs of the body, have some influence 
in inducing these phenomena. If these neurones are 
activated in certain ways, tension of certain of the 
involuntary muscles is induced. This, along with certain 
states of secretion in the glands and postural tone in 
voluntary muscles, may be said to make up a pattern of 
activation. Such patterns of action, with the accompany- 
ing efferent activities, vary enormously in accordance with 
the constituents involved, but all have a mental correlate. 
As part of this mental correlate there may be recognized 
degrees of feeling, or " affect." In the case of certain 
patterns of activation this feeling is one of ease or 
"pleasure," while in the case of others the feeling is of 
distress or "unpleasure ". These affects, depending as 
they do on vegetative activity, determine to a large 
extent the permanence or impermanence of the en- 
graphic arrangement of the neurones. Pleasure tends 
to facilitate their establishment, unpleasure tends to 
inhibit them. This process may be brought about 
indirectly by the intervention of modifications in the 
endocrine secretion. Further, if in the organization of 
the more complex engrams the addition of a given 
engram involves pleasure, it will tend to be amalgamated 
with the original, while if it tends to induce unpleasure 
it will tend to be divorced from the original. To under- 
stand pleasant or unpleasant affect, the quality of sensa- 
tion, which also has an influence on the organization 
of engrams, must be considered. Sensations may be 
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pleasant or unpleasant, and this quality depends on their 
intensity, the dividing line between the two varying with 
the sensation. For example, sweetness is pleasant up to 
a certain point, but after a certain intensity has been 
reached it becomes unpleasant. Similarly, with various 
other sensations, many of which are pleasant up to a 
very considerable degree of intensity. In the case of 
pain, on the other hand, the vast majority of the range 
of this sensation is unpleasant. However, very slight 
degrees of pain, such as that induced by the friction of 
the scalp with a hard brush, are pleasant. The distinction 
between pleasure affect and pleasurable sensation is 
sometimes made, and merits discussion. The former is 
usually described as dependent on the condition of 
relaxation, consequent on successful conation, while un- 
pleasure is dependent on the condition of tension, or 
thwarted conation. This especially applies to instinctive 
reaction. Thus, the cat who has caught, killed and eaten 
a sufficiency of mice, sinks into a state of relaxation and 
may presumably be said to experience pleasure, while 
the hungry cat, who is prowling round in a vain search 
for mice, is in a state of muscular tension, and may be 
said to experience unpleasure. Such states of pleasure 
and unpleasure would seem therefore to depend on 
relaxation and tension of both striped and unstriped 
muscle, but it must be remembered, that when a muscle 
is in a state of increased tonus or tension a message as 
to its state of tonus is conveyed to the central nervous 
system, and is presented to it in the form of a sensation. 
In the case of pleasure the sensation will be of minimal 
intensity, and in the case of unpleasure of increasing 
intensity. This factor of intensity of sensation would 
therefore seem to be the fundamental factor, in determin- 
ing whether affect is pleasurable or unpleasurable. Most 
examples of pleasure, even in its purest form, are already 
somewhat complex. For example, the performance of the 
sexual act is often quoted as affording pleasure in its most 
crude form. But even in this, there are three distinct forms 
of pleasure; the relaxation consequent on successful 
conation, i.e. pleasurable sensation derived from the entero- 
ceptors, the sense organs concerned with reception of 
stimuli from the body itself; a definite pleasurable sensa- 
tion in the ordinary sense of the term, i.e. sensation derived 
from the proprioceptors, the sense organs concerned with 
....,- -..- 
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reception of stimuli from the environment in contact with 
the body ; also, as will be pointed out later, pleasurable 
prospective imagination is involved, which is a function 
of much higher levels than those with which we are con- 
cerned at present. It must be remembered also that an 
engram may be altered, not only by actions which directly 
induce pleasure or unpleasure, but by actions which may 
secondarily induce these states. This brings us to a 
condition of more complex relatedness which may involve 
discrimination and therefore conscious, as opposed to un- 
conscious activity. This may best be illustrated by a 
somewhat indirect analogy in behaviour. Suppose primi- 
tive man having reached the stage of eating cooked meat, 
accidentally discovers that the addition of certain white 
crystals which we know as salt is pleasurable, this pleasure 
is induced by the pleasant sensory response to a moderate 
intensity of saltiness, and also by certain changes in the 
muscles and glands of his digestive system, through the 
response of vegetative neurones to the chemical stimulus 
of salt, with their resultant sensory impressions. Salt is 
now sought for and the new primary engram induced by 
the stimulus of salt and the secondary engrams necessary 
to obtain salt are added to the original engram on which 
the eating of meat depended. But suppose he comes upon 
another white powder, say Tartar Emetic, and thinking it 
is salt tries it with his meat ; the vomiting which results 
induces an affect of decided unpleasure. This unpleasure is 
again due to a different pattern of muscular and glandular 
activity responding to the chemical stimulus of the emetic. 
The engram becomes much more complicated, achieves a 
new relatedness, whereby discrimination is possible, and 
that part which involves Tartar Emetic as a stimulus is 
inhibited, so that he carefully avoids again taking Tartar 
Emetic with his meat. This complication of engram and 
the power of discrimination depends on an increase in the 
detail of the stimulus pattern, whereby certain visual and 
gustatory factors present themselves as different, and split 
themselves into two patterns, the stimulus pattern of salt 
being followed by facilitation of the engram subserving 
ingestion, while the stimulus pattern of Tartar Emetic is 
followed by inhibition of that engram. 
These more complicated engrams then, from the neuro- 
logical standpoint, involve a series of arcs superimposed 
one on the other, each "higher" arc delaying, diminishing 
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the intensity of, and organizing and correlating the activity 
of the lower arcs. The evolution of the nervous system 
takes place, along the lines of a series of additions of 
higher arcs, at the front, or cephalic end of the nervous 
system. These higher superimposed arcs at the cephalic 
end constitute the "brain" at the various stages of develop- 
ment, though as has been said above, the term brain proper 
cannot be applied, till there develops some arcs higher 
than the brain -stem, whose function is essentially of the 
same class as that of the spinal cord. In the animal 
kingdom this represents the advance attained by the 
fishes, in which the appearance of a forebrain, corre- 
sponding to the basal ganglia, and the rudiments of a 
cortex is manifest. In the mammals we find the "neo- 
pallium " or cerebral mantle appearing. In the anthropoid 
apes, this has assumed a considerable degree of complexity 
and has so developed that the cortex has bent back and 
covers the whole of the rest of the brain. In man, not 
only is the size and complexity of the cortex increased, 
but two extra layers of cells are added. This means that 
the number of neurones, and consequently the potentiality 
for increased variation and complexity of action, is en- 
hanced. It is calculated that in man there are nearly 
ten thousand millions of neurones, and if this figure is 
considered from the standpoint of potentially different 
combinations in engrams, the powers of adaptation in 
man's behaviour is explicable. It must be remembered 
that the inclusion of any given neurone in one engram 
does not preclude the inclusion in any number of others. 
Take as analogy a complex network of railways all over 
England. Any given stretch of line, say in Leicestershire, 
may be traversed by trains going from London to Carlisle, 
or from Cromer to Birmingham, or from Manchester to 
Bedford, or from Lincoln to Bristol, and so on, but yet 
there are perfectly definite routes laid down from London 
to. Carlisle, etc. Such routes correspond to the engrams 
and the individual stretches of line to neurones. 
A brief survey of the arrangement of arcs subserving 
the functions of motion, sensation and feeling will illustrate 
the sort of way in which the system functions. 
In the case of motility, the primary path is the peripheral 
arc which is concerned with the maintenance of muscular 
tone in man, and is represented in the evolutionary scale 
by the segmental reflex of the earth -worm. If this reflex 
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is interfered with, at any segmental level on the efferent 
side, the corresponding muscles lose their tone completely. 
If the afferent side is affected, then sensation in a corre- 
sponding area is lost, and the muscles partially lose their 
tone. This reflex is doubtless capable of integration up 
to a certain complexity, without the superposition of 
definite arcs, in some such manner as is represented by 
the mass reflex in man, already referred to. The next 
recognizable superimposed structure is the spinal arc, 
which reaches the brain -stem at the level of the upper 
part of the medulla, and establishes connexion with the 
cerebellum, a special structure which is chiefly associated 
with the functions of posture and balance. This spinal 
arc is, in man, associated with the maintenance of tone 
in the flexor muscles, which are concerned with the with- 
drawal of a limb from danger. In lower animals, however, 
this arc is concerned with the tone in the extensor muscles, 
whose function is to maintain the body raised from the 
ground, against the action of gravity. In the evolutionary 
scale, the establishment of this arc is probably related to 
the development of specialized limbs. The third arc is 
termed the prespinal arc, and establishes connexions at 
the level of the basal ganglia. In man this arc is con- 
cerned with posture and tone in the extensor muscles of 
the lower limbs, and the flexor muscles of the upper limb. 
Acting alone it allows certain movements of the limb as 
a whole, but the finer discriminated movements are im- 
possible. In animals the reflex is concerned with the 
tone of the extensor muscles in all four limbs, and in the 
maintenance of posture against gravity, having an action 
similar to, but more efficient than that of the spinal arc. 
The reason of the difference between man and animals of 
function of this arc in respect of the arms is that the 
ancestors of man, in the direct line, had early depended 
on their fore - limbs for grasping and embracing move- 
ments. This development was in accordance with their 
arboreal habit, in contradistinction to the terrestrial habit 
of other animals, which requires that all four limbs should 
be used for locomotion. In the evolutionary scale this 
arc was efficient for those animals who only required that 
their limbs should move as a whole, as for instance the 
fin of a fish. The fourth and last definitely motor arc 
establishes connexions at the level of the cortex, in that 
part which is termed the Rolandic or motor area. This 
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arc allows for fine discriminated movements, varying from 
the ordinary muscular movements involved in walking, to 
the fine discriminated "touch" of the expert pianist or 
violinist. The disturbance of any of the higher arcs 
releases the function of those lower in the scale, and it 
is largely as a result of the study of pathological cases that 
we have attained our knowledge of those lower arcs. 
On the sensory side, in dealing with the proprioceptive 
system, we may follow up the same series of arcs and gain 
further knowledge by a study of sensory disturbances : 
(t) the peripheral arc, in which the cell bodies are situated 
in the posterior ganglia, just outside the spinal cord, and 
whose destruction involves complete loss of sensation : 
(2) the spinal arc, in which the cell bodies are found in 
the lower part of the brain -stem : (3) the prespinal arc, 
with cell bodies in the basal ganglia, and (4) the cortical 
arc, with cell bodies in the " sensory " cortex, situated just 
behind the motor cortex. It is interesting that the func- 
tions of the last two arcs involve a certain degree of 
awareness or consciousness, and that the basal ganglia 
and prespinal arc involve integration with impulses, 
travelling through the vegetative system from the entero- 
ceptors. The series of arcs involved in this latter system 
is somewhat different; for the first arc involves cell bodies 
collected in ganglia, out among the viscera. The next arc 
has its cell bodies in the ganglia which form a chain on 
either side of the spinal column, and after a probable 
relay in the brain -stem, the final definite arc belonging 
to this system has its cell stations in the basal ganglia. 
Here then, these various types of sensation are correlated, 
and every sensation is accompanied with a greater or less 
degree of pleasure or unpleasure, as has been described 
above. Head 4 has shown that those sensations, whose 
perception involves much affect but little discrimination, 
are represented chiefly at the level of the basal ganglia. 
Thus pain is not seriously affected by the severance of 
connexions with the sensory cortex so long as the arc 
involving the optic thalamus is intact. On the other 
hand, those sensations whose perception depends chiefly 
on discrimination require representation on the cortex ; 
and if this is interrupted, they are almost entirely lost. 
A good example of such a sensation is the sense of 
posture, for the position of a limb in space does not in- 
volve any particular feeling, apart from pressures and 
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tension on painful spots, which are concerned with another 
sensation altogether. 
It has been said that the basal ganglia represent the 
final cell station of the vegetative system. This is in a 
sense true, but none the less, the impulses which travel 
from the enteroceptors by this route are integrated with 
others to activate engrams whose mental correlates are 
emotions and sentiments, and these involve cortical repre- 
sentation. Apart from this however, the cortex does seem 
to have a controlling influence on the affective activities. 
Wilson 6 has shown that in lesions which interrupt cortico- 
thamalic connexions, the patient may have uncontrollable 
fits of involuntary laughing and crying, quite out of pro- 
portion to the stimulus, and unaccompanied by a corre- 
sponding conscious feeling of joy or grief. This illustrates 
an important principle, that activity at the level of the 
basal ganglia tends to be of the "all -or- none" variety; 
that is to say, if action of any sort results, it will be 
carried out with the maximum intensity of which the 
animal is capable. The final integration of activity of 
all varieties depends on the presence of the great associa- 
tion areas, which are the special feature in the development 
of man's brain, as compared with those of animals. The 
most important of these are the frontal lobes, and it is in 
these that the difference may, be specially noted between 
the highly civilized man and the primitive savage. Little 
is known as to their exact function, but Bianchi 6 has per- 
formed some interesting and important experiments with 
monkeys. His findings in respect of the emotions may 
be taken as illustrative of the way in which these higher 
structures function. He found that those monkeys who 
were deprived of their frontal lobes retained their 
appetites, such as hunger, sex and panic fear, but that 
all the higher emotions and sentiments were lost. This was 
specially the case with all those emotional reactions, involv- 
ing sociability and interaction with others of their kind. 
We must conclude, therefore, that on the highest level 
of superimposed arcs depend all the complicated reactions 
of man, which are the special domain of psychology. It 
will be our duty to study these reactions, but we shall do 
so from the mental aspect, always assuming each reaction 
to have a physical correlate, depending on an engram, 
whose exact delimination cannot be determined, but whose 
nature and structure can be inferred from its analogy with 
those known to subserve activities at lower levels. 
CHAPTER V 
THE TEMPERAMENTAL FACTOR IN 
PERSONALITY 
To the older writers, the various types of personality were 
distinguished according to the dominant "humour" of the 
body, and mankind was divided into four groups, corre- 
sponding to the four humours recognized by them. The 
sanguine person, in whom the blood was the dominant 
humour, was supposed to be light, superficial and accom- 
modating. The melancholic, in whom black bile, whatever 
that was, dominated, represented the deep, self -involved, 
slow moving person -the strong silent man. The choleric 
person, with yellow bile dominant, was passionate, strong, 
and possessed of an active imagination ; while the phleg- 
matic type, dominated by the colourless thick phlegm was 
dull, cold and slow -the " bromide " of a recent phraseology. 
Such a division involved no little psychological insight 
into the different sorts of men, but it was impossible to 
demonstrate any facts to support the inference that these 
types had anything to do with the special variations in 
the liquid constituents of the body. The study of tem- 
perament thereupon came to be rather neglected ; and, 
although it was universally recognized that bodily states 
influenced mental attitudes, the how and the why remained 
unanswered. It is a matter of common observation, that 
a grain of calomel may change a man from a hopeless 
pessimist into an unbridled optimist, but this is due to 
the clearance of the system from toxins which are directly 
influencing neural processes. It is probable, however, 
that there is more than this removal of toxins, for the 
immediate relief of mental strain which is sometimes 
experienced on movement of the bowels cannot be the 
result of depleting the circulation of toxins, a process 
which must involve more time. Whether we have any 
right to postulate any definite reflex action is doubtful, 
and this result may simply be due to suggestion. So, 
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with the dysfunctioning of other organs, the toxins thus 
produced or retained within the body interfere with the 
general ceenesthesia or sense of well -being. This term 
ccenesthesia is used to describe a complicated sensory 
pattern from the enteroceptors, which considerably modifies 
the affective reaction to other stimuli. In the majority of 
cases, the influences of these poisons are temporary and 
pass away with their removal, but if the dysfunction con- 
tinues, then there may be a permanent alteration in the 
personality. Such are familiar in the pessimistic, irritable 
chronic dyspeptic, the sufferer from chronic renal disease 
with his inconsequence, moodiness and depression, and 
so on. Such cases are directly comparable to those 
influenced by poisons introduced from without. Alcohol, 
morphine, cocaine and other drugs produce a transitory 
change in the reaction to the environment, if taken inter- 
mittently, but the whole character of the individual is 
altered if the ingestion becomes constant, and the subject 
is permanently under the influence of the poison. Such 
temperamental factors, then, belong to the realm of path- 
ology and toxicology, and cannot be usefully discussed 
here. However, a new interest has been 
duced into the study of temperament by the increased 
knowledge of the action of the endocrine organs or duct- 
less glands, which elaborate substances termed internal 
secretion or hormones. These organs are constantly 
present, and constantly pour their products into the blood 
stream, so as to affect neural function and consequently 
the manifestations of behaviour. Therefore, although a 
certain amount of excursion into the province of pathology 
is necessary to elucidate their action, it seems legitimate 
to study their influence on personality in greater detail. 
This is specially the case inasmuch as they influence 
growth, and as will be seen in later chapters, the departure 
of personality from the normal largely depends on abnor- 
malities of growth, whether bodily or mental. 
It is one of the fundamental characters of living proto- 
plasm that it elaborates complex chemical compounds 
with a more or less specific action. On such substances 
depend the tropisms of unicellular organisms, the function 
of approach to food particles, and the retreat from noxious 
substances. Similarly, nervous action and transmission 
depend on biochemical substances elaborated within the 
cell, and at the synapses, which act locally at the point of 
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liberation. The endocrine organs are specialized in this 
function and elaborate various substances, the so- called 
hormones, with definite specific actions, which act at a 
distance and influence the whole body. All these organs 
are well supplied with blood vessels and their products 
are absorbed into, and circulated in the blood stream, so 
that they are conveyed to all parts of the organism. It is 
arguable that all the organs of the body elaborate hormones, 
and the enthusiastic specialists in the subject claim that 
they can differentiate the functions of the hormones derived 
from the intestines, liver and so on. No doubt, when more 
fully understood, these hormones will be found to influence 
personality in definite specific ways, and their exact con- 
tribution to temperament will be elucidated. At present, 
however, their known action is purely physiological, and 
their psychological influence is undetermined or completely 
obscure. No purpose is to be gained, therefore, by dis- 
cussing them, and it will be found more profitable to confine 
our attention to those whose action has been determined, 
both in the physiological and psychological fields, or in 
whose case the physiological effect is so far reaching that 
secondary psychical effects ensue. 
It is one of the misfortunes of modern psychology, 
that the study of the action of the endocrine organs is 
one of such great complexity and difficulty. Everyone 
is agreed that these structures are of great importance in 
the regulation of both the bodily and mental activity of 
the individual, but, in spite of a very large literature which 
has grown up, exact knowledge in this sphere is still very 
restricted. Certain works which have been published in 
late years purport to give a clear picture of the mental and 
bodily alteration dependent on the excess or diminution 
of the secretory activity of the various glands ; but many 
of the statements, especially in relation to mental factors, 
are of the nature of a priori probabilities, rather than of 
empirically proved facts and are consequently of very 
limited value. The difficulties which beset the path of 
investigators in this field are largely due to the fact that 
the system of endocrines work as a whole, so that, if one 
drops 'out, certain phenomena are met with which may be 
the effects of deficiency of the given secretion, or of the 
compensatory over -activity of others. Hence the exact 
function of one gland, or of a pair of glands, is hard to 
determine. Moreover, two given glands may act in co- 
E 
66 PERSONALITY 
operation in one respect, but in opposition in another. 
For example, the thyroid and the pituitary are both kata- 
bolic in function, that is, they convert potential energy 
into actual energy, and sugar from the blood will be 
mobilized for immediate use as fuel, if they are stimulated 
to activity. But the mental effects produced by over - 
activity of the thyroid are quite different from those 
consequent upon hyperpituitarism. In the former, the 
energy is dissipated in fretful irritable emotionalism, while 
in the latter, it may be used to foster a pushful ambitious 
efficiency. As Leonard Williams 1 has shown, the typical 
energetic American has the features of a very mild case 
of Acromegaly, a disease depending on the over -activity 
of the pituitary. For the purposes of this study, it may 
be best to try to indicate how the different glands influence 
the personality at various stages of growth. 
Before and immediately after birth, metabolism and 
growth are said to be governed by the activity of the 
thymus gland, situated in the upper part of the chest, 
which normally ceases to function about the period of 
puberty, though some observers consider that thymic tissue 
persists to an advanced age. In man, this gland is de- 
veloped from the third visceral pouch, an outgrowth from 
the alimentary tract, occurring at the time when the foetus 
is passing through what may be described as the fish 
stage, since these outgrowths persist; in the fish as the 
respiratory organs or gills. In man this pouch later takes 
on a lymphoid structure. The old idea, that this gland 
underwent involution about the second year of life, is not 
borne out by later investigation, and recent research shows 
that the activity and size of this organ has a certain direct 
relationship with that of the thyroid, so that it tends to 
undergo involution after thyroidectomy, and to increase 
in size in hyperthyroidic states. On the other hand, there 
is much evidence to show that the increase in growth and 
function of the reproductive organs hastens involution of 
the thymus, and any delay in development of the former 
leads to a persistence of the latter. Or, it may be that 
the reverse causal sequence is the true explanation, and 
one function of the thymus may be to act as a break on 
the development of the gonads. As may be gathered, 
exact knowledge of the function of this gland is not yet 
established, but deficiency of thymic secretion, due to 
extirpation in young mammals, causes a weakness of 
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muscles, deficient calcifications of bones and general meta- 
bolic upset ; that is to say, an interference with normal 
muscle and bone formation, which is the chief function 
of growth in the young child. On the other hand, over- 
growth of the thymus frequently leads to sudden death 
from failure of the respiratory function, which may be the 
consequence of a resultant abnormal sensitivity to foreign 
proteins, or drugs. This is the condition known as status 
lymphaticus, which has been held to be responsible for 
many fatalities in children under anwsthetics. 
The pineal body, a small structure embedded in the 
brain tissue, seems to have a similar inverse relationship 
to the sexual glands, as does the thymus, and destruction 
of the former by tumour leads to precocious sexual and 
mental development. It may therefore, also be responsible 
for the postponement of sexual function till puberty. It 
is to be noticed that only in the pineal type of sexual 
precocity does mental precocity occur as an accompanying 
phenomenon, and in view of this, it may be that its 
retarding influence extends to the more highly developed 
cortical cells, whose function is only required when the 
individual reaches a certain age. Little is known, however, 
as to the actual function_ of this gland. 
Skeletal growth is considerably modified by the function 
of the pituitary gland, situated at the base of the skull. 
This consists of an anterior and intermediate portion, 
derived from an ectodermal invagination during early 
foetal life, and a neuroglial posterior portion, derived from 
an outgrowth from the thalamencephalon, a part of the 
developing brain. Extracts from the posterior part, which 
contain a substance called pituitrin, exercise a marked 
tonic effect on plain muscle, especially in the circulatory 
system, and an increase in the activity of certain glands 
This, however, is a pharmacological action of transitory 
duration, and has no influence on the make -up of the 
personality. The presence of the anterior lobe seems to 
be essential to life, and diminution of its function delays 
growth of the skeleton and arrests sexual development. 
Over- function of the anterior lobe promotes tissue growth, 
especially in the skeleton, skin and subcutaneous tissue, 
and excites the development of secondary sexual char- 
acters. The hormone of the pituitary, therefore, promotes 
a continuance of growth and facilitates sexual develop- 
ment when the time comes forr its full function. The 
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disease acromegaly, which is characterized by marked 
overgrowth of the skeleton, is generally regarded as being 
due to hyperfunction of the anterior lobe. Insufficiency 
of the posterior lobe causes a slowing of metabolic pro- 
cesses. There is a high sugar tolerance, with the result 
that the storing up of carbohydrate induces adiposity. 
At the same time, the pulse and respiration rates are 
lower, and the blood pressure is diminished. These 
changes are specially marked in the hibernation of animals, 
and this phenomenon seems to depend on changes in the 
pituitary body, with diminished function of the posterior 
part. Insufficiency of pituitary substance, as a whole, 
causes the disease process associated with the name of 
Fröhlich. This is characterized by delay in skeletal 
development, great deposit of fat and persistent infan- 
tilism, i.e., the failure of development of primary and 
secondary sexual features. This is also accompanied by 
a childish mentality with a marked lack of initiative. 
The records of the psychic effects of abnormalities of 
the pituitary gland are somewhat conflicting, and refer 
chiefly to the changes consequent on increased function 
of the anterior lobe. It would seem that mild increase 
in this is compatible with a good intellect, with an im- 
aginative force which can be controlled and brought to 
the service of the subject's active brain ; he is often 
musical, in short a practical visionary. However, even 
where skeletal development shows an overaction of the 
anterior lobe there may be a decided loss of control, and 
the patient is found to develop delinquent tendencies, such 
as lying and stealing. This may be due to the fact that 
there is a primary overgrowth of the gland, resulting in 
skeletal changes, followed by a secondary degeneration, 
resulting from the fact that the sella tursica -the depres- 
sion in the skull, which contains the gland -is too small 
for the growing structure, and therefore induces a pressure 
fibrosis which destroys the active gland substance. There 
is a good deal of evidence to show that the anterior lobe 
is associated with masculinity and that the flat -chested, big - 
boned female, such as the French caricaturists used to 
portray as the typical English Miss, suffers from a too active 
anterior pituitary lobe. Such people are usually said to be 
unemotional, but this apparent want of emotion is due to 
an efficient control over emotional expression and im- 
pulsive actions. The fact that in many pituitary tumours 
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there is often marked dullness and sleepiness, may depend 
on increased cranial pressure rather than on changes in 
the gland itself. Moreover, this sleepiness may be associ- 
ated, to a certain extent, with the aggressiveness charac- 
teristic of normal hyperfunction of the gland. An example 
of this is afforded by the famous fat boy, who, when not 
asleep, strove to thrust himself into the lime -light by 
"making your flesh creep." It would seem therefore that 
cortical function, at its highest level, is dependent, at least 
to some extent, on a properly functioning pituitary gland. 
The thyroid gland, situated in the neck, has a marked 
influence on metabolism all through life, and its function 
is perhaps better understood than that of the other 
endocrine glands, because its extract, given by the mouth, 
can be proved to have a definite metabolic effect, and 
because the diseases cretinism and myxcedema, on the 
one hand, are known with certainty to be due to deficiency 
of the thyroid secretion ; while Graves' disease, on the 
other hand, is due to excess of this substance. Congenital 
absence of thyroid function gives rise to the type of mal- 
development, called cretinism, either of the myxoede- 
matous or nervous type. In both types of this disease 
there is a marked inhibition of mental development, deaf - 
mutism being common.. In the former type, the most 
characteristic features are the thick dry skin, stunted 
growth, and infantile characteristics ; in the latter type 
there may also be certain physical neurological symptoms, 
such as spasticity, variations in posture, grimaces and 
other involuntary movements. As a whole the cretin 
is slowed down in growth, in mind and in bodily function, 
and if untreated, remains a dwarf and an idiot. Myxcedema 
is a disease due to deficient thyroid function, which super- 
venes in adult life. It is characterized by gradual swelling 
of the skin, which becomes dry and rough, sensitivity to 
cold, and an increasing languor and mental dullness. 
The mental changes may go on to hallucinations and 
melancholia, and the administration of thyroid will often 
benefit these latter conditions, even though they are not 
associated with definite physical signs of myxcedema. Here 
again there is a general slowing down of both bodily and 
mental function, and both these diseases may be improved, 
or even cured, by administration of thyroid substance. 
Graves' disease, in which excessive function of the thyroid gland occurs, is characterized by an increase in 
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the katabolic changes of the body, but the work done, as 
the result of this increased fuel destruction, all goes to 
waste for lack of organization. The signs associated with 
this disease are rapidity of heart action, acceleration of 
the respiration, excessive sweating, inco -ordinated function 
of the digestive system leading to nausea, vomiting and 
diarrhoea. The patient reacts excessively to all stimuli, 
and mentally and physically is incapable of co- ordinated 
effort. The result is excessive emotionalism, ready fatigue, 
and incapacity for sustained effort. This morbid syndrome 
is often capable of relief, or cure by extirpation of part of 
the enlarged gland. The relationship of thyroid activity 
to sexual life is still imperfectly understood, but it is 
certain that in the absence of thyroid secretion, sexual 
maturity is impossible, for untreated cretins remain in- 
fantile or sexually immature, and, in women at any rate, 
periods of sexual activity, puberty, pregnancy and men- 
struation, tend to increase thyroid activity. It is supposed, 
that the ovaries exert an inhibitory action on thyroid 
activity, and hyperthyroidism is often met with after 
extirpation of the former ; but, although Graves' disease 
does sometimes develop after the menopause, it is 
more common to find a deficiency of thyroid function at 
this time, the functions of both glands diminishing at this 
period of life. On the mental side, excessive emotional 
activity, especially if repressed, will result in an over - 
action of the sympathetic nervous system, and amongst 
other things produce hyperthyroidism. This pertains 
especially to the emotions of fear and anxiety, the re- 
actions which are essentially concerned with increased 
sympathetic activity. In such cases a vicious circle is 
set up, for the increased thyroid secretion sensitizes and 
facilitates sympathetic reaction, so that the patient responds 
particularly readily to these emotions. The occurrence of 
moderate degrees of hyperthyroidism was remarkably 
common during the war, and represented the reaction of 
the thyroid system to fear and anxiety. We see then, 
that the thyroid secretion is necessary for the development 
and maintenance of nutritive, sexual, and mental function. 
The parathyroids, separate glands in close anatomical 
association with the thyroid, have to do with the control 
of intestinal toxins, since their removal upsets the meta- 
bolic balance and allows the system to succumb to poisons. 
They are also associated with calcium metabolism and are 
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essential to life. The existence of poisons circulating in 
the blood interferes materially with both bodily and 
mental function, and neither can be adequately maintained, 
unless the lime salts are in proper proportion. Apart from 
these factors however, the exact functions of these glands 
are so little known that they can hardly concern us here, 
in a study of Personality. 
The adrenal bodies, situated in close contact with the 
kidneys, may next engage our attention. These consist 
of two parts, termed the cortex and the medulla. The 
former is mesoblastic in origin, while the latter consists of 
chromophil substance, a primitive embryological tissue, 
derived from the neural ectoderm, and concerned with the 
development of the sympathetic ganglia, as well as certain 
endocrine organs. By the study of Addison's disease, we 
may learn the effect of destruction of the adrenal glands. 
The symptoms of this morbid condition are extreme 
muscular weakness, low blood pressure, nausea and 
vomiting, along with increased pigmentation of the skin. 
In these cases the asthenia becomes so extreme that 
death eventually intervenes. This syndrome is found 
associated with disease of the adrenal bodies, usually 
tubercular in origin. Little is known with certainty as to 
the effects of increased activity of the glands, but high 
blood pressure and chronic interstitial nephritis, are often 
found to be accompanied by overgrowth of the adrenals. 
Whether the latter has any causal relationship, with the 
former, is not known. Recent experiments on animals, 
involving extirpation of the glands, give conflicting results, 
but it would seem that the cortex is the part which is 
essential to life. In transplantation experiments, most 
observers agree that the cortex survives, but that the 
medulla disappears. The latter contains an important sub- 
stance known as adrenalin, whose physiological action 
closely resembles, if it is not identical with, that of the 
sympathetic nervous system, and is in most cases antagon- 
istic to autonomic action. The chief features of its 
activity are constriction of the blood vessels with, àccelera- 
tion of the heart, relaxation of the bronchioles, a liberation 
of sugar, and inhibition of vegetative or anabolic functions. 
All these effects prepare the animal for action, whether 
offensive or defensive, attack or flight, and there is no 
question, that the secretion of the adrenal medulla is 
increased in association with the arousing of the sthenic 
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emotions, such as fear (panic) and anger. There is a 
certain amount of evidence to support the theory that this 
adrenalin is poured into the circulating blood, as the result 
of the reception of stimuli which arouse these emotional 
reactions, and reinforces and prolongs the nervous activity 
induced. For example, an asthmatic, in the course of an 
attack characterized, as all asthma is, by spasm of the 
bronchioles, was driving a motor car down a steep hill, 
when he suddenly found his brakes would not work. He 
experienced considerable fear, but having escaped destruc- 
tion at the bottom of the hill, found that his asthma had 
disappeared. He usually experienced relief from an attack, 
by the administration of a dose of adrenalin, and there 
seems little doubt that the attack under discussion was 
cut short by a physiological dose of adrenalin, induced by 
the cognition of danger. The relationship of the medulla 
of the adrenal to the maintenance of blood pressure under 
ordinary circumstances is much more doubtful, and 
requires further investigation before a categorical answer 
can be given. On the whole, we may conclude that 
the action of adrenalin, like pituitrin, is pharmacological 
rather than that of a true internal secretion. The function 
of the cortex of these glands is still more doubtful, and 
various theories are held. It is tolerably certain that there 
is an intimate connexion between the sex characters and 
the adrenal cortex. Hypertrophy of this tissue is some- 
times associated with precocious sexual development, and 
with the appearance of male characters in the female. 
Guthrie' described two types of cases of adrenal tumour 
with overgrowth of the cortex of the gland : (I) an obese 
type met with in both sexes with increased and precocious 
growth of pubic hair, but otherwise with little sexual 
precocity : and (2) the infant Hercules type, occurring only 
in males, who show true sexual precocity, but often mental 
defect. There is a good deal of evidence to support the 
theory that the adrenal cortex increases in size during 
periods of sexual activity and during pregnancy. Moreover, 
in structure this tissue closely resembles the interstitial 
cells of testis, ovary and corpus luteum. Feeding experi- 
ments in young animals point to the fact that the cortex 
exercises a stimulus to growth of the testis. The develop- 
ment of active suprarenal glands, within normal limits, 
will produce an aggressive virile type, similar to that 
depending on a good pituitary development, but over- i 
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action of these glands would seem to be associated with a 
dominance of fear and the occurrence of phobias, anxieties 
and the like. Under -development of the gland leads to 
weakness, submissiveness and feebleness of character. The 
adrenals maintain bodily and mental function in certain re- 
spects, and promote sexual development at the proper time. 
The internal secretion of the reproductive organs are of 
very great importance in relation to personality. Removal 
of the testes in early life, or failure of development, leads 
to an arrest of the growth of the accessory sexual glands, 
viz., the prostate and the glands of Cowper ; but more 
important than this, they lead to a failure in development 
of the secondary sexual characters, i.e., those physical and 
perhaps mental characteristics, which distinguish the man 
from the boy and the woman. Experiments on roosters 
have led Pezard 3 to conclude that these secondary sexual 
characters are maintained by a continual secretion from 
the interstitial cells of the testes, and that failure of the 
latter at any stage of development results in disappear- 
ance of these characters. These interstitial cells are 
distinct from the germ cells, are directly concerned with re- 
production, and function as an endocrine organ. He also 
concludes that more internal secretion than is necessary 
is produced by the testicle to maintain these secondary 
sexual characters, since a small portion only of the testicle 
need be retained, to avoid their regression. Further, if 
secondary sexual characters are produced or maintained 
at all, they are maintained as a whole, and are not met 
with singly, or partially developed. Absence of testicular 
tissue leads to a persistence of infantile characteristics, 
and in no case to the development of female characters. 
Thus, in man, no hair develops on the face or on other 
parts of the body, the normal changes in the thorax and 
larynx do not occur, so that the voice remains high pitched, 
and the shape of the body remains that of the boy. It 
would seem, however, that the testicular internal secretion 
controls and inhibits the growth of bone and muscle in 
the body, so that early castration leads to gigantism. 
This is borne out by the observation that the Herculean 
man is often of low sexual potency. The presence of 
actively functioning testes seems also to control the ac- 
cumulation of fat, which may account for the fact that 
eunuchs are almost invariably obese, and that on the 
whole, women are fatter than men. 
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Removal of the ovaries before puberty is a rare opera- 
tion, and the records are inexact, but the result seems to 
be that not only do the usual secondary changes of 
skeleton, such as widening of the pelvis and characteristic 
fat distribution, not take place, but the woman takes on 
certain characters of the male, such as growth of hair on 
the body, low- pitched voice, etc. This would seem to 
indicate that the secondary sexual characters of the male 
are latent in the female, but are suppressed by the internal 
secretion of the ovary. It is to be noted that the converse 
is not the case, and that secondary female characters never 
develop in the male. The appearance of male char- 
acters after the destruction of the ovaries can be demon- 
strated in animals, as for instance, the growth of horns in 
female deer, and the development of anatomical and 
behaviouristic character in the hen, described by Crew 
when the ovaries were destroyed by tubercular disease. 
Removal of ovaries after puberty results in an excitation 
of autonomic activity, in addition to the cessation of 
menstruation. This induces emotional disturbances, head- 
ache, fainting, intestinal derangements, and feelings of heat 
and cold. 
Much has been written about the interrelationship of 
the individual ductless glands, and various syndromes 
involving two or three, have been evolved, whose intricacy 
is only equalled by the lack of evidence for their existence. 
These glands are derived from various sources, all three of 
the primitive layers of embryonic cells -ectoderm, mesoderm 
and endoderm -being represented. Hence there is no 
prima facie reason why they should work in such intimate 
relationship as many writers suggest, yet there can be no 
doubt that this specialized endocrine system does work as 
a whole, and interference with the function of one gland 
does show a repercussion on all the rest. 
The thymus, thyroid and parathyroid are all derived 
from branchial clefts, and the glandular portion of the 
pituitary has a similar origin, though the former are 
derived from endodermal structure and the latter from 
ectodermal. The cortex of the adrenal is derived from 
mesodermal tissue, which is at least similar to that from 
which the gonads arise, while the medulla of the adrenals 
develops from the ectodermal chromophil tissue, from 
which the sympathetic ganglia also develop. Even in 
the case of those glands derived from the same embryonic 
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cell layer, it by no means follows that there is a similarity 
in their physiological activities. There are however, certain 
indications which may be accepted with a due amount of 
reserve. The thyroid and adrenal medulla, both katabolic 
in their action, seem to work together, so that in hyper- 
thyroidism more adrenalin is yielded to the blood. There 
is, however, no evidence to show that a diminution in 
thyroid activity is associated with alteration in adrenal 
function. When the thyroid is removed there is a con- 
siderable weight of evidence to show that the pituitary, 
also katabolic in its action, increases its functional activity; 
but it is doubtful if the secretion so induced is really a 
substitute for the deficient thyroid substance, for there is 
no increase of iodine, which is the chief constituent of 
thyroid secretion in the hypertrophied pituitary. The 
fact that the thyroid becomes enlarged at times of sexual 
activity, and that there is failure of sexual development 
in cretins, and frequently impotence in those suffering 
from myxoedema, points to the reciprocal stimulating in- 
fluence of the thyroid and the reproductive organs. The 
effects of the increase or decrease of thyroid secretion, 
on other organs, is too doubtful to merit discussion here. 
With regard to the pituitary, absence or removal of this 
seems to result in increased activity of the thyroid, with 
a possibly indirect vicarious action. The pituitary seems 
to have a reciprocal effect with the sex glands, and also a 
compensatory action, and like the thyroid, it hypertrophies 
and increases its function at times of special sexual activity, 
while the same occurs if the gonads are removed. The 
adrenal cortex has a definitely stimulating effect on the 
sexual activity, and the function of the sex glands, especi- 
ally in males ; while the medulla would seem to have an 
antagonistic effect on the thymus and pancreas. Defi- 
ciency in growth of the sex glands seems to result in 
an overgrowth of the pituitary, perhaps by the absence 
of a normal inhibition with a consequent overgrowth of 
skeleton. The normal development of the sex organs at 
puberty checks the growth of the thymus, and seems to 
induce its retrogression, for castration results in a pro- 
longation of thymic growth and activity. 
The importance of abnormalities in sexual and bodily 
development is referred to in later chapters. It seems desirable therefore to draw attention to certain of these 
which are determined by temperamental factors. 
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Sexual precocity and its mental accompaniments 
The appearance of puberty at abnormally early ages has 
been studied by many writers, and is apparently due to 
endocrine anomalies. The condition has been observed 
in connexion with tumours or overgrowth of the gonads, 
the pineal body, and the adrenal cortex. In the ovarian 
type there is an early development of primary and second- 
ary sexual characters, menstruation often starting in the 
first few weeks of life. The mental condition does not 
keep pace with the physical development. On the con- 
trary, there is usually a definite retardation in relation to 
the actual age. These children are generally small, with 
early closure of the epiphyseal junctions, at which the 
growth in the length of the bones take place. It is a 
common observation in normal women that those who 
menstruate early are usually short, and those in whom 
this function starts later in life are tall. This applies to 
races as well as individuals, as for instance in the Latin, 
as opposed to the Scandinavian women. 
In the testicular type, there is similarly early develop- 
ment of primary and secondary sex characters, and often 
great muscular strength. The mental condition is re- 
tarded and the general control is poor, so that there is 
a tendency to delinquency, chiefly of the passionate and 
mischievous types. These children are also short, pro- 
bably by reason of the inhibitory effect of gonadal 
secretion on pituitary activity, and consequently on the 
growth of the skeleton. 
The pineal type occurs almost, but not quite exclusively 
in the male sex, and is the only form of sexual precocity 
associated with mental precocity. This latter is often 
astonishing, though if later the tumour of the pineal body 
produces intracranial pressure, various mental defects 
ensue. These children are reserved, shy and sensitive, 
and cry easily, and their general physical health is not 
robust. 
The adrenal type tends towards masculine precocity. 
It is most commonly met with in the female, and leads to 
various male characteristics -development of hair on the 
face and body, enlargement of the clitoris and absence of 
menstruation. When it occurs in the male, there is marked 
precocity of primary and secondary sexual character, and 
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a stature in excess of the normal. This latter feature dis- 
tinguishes the adrenal type from the testicular cases. In 
mentality, all these cases are backward, and may be com- 
plete idiots. They tend to be aggressive and difficult. 
Infantilism 
By infantilism, is meant the retention of the char- 
acteristics of childhood up to an unduly advanced age, 
or a retardation of the rate of development. It is not 
necessarily associated with dwarfism, or arrest of mental 
development, but there is always delay or failure of sexual 
development. Various types are recognized ; that most 
strikingly associated with endocrine defect, is the cretin, 
due to congenital lack of thyroid secretion, which has 
already been described. A second form of infantilism, 
is that associated with deficient pituitary secretion already 
referred to under the title of Fröhlich's syndrome. A third 
group is associated with intestinal disorders (Herter),5 or 
deficiency of pancreatic secretion (Byrom Bramwell).6 
These cases show retardation of development in varying 
degrees, and all suffer from diarrhoea, with excess of fat 
in the stools. In Bramwell's case, the administration 
of pancreatic extract caused considerable improvement. 
Infantilism has also been observed in association with 
hypertrophic cirrhosis of the liver and chronic renal 
diseases, but the real causal factors in these conditions is 
obscure. Infantilism is met with in association with more 
general arrests and abnormalities of development, such as 
congenital heart disease, Mongolism and microcephaly, 
in which the condition under consideration is only a part 
of a general retardation. An interesting group are those 
described by Hastings Gifford.' They tend to appear in 
successive generations in a family, and form the greater 
number of what may be called the professional dwarfs. 
They perpetuate the facies of babyhood in adult life, and 
so tend to resemble each other closely. The head is 
relatively large, the face flat and wide, and the limbs 
short. Some eventually attain puberty, after long delay, 
but others remain infantile. There is no known etio- 
logical cause for this condition. 
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The relation of endocrine secretion to mental defect 
It is quite certain that all cases of retarded mental 
development_ are not due to endocrine dysfunction, but 
there is an increasing body of evidence to show that there 
are types of mental defectives who show associated signs 
of endocrine defect. To attribute causative relationship 
to this endocrine defect is at present unjustified, for the 
latter may simply be part of a general arrest and abnor- 
mality of development. Mental defectives with endocrine 
abnormalities, can be classified into three groups : (t) 
The status lymphaticus group - slender loose -jointed 
children, with soft skin, poorly developed genitalia and a 
tendency to bed -wetting, and other infantile characteristics. 
The blood pressure is low, blood sugar below the normal 
and build under the average. These respond to a certain 
extent to endocrine therapy (small doses of thyroid and 
pituitary) gaining both in physical and mental develop- 
ment. (2) The hypothyroid group- short, stocky children 
with thick lips, flat noses and dry scaly skin. They are 
dull, lethargic and easily fatigued, listless, showing a low 
blood pressure and deficiency in blood sugar. So far as 
their personalities are concerned, no great change can be 
looked for from endocrine therapy (thyroid extract) if 
this is begun at all late in childhood, though a few improve 
quite definitely. If begun early in infancy, a cretinous 
baby may under favourable circumstances grow to be a 
normally intelligent child, fit to enter and hold his place 
in a public or secondary school. (3) The dyspituitary 
group ; these are generally overweight, and big for their 
age, with irregularity of genital function, but normal 
blood pressure and blood sugar. These children are 
mostly irritable and unstable, with a tendency to sluggish- 
ness. Only rarely do they respond well to treatment by 
pituitary substance. 
Potter, in his investigation at Letchworth village 
colony, found a moderate degree of improvement in many 
cases belonging to the type described above, while under 
endocrine treatment. His results seem to justify the con- 
clusion not only that the endocrine function is an im- 
portant contributory factor in determining arrested mental 
development, but also that in some cases, the lack of this 
can be, at least partially, remedied by artificial provision 
of the required glandular extract. 
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Dwarfs 
Many authors divide dwarfs into those who are normal 
in proportion, and those who are disproportioned. In 
some cases the deficiency in stature is associated with 
infantilism, but not always so. In the first group of well - 
proportioned dwarfs, there are those who are described by 
von Hausemann 8 as " too small from the beginning " and 
those in whom growth is arrested at some period of 
development. These persons are normal in proportion, 
and resemble men and women seen from the large end of a 
telescope. They are not infantile as a rule, and may 
propagate their kind, but such anomalies as undescended 
testicle are not uncommon. Similarly, their mental capac- 
ity is good, and corresponds to their age and not to their 
size. The cause of the retardation of ossification, which 
is responsible for the condition is not understood. 
Another type of symmetrical dwarf is that associated 
with injury, or deficiency of the pituitary. These have 
symmetrical skeletons, infantilism, and a normal mental 
equipment. They show a broad skull and a widely open 
jaw angle. The general resistance of these persons is 
fair, and though their bones are small, they are relatively 
strong. In contrast to this type, is that described by 
Sternberg ° as hypoplastic dwarfism, in which there is a 
deficiency of all the ductless glands, as well as other 
organs, such as the brain. In these there is a symmetrical 
skeleton, infantilism, deficiency of mental power, and 
lowered general resistance of the body, coupled with 
feebleness of bones and muscles. The skull is not broad, 
as in the last type, since the brain is not fully developed, 
and so does not require the compensatory enlargement 
of the cranial vault. Dieterle 1° and others describe a 
dwarfism due to deficient thyroid secretion, differing from 
cretinism. Although there is a tendency for growth in 
length to be deficient, and growth in breadth to be normal, 
this is not always so. The probability is that some other 
factor besides deficiency in thyroid secretion is involved 
in these cases. Gigonn describes dwarfism due to failure 
of cerebral development. This may be symmetrical, or 
certain parts, such as the left arm, may be dwarfed with 
corresponding failure of development of the associated 
area of the cerebral cortex. These show marked mental 
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deficiency and often other cerebral disturbances, such as 
epilepsy. Stier la maintains that in cases of partial 
dwarfism the deficient limbs are those in association with 
the " inferior hemisphere," i.e. the right hemisphere in right - 
handed persons, and the left in left- handed. Whether 
this failure in cerebral development is a primary variation, 
or secondary to endocrine defect, is uncertain. Dwarfism 
is also found in Mongolian idiots, a form of cerebral mal- 
development associated, at least in many cases, with 
congenital syphilis. Similarly in other forms of idiocy, 
growth and general development are definitely deficient. 
The second group of deformed dwarfs, comprises the 
true cretin, and certain dwarfisms, due to definite diseases. 
The cretin, as has been described above, is due to 
deficiency in thyroid secretion. The skin is thick, the 
tongue and lips enormous, the legs crooked, and the 
spine abnormally curved. These cases if untreated remain 
infantile, and hopelessly mentally deficient. The adequacy 
of normal nutrition plays an important part in the deter- 
mination of dwarfism. For example, achondroplasia is a 
disease characterized by failure of growth in length of the 
long bones. The head and trunk are of normal size, but 
the limbs are stunted. Sexually they develop normally, 
and mentally are usually up to the average. The con- 
dition is supposed to be due to anomalies of nutrition in 
intra- uterine life. 
Rickets, a disease of nutritive deficiency in childhood, 
so affects the growth of the bones, that deformity and 
dwarfism is a frequent result. In these cases sexual and 
mental development are usually normal. 
Gigantism 
Giants like dwarfs, may be divided into two groups - 
symmetrical giants and deformed giants. The former are 
normal in health and development, except for their 
unusual size. 
In certain cases gigantism is associated with disturb- 
ances of the pineal gland ; and in such cases, there may be 
both sexual and mental precocity, with no abnormality of 
proportion in the skeleton. Eunuchoid gigantism is associ- 
ated with failure of development of the genital glands. 
Such persons show a poor mental equipment, and often 
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certain skeletal anomalies, such as genu valgum and saddle 
nose. The commonest type of gigantism is associated 
with overgrowth of the pituitary gland, the so- called 
Acromegaly. If this occurs in Youth, before the epiphyseal 
junctions are closed, a more or less well - proportioned 
gigantism results, but there is always a tendency to special 
growth of hands, feet and jaw. If the disease comes on in 
adult life, there is no increase in stature, but the latter 
enlargements only are met with. Such cases are, as a rule, 
definitely in bad health. The muscles are poor and flabby, 
the bones porous and often brittle, and the mentality low 
in most cases. The genitals are normal in size i.e., small 
in proportion to the size of the body, and their function is 
often, though not always, deficient. Deformities due to 
spinal curvatures are common, due chiefly to the weakness 
of muscles and supporting structures. 
Gigon n maintains, that just as cerebral deficiency may 
lead to general or localized dwarfism, so cerebral hyper- 
trophy may lead to general or localized gigantism. 
These examples show the importance of temperament 
in general, and of the endocrine glands in particular, in 
influencing the equipment of mentally 
and physically. Also it will be evident that our knowledge 
of the exact function of these organs is woefully deficient, 
and that if the future brings us a clear understanding of 
the interaction of the nervous system and the endocrine 
glandsl$-14, many problems in the study of personality, and 
its multifarious reactions will be solved. For the present, 
however, it is not fruitful to pursue this subject further, 




THE INHERENT ORGANIZATION OF 
MENTAL FUNCTION 
HAVING established the principle of temperamental in- 
fluence, and having indicated how the different hormones 
reinforce and modify neural function, we must return once 
more to a consideration of the latter. It is however 
necessary to change our point of view, though, in passing 
from the consideration of bodily function to that of mental 
function we do not alter the subject of study, but only 
the aspect from which we study it. Heretofore we have 
been chiefly concerned with the more lowly organized 
patterns, whose physical aspect was presented for our 
study, but whose psychical aspect was of such a low order 
of organization that it failed to have significance. We 
might continue to attempt to follow the engraphic physical 
structure of the more complex mental patterns, together 
with the temperamental factors which influence their func- 
tion, but this would lead us into such a complicated maze 
of neurones that our efforts would be fruitless ; especially 
as the exact function of the higher cerebral realms, such 
as the frontal lobes, are still beyond our grasp. For this 
reason, it is more useful to concentrate on the psychical 
aspect, and transfer our attention from physiology to 
psychology. This is the more important, inasmuch as 
at these higher levels it is the psychological and not the 
physiological aspect which is significant ; and in order to 
be intelligible, it is necessary to describe and examine 
behaviour according to psychological laws. In this sense 
it is legitimate to talk of an animal being guided by 
instinct, or by reason. This does not mean that we 
regard instinct or reason as having any force or influence 
of themselves. All that is implied is that the behaviour 
of the animal is a function of the activation of that en- 
graphic pattern, which involves instinct or reason, and 
which is significant in virtue of that instinct or reason. 
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At these higher " mental " levels, the organization of the 
engram involves both central and visceral systems, on the 
afferent and efferent sides, and hence we can always re- 
cognize three phases in the processes under discussion. 
These are an afferent phase or cognition, involving the 
mental aspect of the reception of the incoming stimuli ; 
a visceral phase or affect, involving pleasure or unpleasure ; 
and an efferent phase or conation involving the mental 
aspect of the urge or " wish " * towards activity. These 
phases of cognition, affect, and conation are always present 
in every mental process, but may be differently stressed, 
and occur in different proportions. 
As has been said already, the lower grades of mental 
activity are hard to describe because they are not open 
to clear introspection, not having achieved that organiza- 
tion which involves full consciousness. Moreover, in 
ordinary life they have, as a rule, been organized or 
fused into higher processes, so that they only appear in 
their primary form under exceptional circumstances. It 
will be remembered that in the discussion of the nervous 
system, it was pointed out that organization tended to be 
in the form of pairs of opposites, so far as the efferent 
or conative phase was concerned. This is specially the 
case in the vegetative system, where the sympathetic and 
the autonomic systems function antithetically, each pro- 
ducing the opposite effect to the other. Similarly in 
the projicient system, which has to do with the organiza- 
tion of voluntary muscular action, the muscles are arranged 
as agonists and antagonists, one group relaxing while the 
other contracts. It is not surprising therefore to find that, 
in the higher organizations, conation tends to appear as 
pairs of opposites. This is specially so in those patterns 
which subserve organic needs, and of which the visceral 
neurones form the most important constituent. The 
same is true of the affective dispositions, which at higher 
levels involve emotional life, since they also involve 
visceral activity which is most typically bipolar from the 
beginning. As has been pointed out, the transition from the reflex stage, in which an animal is little more than 
a plaything of circumstances, responding in a special way 
to any stimulus which impinges upon it, involves a new 
"Wish" is here used in the technical sense introduced by Freud, which, as Holt pointed out, was a real contribution to Psychology, as giving a name to the unit of conation. 
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emergence -viz., that of mind, and requires a new ana- 
tomical structure, that of brain, as opposed to the purely 
segmental nervous system. With this new structure and 
new function, two new factors are introduced, namely 
enjoyment * and initiation of effort. This enjoyment and 
this initiation of effort need not be conscious, but even 
at the level of appetite, we talk of feeling or of experienc- 
ing, technically enjoying, hunger. If we study the de- 
cerebrate dog, who has no brain and no mind, we find 
that if food is placed in his mouth, he eats it, but will go 
on eating without reference to the enjoyment of hunger. 
Further even if food is placed near him he will not take it. 
These new factors seem to depend on the more complex 
organization at this level, in accordance with the law of 
emergence. 
The first processes which call for discussion, are the 
appetites of hunger and thirst. The stimulus pattern, from 
which the cognitive phase of these processes is derived, is 
received by the enteroceptors, the sense organs of the 
viscera, in the form of certain kinmsthetic sensory impulses 
from unstriped muscles, innervated by the vegetative ner- 
vous system. The affective phase is almost pure unpleasure, 
while these tensions are unrelieved, and pure pleasure when 
the appetite is satisfied, and tension is relaxed. The con - 
ative phase is the urge towards activity, which will satisfy 
the organic need of food and drink. This may result in 
the most complex behaviour in those animals who live 
in the medium where food has to be sought and won. Such 
complex behaviour however, is secondary, for the obtaining 
of satisfaction is a much more simple process when the 
animal lives in the all- pervasive medium of water, which 
was certainly the habitat of the earliest forms of life. In 
the majority of cases it meant that a volume of the 
surrounding medium was engulfed, and the fortuitous 
presence of organic material in it, satisfied the need. 
The opposite to this hunger appetite is a process which 
requires mention at this level, and which may be described 
as the act of repulsion This has a definite cognitive phase, 
which is met with in the youngest infant, and depends on the 
reception of stimuli from visceral tensions of overstretched 
plain muscle fibre. It is difficult to give a name to this, 
but it is the experience involved when an overfull hollow 
* Enjoyment is used in Alexander's sense as a technical expression for 
what might be expressed colloquially as experiencing. 
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viscus requires a discharge of its contents. It is the obverse 
of the appetite, since it is expulsive instead of appetitive. 
The affective phase is an especially differentiated state of 
unpleasure which, in the case of the stomach, is termed 
nausea, and the conative phase leads to contraction of 
the viscus, with correlated reflex closing of one opening 
and relaxation of another. For example, in the case of 
the stomach, the organ contracts, with the opening of the 
communication to the gullet, and the closing of the com- 
munication with the bowels as accompaniments. 
The next process to consider is the sex appetite which 
is more complex, since it is a composite of appetitive and 
expulsive dispositions. It must be pointed out, that though 
sex appetite is regarded as pleasurable, it is only the 
consummation that is so. The preliminaries involve tension, 
and tension is always unpleasant. It is only, when the 
conscious level is reached at which imagination begins, 
that the whole process is pleasant. As McDougall 1 has 
pointed out, imagination is typically anticipatory, and this 
is so in virtue of the engraphic patterns, already laid down. 
Thus, once the activation has started at the conscious level, 
"the end is in view," in virtue of the short cut process of 
thought and imagery, which will be discussed later. This 
anticipation involves such intense pleasure, that it quite 
outweighs the unpleasure of the preliminary tension. In 
the sex appetite, the appetitive and expulsive conations 
would seem at first sight to be differentiated in accordance 
with sex difference ; the conation to fill a hollow viscus, 
being the female part, and to empty a hollow viscus, the 
seminal vesicles, the male part. However, as we shall have 
occasion to discuss more fully later, the sexes cannot be 
rigorously separated, either structurally or functionally, 
even on the physiological level of simple organization, still 
less on the psychological level of complex organization. 
So we must allow both in the male and female sex appetite, 
a bivalent rôle of appetition and expulsion, with an affect 
of unpleasure before consummation, which is overshadowed 
by the anticipatory pleasure at the conscious level. 
The importance of these visceral tensions, based on the 
primary appetites as underlying factors in our behaviour, 
will be referred to later, when discussing Kempf's con- tribution to the study of personality. 
At much the same level as these simple appetites, may be placed the processes of primitive fear, and primitive 
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anger, whose conations of retreat and aggression are like- 
wise a pair of opposites. These are not experienced by 
individuals under ordinary circumstances, being as a rule 
fused, to constitute higher level reactions. When they do 
appear, they have not such a high organization, either on 
the cognitive or conative sides, as have the usual expressions 
of the appetites already discussed. As organized and 
experienced in human consciousness, the three latter 
appetites are characterized by a knowledge of what is the 
matter. We know that we are hungry, thirsty or lustful, 
and as a sequence of the conation, we plan out discriminated 
behaviour to obtain food, drink or mate. Moreover, we 
are able to exercise control, so that these various activities 
may be modified to any extent, or inhibited altogether. 
This is only another way of saying that these appetites 
may be, and usually are, organized on the level of con- 
sciousness or cortical function. This is not the case how- 
ever with the processes about to be discussed. Panic 
fear only occurs under overwhelming stimulus, which is 
strong enough to involve a dissociation, of personality; or 
in the course of neurotic illness, when dissociation, and 
abolition of full cortical function, are the chief characteristics 
of the pathological process ; or again, in gross lesions of the 
cortex. For instance, Bianchi 2 describes this unreasoning 
fear as occurring characteristically in monkeys whose 
frontal lobes have been destroyed. This process of panic 
is characterized by a cognition of danger to the ego, but there 
is no knowledge of what this danger is, nor discrimination 
in time and space as to when and where the danger arises. 
The affect is intense unpleasure, with very marked increase 
of tension, and this is so organized with the efferent conative 
pattern that the resulting impulse is to escape anyhow, in 
any direction. This process, as seen in the neurotic, does 
not show the normal conation. The activation of the 
efferent neurones is inhibited, with the result that there is 
a short circuiting through the visceral neurones, with the 
most distressing and violent unpleasant affect. 
Primitive anger is never exhibited under ordinary 
circumstances in human behaviour, but probably the con- 
dition not uncommon among certain primitive people, 
especially in the Malay Archipelago, known as running 
amuck, is a pathological unmasking of this process. In 
this case the cognitive process may be set off by almost 
any stimulus, whether actually thwarting or threatening 
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the individual, or not. The affective unpleasure is só 
organized with the efferent conation, that the most violent 
aggression results, with every effort directed to destroy 
any object that comes in the path. 
As integration and differentiation proceed, in the course 
of evolution, a disposition is laid down which McDougall s 
has referred to as primitive passive sympathy. This is 
present to a certain degree in all animals, and, as will be 
seen later, is integrated and differentiated to a remarkable 
extent as evolution proceeds. The cognitive phase is 
represented by the reception of afferent impulses, derived 
from stimuli arising from some other member of the animal 
kingdom, whether in the form of a cry or a movement. 
The affective and conative phases are considerably differ- 
entiated, as the tendency is for similar engrams to be 
activated in the recipient of the stimulus, as are being 
activated in the originator. Examples of this may be 
observed by watching the behaviour of other rabbits in a 
warren, who have seen the warning spectacle of the dis- 
appearing white tail of one of the tribe who has scented 
danger. Or again, of the wolf pack, hearing the hunting 
yelp of one member who has scented prey, and so on. 
An obverse of the primitive passive sympathy may be 
postulated, in which the affect and conation are the direct 
opposite to that of the originator of the stimulus, but this 
is not readily observed, unless it be in the negativism of 
children and neurotics. In this state, the recipient feels 
and does exactly the opposite to the originator, but nega- 
tivism is certainly a derivative, and not a direct manifesta- 
tion of the obverse of primitive passive sympathy. In 
Chapter IX the phenomenon of the ambivalence of the 
emotions will be discussed. In this connexion, there 
seems a general tendency for affective dispositions to occur 
in pairs of opposites, which are readily translatable one 
from the other ; therefore, at least on a priori grounds, it 
seems probable that there is such a primitive disposition, 
though not readily observable in ordinary behaviour. It 
may be noted that these last four dispositions are essenti- 
ally built up round the organization of the distance 
receptors, and therefore necessarily involve the level of 
the brain proper, and a certain degree of cortical function. 
Next in order of integration come those inherent en- 
grams subserving patterns of behaviour, which McDougall s 
has termed instincts. It has been suggested that the term 
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" emotional disposition " might be better, inasmuch as 
McDougall's instincts are rather more highly organized 
than are those dispositions in animals to which the term 
instinct was originally applied. Moreover the latter term 
was used to connote a disposition less easily modified 
by contact with the environment than are McDougall's 
primary units. This point however is of no very great 
importance, since too much stress cannot be laid on the 
fact that man's personality and behaviour depends on 
" instincts," strictly comparable to those of the animals, 
and not on some peculiar faculty of reason or free will. 
Whatever term we use, McDougall describes seven of 
these dispositions as primary. They are characterized by 
an organization of the three phases referred to above, on 
the cortical level. The cognitive phase, by means of which 
the subject is aware of the nature of the stimulus, is definite, 
and as a rule, the degree of the stimulus and its situation 
in time and space are distinguishable. The affective phase 
is characterized by an emotion,* that is to say pleasure or 
unpleasure, differentiated as to nature and degree, and 
organized with a conscious cognition, and a more or less 
controlled and discriminated conation. The conative phase 
is so organized, with the affective phase, that it results in 
a more or less specific pattern of behaviour, which is 
typically under conscious control. As has been said in 
Chapter IV, affective reactions have much to do with 
facilitation and inhibition, and so influence both the quality 
and quantity or force of conation ; so that for this reason 
the emotions are often referred to as the springs of be- 
haviour. Such characteristics show that these dispositions 
are organized on the level of full cortical function, that is 
to say, they are fully conscious. 
It is not necessary to discuss these very fully here, 
since this has been done so admirably by McDougall 
himself, and by others who have followed him .4 All that 
need be attempted is to indicate the organization of mental 
process in gradually increasing orders of complexity. 
The disposition which McDougall describes as the 
instinct of flight is derived from primitive panic, by means 
of greater organization and discrimination. The cognitive 
phase, at this level, allows for a certain amount of dis- 
* The term " emotion " is too loosely used in psychological literature. 
Here it is suggested that the word may connote affect organized on the cortical 
level, and integrated with conscious cognition and conation. 
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crimination, as to the nature and degree of the stimulus, 
and similarly, the affective phase allows of discrimination 
of degrees of fear experienced. So far as the conative 
phase is concerned, this is more or less specific in most 
animals, according to the species. Thus, the horse runs 
away, the rabbit runs and hides, the hare remains motion - 
Iess, and only runs as a last resource. But as Rivers 5 has 
pointed out, this conation may be differentiated in man 
to a considerable extent. The resultant behaviour may 
be flight, or concealment, or a transformation to the cona- 
tion belonging to another disposition, namely aggression. 
Again it may be transferred to a much higher level, and 
result in complex manipulative activity, or it may sink to 
a low pathological level, and appear as complete collapse. 
This means, that the conation is under the discriminative 
control of cortical function, except in the last case, and 
that in virtue of this higher and more complex organization, 
man is freer in his action than are the animals. 
Similarly the disposition to aggression, in the presence 
of some thwarting of a conative effort or wish, is an organi- 
zation of primitive anger, on a higher level, with greater 
specificity, differentiation and control, in all three phases. 
Curiosity is an emotional disposition, which has been 
evolved from the appetites of hunger, and perhaps sex, 
when the rise in evolutionary differentiation necessitated 
the search for food, drink and a mate. The cognitive 
phase consists of the reception of stimuli from some- 
thing strange. The affective phase, which McDougall 
calls wonder, leads to a conative phase, in which the 
strange object is approached. That this approach was 
originally for the purpose of satisfying the appetites may 
be inferred from watching a goat or a cow approach a red 
petticoat hung on a line. Curiosity is obviously aroused, 
and if the panic reaction is inhibited -for a strange object 
may activate this engram, as well as that subserving 
curiosity -she proceeds to chew it vigorously until such 
time as it is obvious that it is not satisfactory as a means 
of relieving hunger, when it is dropped and curiosity in 
respect of it ceases. Later, with further discrimination of 
all three phases, neither cognition or conation may have anything whatever to do with the primary appetites, the conation being conditioned to respond to some other stimulus and serve some other end, but such modifica- tions are of course constant in evolutionary progress. 
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The disposition of repulsion, with its emotion of disgust, 
is clearly derived from the disposition of the overfull hollow 
viscus, in this case the stomach, to expel its contents. It 
must be realized however, that in the stomach the physical 
process of antiperistalsis, with its affective reaction of 
nausea, may be set up, not only by mechanical overfilling, 
but by the presence of irritant material in contact with 
the mucous membrane. Secondarily, in accordance with 
the law of the conditioned response, the same reaction 
may be experienced in relation to certain odours, often 
erroneously described as tastes, and even to sights and 
sounds. Hence the range of stimuli giving rise to the 
cognitive phase of this disposition is widened and differ- 
entiated to a considerable extent, while the conative phase 
is also more differentiated and controlled than in the 
primitive expulsive reaction described above, for disgust 
by no means necessarily involves vomiting, any more than 
fear necessarily involves flight. 
The parental or protective disposition, is derived from 
primitive passive sympathy, organized with a reaction 
which was primitively at the reflex level, namely the 
suckling of the young. The excretion of milk, in response 
to sucking or pulling of the nipple, is a true reflex, and it 
is while this is in action that the parental instinct in its 
most simple form can be observed. It may be objected 
that many, if not most, of the examples of the parental 
disposition in operation, have nothing to do with the 
suckling of the young, but it is a well -established fact 
that, in the course of evolutionary progress, many reflex 
and analogous processes are diverted from their original 
end, both on the afferent and efferent side. It is important 
to realize that the suckling reflex, in common with the 
other excretory reflexes, is centrifugal in respect of the 
ego. Moreover the reflex of giving milk, started by the 
contact of the lips of the offspring with the nipple, is of a 
different category from others, inasmuch as it is essentially 
related to the behaviour of another individual. It is this 
which conditions and changes the affect, but specially the 
conation of passive sympathy, so that it emerges as 
something different and characteristic, as an altruistic im- 
pulse, according to the strict law of emergence. Another 
objection might be raised, that the parental disposition is 
just as characteristic of the male as it is of the female, 
and therefore cannot depend on the purely feminine 
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activity of suckling. But in Chapter XI we shall have 
occasion to point out, how the sexes are much less differ- 
entiated, both physically and psychically, than is at first 
sight apparent, so that, an archaic reflex such as the one 
under review, may easily be manifest as a contribution to 
the emergence of a disposition in man, as well as in woman. 
Moreover every man has vestigial mamma, which occa- 
sionally are able to function to a slight extent. From 
this it may be inferred, that there is at least a potential 
organization of an engram subserving their function. In 
support of this we may refer to the story quoted by 
Darwin, of the man whose wife was suddenly killed while 
nursing her child, and who was able to rear the infant, by 
the secretion of milk, induced by the continual stimulus 
to his own breasts. As organized in the parental dis- 
position, the cognition is derived primarily from the move- 
ment, smell or cry of the offspring, but secondarily, from 
anything small and unprotected. We have no special 
word to describe this affect, but McDougall terms it 
tender emotion. The relation of this to sympathy is 
obvious, inasmuch as we tend to experience the same 
emotion as does the object of our tender feeling. The 
conation may be complex and varied, but its primitive 
form may be inferred from the mother clasping her child 
to her breast, or the tendency of the ignorant mother 
to give her baby the breast whenever it cries. At higher 
levels, the conation is directed to the protection and 
cherishing of the object which originates the cognition. 
The dispositions of self -abasement and self -assertion 
are difficult to place. Many writers are agreed that they 
are much too complex to be classed as primary, though 
their successful analysis is by no means easy. Under the 
principle of emergence however, this may be attempted. 
In the composition of self -assertion, there is unquestionably 
aggression, and the conative behaviour of self -display is 
quite easily transformed into frank aggressive attack ; 
yet it is aggression modified and conditioned in a remark- 
able way. The cognitive phase is derived from stimuli, 
arising from objects in the environment, weaker than the 
subject, especially from living organisms, who are ex- 
hibiting behaviour dependent on the opposite disposition, self -abasement. The affect and conation are the direct 
opposite of the latter, and in accordance with this it is suggested that, in this case, aggression is combined and 
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conditioned by that disposition described above, as the 
obverse of primitive passive sympathy. Moreover, the 
appetites may have contributed to the organization of 
this disposition in its primitive form, for the conative 
behaviour, or self -display, early becomes an adjuvant to 
the obtaining of food and winning of a mate and as 
Darwin has shown, display soon becomes almost a 
secondary sexual character. 
Self -abasement certainly involves panic and retreat, but 
this is modified and conditioned, just as aggression is 
modified, in self -assertion. Here the cognitive phase is 
derived from stimuli arising from something threatening 
in the environment, especially if it is exhibiting self -display, 
and the affect and conation is the direct opposite; so 
again, the obverse of passive sympathy is a factor in the 
emergence. In addition, just as the appetites may have 
had something to do with self -assertion, so the expulsive 
disposition may contribute to self -abasement. At any 
rate, the emptying of a hollow viscus is a frequent ac- 
companiment of self -abasement, as can be seen by watch- 
ing the behaviour of a puppy. It is conceivable that, as in 
self -assertion, when part of the conative effort is to achieve 
and receive something, the appetite impulse is dominant; 
so in self -abasement part of the conative impulse is to 
propitiate and give something, and hence the expulsive 
disposition may be dominant. Incidentally, certain of the 
Freudians maintain that the excretions are regarded as a 
propitiatory donation, but such contentions must be left 
sub judice. As further evidence that the disposition of 
self -assertion and self -abasement are highly organized, it 
may be pointed out that both tend to avoid expenditure 
of energy. An animal, by self- assertion, frequently achieves 
an end which would otherwise require great effort in the 
form of a fight against an enemy, or the pursuit of a 
mate. Similarly by self -abasement, he may achieve 
safety for himself, which would otherwise only be won 
by fighting or flight. Professor Janet s pointed out, that 
it was characteristic of behaviour at higher levels that 
there was a saving of actual energy, though there might 
be great potential energy involved in the process. The 
use of language exemplifies this, when we compare the 
energy expended in expressing our meaning by a word, 
or by pantomimic gestures ; or again, as Varendonck has 
shown, when we use selective memory, as opposed to re- 
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duplicative memory, in which every detail is recalled. 
Inasmuch then, as these dispositions save expenditure of 
energy, they represent behaviour at a high level, and, the 
primary status claimed for them by McDougall should 
not be accepted too readily. 
In adçlition to these seven " primary " dispositions, 
which have well- marked cognitive, affective and conative 
phases, McDougall recognizes several. others. Suggestion, 
sympathy and imitation would seem to be organizations of 
the three phases of primitive passive sympathy, with a 
certain degree of self -abasement. Suggestion, which is 
the cognitive phase, is fully discussed in connexion with 
the neurotic personality. Active sympathy which is 
essentially affective, differs from passive sympathy in its 
more elaborate differentiation, and by its being under the 
discriminating control of cortical function. Imitation 
again, is the more controlled and differentiated conation, 
which is exactly comparable to the behaviour of the 
rabbit or wolf quoted above, who whole -heartedly copies 
the behaviour of the originator, in his flight from danger, 
or his pursuit of prey. 
The gregarious instinct, which is only characteristic of 
certain animals including man, has, as its cognitive phase, 
a negative stimulus, in the shape of absence of others of 
the species, but this also involves a certain amount of 
cognition of danger. The affect is an organization of 
tensions, involving unpleasure, for which we have no name. 
The conative phase, in its original form, constituted an 
impulse to gain close physical contact with other members 
of the herd, as when a buffalo, which has been left behind, 
on regaining the herd worms his way into the very 
centre, as though he would apply every part of his body 
to the living flesh of his mates. This would appear to 
be an organization of panic flight, with primitive passive 
sympathy, in a new relatedness. This new emergent is 
of great importance in man, and has undergone modifi- 
cation to a marked degree, in so far as its activity has 
been translated, for the most part, from the field of 
muscular activity to that of thought. That this is not 
altogether so, however, may be seen from the sands at 
Blackpool on August Bank Holiday, where actual physical contact seems to be the chief object. Nevertheless, what truly troubles man is not absence of this physical contact, so much as absence of mental and moral contact. In 
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the next chapter, we shall have occasion to notice, how 
activities, which at lower levels proceed through engrams 
involving efferent paths to muscles and glands, are side- 
tracked into engrams comprising the great association 
areas of the brain which involve thought, the passage of 
activation to the muscular efferents being inhibited. So 
it is with the central nervous system neurones of this 
disposition, they are so conditioned, both in the cognitive 
and conative phase, that their relatedness is altered, but 
so far as the vegetative neurones are concerned, there is 
no such alteration in the engram, and so the affect remains 
much the same, whether the lack of contact is physical or 
mental. 
A disposition described by McDougall as the instinct 
of appeal, is specially characteristic of gregarious animals. 
This would seem to be rather a new type of behaviour, 
emerging from primitive panic and primitive anger, rather 
than a fully organized independent instinct, for it comes 
into play when the animal is distressed or thwarted, 
especially in its efforts at flight or aggression. In this 
conation we meet with a true emergent, something quite 
new in behaviour, the uttering of a cry or noise. This 
new emergent in the process of mental evolution is of 
very greatest importance ; for, from the differentiation of 
this cry, is derived language and all that it involves. 
The two remaining instincts which are to be discussed 
are of considerable moment, since they are the direct 
manifestations of the two biological principles on which 
life depends, namely the maintenance of the individual 
and the maintenance of the race. 
The first, the food -seeking disposition, does not require 
much discussion here, since it is an organization on a 
higher level of the appetites of hunger and thirst, modified 
according to the requirements of the animal, according to 
its species, and its necessity to seek and perhaps kill its 
food. With this is related the acquisitive disposition, with 
its dual conations of collecting and hoarding. This is 
clearly derived primarily from the appetites of hunger, and 
is only secondarily transferred to other objects uncon- 
nected with food. 
The second, the mating disposition, merits further 
discussion. In animals, this disposition has for its end 
the biological function of perpetuation of the race, and is 
a higher organization of sexual appetite. In the majority 
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of cases, it is not only confined to the period of life when 
the animal is full grown, and therefore capable of per- 
forming this important function to the best advantage, but 
also to special periods of varying length and frequency, 
termed oestral cycles, to which the active exhibition of this 
behaviour is limited. In man on the other hand, though 
the active period is more or less confined to the years 
during which he is full grown, once sexual activity has 
started, there is no periodic interruption at all. Perhaps 
associated with this prolongation of the opportunities for 
sexual activity, we find that man does not only use this 
disposition to fulfil its biological function, but also for the 
purposes of obtaining pleasure for himself. This latter 
function is only possible at the level of self -consciousness 
and reflective thought, for though pleasure may be gained 
incidentally in the course of various activities, it cannot 
be deliberately sought and schemed for, except at the 
higher levels. This mating impulse is clearly differentiated 
from the other similar dispositions, which have been under 
discussion, in a way analogous to the suckling reflex and 
parental dispositions. In the latter we saw that the 
conative phase involved the giving of something from the 
ego to another. But in addition to their centrifugal char- 
acter, the sex appetite and derivative mating impulse in- 
volve behaviour which results in the creation of something 
quite new, the offspring. The characteristic, therefore, of 
this engraphic pattern is its creative function. 
This creative conation is also seen in one other dis- 
position, which is generally referred to as the constructive 
instinct. This is very well established in certain animals, 
especially in the insects, spiders and birds. In mammals 
it is much less defined, except in the case of the beavers ; 
and in the primates any defined instinctive behaviour of this sort is conspicuous by its absence, though in man it 
persists as a diffuse impulse to make things. In its original 
form this constructive instinct is very closely bound up with sex, the construction invariably being to house the products of sexual conation. Unquestionably the behaviour incident in the parental disposition takes place in the con- structed nest, but the making of nests and pairing are associated together, not the making of nests and rearing the young. Moreover both are preparatory to, and lead up to, the exhibition of the parental disposition. There- fore, it may be taken, that mating and construction are, 
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in their original form, most closely associated together; 
so closely as to suggest that one may be derived from 
the other or from an original creative impulse. If this 
is admitted, it must at once be allowed that the differ- 
entiation between the mating disposition and the con- 
structive disposition appeared early, and by the time the 
level which we have been discussing is reached, they have 
evolved in different directions in many respects, and each 
has emerged as a concrete entity. Yet in certain respects 
they show marked similarities. Just as man has largely 
transferred the mating disposition away from its biological 
function to serve his own pleasure, so has he transferred 
the constructive disposition from its biological function of 
nest building, to minister to his pleasure. From this 
constructive impulse has arisen the whole of man's artistic 
creation,which,though it serves no useful biological function, 
is a requirement of the human race, comparable to all 
instinctive types of reaction. This, therefore, may explain 
why artistic expression is so universal and almost necessary 
to mankind, and why it is so closely related to sex in 
many respects. It has been said that transference of a 
conation to serve the end of man's pleasure is only possible 
at the level of self -consciousness and reflective thought; 
and this must be so, for it involves the possibility of a 
control of his destiny, which is the peculiar attribute of 
man. This does not involve free -will in the commonly 
accepted sense, but a freedom in virtue of organization 
and relatedness, whereby a pattern of behaviour related 
to the self, as opposed to the environment, can serve as 
a stimulus for a further pattern of behaviour and so 
modify the whole constitution of the relationship of the 
ego and his surroundings. But this will be discussed 
more fully in Chapter XVII. Another aspect of the sex 
and mating disposition must be referred to, namely the in- 
herent bivalency of the disposition. The balance between 
giving and taking in love relationship should be a nice 
one, and this seems to depend on the constitution of the 
sex appetite, upon which mating, and, at a higher level, 
love depend. Mention has already been made of this, 
when it was pointed out, that in addition to the appetition 
there was an expulsive pattern involved in the constitution 
of the appetite, which implies a definite bivalency of taking 
(appetition) and giving (expulsion). In love and the de- 
rivative relationships of friendship, these opposites do not 
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always appear in the same proportions, but there is always 
an element of creative unselfish giving, and an element 
of destructive selfish taking. The creative generous lover 
is familiar, but so is the selfish and destructive vampire, 
and we may meet with all grades between the two 
extremes. 
With this we have concluded the review of the more 
important dispositions with which man is equipped at 
birth. It remains to discuss how this organization of 
mental function continues, by means of growth and con- 




THE FURTHER ORGANIZATION OF 
MENTAL FUNCTION 
IT has already been pointed out that every mental process 
presents three phases for discussion, cognitive, affective 
and conative. Up to the present we have examined them 
together in the processes under discussion, giving to each 
a more or less equal value, but in the more complicated 
grades of mental development, which take place during 
the life of the individual, it is more convenient to examine 
the organization of what we may call affective or emotional 
processes, cognitive or thought processes, and conative 
processes or sentiments. Nevertheless, we must remember 
that these terms are only conveniences, and that there can 
be no real separation of the three phases. 
The emotions -simple, compound and derived -con- 
stitute the more complicated affective processes -and we 
call them affective processes, because the most obvious 
feature of their organization is feeling. None the less, the 
term emotion only has a meaning, in virtue of the organiza- 
tion of affect with a definitely recognizable cognition, and 
a definitely recognizable " wish" for action. For example, 
we cannot be said to feel the emotion of curiosity, unless 
we can recognize a stimulus in the form of some strange 
object, and without experiencing an impulse to some sort 
of action in relation to it. 
The nature and possible modifications of this conation 
or impulse to action, when organized on the fully conscious 
level, are somewhat different from those we have so far 
considered. At the level of instinct and emotional dis- 
position, conation was defined as the mental correlate of 
the activation of the efferent division of the engram, which 
led to muscular activity, so that the efferent organization 
was essentially neuromuscular. Therefore if I felt curiosity 
at this level, T necessarily experienced an impulse to investi- 
gate the object of that curiosity. At the level of reflective 
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thought, however, we have a more complex organization, 
and this would seem to involve a redistribution of the 
efferent activity or, expressed from the psychological 
standpoint, a new orientation of the conation. With the 
great complication of the arrangement of neurones at this 
high level, which is characteristic of man, the possible 
" motor paths," open for activation, are enormously in- 
creased. So far, the efferent activation has typically 
served as the stimulus to muscular activity, the activation 
passing to a peripheral motor nerve, after traversing a 
limited number of intermediate central neurones. At 
the higher level however, the activation may be side- 
tracked to other engrams in the higher areas of the brain, 
so that it passes through to further intermediate central 
neurones, and may never influence a peripheral motor 
nerve so as to induce muscular activity. Thus the process 
may go on, from engram to engram, through the newer 
anatomical structures of the " association areas," without 
involving overt behaviour, though it does involve a psycho- 
logical function, namely thought. Such activation would 
seem to be accompanied by the new emergent, which we 
call reflective thought. In this process, every efferent 
conation of one engram, becomes immediately an afferent 
cognition for the next, and hence thought is a develop- 
ment on the cognitive side, and, by reason of the cortical 
functions of integration and discrimination, one thought 
can be compared with another. This statement, however, 
requires qualification. We have said that the process of 
activation of neurones in the higher areas, described above, 
does not involve muscular action ; but this is not strictly 
true. The Behaviourist school has rightly pointed out 
that thought is accompanied by minute, scarcely observable 
muscular movements, of lips, tongue, larynx, eyes and so 
on. They go on to say that this is thought, and where 
such movements are not apparently present, such absence is 
due merely to difficulties of observation. This is a pre- 
sumption, which we are hardly prepared to follow. We 
have argued above, that feeling is the mental correlate 
of the activation of certain vegetative neurones, and it 
seems reasonable to suppose that thought may be the 
mental correlate of the activation of cognitive neurones 
in the higher realms of the cortex. But we cannot prove 
this thesis ; nor can the Behaviourists prove that thought is 
the function of those minute muscular movements. How- 
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ever, it does not seem that the issue is of great practical 
importance. It is sufficient to say that these minute 
muscular movements do accompany certain thought pro- 
cesses, though they are not necessarily causative. Perhaps 
the most plausible explanation may be as follows. We 
have said that reflective thought involves activation of 
large numbers of intermediate neurones, accompanied by 
an inhibition of activation of neuromuscular patterns. 
Such inhibition is not always absolute, but may be relative, 
so that some part of the activation may be able to pass 
the resistance of the synapses, and activate the neuro- 
muscular patterns in a feeble way. As Janet has pointed 
out, the higher the level of cortical organization, the more 
efficiency is attained, but the violence of activity is lessened. 
For instance, compare the movement of the limb in volun- 
tary activity, with that during an epileptic fit. According 
to this law, the higher the level of thought, the less 
activation will proceed through the neuromuscular pattern, 
since the new engrams will be more efficiently established, 
and the inhibitions more complete. This is borne out 
by the fact that when the savage or the child thinks, the 
process is very apt to be accompanied by observable, or 
even comparatively violent muscular movements of silent 
speech or gesticulation ; and further, when we are excited, 
that is to say, when the general control of our mental 
processes is lessened, we are apt to make muscular move- 
ments of which we are quite unaware, but which are quite 
evident even to the casual observer. This merely illus- 
trates the fact that, though the neural mechanisms which 
subserve conation may not be so obvious in thought pro- 
cesses, as they are when muscular action ensues, they are 
none the less present. Thus, when we feel curiosity, 
though we may not approach the object to investigate 
it, but may sit and ponder over the possibilities, neverthe- 
less conation does occur and forms part of the process. 
Similarly, when we consider the organization of cognitive 
processes into perceptions, apperceptions and beliefs, all 
these involve conation in the sense we have discussed. 
In the same way, thought always involves affect. It 
is sometimes held that reflecting upon a mathematical 
problem is not accompanied by feeling. But this cannot 
be the case, as the reflection on such a problem is not 
an isolated event, which can be plucked out of its con- 
tent. It is all part of a process and is related to some 
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sentiment, probably to that of the piece of work in hand, 
or to the self -regarding sentiment, which must involve 
feeling, as we shall see later when we study sentiments. 
Moreover, no process of thought, however abstract, can 
be entirely divested of such emotions as curiosity, hope, 
despondency, elation and so on. Thought, therefore, can 
never be divorced from affect, any more than it can be 
from conation. Again, the organization of conations into 
sentiments and character, involves a cognitive recognition 
of the object of the sentiment, and quite definite feeling 
towards it. Hence, although, for convenience, we talk 
about organization of these various phases, we do not 
depart from the general structure which we have laid 
down as essential to mental processes, but merely lay 
stress on the greater significance of one phase or the 
other, in the process under examination. 
In a discussion of the organization of affective reactions, 
we cannot do better than follow McDougall, as we have, 
to a large extent, done so far. We must however insist 
that, as the primary emotional dispositions involve en- 
graphic arrangements of neurones in the nervous system, 
so, the more complex psychical organizations involve 
more complex physical organizations, always remember- 
ing that any given neurone, far from having any correlation 
with any given mental "element," may be a constituent 
in any number of engrams, just as in our previously quoted 
analogy, any given stretch of railway line might figure 
in any number of routes from place to place, as laid down 
in the railway timetables of the country. Further, it is 
postulated that the various emotional experiences, so far 
as affect is concerned, are the mental correlates of various 
combinations of the sensory patterns, depending on ten- 
sions in the visceral field. 
When the emotional dispositions, previously discussed, 
are organized on the c cal level of full consciousness, so 
that we are aware of the object of our'-emotion,.-and have 
control and discrimination of the subsequent conation, we 
may describe them as trtiemaions. In addition, 
we find the simple emotions combined in certain ways 
so that new compound emotions emerge. But it must 
be pointed out that the emergents described by McDougall 
as the compound emotions, are not the only ones possible, but that the same simple emotions may combine and emerge as something quite different. These atypical 
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emergents are usually associated with some pathological 
state of mental function, whether instability, dissociation, 
or retardation, and very often they cannot be given a 
name ; but, having drawn attention to this, we need not 
concern ourselves further with this matter here. Con- 
siderations of space forbid a full discussion of the 
compound emotions, and reference must be made to 
McDougall's 2 work for this purpose. However, we may 
quote his treatment of the compound emotion of rever- 
ence, to illustrate the sort of integration which takes place. 
Admiration is certainly a true emotion, and is, as certainly, 
not primary. It is distinctly a complex affective state, 
and implies a considerable degree of mental development. 
We can hardly suppose any of the animals to be capable 
of admiration, in the proper sense of the word, nor is it 
displayed by very young children. It is not merely a 
pleasurable perception or contemplation. One may get 
a certain pleasure from the perception or contemplation 
of an object without feeling any admiration for it -e.g., a 
popular ditty played on a barrel -organ may give one 
pleasure though one admires neither the ditty, nor the 
mode of its production, and though one may despise 
oneself a little, on account of the one feels. Nor 
is it merely intellectual and pleasurable appreciation of 
the greatness or excellence of the object. There seem 
to be two primary emotions essentially involved in the 
complex state provoked by the contemplation of the 
admired object, namely, wonder, and negative self -feeling 
or the emotion of submission. Wonder is revealed by the 
impulse to approach, and to continue to contemplate the 
admired object ; for, as we saw, this is the characteristic 
impulse of the "instinct" of curiosity, and wonder is 
clearly expressed on the face, in intense admiration. In 
the admiration of older children, one may observe wonder 
very clearly expressed and dominant. ' Oh, how wonder- 
ful !' or `Oh, how clever !' or ' How did you do it ?' are 
phrases in which a child naturally expresses its admiration, 
and by which the element of wonder and the impulse of 
curiosity are clearly revealed. But, as soon as we feel 
that we completely understand the object we have 
admired, and can wholly account for it, our wonder 
ceases, and the emotion evoked by it is no longer 
admiration. 
But admiration is more than wonder. We do not simply 
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proceed to examine the admired object, as we should one 
that provokes merely our curiosity or wonder. We approach 
it slowly, with a certain hesitation ; we are humbled by 
its presence, and in the case of a person whom we intensely 
admire, we become shy, like a child in the presence of an 
adult stranger; we have the impulse to shrink together, to 
be still, and to avoid attracting his attention ; that is to 
say, the instinct of submission, of self -abasement, is excited, 
with its corresponding emotion of negative self -feeling, by 
the perception that we are in the presence of a superior 
power, something greater than ourselves. 
As an example of the further complication of emotion, 
let us consider the nature of our emotion, if the object that 
excites our admiration is also of a threatening or mysterious 
nature, and therefore, capable of exciting fear : e.g., a 
tremendous force in action, such as the Victoria Falls, or 
the display of the aurora borealis, or a magnificent thunder- 
storm. The impulse of admiration to draw near humbly, 
and to contemplate the object is more or less neutralized 
by an impulse to withdraw, to run away, i.e., the impulse 
of fear. We are kept suspended in the middle distance, 
neither approaching very near, nor going quite away ; 
admiration is blended with fear, and we experience the 
emotion we call awe. 
Awe is of many shades, ranging from that in which 
admiration is but slightly tinged with fear, to that in which 
fear is but slightly tinged with admiration. Admiration is, 
then, a binary compound, awe a tertiary compound. And 
awe may be further blended to form a still more complex 
emotion. Suppose that the power that excites awe is also 
one that you have reason to regard as beneficent, one that, 
while capable of annihilating us in a moment, yet works 
for our good, sustains and protects us, one that evokes 
gratitude. Awe then becomes compounded with gratitude, 
and we experience the highly compound emotion of rever- 
ence. This is the religious emotion par excellence ; few 
merely human powers are capable of exciting reverence, 
this blend of wonder, fear, gratitude and negative self - 
feeling. Those human beings who inspire reverence, or 
who are by custom and convention considered to be entitled 
to inspire it, usually owe their reverend character to their 
being regarded as the ministers and dispensers of divine 
power. 
What then is gratitude, which enters into the emotion 
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of reverence for the divine power? Gratitude is itself 
complex. It is a binary compound of tender emotion and 
negative self -feeling. To this view it may be objected that if 
tender emotion is the emotion of the parental instinct, whose 
impulse is to protect, how can this emotion be evoked by 
the divine power? The answer to this question is that it 
is evoked in the same way as the child's tender emotion 
towards the parent is evoked, namely by sympathy. The 
other element in gratitude is that negative self -feeling, 
which is evoked by the sense of the superior power of 
another. The act that is to inspire gratitude must make 
us aware, not only of the kindly feeling, the tender emotion 
of the other towards us ; it must also make us aware of his 
power, and we must see that he is able to do for us some- 
thing that we cannot do for ourselves. The element of 
negative self -feeling, then, is blended with tenderness in 
true gratitude, and its impulse, the impulse to withdraw 
from the attention of, or to humble oneself in the presence 
of its object, more or less neutralizes the impulse of the 
tender emotion to approach its object ; the attitude typical 
and symbolical of gratitude is that of kneeling to kiss the 
hand that gives. Other compound emotions of this sort 
are pity, jealousy, shame and so forth ; and as has been said, 
these emergents may be more manifold than we have 
names to give them. 
The characteristic of these simple and compound emo- 
tions is that they occur in the organization of definite 
dispositions, with definite cognitive and conative phases 
of a permanent, though modifiable character. In other 
words they take their place as part of the function of a 
more or less permanent and specific engram. Given any 
one phase of these dispositions, the rest is predictable, 
as the emotion is always associated with a more or less 
definite situation. The derived emotions, on the other 
hand, may arise in the course of the activity of any of 
these dispositions. That is to say, that under certain 
circumstances, in the course of the activation of an engram, 
the neurones which subserve these derived emotions may 
be coincidently activated, but are not part of the original 
pattern as inherently laid down. For example, the sight 
of a sick child is associated with the emotion of pity, and 
the impulse to assist. That is the correlate of an engraphic 
activation inherently present in the architectural structure 
of the nervous system. However, in the course of this 
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process, any of the derived emotions, hope, despair, anxiety 
and so on, may intervene. These are the correlates of 
activation of neurones, other than those which constitute 
definite inherent dispositions, and they do not tend to form 
permanent components of sentiments. 
The derived emotions are met with at a level at 
which imagination, both prospective and retrospective, has 
come into play. These emotions divide themselves into a 
prospective group- confidence, hope, anxiety, despondency, 
despair -and into a retrospective group- regret, remorse 
and sorrow. A few others will be mentioned presently. 
To follow McDougall again, we may say that the derived 
emotions may occur in the course of any line of action, 
either singly or consecutively, depending for their intensity 
on the strength of the original conation ; and in their 
turn contributing to the persistency of the conation. In 
this respect they are analogous to the effect of endocrine 
activity, in inducing a persistent effect of vegetative nervous 
activity ; and doubtless their nature depends, to a large 
extent, on the state of the endocrine glands. For example, 
suppose I am setting out to climb a mountain, I awake 
early, the day is fine and I set out, full of confidence that 
I shall reach the top. Things may go perfectly smoothly, 
and the confidence persists until I have achieved my object. 
Or, I may find that the preliminary slopes are much more 
arduous than I expected, and instead of reaching the 
beginning of the real climb in two hours, I take three. 
By this time I am not so confident, but I am still 
full of hope, and go on with full determination to 
succeed. About half -way up, I notice that clouds are 
gathering very fast, and I know that the mountain is very 
dangerous in fog. I alternate between determination and 
expectancy that I shall succeed, and doubt and fear lest 
I shall fail, or even worse befall me. This " long drawn 
out fear" is anxiety. An hour later, I am still some 
hundreds of feet from the top when the fog closes down 
completely, and I realize that I shall never reach the top; 
so I give up the attempt, and sit down to rest in a state of despondency. Then I start to go down, still enveloped in fog, but I suddenly realize that I have lost my way, that I have eaten all my food, that no one knows exactly where I am. I reflect on all the disasters which have occurred on this mountain, and I give way to despair, in which state I cease to make any effort whatever. 
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When I have more or less recovered from this state of 
utter despair, and am sitting waiting for the mist to clear, 
I may carry my mind back, so to speak. I may then 
experience regret that I did not get up two hours earlier, 
or that I did not heed the warnings of the peasant I 
passed on the way, whom I had regarded as a miserable 
croaker. Then I may suddenly remember that I had 
left my dog shut up in a room, where he can get no food 
or drink, and I may reflect that I shall not get down to let 
him out for hours, or perhaps not at all, and I experience 
remorse. Upon this I settle down and think how I 
enjoyed life, how well I was getting on in my career, and I 
experience sorrow for myself. Then suddenly the mist 
clears, the sun comes out, I find that I am much nearer 
the bottom than I thought, and I experience joy, because 
I realize that I have got on better than I expected. 
Finally, while walking back towards home, I suddenly see 
my dog running towards me, whom I thought was shut 
up in the house, and I experience surprise. From this 
imaginary sequence of events, the reader may understand 
what is meant by the term derived emotions, and it is clear 
that they may occur in the course of any line of action. 
It would seem that confidence is the correlate of the 
pleasurable sensory pattern, depending on tensions, or 
absence of tension accompanying an anticipated conation 
with no prospect of failure. Despair, on the other hand, 
is the correlate of the unpleasurable pattern of tensions 
accompanying an anticipated conation, with no prospect 
of success, while hope, anxiety, and despondency are 
emergents from various combinations of these. Regret 
is the retrospective reflection of failure, corresponding to 
the prospective tensions of despair. If regret involves 
a pattern which subserves something or someone for 
whom tender feeling is habitually experienced, whether 
self or some loved one, then sorrow is experienced. If 
to this, is added the high grade pattern of self -criticism, 
remorse is felt. 
Joy is both retrospective and prospective. It accom- 
panies imagination of success achieved, but particularly 
the retrospective aspect of this. Shand B regards joy as 
a definite disposition, and treats it at great length, but 
though a difficult subject, it seems to fit into the category 
of derived emotions more satisfactorily than into that of 
dispositions. 
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Surprise, as McDougall says, is more difficult to analyse, 
but it seems to be the correlate of that pattern of tensions 
which eventuates from a sudden intervention of a new 
stimulus, in the progress of a conation, at the level of 
prospective imagination and reflective thought, since, 
unless we have some sort of image of the expected 
end, we cannot experience surprise at its failure to 
eventuate. 
Finally, amongst the affective organizations, we must _-- 
consider belief and doubt. These processes essentially 
involve integration on the level of reflective thought. 
The animals cannot be said to believe or doubt. For 
example, suppose a young horse sees a strange object, 
he may alternately approach it, or retreat from it, because 
his behaviour is alternately in accordance with the pattern 
of his " curiosity " disposition and his " fear flight " dis- 
position ; but he does not doubt. The integration of the 
process has not reached that level. In order to doubt, I 
must have at least two questions on which I can reflect, 
Is this so? and Is it not so? We say that anxiety -._. 
depends on affective correlates of tensions resulting from 
alternating prospective success or failure of conations. 
Doubt is an analogous affective experience, translated to - 
the field of intellectual propositions, rather than simple 
conations. We may doubt in respect of a purely abstract 
intellectual proposition, for instance, as to whether men 
live on Mars, or we may doubt as to what we are going 
to do in the next quarter of an hour ; but in the latter 
case, if we are really to experience doubt, we must present 
possibilities of action to ourselves in the form of questions, 
am I to go to sleep ? or, am I to go for a walk ? These 
are discriminated and judged upon in the field of intel- 
lectual activity, and not in the field of conation, leading 
to overt behaviour. The affective experience of doubt 
then, accompanies the highest discriminative function of 
our cortex, namely judgment and reason, and is integrated 
at the highest levels of its development which subserve 
reflective thought. The affect would seem to be the 
unpleasurable correlate of the sensory pattern, derived 
from the visceral tensions, involved in the failure of the 
opposed patterns to achieve co- ordination. This state is 
an interesting example of the importance of the lowest 
visceral functions, co- ordinated with the highest cortical 
activity, and illustrates how all mental processes are a 
_;. 
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unity, and may involve and include the lower processes by 
fusion, without any suppression whatever. 
Belief, similarly, is an organization of pleasurable 
affective patterns on the plane of reflective thought, and 
follows when the patterns between which judgment is 
made have been co- ordinated and resolved into a single 
proposition. The more perfect the co- ordination, the 
freer from unpleasurable tensions will the affective 
pattern be, and therefore, the " stronger" the belief. 
This refers to true logical belief at the highest level, 
which presupposes a state of doubt that has been 
resolved by what is called reasoning. However, the same 
pleasurable affective tensions exist implicitly at lower 
levels. Thus the proposition, " the world is flat," may 
be implicitly believed in by the illiterate peasant, because 
there is no evidence from his senses to contradict it. 
Hence there are no unpleasurable tensions from activation 
of opposing visceral patterns, which engender doubt. 
Later the illiterate begins to learn, and various pheno- 
mena are pointed out to him, which he had never noticed 
before. These give evidence that the world is not flat, 
his implicit belief is shaken, and he enters into a stage of 
doubt. From this experience of tension he is eventually 
relieved when, with the increase of his knowledge, he 
reaches a sufficiently high level of organization to form a 
judgment, and he can appreciate the conclusive evidence 
for roundness. His doubts are allayed and he again 
achieves the pleasurable affective state of firm belief. 
Primarily therefore, the child experiences an affective 
state of implicit belief in respect to all propositions, whether 
submitted to him in the form of evidence from his own 
senses, or as suggestions from others. It is only with 
the growth of experience, knowledge and discriminative 
function, that he experiences doubt. In certain cases, this 
doubt is integrated once more into a unity which consti- 
tutes belief, with the growth of the higher functions which 
subserve judgments and reasoning, and the more beliefs 
that can be established, the more chance of stability of 
personality does he have. Before discussing this further, 
however, we must turn to the organization of cognitive 
processes. 
When referring to Semon's Mnemic laws in Chapter 
II, we drew attention to the fact that once the various 
systems of neurones had been arranged engraphically, a 
MIIGn. Ala 
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similar stimulus pattern, or part of such pattern, as had 
already established the engram, was capable of reactivating 
the engram, so that its mental and physical correlates 
could again be experienced or observed. The mental 
aspects of such reactivations at the level of full conscious- 
ness, are what are known as images, and may involve 
visual activities, auditory activities, and so on. Images 
may be represented below the level of consciousness ; but, 
for the purposes of this discussion, we propose to confine 
the term to the usually accepted meaning of re- presented 
sensory experiences, of which the subject is aware. The 
representation is more or less exact, though it never can 
be precisely so, since it involves a new relatedness. This 
recall of the more or less exact image of the original 
pattern, constitutes what Varendonck 4 has called redupli- 
cative memory. This is characteristic of instinctive and 
habitual behaviour at, or below conscious level, in which 
the same engraphically determined pattern may be evoked 
again and again, as when the bee repeats the same geo- 
metrical structure of cell, time after time, or we follow the 
same routine in retiring to bed, night after night. It is 
also characteristic of the mental processes of children, 
primitives and retarded personalities. Moreover, it is used 
constantly in the everyday life of normal people, when 
exact representation is all that is required to serve the 
end of our behaviour. None the less, as these engrams 
become organized on the level of higher cortical function, 
this type of memory tends to give place to a different 
type, termed by Varendonck "synthetic memory." The 
latter depends on the discriminative and integrative 
functions of the cortex, which determine a certain com- 
bination of significant features in the re- presented pattern 
to form a new and more efficient emergence. This dis- 
criminative and selective function, is not confined to these 
higher cognitive processes, which subserve abstract and 
creative thinking, as some are disposed to argue, but is 
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characterizes the difference between synthetic and redupli- 
cative memory. Side by side, with the development of 
these cortical functions, which permit of discrimination 
and selection, the cognitive processes of man have been 
advanced enormously by the growth of language. Naines 
or tokens of certain sensory patterns seem to have been 
the fundamental origin of language, and these greatly 
simplify thought processes and the use of imagery. It 
will be remembered, that in discussing the inherent motor 
dispositions, we described the disposition of appeal. As 
McDougall ° has suggested, this is probably the basis of 
language, since it is the only primary disposition, which 
has the production of voice as its conation. With increas- 
ing organization however, this conative pattern has been 
translated from its original purpose of a cry for help, to 
subserve functions in the organization of other impulses, 
specially in relation to mating, active sympathy and the 
gregarious " instinct " -the three specially socializing dis- 
positions. This already lays down a differentiation of 
voice, in the call to the mate, the warning of danger, and 
so on. In the dog we can easily recognize differentiation 
of voice sounds, in the growl of anger, the yelp of food 
seeking, the whine of self- abasement, and the bark of pure 
excitement. In point of fact, this conation of voice pro- 
duction tends to become differentiated and organized in 
relation to the primary dispositions. It is easy to imagine 
further differentiation of voice sounds, say in the case of 
the warning cry of danger, whereby one sound meant lion, 
another snake and another tiger and so on. Thus we 
have established sounds, representing the names of things, 
which specially characterize the language of primitives. 
These races tend to name very general groups, such as 
trees, and then specific examples, and not generic classes, 
since the secondary synthetic power is not yet devel- 
oped. Thus we have the example of aborigines, who 
have a name for tree and different names for all varieties 
of oak tree, but no name for the genus oak. Later, how- 
ever, particulars become collected into more general groups, 
which makes for greater simplicity and efficiency in speech. 
From this the growth of language is not difficult to follow 
until it reaches the complexity of the modern civilized 
tongues. Having gained the power of selection among 
images and sensations and, by means of language, acquired 
a ready means of presenting them to ourselves or others, 
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the next advance is the power of directing attention to 
such images or sensations. When referring to function at 
cortical level, we noted that the organization of engrams 
is such, that when any engraphic pattern is in action there 
is also in consciousness, a fading impression of the mental 
correlate of the engram, which has just preceded the one 
in action, and a somewhat dim forecast of the engram 
about to be activated. The condition of passive or im- 
plicit attention would seem to depend on the fact that the 
most definite activation is taking place in the engram, 
which is said to be in the focus of consciousness ; the past 
and future engram being said to be in the margin of con - 
sciousness. Implicit attention is chiefly noticeable in the 
correlates of those engrams, whose stimulus pattern is most 
intense or most persistent. "Active" attention depends on --- 
the organization of engrams, or their correlated patterns, 
into systems with an affective appeal. These systems, 
complexes, or constellations, are in relation to one or more 
of our dominant sentiments. For instance, we can, as a 
rule, fix our attention on incidents or images in relation to 
our ambitions, our loves and hates, and it is in virtue of 
the organization of the pattern in relation to these senti- 
ments, that the so- called fixation of attention is possible. 
Again, therefore, active attention depends on higher cortical -' 
function, and is an emergent, depending on a new related- 
ness. The succession of activation of engrams subserves 
the stream of consciousness, and allows for consecutiveness 
of thought. Also this allows for what we call prospective 
imagination, whereby we forestall actual behaviour by 
"imagining it in our mind's eye." Prospective imagination 
of something absolutely new and altogether outside our 
experience is impossible, for it necessarily involves the 
activation of an engram already laid down, but the selective 
and reintegrative function already referred to, allows for 
new groupings within the engram, so that a new emergent 
from old material may arise. Of such sort is the creative imagination of the artist and the genius. However, it is clear that such prospective imagination would be im- 
possible were it not for the short cut provided by symbolic images of various sorts, and especially by language, for in this way the subject, working in imagination, escapes the necessity of having to go through the long tedious process of redintegration, but achieves results by selection and synthesis. This stream of prospective imagination is 
I I2 PERSONALITY 
specially characteristic of dreams and phantasy formation, 
which are not subjected to the control of the higher forms 
of thought, termed reasoning, and are never interrupted 
by muscular activity. 
To return to the activation of engrams, imagination 
depends on the spread of activity through a series of these, 
and with each a mental correlate will be experienced, 
having an organization related to that of the engram. The 
nature of our most ordinary mental experiences is not only 
dependent on the exact representation of the engraphic 
correlates, but will depend on several other factors, amongst 
which are the effects of the present stimulus, the organiza- 
tion of past engraphic effects, certain facilitations and in- 
hibitions, depending on temporary temperamental factors, 
and so on. Each such experience -or perception -is a 
true emergent, something coherent in itself, having its own 
organization and form. This is what the Gestalt theory 
seeks to demonstrate, that perceptions are not mere 
agglomerations of sensations and images but have a 
definite form and structure of their own and are recog- 
nized in consciousness, in virtue of that form and structure, 
and acquire meaning only in virtue of this inherent 
organization. Hence, part of a perception is meaningless, 
and is incapable of being considered in consciousness, since 
the very essential nature of the perception is its wholeness. 
A perception from its very nature is necessarily conscious, 
and, except as an emergent whole, it cannot attain that 
relatedness which involves consciousness. This essential 
structure and form is not hard to grasp, if a perception is 
considered as the correlate of an engram, organized at the 
level of full cortical function, where a very definite degree 
of integration has been reached. This factor of form is 
another means whereby mental processes are simplified at 
higher levels, and we come across it again and again all 
the way up to the thought of the physicist and mathe- 
matician, who frequently helps himself by constructing 
images of organized form, and the artist who composes his 
picture in relation to forms and volumes. This organiza- 
tion into complex, but yet integrated form, has only been 
recently recognized, for it was obscured by the much dis- 
cussed process of association. This constitutes a linking 
together of engraphic patterns, with their correlates, the 
perceptions, by some of the many ties described by the 
association psychologists ; but this linking together only 
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becomes significant when it leads to a new organization. 
In itself, the mere process of association, independently of 
the essential higher functions of the cortex, may occur in 
the incoherence of dreams and the redintegrations of the 
insane, and has no significance. 
The primary perceptions of the child and the primitive 
are generic rather than particular, and the first advance 
is by the function of discrimination. Consider the child's 
impression of any presentation of its environment. Certain 
of these presentations appear to him as four -legged moving 
beings. These are then discriminated into bow -wows, 
pussies, and so on, depending on his auditory and other 
simple sensory impressions. Gradually, as this formal 
perception is .enriched by experience, suggestion and in- 
struction, he is enabled to discriminate between the various 
sorts of bow -wow, till he can differentiate almost any 
variety. On this process of discrimination, combined with 
the opportunities of experience and instruction enjoyed 
by the subject, depends the acquisition of knowledge. 
Personalities vary greatly in this power of discrimination, 
and consequently of acquiring knowledge, but they vary 
still more in the higher functions which involve the appli- 
cation of knowledge. It is clear, that if this process of 
discrimination was to continue indefinitely, the individual 
would be provided with an enormous number of separate 
perceptions, whose very multiplicity would lead to confu- 
sion and futility. Hence the next process is a re- synthesis 
of individual perceptions into general classes, grouped 
according to significant features. This process is termed 
apperception, and involves the formation of concepts. For 
example, suppose a child uninstructed in physics has re- 
garded ice, water, and steam as essentially different sub- 
stances, having nothing to do with each other. Then he 
learns, that, if subjected to a sufficiently high temperature, 
ice first becomes water, and then steam ; and that steam 
sufficiently cooled becomes first water, and then ice ; and 
similarly water, subjected to the proper conditions, may 
be converted into either ice, or steam, he realizes that 
they are, in fact, the same substance under different 
physical forms. This grouping of these three separate 
perceptions into one, which may further be symbolized under the sign H2O, obviously allows for short cuts in thought, and enormously simplifies the engraphic pattern. Apparently in certain people at any rate, this grouping 
H 
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of perceptions by appreciation of common features, may 
go on below the level of conscious awareness, in which 
case, the new emergent structure appears in the form of 
an intuition. With the emergence of concepts we find 
a further organization with the affective patterns, which 
have been referred to as belief. The simpler concepts may 
give rise to conflict, and engender doubt, or be further 
integrated and give rise to more general beliefs, and this 
leads to the next step in the organization of cognitive 
dispositions by the process of reasoning. The functions of 
discrimination and apperception, on the level of reflective 
thought, allow us to present for consideration propositions 
which are correlates of complicated engrams, which involve 
the pleasurable patterns subserving the affect of belief. 
In the process of reasoning the functions of discrimination 
and integration come into play at the highest level. The 
simplest form of reasoning is from two particular beliefs 
to a third. Thus, experience tells us that steam is hotter 
than water, and there being no counter experience to 
engender doubt, this proposition is accompanied by belief. 
Secondly, experience establishes a further belief that water 
is hotter than ice. Therefore reason tells us that steam 
is hotter than ice. Such an example of reasoning is so 
crude as to savour of the ridiculous, but it serves as an 
example of a large class of mental processes whereby 
new beliefs are formed and knowledge is applied. They 
may be expressed by the formula X = Y and Y = Z .'. Z X. 
This form of reasoning is simple, and gives rise to reliable 
propositions. 
The next step is inductive reasoning. This consists 
of the argument from the particular to the general, which 
may be exemplified by the following example. I have 
seen and touched a very large number of fish, and all 
these are cold -blooded, therefore all fish are cold - blooded. 
This type of argument is extremely common, and is very 
useful for arranging facts, but its inherent possibility of 
fallacy must be remembered. For example, it is possible, 
however improbable it may be, that one day I might come 
across a warm -blooded fish, when the whole argument 
would fall to the ground. The possible fallacy of such 
reasoning is more apparent from such an example as the 
following. Suppose I have to catch a train every morning, 
and for months it is at least five minutes late, it is a 
legitimate inductive argument that I can always take 
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five minutes more over breakfast ; but one day I shall 
certainly miss my train. Hence, a belief established by 
inductive reasoning should never be so organized as to be 
essential to the stability of the personality, for it is always 
liable to be upset. The form of argument of inductive 
reasoning may be represented thus : 
X =Y, Xi =Y, X2 =Y, Xn =Y, .. all X's =Y. 
The third type of reasoning is known as deductive 
reasoning, and is an argument from the general to the 
particular. This may be exemplified as follows. I am 
walking on a tableland, from which I wish to descend. 
I come to a stream flowing westwards. I argue, water 
always flows down hill, this water is flowing westwards, 
therefore westwards is down hill. This type of argument 
is dependable, provided the premises are reliable, but if 
not, then the most grievous errors may be arrived at by 
the most logical processes, as may be seen in the delusions 
of certain insane persons -the paranoiacs. This form of 
argument may be represented by the formula :-all X's 
are Y's, Z is an X. .. Z is a Y, but the fallacy expressed 
thus, all X's are Y's, Z is a Y, .. Z is an X, must be 
carefully guarded against. 
All these processes of reasoning result in systems of 
beliefs, which are of the greatest importance to the per- 
sonality. When formulated in the realm of reality they 
are referred to as convictions of facts, but when they are 
formulated in the realms of phantasy, or ethics, they are 
referred to as faith. The freer these systems of belief are 
from the tensions engendered by doubt, the more stable 
will be the personality. Further, this stability will be 
achieved in so far as these various systems of belief are 
organized into a coherent philosophy of life. A spurious 
stability may be established if the systems which conflict 
with each other are kept in what have been termed logic - 
tight compartments, so that they are never allowed to 
become associated in such a way, that the tensions of 
doubt are engendered. For instance, it is not uncommon 
to find an employer of labour seriously denouncing the 
evils of slum dwellings, and pointing out how this leads 
to the ill- health and inefficiency of his work- people, while 
he gladly accepted the good rents from this class of real estate. Shaw has dramatized this situation in Widowers' 
Houses. Sooner or later, however, circumstances arise in 
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most cases, which break down these artificial barriers and 
stability is seriously threatened, if not actually interfered 
with. 
Personalities vary considerably in their capacity of 
exercising the higher functions of thought, which we may 
term intelligence, and consequently in the degree to which 
they can build up these systems of beliefs, and use them 
in the general organization of their minds. 
Some people go through life with these systems un- 
organized into any definite structural whole, but they 
generally fail practically, since there is no unity in their 
personalities. They are sometimes said to have no beliefs, 
but only working hypotheses. This is not an accurate 
description, since it is not an absence of beliefs, but an 
absence of organization of beliefs, that is characteristic. 
In these people, the upsetting of any one system of belief 
has little or no effect on the rest, and so does not seriously 
affect the personality as a whole. At the other end of 
the scale are those people whose beliefs are all narrowly 
integrated together, so that the whole structure stands or 
falls by each separate system. These tend to weave their 
philosophy of life into a sentiment, without due regard 
to a comprehensive relationship with the environment; 
that is to say the integration of this philosophy of 
life is at a lower level than the general organization 
of the self -regarding sentiment to which we shall refer 
presently. In this process of integration all sorts of 
emotional dispositions are centred round the philosophy 
professed. This state may be exemplified by the extreme 
Puritan, who hated and feared those that disagreed with 
his creed, was elated if he felt that his behaviour upheld 
it, loved those who professed it, and so on. The most 
desirable personality is presumably he in whom there is 
a well organized system of beliefs, constituting a satis- 
factory philosophy of life. This philosophy of life should 
not be too unyielding and narrow, but should be com- 
prehensive and capable of modification within its own 
structure. 
Finally, we must consider the organization of conative 
processes. First of all, it will be as well to draw attention 
to the fact that we are dealing with purely mental processes, 
and to guard against the fallacy of loose terms, which 
imply that a conation, or any other mental process, can do 
anything. There is only one source of energy in the body, 
FURTHER ORGANIZATION. i 17 
and that is provided by the combustion of fuel, which in 
living organisms takes the form of digestion of the food. 
To take an analogy, a motor car can do nothing by itself, 
it can only work by means of the combustion of petrol ; 
but the car will go faster and more efficiently on the same 
amount of petrol if all its parts are properly fitted to- 
gether, and all its nuts and screws are tight, also if all 
sources of internal friction are removed. Similarly with 
conations, if the patterns on which they depend are firmly 
organized, and so constituted that the whole efferent tract 
to the final motor path, whatever it may be, is facilitated, 
and free from inhibitions, the resulting activity will be more 
efficient. Therefore, when we say this conation, impulse, 
urge, or whatever we call it, is stronger or more vigorous 
than that other, all we mean is that the pattern through 
which the efferent activation progresses, is better organized 
and facilitated. The patterns, moreover, which are 
most closely organized and facilitated, are those which 
we have described as the primary emotional dispositions, 
and we find that when conation appears most vigorous, 
the pattern of behaviour is in accordance with one of 
these primary dispositions, fear, anger, curiosity, sex and 
the like. 
This gives us means to understand such factors as 
interest and desire. We saw that passive implicit attention 
depended on the full activation of any particular engram. 
Active, so called voluntary, attention depends on the fact 
that the particular engram is organized with one of the 
primary dispositions, generally curiosity in the intellectual 
sphere, but also with others, and built up with a sentiment. 
Further, it is the conation, the wish, the urge, organized on 
the conscious level, which gives us the sense of effort, which 
we call "taking an interest." Similarly with desire, which is 
generally applied to the sphere of action, and not so much 
to the sphere of intellect. This is the mental correlate of 
another somewhat different organization of the conative 
pattern on the conscious level, and the urgency of desire depends on the closeness with which the engram under activation is organized with one of the primary disposi- tions, or built up within a definite sentiment and;the degree of facilitation within this engram. To go back to our analogy of the network of railway lines, we may suppose that at various parts, there were stretches of line, particularly well laid, particularly smooth and frictionless, which would 
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correspond to the primary dispositions. The rest varied 
very considerably in its quality, some being very poorly put 
together, with frequent unevenness and friction. It is 
clear, that given a constant fuel consumption, the more 
the train could run over the smooth parts in going from any 
one place to any other place by the scheduled routes, the 
more speed, efficiency and apparent power it would exhibit, 
but this power would only be apparent, for it depends on 
the permanent way, and not on the fuel consumption of 
the engine. 
In discussing the organization of conative dispositions, 
we cannot do better than follow McDougall again in his 
conceptions of the sentiments. A sentiment may be 
defined, as an organization of affective dispositions in 
relation to an object, so that the various conative trends 
are modified in relation to this object. The object may 
be anything at all, animate or inanimate, work, golf, or 
child, and the organization of conative dispositions will 
depend on the nature of the sentiments. Examples of 
sentiments are love, hate, contempt, respect, friendship and 
so on, but it is evident that the combination may be legion, 
and for many of the emergents we can have no name. As 
an example, we may indicate how the dispositions are 
organized within the sentiment of love. Self- abasement 
is felt in the presence of the loved one, who is generally 
felt as " far too good ". Self -assertion is felt at having 
won such a prize, and at being thought worthy to love such 
a one. This is directed towards other people more than 
to the object of the love, and yet to a certain extent to the 
loved one as well. Fear is felt lest any danger should 
approach, anger against any that interfere with our relation- 
ship with the loved one, and also against any that should 
harm or threaten her. Tender emotion is felt in a desire 
to cherish and protect her, curiosity to find out all about 
her, and all sides of her character. One is open to sugges- 
tion from her and about her, one sympathizes with her 
and tends to imitate her actions, and throughout all is the 
strongly organized, and therefore conatively vigorous, 
mating impulse. These and other dispositions are all 
organized round the object of the loved one, and the more 
firmly organized the sentiment the " stronger " is the 
love. The more the relatively simple, closely organized, 
facilitated disposition of sex is dominant, especially if it 
is 
in its relatively low state of integration of appetite, the 
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more "violent" will be the love, in accordance with the 
principle, that has been referred to before, that the higher 
the integration the more efficient, but less violent is the 
resultant.. pattern of behaviour. Hence, it may be seen 
that all sorts of variations may occur in the ultimate nature 
of a sentiment, according to the variation and proportion 
of the dispositions, which are organized within it ; but this 
very organization will determine the conations and overt 
behaviour of the individual. 
With the development of self -consciousness it necessarily 
follows that a strong, enduring and important sentiment 
must be formed round this new object, the self. This 
McDougall has termed the self -regarding sentiment, and, 
according to the organization and form of this will be 
determined all the relationships between the self and the 
environment in the widest sense. The sentiment will vary 
with the dominance of fear, curiosity, tender emotion and 
so on. Moreover this sentiment must necessarily embrace 
all others, love, hate, contempt, respect, friendship, and so on, 
for all sorts of objects, for they cannot exist except in relation 
to the self, and must be organized round the self. 
We have now reached the point when we can consider 
the final which results in the emergence 
the unique complete personality. This final organization 
would seem to be the union of the self -regarding sentiment 
with the philosophy of life, described above, as the pro- 
visional culmination -of the cognitive dispositions, together 
with the all- important temperamental factor already dis- 
cussed. This organization may help to explain how it 
is we can resist the common temptations of life, which 
seem to be so much more violent than what we call our 
moral sentiments. In spite of this violence however, if 
this new organization within the personality is firmly knit, 
then it will gather within its formal structure all these 
"lower" impulses so that they cannot "break loose and act 
on their own," unless the stability of organization weakens, 
and dissociation occurs. Let us take an analogy ; imagine a highly trained organized troop of cavalry executing a 
musical ride ; their coherence depends on the close and 
carefully organized form of the whole, and as this form 
alters and shifts in the course of the ride it presents kaleidoscopic changes to the onlooker, but always remains the same organized group, which may seem incapable of acting separately. But supposing discipline and control 
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is relaxed over the individual rider and horse, that in- 
dividual is capable of executing the most violent inde- 
pendent movements, and throwing the whole into the 
most unutterable confusion. Let the individual rider and 
horse represent the "lower" impulses, and the organized 
troop, the properly integrated personality, and we see how 
" giving way to temptation " depends on the disorganization 
of personality, and why the lower impulse sometimes wins 
the day and sometimes loses, in the apparently unequal 
struggle. It would be just as sensible or foolish to ask 
why, in the course of a musical ride, any one horse does not 
always turn and gallop away to its stable and its oats, as 
to ask why, in a well- organized personality, one of the 
lower impulses does not always become dominant, and 
stampede the personality in the direction of lust, theft, 
murder or panic. To push our analogy a little further, 
we may observe that the musical ride may be beautiful 
or ugly, efficient or untidy, according to the "form" in 
which it is organized. We have seen how important this 
" form " is, in relation to cognitive integration, and now 
we see that it is the philosophy of life which gives form 
to our behaviour, and determines the coherence and nature 
of the self -regarding sentiment. Before leaving this analogy 
however, it must be pointed out that it is not exact, 
and yet it may stand as an illustration. It is not exact, 
because the individual horse in the troop does have a 
separate source of energy belonging to its own individual- 
ity, which we cannot allow to the primary dispositions. 
The analogy would perhaps be closer, if we imagined the 
troop to be mechanical and coupled together, all driven 
by the same steam engine. But under certain conditions 
the couplings might break, and the individual units pro- 
ceed to disintegrate the whole by their own momentum. 
The philosophy of life, which we have described as 
the pattern according to which behaviour is determined, 
may be noble or ignoble, according to purely hedonistic 
principles of avoidance of pain and gaining of pleasure; 
according to the dictates of the eleventh commandment 
" thou shalt not be found out"; or according to the highest 
ideals and aspirations, of which the human race is capable. 
Our behaviour will be shaped in relation to this form of our 
philosophy, and hence the importance of having some 
philosophy of life, preferably a good one, with which our 
self -regarding sentiment may be integrated. Only so can 
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we reach the desired end of the development of our 
personality, namely stability of structure, capable of 
modification within that structure so as to ensure 
adequate adjustment to the changing circumstances of 
the environment. 
CHAPTER VIII 
VARIATIONS IN PERSONALITIES 
As far as space will allow, we have now completed the 
review of the scheme according to which we conceive the 
development of personality from the inherent dispositions, 
and have arrived at a point when we can consider the organ- 
ized emergent as a whole. 
So far, however, we have not laid sufficient stress on 
the influence of environment in moulding the personality. 
It is obvious that from the very moment of birth, environ- 
ment as a whole influences and modifies the dispositions, 
and it is clearly impossible to follow out, in any general 
way, what must necessarily be an individual experience. 
However, there are certain environmental factors which 
require mention. To begin with, there are the physical 
factors in the environment, which may be grouped under 
the general term climatic. Next the generic factor, race, 
though not itself environmental, is involved in the acquired 
factor of social heritage. It is by no means an easy task 
to differentiate the particular contributions of these 
factors in the make -up of the individual, for no very 
accurate observations, on a sufficiently large scale, have 
been carried out. However, there is no doubt that there 
is a lot of truth in the popular conception that those who 
live in a cold bracing climate are on the whole more alert, 
more progressive, and more aggressive, than those who live 
in a warm relaxing climate. The latter tend to be inert, 
conservative, and prone to follow the path of least resist- 
ance. In these days of rapid communication, it is probably 
becoming increasingly hard to be certain of the exact 
influence of climate, for, in order to produce their effect, 
these physical factors must exert their influence continu- 
ally and for some considerable time, and we are apt to 
attribute to " a change of air," effects which are due to 
quite different causes. If we have the misfortune to live 
and work in a relaxing climate we know the effect of the 
change to the sea or the hills, how our mind clears, how 
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new apperceptions are achieved, and all our mental functions 
work at a higher level. All this we are apt to attribute, to 
the climatic change, forgetting the effect of freedom from 
worry, and fatigue, and the new stimulus patterns which 
are presented to our senses quite independently of changes 
of climate. Nevertheless, the fact remains, that any 
personality does have a climatic medium in which both 
physical and mental functions are at their best, and this 
varies with the individual. For instance, for one person 
the optimum is a mountain climate over 500o feet, while 
others would feel no energy at all at such a height, indeed 
a case may be cited of a lady who is depressed by 
mountains to such an extent that she is acutely miserable 
while the train passes through Switzerland on the way to 
Italy, but quite regains her spirits on reaching the plain at 
Milan. McDougall sums up the effects of climate as 
follows : "There is a fair consensus of opinion to the effect 
that what we may call climate exerts an important influence. 
In climate, the two factors recognized as of chief importance, 
are temperature and moisture. High temperature combined 
with moisture, certainly tends to depress the vital activity 
of Europeans, and to render them indolent and indisposed 
to exertion of any kind. On the other hand, high tempera- 
ture combined with dryness of the atmosphere, seems to 
have the effect of rendering men but little disposed to 
continuous activity, and yet capable of great efforts ; it 
tends to produce a violent, spasmodic activity. A cold 
climate seems to dispose towards sustained activity, and, 
when combined with much moisture, to a certain slowness. 
These effects, which we ourselves experience, and which we 
see produced upon other individuals on passing from one 
climate to another, we seem to see impressed upon many 
of the races, which have long been subjected to those 
climates ; for example, the slow and lazy Malays have 
long occupied the hottest, moistest region of the earth. 
The Arabs and the fiery Sikhs, may be held to illustrate 
the effect of dry heat. The Englishman and the Dutch- 
man show the effects of a moist cool climate, a certain sluggishness, embodied with great energy and persever- ance." He quotes a somewhat doubtful example of more definitely physical modifications. Thus, it is said that in North America, a race characterized by a new specific combination of mental and physical qualities is being rapidly formed ; and it seems to be well established that 
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long slender hands are among these features ; for in Paris, 
a specially long slender glove is made every year in 
large quantities for the American market. Again, we 
see apparently a change of physical type in the white 
inhabitants of Australia. They seem to be becoming 
taller and more slender cornstalks' ; and this modi- 
fication is commonly regarded as the direct effect of 
climate. That a new race or sub -race, with a specific 
combination of qualities, should be forming in America, 
is certainly to be expected from the fact that the intimate 
blending of a number of European stocks has been going 
on for some generations. But what gives special support 
to the assumption that these new qualities are the direct 
effects of climate, is that these physical qualities, at 
least, seem to be approximations to the type of the Red 
Indians, the aboriginal inhabitants. And, it is said, this 
approximation of type can only be due to hereditary 
accumulation of the direct effects of the climate on in- 
dividuals. This, however, leads us on to the vexed 
question of inheritance of acquired characters, with which 
there is no space to deal here. 
When we turn to the influence of race on the person- 
ality, we are met with the most perplexing problems. All 
through history many attempts have been made to differ- 
entiate racial characteristics and in modern times, since 
Jung 2 expounded his introvert and extravert types, many 
writers have tried their hand at differentiating the types, 
as exemplified by the various races. The difficulty in 
such work is that, even with scientific writers of the 
highest repute, the patriotic prejudices engendered by the 
late war, are not without their effect. Trotter's 3 efforts 
to classify nations in correspondence with animal herds, 
was not particularly happy, and the later efforts of 
McDougall,' Hinkle' and Seligman,' though full of 
interest and suggestion, are not altogether convincing. 
The fact of the matter is, that in any given race, there 
are so many exceptions that no rule can be satisfactorily 
established. For this reason no attempt will be made 
here to discuss the question of racial differences, since 
this belongs rather to the science of anthropology. It is 
sufficient to point out that racial differences do exist, and 
that however similar their climatic, social and educational 
environment, the respective descendants of Shem, Ham 
and Japheth can never emerge as identical personalities. 
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The next factor is what Mr Graham Wallas' has 
termed " social heritage." This corresponds, in some 
measure, to what Trotter calls the " herd instinct." The 
latter discusses this, not so much as a reaction of the indivi- 
dual in virtue of an inherent instinct, but rather as the 
influence of the attitude of the community on the individual. 
He shows how this attitude controls and restricts, not only 
the conations of man's primary dispositions, but also 
man's progress towards higher rational levels. In the 
last chapter it was assumed that the philosophy of life, 
which subserved the highest emergence, should be organ- 
ized on the highest rational level, but it must be admitted 
at once, that this is not attained in the majority of cases. 
Our most fixed beliefs are too often merely the products 
of the suggestion of the community, and this especially 
applies to such as relate to our position in the universe 
and our object in life. The Christian and the Atheist, 
the Conservative and the Socialist, too often hold their 
beliefs because their set believe these doctrines, and not 
because they have arrived at their standpoint by any 
process of reasoning at all. 
As a result of the possession of language and its 
derivatives, man has an enormous mass of this social 
heritage, which is the accumulated experience of the herds 
and communities into which the human race has been 
divided, but as Wallas points out, it is not confined to 
man. Zoologists have shown that many birds hand on 
individual experiences of song production, routes of migra- 
tion, and habits of various sorts. For example the trick 
of getting at the kidneys of the sheep, which are their 
victims, seems to be a true social heritage of the mountain 
parrots of New Zealand, and the practice of sea -gulls 
flocking up the river to London in winter, was a habit 
engendered as recently as 1895, when a few gulls found 
refuge and food there, during an exceptionally prolonged 
cold spell. However, it is only in man that this social 
heritage has assumed such great importance. So great 
indeed is this, that it is doubtful if modern civilized man 
could long survive if deprived of all that it contributes to 
his daily life. The nature of this social heritage depends 
to a very large extent on the social class into which an 
individual is born, for this determines all sorts of im- 
portant factors, both physical and mental. Obviously 
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diet, fresh air, education and companionship are largely 
dependent on the social strata in which the child finds 
himself, but also, more subtle influences are thereby deter- 
mined, such as the closeness of relationship with the 
parents and with brothers and sisters, the age at which 
the child has to enter the world and fend for himself, the 
degree of responsibility devolved upon him, both in respect 
of his younger brothers and sisters, and so on. In spite 
of these factors however, too much stress must not be laid 
on the influence of environment, for it is probable that 
much more is due to nature than to nurture, as may be 
seen by the very considerable variation amongst indi- 
viduals of the same class and circumstances. For ex- 
ample, a statistical enquiry was made into the manual 
workers of Sheffield, some 800 men and women being 
taken for investigation. Of these it was found that 22 
per cent. were of an exemplary type, sober, industrious 
and of sufficient intelligence to be worthy to exercise the 
vote ; 14 per cent. were vicious and undesirable ; while the 
remainder were of poor capabilities, incapable of advanc- 
ing themselves in the world, and of barely sufficient in- 
telligence to vote properly. It is possible that with a 
better social heritage this large middle group might have 
been improved, so as to be worthy of inclusion in the first 
group, but on the whole, they were condemned to hopeless 
mediocrity, by their lack of innate capabilities, rather than 
by their lack of opportunities. 
Further elaboration of these environmental factors must 
be sought in works on anthropology and sociology, for 
it is impossible to discuss in any adequate way the infinite 
variety of environmental factors which influence the for- 
mation of personality, and we must be content to reiterate, 
that personality has no meaning in terms of nature alone, 
nor yet in terms of nurture alone, but is an emergent from 
the interrelatedness of the two. 
It remains to consider broad factors determining the 
variations between personalities. In some cases grouped 
together under the head of retarded personalities, the in- 
dividual is incapable of full development, owing to inherent 
defects of the nervous system. These merit separate dis- 
cussion, in view of the light thrown by them on the 
development of the normal and will be dealt with in 
Chapter XV. Others reach their full development ab- 
normally early. Such are termed precocious. As has 
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been seen already in Chapter V general precocity may 
be associated with anomalies of the endocrine system, but 
precocity in particular functions may also occur. Most, 
if not all individuals are provided with one or more talents, i 
for instance for singing, for dancing, for construction, for 
abstract thought, and so on. These differ from the dis- 
positions we have so far discussed, in being peculiar to 
the individual, and not general for the species. Everyone 
possesses an instinct, or emotional disposition of curiosity, 
but not everyone possesses a talent for singing. Such 
talents may be described as a special aptitude for some 
particular function, and these aptitudes depend on a 
specially organized engram, within which all neuronic 
connexions are facilitated ; for it is noticeable that the 
activity represented by the talent is not only done well, 
but also easily and quickly. Talents are special develop- 
ments of the functions we have learnt to regard as 
belonging to the highest levels of cortical activity. For 
example, the talented musician must be able to discriminate 
a variety of tones in such a way as to surpass the average 
person in the subtlety of this discrimination, so that he 
can distinguish, say, five separate tones, where the average 
man can only distinguish one. Then he must be capable 
of reintegration, so as to produce new tone combinations, 
and finally have such power of discriminative muscular 
movement as the technique of singing, piano -playing, or 
the like, demand. It is obvious that in the majority of 
cases such talents owe something to inherent dispositions, 
and a great deal to acquired skill, and the proportion of 
these two constituents will vary with the nature of the 
talent. In certáin cases the talent appears precociously 
early in life, so that it is evident that the engram is almost 
entirely inherently constituted. The classical example is 
that of Mozart, who was able to play a piece on the piano 
at the age of three, with very little practice. It is to be 
noticed, however, as Darwin points out, that his action was 
not instinctive in the true sense. If this had been so, it 
must have resembled the duckling, which swims perfectly 
when put in the water, with no practice. None the less, as 
Wards says, such precocious talents come remarkably 
close to instinctive action, and may eventually come to be ` instinctive, inasmuch as they can be performed without 
practice. Thus, if we accept at least the possibility of transmission of acquired characters, the talents of the 
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present may represent the instincts of the future. Pre- 
cocity of talents then, is an early organization and facilita- 
tion of certain engrams, subserving high -grade activity of 
considerable complexity. It is noticeable, however, that 
talents which are precocious are concerned with those 
levels of the cortex which are not of the very highest, but 
have to do with sensory and motor discrimination and 
integration, expressing themselves in terms of tone, colour 
and form. Hence we find precocity in music, painting and 
the manipulative arts, but not in abstract thought, or in 
the framing of philosophical concepts, since such function 
only comes to fruition later in life. Infant calculators are 
not uncommon, but probably this function has to do with 
perception of geometrical form, rather than with any real 
mathematical ability. Again reduplicative memory may 
be very highly developed at quite an early age, so that a 
young child may be able to repeat long passages by heart, 
but synthetical mémory is not a feature that is ever to be 
met with till later. 
While some personalities are retarded and others 
precocious, the majority develop up to a point, at much 
the same rate and in much the same way ; but in the later 
stages of development there is a considerable difference 
in the extent of growth, and in the levels of so called 
intelligence which are reached. The intelligence of a 
person is not his intellectual knowledge, but his capacity 
for using that knowledge. It depends therefore on the 
employment of synthetical memory, and on the exercise 
of these higher functions of the cortex, which we have 
referred to when discussing apperception, concepts and 
reason. People vary enormously in the ability to use these 
functions, and the fundamental factor in this variability 
is probably innate. As has already been said, the new- 
born child possesses all the nerve cells he is going to have, 
but not all are able to function at once, because the nerve 
processes are not provided with their insulating myeline 
sheaths. These are only provided as further development 
takes place. Inasmuch as intelligence consists in the 
capacity for forming new groupings amongst the simpler 
engrams already laid down, the capacity for this function 
must depend in some measure on the number of neurones 
in the superficial layers of the cortex with which the 
individual is provided, since these cells subserve 
the 
highest function ; and the age at which intelligence 
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appears and develops will depend on the rate at which 
these cells acquire their myeline sheaths. Both of these 
factors are variants, and may account for the difference in 
individuals in this respect, for the study of the retarded 
personality reveals how the higher level structures of 
brains do differ. It is not easy to estimate the general 
intelligence of any personality, since the factor is essenti- 
ally a complex integration of various capacities which 
depend very largely on environmental factors as to how 
they are displayed at any given time. Further considera- 
tion will be given to this subject in Chapter XV. 
Of those personalities in whom new integrations of 
engrams arise to a greater extent than usual, with the 
result that original behaviour emerges, we say that they 
exhibit genius. This capacity for genius is generally 
admitted to be innate, but not to be identical with the 
possession of talents, which may be precocious but are 
essentially acquired. As we have seen, talents are 
examples of specially facilitated behaviour of a sort, 
which is familiar in the race, and which differs more in 
degree than in kind, from the pattern of behaviour 
exhibited by the average individual. Genius, on the other 
hand, is essentially the exhibition of a pattern of behaviour 
which is genuinely new, and differs in kind from the 
patterns exhibited by the rest of the community. The 
term " pattern of behaviour" is used in order to avoid 
narrowing the field of genius, since genius may be ex- 
hibited in manipulation, or in thought, in applied practical 
behaviour, or in abstract philosophical speculation. From 
this it is evident that the capacity to display a talent is 
innate, inasmuch as the engram concerned is innate ; but 
the special facilitation which makes the engram subserve 
a talent, rather than an ordinary pattern of behaviour, is 
dependent on training and opportunity, though, in the 
more markedly precocious talents, this may be reduced 
to a minimum. To put it in another way, the disposition of the talented individual at birth does not materially differ from that of his less talented neighbour. On the other hand genius depends on an innate difference of disposition, namely the higher development of the super- ficial cortical neurones. None the less, it may require training and instruction to bring out the capacities of the genius. One other distinction is necessary to make. The talented man is frequently, if not always, a well -balanced 
I 
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individual, whereas a man of genius is only too often ill - 
balanced. The usual explanation, that genius requires 
for its appearance an agility and adaptability of mind 
which is impossible in the stable -minded, is only partially 
satisfying, and it would seem that we have to consider it 
from the aspect of different levels. The talented man is 
the highest example of a level which has "arrived" in 
the race, whereas the genius is a new departure, and new 
departures are never stable to begin with, but only 
achieve such stability after the function has become more 
generalized throughout the race. We may suggest there- 
fore, that the products of contemporary genius become 
the talents of the future race, while contemporary talents 
become future instincts. 
If talents, intelligence, and genius are functions of 
cortical integrations, involving cognition as the principal 
phase, there remains to consider the variation between 
individuals, dependent on the affective and conative in- 
tegrations. It is clear that individuals will differ in the 
proportionate importance of the various emotional dis- 
positions with which they are provided. Thus one person 
may have anger dominant and another fear. Under these 
circumstances, popular speech describes such people as 
being of an irascible disposition, or a timorous disposition, 
or again of an inquisitive disposition. However, in addition 
to this, McDougall has pointed out, that personalities vary 
in virtue of what he calls tempers, which are independent 
of the dominance of any particular impulse. He distin- 
guishes three varieties of temper, (t) intensity or urgency, 
(2) persistency and (3) affectability. Acting on any im- 
pulse depending on a primary emotional disposition, a 
man may set out with a great energy and urgency, so 
that his activity is sudden and sharp, but this urgency 
may soon die down if the end is not immediately reached. 
Another may set out without such violence or speed, but 
may continue with the greatest persistency, until he has 
brought the activity to a successful conclusion. Again, 
a man may be easily affected by pleasure and unpleasure 
in his activity, so that he is much elated by success, and 
much cast down by failure. This is what McDougall 
calls affectability of temper, and this varies somewhat 
in 
its distribution. A man may be affected strongly both 
by pleasure and unpleasure, so that he is always very 
much up or very much down, or he may be very much 
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affected by pleasure, but little affected by unpleasure, so 
that he is always buoyant and hopeful, or he may be much 
affected by unpleasure, but little by pleasure, so that he is 
always despondent. These differences are dependent on 
the organization of the engrams subserving the behaviour 
patterns and on the flow of activity through them. In 
the case of the urgent temper, the activation of any given 
engram is short and sharp and easily passes over to some 
other engraphic pattern. In the case of the persistent 
temper, the activation is slow, and the neuronic activity 
is maintained within the engram, passing on to other 
engrams with difficulty. In the temper characterized by 
affectability, the results of affective responses, involving, 
as they do, visceral and endocrine activity, easily modify 
the engraphic patterns, so that the correlated behaviour 
pattern is also changed. It is hard to explain how these 
modifications are brought about, unless it be by means 
of changes in the endocrine balance. Indeed, we know 
enough to recognize the affectability of the mild hyper- 
thyroid individual, the persistency of the mild hyperpitui- 
tary, and the urgent activity of the mild hyperadrenal 
type. This indicates that the origin of the variation in 
tempers is to be sought in the temperamental factor, though 
our knowledge is not yet sufficiently exact to enable us to 
determine precisely the proportionate changes which are 
involved. 
A similar explanation may be sought to account for 
moods. It has been said that the various endocrine secretions 
tend to intensify and perpetuate visceral nervous system 
activities. Thus it is known that certain physical changes, 
such as relaxation of the bronchioles, which are normally 
the result of sympathetic activity, may be intensified and 
perpetuated by keeping up an adequate supply of adrenalin 
in the circulating blood. Moods more or less correspond 
to emotions, and are referred to . by similar names, such 
as angry, submissive, aggressive moods and the like. But 
they differ from emotions, inasmuch as they are more 
persistent as a rule, and are, to a certain extent, inde- 
pendent of emotions. Thus if I experience the emotion 
of anger, I am angry until that emotional reaction to a stimulus has passed, and some other stimulus with its 
appropriate emotional reactions intervenes, but if I am 
in an angry mood, I may experience some other stimulus to emotion while still in that mood, and to a certain 
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extent react with the new emotion. I may be afraid or 
cheerful or anything else, though while I remain in an 
irritable mood, the emotion of anger is more easily aroused 
than if I am not in that mood. It would seem, then, that 
a mood is started by the corresponding emotion, but that 
it persists in the same way as the physical changes men- 
tioned above persist, under the influence of adrenalin. 
We may conclude therefore, that the psychological state- 
ment that a mood is induced by emotion, but persists after 
the disappearance of the emotion, may be translated into 
physical terms as follows. An engram involving a special 
arrangement of vegetative neurones is activated, and under 
certain circumstances, varying with the individual and 
the nature of the stimulus, the corresponding pattern of 
endocrine activity is more than usually prominent, so that 
the period of activation of the neuronic engram is pro- 
longed, and its irritability in the physiological sense is 
increased. Moody personalities are those whose endocrine 
system is specially susceptible to such activation. 
In view of these variations between individual person- 
alities, some of which are transitory and some of which 
are more or less permanent, many observers have at- 
tempted to classify the human race into groups, each 
characterized by some special type of personality. The 
recent work of the psycho -analytic schools has not only 
revived this study, but has given it a new orientation. 
This merits our further consideration, but before ex- 
amining the doctrines of the various schools, it may be 
as well to consider how their views fit in with the 
standpoint adopted in this book. To begin with, we must 
recognize at once that their terminology, as usually ex- 
pressed, is not in accordance with ours, and that if their 
doctrines are to be used or criticized, there must be a common 
ground of understanding as to terms. The most apparent 
inconsistency is in the use of the term libido. By libido, 
many of the psycho -analytic writers imply some special 
form of energy, whose origin and nature are by no means 
clear. Such an ill- defined conception we cannot admit, 
but, if we take a definition accepted by Jung, it may lead 
us back to a correlation with our point of view. The 
concept of energy is that which comes nearest to the concept 
of libido. Libido can perhaps be described as effect, or 
capacity for effect. It is capable of transformation from 
one form to another. The metamorphosis can be sudden, 
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as when one function replaces another in a moment of 
danger, or it can be gradual, as we see it in that process of 
sublimation, where " the libido is led over a long and 
difficult path through a variety of forms into a different 
function ". Our postulate has been that we have no right 
to presuppose any special form of energy acting within the 
body, other than that provided by the metabolism of the 
food, in a manner strictly analogous to the energy provided 
by the fuel in a combustion engine. We may put this in 
another way by saying that, with the emergence of life, 
the chief new function to be observed is the capacity for 
transforming potential energy into actual energy by a 
process we know as metabolism. Moreover the actual 
energy so liberated, may take the form of heat, chemical 
or electrical energy or of some other form, of whose nature 
we are ignorant, and which we are only capable of recog- 
nizing in the form of these other more familiar examples. 
So long as we recognize its common origin from the meta- 
bolized food, there is no particular: objection to calling this 
energy libido, if it is convenient to do so. We may say 
then, that with the emergence of life, the body is capable 
of transforming the potential energy contained in the food, 
into actual energy, libido, and, that by virtue 
energy, various integrated patterns of structures in the 
body are capable of activation and function. These patterns 
of structures are integrated and controlled through the 
function of the nervous system, so that one, when activated, 
subserves digestion, another locomotion, another circulation, 
and a fourth thought and so on. Hence we have no right 
to differentiate the energy or libido into thought libido, or 
digestive libido, or sex libido, or anything else, unless we 
are quite clear, that we are really talking of one and the 
same libido functioning in different ways, in virtue of the 
form of pattern of structures which is being activated at 
the moment. A good deal of confusion of thought is apt 
to arise, as a result of the failure to recognize such dis- 
tinctions. For example, sex energy or sex libido is apt to 
be spoken of as if it was some terrific force, different from 
all other manifestations of energy in the body. It has 
been stated that, if the sex energy could only be harnessed 
to the function of thought, man would be capable of limit- less intellectual achievement. If our contention is correct, C sex energy is no different from thought energy, or digestive energy or any other energy. It is the same libido, the 
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characteristic manifestation of the emergence of life, 
functioning in a special way, in virtue of the pattern which 
is in a state of activation. Yet there do seem to be 
differences between the "drive" of sex, and the " drive" of 
thought. Can such differences be explained ? There 
seems no great difficulty. We have seen that the nervous 
system is essentially involved in all such patterns, that the 
synapses between the several neurones composing any 
given engram act as resistance boxes in the circuit which 
is being activated. Other things being equal therefore, 
the fewer synapses through which the activation has to 
pass, the more energy will be conserved, and the more 
"violent" will be the observed behaviour. Hence the simpler 
the pattern, and the lower the level in the nervous hierarchy, 
which is involved, the greater will be the "drive ". But 
another factor comes in, that of inhibition and facilitation. 
By the former, resistance is increased to a maximum and 
the observable drive is diminished ; by the latter, the 
resistance is reduced to a minimum, and the "drive" is 
increased. We should be more intelligible then, if, instead 
of talking about the transmutation of sex libido or sex 
energy into the function of thought, which would thereby 
increase the potentialities of man's intellect, we spoke of 
simplifying and facilitating the pattern subserving thought, 
so that it compared favourably with that of sex, in `hese 
respects. Then we might expect this increase in poten- 
tiality. Moreover, there are plenty of indications that by 
means of such short cuts, as language and capacity for 
form perception, this is actually taking place in the course 
of evolution, but we must not expect that by any pro- 
cess of psychic alchemy, man's capacities should change 
suddenly, any more than we can expect to change lead 
into gold by a simple chemical process. Having estab- 
- lished this definition of the libido, as a characteristic mani- 
festation of life, we may allow that in the course of evolu- 
tion the organization of structural patterns has been so 
constituted, that the emergent behaviour patterns differ 
considerably, and the general " go " of the personality is 
oriented in various directions. With the emergence of hfe 
two functions must he fulfilled, the preservation of the race 
and the preservation of the individual. Moreover, if we 
examine the constitution of the individual at a low level, 
before matters have become too complicated, we may 
recognize, that certain of his dispositions function chiefly 
1 
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to serve self -preservation, and others to serve race -pre- 
servation. Thus at the level of the appetities, it is clear 
that the nutritive appetites subserve the function of self - 
preservation, while that of sex subserves the preservation 
of the race. Primitive fear and anger are chiefly concerned 
with the individual, but may be so organized as to function 
in respect of race. Conversely, primitive sympathy and 
negativity are primarily concerned with race -preservation, 
but may under certain circumstances be organized in the 
service of the individual. Some authorities put gregarious- 
ness as a function comparable to race- and self- preserva- 
tion, but this would seem to be erroneous, for gregarious- 
ness is not universal like the other two, and is a more 
complicated organization, emerging at a higher level, and 
at a later stage in evolutionary progress. 
If we examine the biographies of individuals we find 
that one person is so organized that the whole trend of 
his behaviour is directed towards the preservation of the 
individual, and the conservation of his interests. Another 
person, on the contrary, shows by his behaviour that his 
organization is towards race- preservation and conservation 
of its interests. It is clear, of course, that no individual 
can entirely rid himself of the concerns of the race, or of 
the ego respectively ; but the organization towards race - 
preservation behaviour, or sex, in the one, is more facili- 
tated, while the reverse is the case in the other. It is 
clear that behaviour concerned with the race is directed 
away from the ego, and is therefore objective, while 
behaviour concerned with the individual is directed 
towards the ego, and is subjective. The psycho -analysts 
talk of one individual as displaying centrifugal, or 
sex libido, while the other displays centripetal, or ego 
libido. We have seen that such use of the word libido, is 
only permissible under the most strict reservations, and 
on the understanding that we are really talking of a 
facilitation of a special structural organization, rather than 
of the flow of a special form of energy. 
Freud, the founder of psycho -analysis, was an empiricist 
and one of the most acute clinical observers in medical 
history. He therefore naturally turned his attention to 
the sex, or objective aspect, in the biography of his 
patients. Like many others of his type, his observations 
were often more valuable than the conclusions he drew 
from them, and consequently his insistence that the 
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objective sex libido determines everything, does not find 
acceptance as a true philosophical explanation, as opposed 
to a convenient hypothesis, unless it be with the relatively 
few, who are content to accept a convenient hypothesis 
as truth, and to whom, by reason of other personal 
characteristics, into whose nature we need not enter here, 
this particular hypothesis proves acceptable. It is clear 
that early in the history of the movement, some who were 
interested in the subjective aspect, would turn their 
attention to the subjective organization in the biographies 
under observation. As it happened, a brilliant disciple of 
Freud, of a more than usually subjective type, was found 
in the person of Adler, and he naturally turned his 
attention to the "ego- libido," and sought to explain things 
in terms of this, as exclusively, as Freud sought to use 
" sex libido." Obviously between the extreme objective 
view and the extreme subjective view, there could be no 
compromise and indeed the antagonism was bitter. This 
however, is useful from our point of view, for by studying 
Freud we gain insight into the individual organized in 
respect of centrifugal race -preservation behaviour, and 
by studying Adler we gain insight into the individual 
organized in respect of centripetal self - preservation 
behaviour. 
There still remains however, another serious split in the 
psycho -analytic school, which was as inevitable as the other. 
In our study of the instincts we had occasion to notice the 
close connexion between the sex and constructive instincts, 
and suggested that they might be regarded as branches 
from one tree. Further, we drew attention to the fact, 
that in man they had been largely diverted from their 
original biological purpose, and harnessed to serve his own 
satisfaction and pleasure. These satisfactions may be 
sought in the purely objective world of reality, by always 
pursuing objects outside the ego, or the individual may 
pursue these satisfactions in the more subjective realm of 
phantasy, the realm of prospective imagination, of dreams, 
of art and creative genius. So here again, we have a 
cleavage in the race of those who are organized towards 
sex -and race -preservation, between those who are integrated 
purely objectively towards sex, in the more usually accepted 
sense of the term, and those who are organized towards 
creation and prospective imagination. So, in the individual 
personality, there is a similar cleavage; for, as has been 
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said, no individual is simple, though one or other organi- 
zation is more facilitated and constitutes a more definite and 
clearly marked engram. As might be expected, this led 
to a further development in psycho - analytic research. 
Freud, the extreme objectivist, ruthlessly pursued the 
objective organization of sex, while the subjectivist Jung 
fixed his interests on the realm of phantasy and creation, 
and studied this type in the race, and this organization in 
the individual. This may be represented diagrammatically 
as follows :- 
Individual Personality 
1 
Race -preservation Self Preservation 
Objectivity Extreme subjectivity 
Sex- Constructive differentiated early 
Ego 
Extreme objectivity Subjectivity_ 
Sex Prospective imagination 
Creation 
Freud Jung Ad er 
From this, we may see, how a critical study of these 
three observers who have turned their attention specifically 
to the three aspects of personality, may be of great service 
to a proper conception of the whole. To such we may 
now turn our attention. 
F 
CHAPTER IX 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF FREUD TO THE 
STUDY OF PERSONALITY 
SIGMUND FREUD 1 was the pioneer of psycho -analysis, 
and what has been called the new dynamic psychology. 
In any modern psychological study, these theories must be 
considered. To understand clearly what is involved, it is 
necessary to describe briefly how this new " psychology" 
came into being. In the year 1880, the Viennese physician 
Breuer was treating a case of hysteria by hypnosis. While 
in an hypnotic trance, the patient related a long train of 
events, some of which had occurred far back in her 
childhood. The narration was accompanied by marked 
emotional excitement, and after the patient was restored 
to full consciousness, her general condition was consider- 
ably improved. Following the suggestion offered on this 
occasion, Breuer and Freud investigated the effect of what 
they called abreaction. This they describe as the freeing 
of " confined affect," which occurs when the patient is 
induced to relate an experience which was originally 
accompanied by considerable affective reaction, and which 
has not been allowed to come into consciousness for some 
considerable time. What really happens is that the 
engram, which subserves the set of ideas relating to the 
experience, is reassociated, so that it achieves that related- 
ness which involves consciousness. So, from the psycho- 
logical aspect, the experience is reintegrated with proper 
relation to time and space, and in proper proportion to the 
rest of the personality. It is this reintegration which 
induces the therapeutic benefit, and not the mere ebullition 
of emotional excitement. This relief by " abreaction is 
familiar in present -day psychotherapy, but its investigators 
soon found that abreaction in itself was not enough, in 
many cases of neurosis. Freud thereupon turned his 
attention away from pure therapeutics, and initiated an 
enquiry into the mental processes of neurotics. Even so 
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recently as 192o he remarks, " At the present time theo- 
retical knowledge is still far more important to all of us 
than therapeutic success." 
This enquiry into the neurotic mind was strictly em- 
pirical, and Freud deliberately turned his back on a 
priori suppositions derived from the orthodox psychology 
of the time. As a result of his studies, he formulated a 
new conception of psychological processes, or rather ex- 
pressed what was partly old in a different way. In common 
with most psychologists, he recognized that the individual 
started life with certain hereditary dispositions, and he 
was content to group these broadly into two divisions, 
Ego and Sex. He laid stress however on the "structure" 
of these dispositions, and pointed out that a conation or 
wish is involved, leading the individual to strive for its 
gratification, and this demand for gratification he termed 
the pleasure principle. In other words he contended that 
there is a "set," inherent in the nature of these disposi- 
tions, which makes for that immediate satisfaction in the 
relief of tension which is termed pleasure. He further 
recognized that at a very early stage in the life of a child, 
the set of his dispositions towards pleasure is opposed by 
the of environment. This latter he termed 
reality principle, which would seem to correspond to 
certain aspects of what Trotter 2 calls the herd instinct, 
but which would be better described as the community 
attitude. Freud refers to the dread of society as a potent 
factor in modifying the activity of the basal complexes, 
and this is indeed the chief influence to act upon the 
primary dispositions. It is obvious that conflict must 
arise between these two principles in every individual, 
and Freud maintained that the origin of the psycho - 
neuroses depended on the failure to find an adequate 
solution of this conflict, and the establishment of a com- 
promise which was not a satisfactory adaptation to 
circumstances. Continuing his investigations in the light 
of his own interests, as explained in the last chapter, he 
was led to the conclusion that the vast majority, if not 
all cases of psychoneuroses, depended on a failure in 
adaptation between the pleasure principle associated 
with sex, and the reality principle. More recently, he 
has somewhat modified this standpoint, and admitted 
the influence of other dispositions in the production of 
neuroses. As he pointed out, it was not unlikely to be 
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true that sex, in the narrow sense, played the dominant 
part in conflict with reality, inasmuch as a child is usually 
trained in the adaptation of his other impulses to environ- 
mental requirements from the very first, whereas little or 
no effort is made to teach him, or help him, to adapt his 
sex impulse. But in Freud's use of the term sex complex, 
he includes much more than the impulse to direct sexual 
gratification, applying the term to the complete sentiment 
we call love. As a result of his studies of the mind of 
children, and his investigations into the apparently for- 
gotten memories of adults, Freud was convinced that 
manifestations of the sexual impulse were present at a 
very much earlier stage, than was usually regarded as 
probable, and that these exerted an influence of para- 
mount importance on the future psychic development of 
the individual. He attributes to sex, therefore, a much 
greater importance in the shaping of a personality than 
we have indicated in the previous chapters. Most of his 
critics accept the general principles of conflict, and re- 
cognize its influence in distinguishing between various 
personalities, and in preventing that harmonious develop- 
ment which is desirable, but seldom, if ever, achieved. 
They consider, however, that he and his followers have 
insisted too much on the universality of the sex impulse 
as the protagonist against reality, and have thought that 
the egocentric impulses may also determine difficulties. 
But as has been said, this has been to a certain extent 
admitted by Freud in his later works. Also, they criticize 
the view of Freud, that any early pleasurable feeling, such 
as is exhibited in feeding at the breast, is necessarily sexual 
feeling. This however may be more a difference in the 
use of terms than a fundamental disagreement, for Freud 
maintains that any effort to attain contact with an object 
in the environment is sexual, while the critics, who have 
refused to accept his conclusions with regard to the actual 
sexuality of many of his interpretations of childish im- 
pulses, would not admit such a wide connotation of the 
word sexual. Its use, moreover, is misleading and, as 
Bernard Hart puts it, a legitimate criticism of the psycho- 
analytic school may be illustrated by the following 
analogy. Suppose an inhabitant from another planet were 
placed outside a room, and told to form his opinion of the 
inhabitants of this world by his observations of the people 
who came out of this room. The inmates were then all 
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passed through a mangle, so that they were rolled out flat, 
before they issued from it. The inference would be that 
the inhabitants of this world were all two- dimensional. 
Is it not possible that psycho -analysis, in the strict sense 
of the term, works somewhat as that mangle works, and 
makes the mental processes of every person, who is 
subjected to it, appear to be sexually determined ? This 
question, however, of the universality of sexual influence in 
the conflict between the individual and his environment, 
need not detain us here, for most people will be agreed, 
that the real value of Freud's work does not involve an 
insistence on this universality. It must be admitted, 
however, by any honest critic, that at any rate so far as 
psychoneurotics are concerned, and so far as the behaviour 
of a great many normal people is concerned, sexual im- 
pulses and their maladaptations to reality do have an 
enormous influence in shaping their behaviour. Freudians 
would probably say that this denial of sexuality in all 
conflict is the attitude of the =prejudiced man who is 
unwilling to admit the truth of a new doctrine, established 
by scientific enquiry. But this attitude is by no means 
unhealthy, and is certainly to be preferred to that which 
embraces new theories, and presumes they are facts, before 
sufficient evidence has been collected to support them. 
To return to Freud's teaching with regard to the conflict 
between the individual dispositions, and the environment or 
reality, which is of first -class importance in the study of 
Personality, he pointed out that the ideal outcome of such 
a conflict is that some adaptation between them should be 
achieved. In this way, a working compromise is obtained, 
which will allow the individual to live in his environment 
with a minimum of friction. We may say without pre- 
judice, that at the present stage of evolution at any rate, 
a completely frictionless adaptation is never achieved, and 
it is this fact which makes Freud's work valuable in the 
study of so- called normal individuals, as well as in the 
realm of psychopathology. When, in the case of conflict, 
friction becomes too great, the only possible solutions are 
by the establishment of logic -tight compartments, or by 
what is called repression. By the former is meant a more 
or less conscious refusal to let the two conflicting com- 
plexes be considered together, and it is only possible, 
when the conflicting complexes do not deeply involve 
the affective organizations of the personality. Again, in 
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the mind of the child, or the primitive, in whom the power 
of logical reasoning has not yet developed, logic -tight 
compartments may exist, simply through failure of integra- 
tion. Many of the religious beliefs of primitive, and even 
of civilized people, are logically quite incompatible, and 
yet are held in consciousness without any conflict. By 
repression is meant that since the individual actually 
cannot get rid of reality, or of his disposition, he must do 
his best to persuade himself that the experience or the 
disposition, which are incompatible with each other, no 
longer exist. As, for example, when sex impulse is 
misdirected, many people persuade themselves that they 
possess no sex feeling at all. Such rejected material 
becomes unconscious, and may cease to develop with the 
rest of the personality. Repressed material may consist 
of dispositions which have never functioned, or of acquired 
experience which is incompatible. As Freud himself 
expresses it " Man's archaic heritage forms the nucleus of 
the unconscious mind, and whatever part of that heritage 
has to be left behind in the advance to later phases of 
development, because it is useless, or incompatible with 
what is new, and harmful to it, falls a victim to the process 
of repression." The same is true of acquired experiences 
which cannot be adapted to reality. The individual can- 
not completely divorce such a disposition or experience 
from his personality, but he can and does divorce it, so far 
as consciousness is concerned ; or, in other words, the en- 
gram which subserves it, from whichever aspect we care to 
regard it, ceases to enjoy that relatedness which involves 
consciousness. The subject, so to speak, turns his back 
on this trait in his character, or experience of his environ- 
ment, and refuses to recognize that it is there, and by 
means of this process of repression actually ceases to 
believe in its existence. It is no longer integrated so as 
to be orientated in time and space, and indeed becomes 
dissociated from the rest of conscious material. It is only 
such material, which has thus been repressed, which becomes 
a complex in the strict Freudian sense of the term, just as 
an unrepressed set of ideas, accompanied by affect, is 
termed a constellation. Repression may be more or less 
successful. If the repressed complex is one which seldom 
comes into opposition with the world of reality in which 
the individual lives, or with his dispositions as the case 
may be -so that it represents but an unimportant element 
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in the personality -he may go through life without any 
disturbance, and repression is successful. In this sense 
repression is a useful function which is constantly in 
evidence throughout life. This success however, is not 
always achieved, and repression may be incompletely 
successful, or even entirely unsuccessful. In the latter 
case, normal existence in the face of an unresolved 
complex is impossible, and the individual either becomes 
neurotic, or may even find a solution in suicide. 
To allow the continuance of existence in relation to 
the environment to go on, the repressed complex, and all 
images or instances in the past which are closely associated 
with it, and which tend to become stimuli which reactivate 
the engram subserving it, must be kept below the level of 
the active consciousness of the individual. This state of 
affairs is achieved by what Freud terms the censor. This 
we may examine, although the somewhat anthropomorphic 
conceptions tend to obscure clear thinking. 
For the purpose of this concept he divides the mind - 
into three territories, sometimes described as layers of 
consciousness. The difference between these territories 
lies in their special degree and manner of relatedness, 
and mental may pass the other in 
gaining or losing that relatedness, which subserves their 
existence in one or other territory or layer. The highest - 
he calls the "conscious," wherein all mental processes of 
which the individual is aware have their being, that is, 
those processes are in consciousness which enjoy that 
relatedness involving reflective thought. Below this, is - 
the layer of the fore -conscious, where all mental processes 
exist of which the subject is not aware at any moment, 
but which can easily be brought to mind. There is a more 
or less continuous interchange of mental processes from 
the fore -conscious to the conscious layer, because there is 
no marked difficulty for the processes in the fore -conscious achieving that relatedness which involves consciousness. It may be, however, that some groups of ideas less easily 
become fully conscious than others. This inhibition of complete integration is what Freud calls the censor. Thus, 
a weak censorship may be said to exist between conscious and fore-conscious, but it is one which is easily overcome, and which does not exert any marked influence on the mental life of the subject. The third layer is termed by Freud the unconscious, and in this, these mental processes 
r 
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have their being which under no ordinary circumstances 
can be brought into consciousness. Some of these com- 
plexes may never have been conscious, others may have 
been conscious at one time, but have been repressed, so 
that they are not recalled. According to the Freudians, 
this prohibition is exercised by the censor, whose business 
it is to refuse admission to consciousness of any complex 
which is strongly imbued with unpleasant affect and, if 
we regard the censor as a process of inhibition, we have 
already remarked on the influence of unpleasant affect in 
establishing inhibition. The mental material found to be 
unconscious will be those hereditary dispositions which 
have not been adjusted to the reality of the environment, 
and also the images of the unpleasant incidents which 
have been responsible for the acute conflicts of these 
dispositions with reality. It will thus be seen, that part 
of the " content of the unconscious " is " material " derived 
from the hereditary dispositions, and part is "material" 
derived from acquired experience, and that all this 
" material " is unconscious, because of failure in adapta- 
tion to reality. This aspect of inhibition at psychological 
levels is analogous to that at physiological levels, and 
just as antagonist muscles must be inhibited so that 
agonists may function, so " antagonist " complexes must 
be inhibited, in order that the rest of the personality may 
function. 
As was said above, success of the censor in maintaining 
the repression of these complexes depends on their im- 
portance, relative to the rest of the personality, and the 
frequency with which they are stimulated into activity by 
the environment. If the repression is completely successful 
the complexes are pragmatically non -existent, because they 
never influence conscious thought or behaviour, under any 
circumstances. If, however, repression is not completely 
successful, the complexes so far as the individual awareness 
is concerned are forgotten, but will influence behaviour in 
some way or other. The analogy so commonly drawn, 
between the Freudian censorship and the censor of a 
country at war, is an excellent one. Enemy subjects 
within the country cannot get information outside by 
direct means, but may be able to do so, by means of 
subterfuges and codes which cheat the censor, and hence 
escape his vigilance. Freud contends that these un- 
conscious complexes may find expression, or partial 
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expression, in consciousness in symbolic form, and that 
the explanation of certain otherwise inexplicable factors 
in human behaviour depends on the recognition of this 
symbolical expression of repressed complexes. In other 
words, inhibition may be incomplete, and though activa- 
tion of the engram, subserving the image of the original 
experience, may be impossible, activation may spread to 
associated engrams, which subserve symbolic representa- 
tions of that experience. Examples of such behaviour 
have been worked out, and are described at length in the 
literature of psycho -analysis, in the cases of dreams, reveries, 
certain artistic expressions, personal mannerisms and 
eccentricities, slips of the tongue and slips of the pen, and 
many other everyday occurrences. The criticisms of these 
explanations of Freud are that he implies some sort of drive 
or impulsion, which so to speak forces out the symbolic 
abnormal thought or behaviour, whereas such thought or 
behaviour may more properly be regarded as a new 
emergent from eccentric combinations of impulses, depend- 
ing on inhibitions and facilitations. These latter may be 
determined by processes and reactions such as are de- 
scribed by Freud. 
Other conceptions of the Freudian psychology which 
demand particular notice, are the wish and the libido. 
For Freud and his " dynamic " psychology, the unit of - 
mental process is the wish. This is the "setting" of an 
engram towards some active conation, which is consequent 
on the stimulus of an object or objects in the environment. 
This "wish" may be appetitive or aversive. As Holt8 
has pointed out, this treatment of the wish, as the im- 
portant phase for examination, is new in psychology, and 
of the greatest value. The principal attribute of living, as 
opposed to dead protoplasm, is that living matter reacts 
to its environment. That is to say, that a new factor 
comes into existence with that relatedness we call life, 
namely, that a living organism can receive impressions 
from its environment, and by its own activity modify its 
environment. The first may to a certain extent be true 
of dead matter, for it may receive impressions from its 
environment, in the shape of a blow or any other applica- tion of force ; but it cannot be said to modify its environ- ment by reason of its own activity, except in such a circumscribed and more or less constant fashion as is observed in radioactivity. This conception of modification 
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of the environment demands an accompanying concept of 
activity, in relationship to the environment, but it is by no 
means necessary to imply that there is a conscious end in 
view in this related activity. When an amoeba flows to- 
wards a food particle and ingests it, there is certainly an 
activity in relationship to the food particle, which involves 
a certain purpose, namely assimilation of food, but we may 
be certain that there is no such conscious end in view, as 
is described by some as an "act of will." This purposive 
mental process, with relation to the environment, is the 
Freudian wish, and so far as can be judged from Freud's 
own works, he means no more than this. However, the 
writings of some of his followers imply a great deal more, 
and suggest a consciously purposeful process or "act of 
will." This is certainly misleading. Freud, then, would - postulate that his unconscious complexes involve wishes, 
that is to say that they have from their very organization, 
a purposive relation to their environment, which, allowed 
to develop, will modify the latter in some way. He would 
imply however, in opposition to Adler, as will be seen 
later, that the striving towards an object is determined 
and organized by the constitution of the dispositions, and 
not from the constitution of the end in view. The modi- 
fication of the environment is the objective aspect of such 
a wish. There is also a subjective aspect, which for want 
--of a better term we may call a gratification of the wish. 
This is, after all, identical with the relief of tension, which 
constitutes pleasure. Freud, as has been said, declares 
that the unconscious complexes, by virtue of their very 
structural nature, are alway striving for gratification, and 
that the reality principle stands in their way. This con- 
flict is followed by repression, symbolical representations 
and the rest. This conception of striving for gratification 
necessitates the concept of some sort of energy, which he 
calls libido. This has been discussed in the last chapter, 
and as has been seen, the Freudian statement cannot be 
accepted without modification. Subject to this however, 
we may describe libido as the form of energy, whatever its 
nature may be, which enables the wish to become trans- 
lated into active behaviour. In the process of growth, 
the wishes as they come into contact with the reality 
principle are more or less successfully integrated and 
modified, and by this integration, the individual reaches 
a higher level in the hierarchy of behaviour. At first they 
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are entirely egocentric, or, to use Janet's 4 expression, their 
radius of action is confined to one individual. Later they 
become integrated on to higher and higher levels, and 
their radius of action, expands pari passu with their 
development, so that the behaviour which results from 
the integration of these wishes becomes more and more 
complicated. If the development is successful, and re- 
pressions do not occur, or are successful by the process 
of normal fusion and suppression, to use Rivers's terms, 
then the original egocentric wishes become changed into 
more socially desirable impulses. This modification is 
what Freud means by the term sublimation. By this 
process of sublimation the constitution of the complexes 
is so changed, that the wishes involved work towards a 
different and more desirable end. 
No individual at any period of his life stands still, and 
with the continual development of the personality, old 
stages in the growth of that personality are left behind, 
and old types of reaction are discarded. They are not 
however incapable of revival, for if, at any time, the diffi- 
culty of adaptation between the reality principle and the 
growing personality becomes too great, regression may 
occur. By regression we mean that there is a harking -- 
back to previous levels of development, so that, for example, 
the adult may go back to childish behaviour. This process 
of regression is an everyday experience, both in normal 
and pathological conditions. It is within the experience of 
every family, and of every married couple, that when one 
member does not get what he wants, he or she is apt to 
regress, and behave like a child, may even talk baby 
language, and perform some old childish tricks which 
have been long left behind, so far as everyday use is 
concerned ; but, as a rule, these processes are temporary, 
and the individual quickly regains touch with reality, and 
proceeds with his personal development and adaptation. 
When however, the conflict is too severe, it may happen 
that the regression is much more serious, and the indi- 
vidual goes back more permanently to a childish type of 
behaviour. Since he finds this will not work in the environment in which he is, he' has by force of circum- stances, to try and make a new environment. This he 
may do, by withdrawing from reality as it surrounds him, and refusing to admit that it is such as it is. Instead, he weaves for himself a new environment of phantasy, in 
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which he loses himself. Such a state of affairs is seen 
in its extreme degree in certain cases of dementia præcox, 
but we are all apt to take refuge from the hard facts of 
real existence by building for ourselves castles in the air. 
Regression, then, is a direct consequence of conflict, and 
is a method, albeit unsatisfactory, of compromising with 
reality. 
A further corollary to the process of conflict and re- 
pression is the active process of forgetting, and Freud 
offers a full explanation of this. It is part of the general 
doctrine of repression, that experiences of incidents which 
are disagreeable to the individual, that is to say, charged 
with unpleasant effective tone, tend to be relegated to 
" the unconscious " and kept there by " the censor," and 
the degree to which they are repressed, and the success 
of the censorship, will depend on the intensity of this 
unpleasant tone in relation to the ego. That this is a 
common mode of forgetting, scarcely anyone will deny. 
We do tend to forget all sorts of things, which are in 
opposition to our amour -propre, and it is these things 
which are most unpleasant to the ego. We do not tend 
so much to forget things which have simply interfered 
with the normal activities or development of our person- 
alities, if we have no particular ideal in phantasy con- 
nected with this activity. But, whenever there is a sense 
of shame, or remorse, or a feeling that we are failing to 
come up to the ideal we set ourselves, the incidents con- 
cerned are very readily put out of mind. Whenever there 
is an arraignment of ourselves before the judgment -seat of 
our ego, then intense painful affect is experienced, and the 
incident which is responsible for this state of affairs tends 
to be repressed. The Freudians suggest that the whole 
of the amnesia of infantile experience, that is to say, of 
experiences before the age of five, which are forgotten, are 
repressed in this way, because they are not compatible 
with ideals established as the infant grows to childhood, 
and that memory of these experiences can be restored by 
special methods. The chief of these methods is psycho- 
analysis. This is a difficult statement on which to deliver 
a fair judgment, for the obvious criticism is, that the 
psycho -analyst has a preconceived idea of what he will 
find, and suggests this to the patient, who produces for 
his gratification various aspects of the so- called OEdipus 
complex. The reply of the psycho -analysts is that sug- 
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gestion is never used, and that similarities in the working 
of the infantile mind are biologically probable, just as are 
similarities of the infantile body, which are much closer to 
the norm than are the bodies of adults. Further, they 
claim the pragmatic sanction, since they maintain, that 
restoration of these infantile memories removes neurotic 
symptoms. This, they contend, would not ensue unless the 
memories were true representations of personal incidents. 
Their explanation is that the activities of the child at that 
time, represent crude gratifications of wishes, mostly con- 
nected with the sexual impulse, which later become im- 
possible when brought up against reality; and with the 
growth of the individual, and his adaptations to reality, 
it becomes intolerable that he should have ever carried 
out, or wished to carry out, such behaviour. To many 
people the claim that in all instances of forgetting this 
explanation is applicable, seems to be going too far, and 
as Professor Pear 6 pointed out, it seems more rational to 
account for forgetting at this age, and later in life, under 
three heads. Firstly, incidents are forgotten when they 
have not made sufficient impression on the individual, either 
because of their unimportance, or because of their insuffi- 
cient distinctiveness from the general course of ideas of 
the subject. For example, we do not remember the 
number of the railway carriage in which we travelled 
three years ago, because this was not sufficiently im- 
portant to make any impression upon our consciousness, 
and so far as observation carries us, this memory is 
completely lost, and cannot be restored by the utmost 
exploration of the unconscious mind, whether in the 
waking or in the hypnotic state. The second sub - 
grouping in this category may be illustrated by conver- 
sation in a political club, when all the members think 
alike. In such a case, the remarks of each one correspond 
too closely to the trend of thought of any member to be 
clearly recollected. However, let a person of opposite 
political convictions come in and join in an argument, 
and his remarks will be clearly remembered. The second 
head under which forgetting may be dealt with, is the Freudian one of repression, that is to say, the refusal to tolerate the ideas charged with unpleasant feeling tone in consciousness. The third head, with which he deals, he describes under the name supersession. By this, he means that the individual is continually changing and continually 
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growing. Hence certain groups of ideas are superseded 
by others, and the earlier group is left behind, and no 
longer comes to consciousness. To what extent this 
group is really differentiated from the group of repression 
is doubtful, because, as Freud said, it is the earlier con- 
stellations which are no longer useful, or which are painful 
to the individual, which come to be repressed, and Professor 
Pear's superseded group would seem to be those constella- 
tions which are no longer useful to the individual. This 
third group is therefore only a subdivision of repression. 
So far reference has been made to the aspects of 
Freudian Psychology in relation to the mental activities 
of everyday life, but one cannot adequately deal with 
these without mentioning his work in connexion with 
the symptoms of the neuroses. Many people will con- 
sider that once we embark on this line of enquiry we are 
necessarily stepping from the normal into the pathological; 
but an error, which many psychologists have made in the 
past, has been that they have regarded the average mind as 
much too well balanced, and much too tidy. It was this 
error that made psychology so little use for medical pur- 
poses at the time when Freud began his investigations. 
This mistake is due to the fact that the majority of 
academic psychologists, who work by introspection, are 
of the type described by James as tender- minded. Such 
people have a horror of loose ideas, and their notions, as a 
rule, are arranged in careful logical sequence. They do 
not allow their thoughts to wander in an inconsequent 
way. The description, therefore, which they deduce from 
the observations of their own mental processes is bound 
to represent the logical and well- ordered mind. For this 
reason, the text - books of many psychologists entirely 
neglect the extreme incoherence of the minds of many 
people, and only describe the mental processes of one 
class of individuals. The neurotic might be described as 
an individual with an abnormally untidy mind. In such 
cases the instabilities, illogicalities of the average man, 
obtrude themselves in an obvious and unmistakable way. 
Further, a study of the symptoms complained of by these 
neurotics does not necessarily mean an excursion into 
pathological psychology, but, on the contrary, may throw 
a flood of light on the personality of the average man. 
It is a characteristic of the psychoneurotic, as opposed to 
those who are insane, that however unsuccessfully, he is 
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making an effort to adapt to circumstances, and even the 
most normal man has to struggle continually to adapt 
himself. 
For Freud, the psyçhoneuroses depend on a failure of 
adaptation between the sexual impulses and the reality 
principle, and the various symptoms of the neuroses are 
symbolical representations of sexual wishes which have 
been denied gratification by the reality principle, or of 
unsatisfactory compromises arrived at in the struggle. 
Since this conflict between sex and reality involves pain- 
ful affect, the wishes have been more or less repressed. 
Repression in these cases is not successful, and the censor 
is not strong enough to keep all manifestations of these 
ungratified wishes out of consciousness. According to 
Freud, the gross hysterical symptoms such as paralysis, 
blindness, sensory changes, and the like, are physical ex- 
pressions of this wish, and may be regarded as crystallized 
protests against their non -gratification. From this, he 
concludes that, in order to cure an hysterical symptom, it 
is necessary to find the repressed wish, and enable the 
individual to avoid repression, by discovering a method of 
gratification, other than that forbidden by reality. This new 
gratification may be found in higher and more adult de- 
velopments of the primitive or childish wish. Such process 
of outlet along higher channels has already been referred to, 
as sublimation. The pathogenesis of hysterical symptoms 
does not concern us here, but the process of sublimation, 
is of great importance. Whereas, at the developmental 
level of the primitive or the child, a wish may only be 
gratified in a primitive physical way, at the adult level, 
the same wish may have been so altered by the processes 
of development and supersession that it finds its gratifica- 
tion through affective and intellectual channels. Sub - 
limation is the basis of many social and conventional 
practices. For example, collecting is a sublimation of the 
acquisitive impulse, restrained and controlled, according to 
the dictates of the community, while dancing is to some 
extent a sublimation of the sex impulse and so on. 
Moreover, sublimations involve a great degree of integra- 
tion and control, and hence are of considerable educative 
value. For instance, although other factors are involved, 
real climbing and other dangerous sports are in some 
sense a sublimation of the fear -flight impulse, and they 
certainly involve an education in the control of fear, which 
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may be of great use to the individual. Hence this process 
of sublimation is the method by which the reactions of 
the personality grow and evolve under the influence of 
experience and education. In the case of the hysteric, 
certain reactions are dissociated and left behind, in the pro- 
cess of general growth, and in order to remove symptoms 
these reactions have to be sublimated, or brought into 
line with the rest of the personality. In the normal, 
all reactions do not grow at equal rates, and hence in 
every one of us sublimation is necessary in one way or 
another. 
Turning to another form of psychoneuroses, the 
Freudians regard the affective manifestations of anxiety 
hysteria to be due to the failure to gratify primitive sexual 
wishes, either directly, or by way of sublimation. Such 
manifestations as phobias, manias, etc., are symbolic 
objective fixations, which take the place of the real 
fixation, which is sexual, and the unpleasant affective 
tone, consequent in failure to achieve gratification of the 
wish, achieves a new fixation. The word fixation is used 
to describe the "set" of the individual towards, or away 
from, some object in the environment. For example, a 
patient suffering from a "mania" may be unable to avoid 
the impulse to wash his hands frequently, while one with 
a phobia may be unable to bring himself to cross a street. 
The washing of hands is usually a symbolical effort to 
cleanse himself of guilt, and the affect really appertaining 
to the real or imagined guilt is attached to the relatively 
unimportant idea of soiled hands. Similarly, the dread of 
a phobia, really applies to fear least some guilty (generally 
sexual) deed be performed, but becomes secondarily at- 
tached, or fixed, to an apparently harmless act, such as 
crossing a street. Such extreme fixations are not met 
with in the normal person, yet which of us have not got 
some irrational attraction or repulsion for certain objects, 
which to others seem quite indifferent. The explanation 
of such attitudes may be found to lie in the fact that the 
objects, though having little value in themselves, are 
symbolic of other objects, of great value to the personality, 
whether according to adult standards, or more often, ac- 
cording to childish standards. 
The field in which Freudian psychology, in connexion 
with the neuroses, has attracted most attention is undoubt- 
edly the interpretation of dreams. It has been a belief, 
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all through the history of mankind, that dreams do mean 
something, and that they can be interpreted. From Joseph 
and Daniel to Old Moore, dream interpreters have been 
found. Freud, however, was the first to invest such'inter- 
pretations with a scientific spirit, and to give an explanation 
of the mechanism of dreams. With the materialistic wave 
of the 19th century, dreams were regarded as too fantastic 
to be worthy of the notice of the true scientist, and they 
were dismissed as being due to such physical causes as 
lying on the back, eating indigestible things at supper, or 
changes in the blood pressure. Although these explan- 
ations may determine the occurrences of dreams -that is 
to say, they may make sleep sufficiently light to allow the 
dreamer to be aware, both that he is dreaming, and that he 
is dreaming about some definite thing -they do nothing to 
explain the cognitive and affective contents of dreams. 
Freud's theory is that the dream is an expression of 
unconscious wishes, just as neurotic symptoms are, though 
he would admit that in certain simple dreams, and in the 
common dreams of children, these wishes are by no means 
necessarily unconscious. A child who has been forbidden 
sweets during the daytime, will dream of eating them at 
night ; but that does not mean the wish for sweets has 
been at any time unconscious in the Freudian sense of the 
term. In the neurotic however, Freud holds that the same 
wishes, which are giving rise to the symptoms of the 
patient, will find partial expression in the dreams of that 
patient, but it will only be very rarely that the expression 
will be direct. The censor, though relatively relaxed, is still 
active during sleep, and the wish has to take on a symbolic 
form. Freud explains the readiness with which dreams 
are forgotten, by the fact that when the patient awakens, 
the censor again becomes fully active and reimposes full 
repression on the complex. Furthermore, there is no 
proper integration of the various wishes which constitute 
the mental content during sleep. Hence, many diverse 
wishes, connected with diverse complexes, may find ex- 
pression in the same dream. Diverse sets of ideas and 
images may be superimposed on each other, so as to give 
an almost unidentifiable picture, analogous to a composite 
photograph, such as Galton delighted in ; but, when un- ravelled and explained, they are found to be expressions of these unconscious repressed complexes, which are disturbing the peaceful integration of the personality. The 
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study of dreams serves to show the importance of the wish 
in psychology, and how an activation once started, may 
spread through all sorts of unexpected engraphic paths. 
It illustrates how complicated are the neuronic arrange- 
ments at the highest levels, yet how, with patient study, 
these patterns may be unravelled, and the process of 
integration understood. The processes whereby dreams 
or other symbolic representations, such as neurotic 
symptoms, may be investigated and determined, comprise 
the art of psycho -analysis. 
The object of this art is to discover the imperfectly 
repressed complexes, and disentangle them from the resist- 
ances which are established under the censor, and which 
prevent the gratification of the wishes which determine 
them. The chief method of psycho -analysis is free associ- 
ation. The patient is encouraged to let his stream of 
consciousness flow without any attempt at purposeful 
guidance, and in this way symbolic representations are 
frequently reattached to their original meaning, and the 
experienced physician may recognize, firstly in what 
directions the resistances lie, and secondly what repressed 
material these resistances cover. When studying dreams 
by this process, it is found that the contents of a dream, 
however nonsensical it may appear, are definitely deter- 
mined, and that certain laws apply to the formation of 
dream contents and serve to explain the images which 
appear in it, and their arrangements one to another. 
Freud has laid stress on the affect in dreams, and emotional 
association is often a valuable means of establishing 
relationships between the symbol and the original. By 
this latter expression is meant a recollection of a situation, 
in which a similar emotion to that felt in the dream was 
experienced. The methods of interpreting dreams are 
fully described in psycho -analytic literature, and are of 
interest in the study of personality, inasmuch as they 
illustrate the presence and influence of repressed complexes, 
even in non -pathological cases. A dream is always associ- 
ated with the ego, and if, as sometimes is the case, the 
dreamer does not seem to come into the picture at all, it is 
fairly certain that he is there under some disguise or other. 
For this reason also, dream investigation may be of con- 
siderable use in the study of personality. Freud regards 
the function of the dream as being bivalent. It is partly 
a means of outlet for repressed material. However, if this 
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strongly effective material were to become conscious with- 
out adequate disguise, the subject would awake, as happens 
in nightmares. Hence the various disguises and symboliz- 
ations instituted by the " censor," keeps the subject asleep 
by preventing too strongly affective material from entering 
consciousness. He maintains that the dream is always the 
fulfilment of some sort of wish, though this wish may be a 
negative wish, that is to say, a desire for avoidance, as op- 
posed to a positive wish, or desire for fulfilment or appetition. 
That this is a commonly accepted explanation of dreams is 
made obvious from many illustrations in literature, but it 
may suffice to recall the remark of Plato, " That a good 
man dreams what a bad man does." Freud considers that 
dreams always have a relation to past tendencies in the 
individual, that is to say, tendencies which existed in 
childhood, and have persisted in a repressed form till the 
present day, and that these tendencies are sexual in nature. 
Jung on the other hand, thinks that this is too indis- 
criminate, that great care should always be taken to be 
quite sure that what is termed a sexual symbol is neces- 
sarily so for the patient. This might be illustrated by the 
following dream. An ex- soldier dreamt of being very 
terrified by the presence of a large snake on his shoulders. 
A snake is a well known sexual symbol, and the Freudians 
would probably say the dream referred to some sexual 
complex, and would no doubt find one by going right 
back into the childhood of the patient. His associations 
with this dream, however, had reference to his most terri- 
fying experience during the war. When on guard outside 
a camp, and standing under a wall, a large snake had 
slithered down over the wall and over his shoulder. This 
dream had been persistent, but disappeared when a con- 
nexion was established with this incident ; and it is 
difficult to see why one should have to go right back to 
childhood to find some sexual explanation of such a dream, 
when the more obvious explanation served to remove it. 
Jung considers that a dream has a good deal to do with 
the patient's tendencies in the present, and may have 
significance in relation to what the patient is going to do. 
He regards dreams as being a useful guidance as to the 
progress of the patient, and considers that when the patient 
dreams of things in closer relation to the practical work 
of the world, that this is a good sign. For Jung, then, the dream may teleological, and is a symbolic picture of 
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the subconscious strivings of the patient's wakening life. 
This view held by Jung is valuable, but must not be carried 
too far, as once any psychological process is looked upon 
as prophetic, there is no limit to the flight of speculative 
ideas which may be deduced from this concept. With 
regard to simple symbolism in dreams, an example may 
make clear what is meant. A boy who had been very 
troubled with war nightmares, which are of course direct 
representations of repressed or partially repressed com- 
plexes, was getting better, and adapting himself more 
successfully to the prospects of the future, and his reflec- 
tions as to his behaviour in the past. However, that he 
was not free from his repression was shown by the fact 
that he had the following dream. He was in a billiard 
room, and was playing at the red ball, aiming at a pocket, 
and had a feeling that if he did not get it down into the 
pocket something dreadful would happen. Taking the 
incidents of the dream seriatim, the billiard room proved 
a simple wish fulfilment, comparable to the childish dream, 
as it represented the place where he spent most of his 
spare time at home. His immediate association with a 
red ball was a bursting shell, and of that with getting it 
down into the pocket, the absolute necessity of getting 
away from it, down a dug -out. This dream enabled us 
to restore an amnesia which previously had not been dis- 
covered. He had given the history that he had known 
nothing from the time when he was in a trench, to the 
time when he reached the dressing station. Now however, 
he remembered that he had been at the top of the dug -out 
steps with his sergeant, that a shell had burst close to 
them, which killed the sergeant, and knocked him all the 
way down the steps of the dug -out. There was also some 
vague idea that he ought to have gone and seen whether 
he could help the sergeant or not, after he had been picked 
up and taken down the line. With the recognition that 
he was not in any way to blame for the incident and the 
death of the sergeant, he recovered from his repression, 
and lost certain of his neurotic symptoms. 
Freud believes that certain symbols in dreams cannot 
be explained by the patient, and that these occur with con- 
siderable constancy in various people's dreams. He re- 
gards such symbols as fixed in their meaning, and believes 
that their interpretation is to be found by the study of 
myths and folklore. He argues from this that they are 
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drawn from race memory rather than from individual 
memory, and that this explains why the individual cannot 
furnish an explanation. As has been said, great caution 
must be observed in regarding any given symbol as being 
of fixed significance. Be that as it may, there is no doubt 
that the study of any individual's dreams may throw con- 
siderable light on the constitution and working of his 
personality which might otherwise be misinterpreted. It 
might not be too much to say, that in evaluating any 
person, for any particular purpose, a systematic study of 
his dreams would be by no means without value. 
Another important feature in relation to the working of 
the mind, on which Freud has laid stress, is what he calls 
the omnipotence of thought. By this he means that the 
individual attributes a value to purely cognitive processes 
quite out of proportion to reality. He recognizes this as 
an important constituent in the mentalities of the primi- 
tive, the child and the neurotic. Primitive man, so far as 
we can judge from observations on the low grade peoples 
who seem most closely to represent the behaviour of 
our ancestors, gradually evolved concepts of the super- 
natural, through the systems of taboo and magic. By the 
various processes of magic they believe that they can 
influence persons and things at a distance. These ideas of 
magic are closely allied to the early animism from which 
we have by no means yet freed ourselves, though we apply 
it much less widely, than did primitive man. The latter 
peopled the world with beneficent and maleficent spirits, 
and every person and object was possessed of a spirit, 
which could detach itself from the "body" and influence 
other "bodies" far removed in space. Freud points out 
that " Animism " is a system of thought, and it gives, not 
only the explanation of a single phenomenon, but makes 
it possible to comprehend the totality of the world from 
one point, as a continuity. He considers that animism 
grew out of the desire of man to master his surroundings. 
For this purpose he invented magic, and to explain magic 
he evolved animism. One process of magic is described 
by Frazer' as imitative, that is to say, the savage per- 
formed some action similar to the end he desired, and 
believed that thereby this end was accomplished. The 
other process he described as contagious, and involved 
the treatment of some part or attribute (such as the name) 
of the object, which the savage desired to affect. This 
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treatment involved, according to primitive belief, the 
experience by the object of just such dignities or indig- 
nities, as were practised on the part or attribute of the 
object. As Frazer says " Men mistook the order of their 
ideas for the order of their nature, and hence imagined 
that the control which they have, or seem to have, over 
their thoughts, permitted them to have a corresponding 
control over things." As Freud points out, Frazer's "order 
of their ideas " corresponds to the " order of their wishes," 
that these wishes if not gratified in reality, were gratified 
by hallucinations, which were of course believed as if they 
were real. 
Similar reactions occur in the child. He finds himself 
at a disadvantage in gratifying his wishes in reality, and 
finds a ready gratification in hallucination. In young 
children, and also in older deficient children, an en- 
tirely undue valuation is put upon thought, and what the 
child wills to think, he believes is so. Adults are often 
apt to regard the results of this gratification by hallucina- 
tion as deliberate lying, but when the imaginative child 
relates to an astonished parent how he met and vanquished 
a band of robbers, when out for his afternoon walk, he is 
not deliberately lying, he has only gratified his wish for 
self -assertion by an hallucination which he does not dis- 
tinguish from reality. That he should be taught to dis- 
tinguish between phantasy and reality, is of course neces- 
sary, but this may not be done best by abuse and punish- 
ment for telling lies. Similarly, the neurotic regresses 
very frequently to this level of being unable to distinguish 
between reality and phantasy, and having a firm belief in 
the identity of his wishes with accomplished fact. In the 
complete anamnesis of a neurotic patient, carried out by 
analytic methods, we are frequently astonished by tales of 
incidents which are said to have happened to the patient, 
but which further investigations prove to be entirely 
fictitious and merely "wish fulfilments." Again we fre- 
quently find him suffering from endless remorse, which is 
traced to a " death wish," expressed for some person, and 
which results firstly, in a fear that this wish may really 
have hurt the object, and secondly as a compensation, in 
an overweening anxiety for that person's health. Again, 
it is found that the difficulty experienced by the neurotic 
in adapting himself to life, is due to the difficulty In 
distinguishing between the values of reality and of 
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phantasy to the detriment of the former. These beliefs 
in the omnipotence of thought, and the automatic fulfil- 
ment of wishes, are by no means confined to the neurotic, 
and are of great importance in understanding the behaviour 
of the average citizen, especially if he has never completely 
freed himself from the phase, which Freud describes, as 
the autoerotic, when he himself is the most important 
object of his desires, and therefore his own personal wishes 
demand gratification. In such a case, it is easy to hal- 
lucinate attributes which he does not possess. 
A further psychological principle, on which Freud 
has laid considerable stress, especially in relation to 
the compulsion neuroses, he terms the ambivalence of 
emotion. By this he means, that it is very frequently 
observed that an individual displays two opposite feel- 
ings to an object, round which he has formed a complex 
or a sentiment. These antagonistic feelings may be ex- 
perienced consecutively, or almost simultaneously, and 
may be exemplified by such everyday concurrences, as the 
attraction and repulsion felt by so many people at witness- 
ing a particularly risky acrobatic feat. As Freud points 
out, however, this ambivalence becomes more important 
when one of the pair, of opposites is repressed and uncon- 
scious, while the other is conscious ; and this is specially 
evident in the ambivalent feeling of love and hate so often 
displayed by both the neurotic, and the so- called normal 
individual, in respect to other people, especially relations. 
Similarly the Sadistic and Masochistic trends often go 
together, and are often directed towards the same indi- 
vidual. In fact, all the opposite varieties of feeling, 
pleasure, pain, attraction and repulsion, excitement and 
relaxation may be felt for the same object, consecutively 
or simultaneously. This was recognized by orthodox 
psychology to a certain extent, but it was not applied in 
the sense that Freud has applied it, and to him must be 
given the credit of laying stress on this extremely im- 
portant factor in the mental make -up of the average man. 
It is clear, moreover, that any such conflict of emotions 
with regard to an object, will not make for the stability 
of the sentiment that emerges, and this ambivalence of 
emotion is one of the most potent factors which determine instability and conflict. 
In a recent contribution, Freud has considerably 
modified his attitude in respect of what has been described 
16o PERSONALITY 
above as the pleasure principle. This involves the theory 
that the set of all wishes is towards an active attainment 
of pleasure by relaxation of tension, and that this attain- 
ment of pleasure in his original sense always involved the 
co- operation, either as adjuvants or antagonists, of other 
wishes and " reality " or environment. Behind this, how- 
ever, Freud thinks that any given wish has a tendency to 
return to its original condition, irrespective of the en- 
vironment. This concept, he contends, involves a tendency 
of the individual as a whole to regress continually, until 
the original condition of non -existence or death is attained. 
For him then, life and progress are the products of 
reaction with reality, rather than fundamental "ends in 
view." These somewhat metaphysical concepts are 
admittedly vague, but they are suggestive as explaining to 
some extent the general phenomenon of regression, and 
some cases of suicide. 
Recently, the Freudians have been engaged in the 
study of character, and have sought to demonstrate types 
based on the theories of regression and infantile fixations. 
They maintain that in the infant, the sex feeling is aroused 
by stimulus from areas outside the genital zone, specially 
from the mouth, anus and urethra, and that in some children, 
one or other of these extragenital erogenous zones are more 
than usually potent. When this is so, such children tend to 
grow up with specialized character traits, which owe much 
to fixation and regression, and to behaviour dependent on 
oral, anal, or urethral eroticism. These studies of character 
are not very clearly defined, except in the case of the so- 
called Anal- erotic, who corresponds in some degree, to the 
introvert sensational type, described in the next chapter. 
Such a man is avaricious and miserly, seeking to acquire 
and hoard wealth, neglectful of his own personal appear- 
ance and slovenly in his behaviour. Often he is childish 
and petulant, but loving childish things and toys, and 
sometimes he displays great love for children, but other- 
wise is unsociable and difficult. Arnold Bennett has dis- 
played just this type in Riceyman Steps. Why such a 
character should be connected with anal eroticism, is by 
no means clear, and it is better to leave the explanation 
to the Freudians themselves, and reference should be made 
for this to their work. However, the fact remains, that 
they have successfully delineated a type of personality 
which may be met with in definite form from time to time. 
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As the Jungian character types seem more satisfactory, it 
is unnecessary to pursue this enquiry further at this point. 
We have seen that many of the doctrines enunci- 
ated by Freud and his school are of great use in the 
study of Personality, but they ought to be used with 
care and discrimination. In criticizing the doctrines of 
Freud the chief point at issue is the loose use of terms. 
For example, the followers of Freud talk as if conscious- 
ness was a dynamic force which does things. Thus 
Dr Douglas Bryan,' in what purports to be a didactic 
article on psychoanalysis, says : " In general, it may be 
said that consciousness chooses what is pleasurable and 
avoids what is painful." There is absolutely no justifica- 
tion for investing consciousness with this power of choosing 
or of exerting any influence on mental processes. As Pro- 
fessor Woodbridge expresses it, consciousness is a state 
comparable to time and space, and just as we talk about 
things happening in time and in space we can talk about 
things happening in consciousness. This corresponds 
with the position taken up in this book, that consciousness 
involves a certain relatedness, and conscious phenomena 
are emergent resultants of this relatedness. Similarly "the 
unconscious" must be regarded as a state which involves 
life but does not enjoy that relatedness which we describe 
as consciousness, and we must not describe the unconscious 
as doing this or that. It is however, legitimate to consider 
certain patterns which may be unconscious or may be 
conscious. In considering such patterns it is necessary to 
deal with the primary concepts which form the basis of 
the Freudian argument, the sex complex or pattern, and 
the ego complex. Many Freudian writers imply that the 
only "impulse " which underlies behaviour is sex, and that 
this sex impulse is already active in infancy. They say 
that from birth till about five years of age almost any 
sensory stimulus activates this "impulse," and that the 
resultant activity is " obviously " sexual. Thus von Hug- 
Helmuth e describes the muscular activity of a baby kick- 
ing his limbs about as resulting in the general excitement, 
the brightness of eyes, etc., which is in every way compar- 
able to the behaviour of an adult in a sexual orgasm. 
Arguing in this way they talk of skin eroticism, muscle eroticism and mucous membrane eroticism, as the primary forms of sex activity. Then they recognize that certain areas of the body are established as special erogenous 
L 
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zones, such as the mouth, anus, genitalia, etc. These at 
first have equal selective activity for stimuli, and all lead 
to sexual activity, i.e., "sexual" feeling and "sexual" 
action. Later, under ordinary circumstances, the special 
zones, with the exception of the genitalia, lose their potency 
more or less and so the normal erotic sensation is confined 
to the proper physiological sexual system. Under special 
circumstances, however, the genitalia do not achieve com- 
plete predominance but this is shared or usurped by one 
or other of the erogenous zones, with the result that various 
perversions arise and, as has been mentioned above, special 
character traits are developed. However, it is not only 
on the receptive side that infantile sex is manifested, but 
also on the conative side, and the infant is said to have 
various wishes or sets towards muscular activity which 
are of a sexual nature. These are described under the 
headings of sadism, masochism, exhibitionism, prying, as 
well as the apparently more obviously sexual activities of 
embracing, cuddling, etc. 
If we examine these on a physiological basis, two ques- 
tions occur to us. Are these impulses sexual at all and 
can we usefully talk about impulses in this vague way 
without making any attempt to define what we mean by 
impulse, and how and from where the " driving force" of 
these impulses comes that we hear so much about. The 
primary forms of so- called eroticism are evidently un- 
differentiated sensory experience. That is to say, simple 
afferent patterns, which are not discriminated in the degree 
proper to fully developed cortical function, are activated 
by simple stimuli. For example, suppose an infant's skin 
is gently stroked, or the mucous membrane of his lips and 
gums are gently rubbed, a stimulus is applied which will 
activate certain afferent sensory neurone paths. If the 
stimulus is not too violent the activation will travel from 
the sensory neurones to certain vegetative neurones, with 
the result that glandular and smooth muscle activities will 
result, which are familiar to us as expressions of pleasure. 
At the same time certain striped muscle activities are 
manifested, which at this age are poorly integrated and 
for the most part ineffectual, but which have the general 
tendency of bringing the child into a position to receive 
more of the pleasant stimulus. Directly the stimulus 
passes a certain intensity it involves unpleasant feeling, 
and totally different behaviour results. Such behaviour 
{ 
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resulting from purely sensory stimuli is characteristic of 
infancy, for with one exception, the patterns involved soon 
become more complicated and differently integrated. This 
complication of pattern and the differentiation of specific 
sensory experiences will result in a relative diminution of 
vegetative activity, and consequently in a diminished in- 
tensity of feeling, and an enhanced predominance of 
thought and integrated muscular activity. In conse- 
quence, this generalized indiscriminated excitement is not 
as a rule met with in the adult in response to the ordinary 
sensory stimulus. But there is an exception to this state- 
ment. The sex pattern is relatively late in its manifestation, 
and in the physical sex act there is retained, in adult life, a 
type of behaviour closely similar to that which is exhibited 
in response to the primary " sensational " experience, which 
is common in infantile life. Hug- Helmuth may be correct 
in stating that she has observed in the kicking infant who 
is enjoying kinesthetic sensation, behaviour similar to that 
of the adult enjoying sexual sensation, but it is suggested 
that she is wrong in deducing from this that the kin- 
esthetic or tactile sensation of the infant is a sexual 
sensation ; things which are examples of the same principle 
are not themselves identical. In his later works, Freud ---- 
defines the sex impulses as those which tend to bring the 
individual into contact with an object of the environment, 
and doubtless the child is trying to do this, but it seems 
rather far fetched to call such an ill- defined series of im- 
pulses sexual, and identify them with adult sexuality. The 
special erogenous zones described by the Freudians are 
apparently those areas of the body in which the sensory 
end organs are most abundant and most specialized, and 
they are not inherently sexual in the adult sense. One of 
the arguments on which the Freudians base their claim 
to the truth of their concepts is that it affords an excellent 
explanation of the development of the perversions, and 
explains many symptoms of the neuroses, and that even 
in the normal adult, stimulation of the "erogenous zones" 
induces a more or less sexual experience. These conten- 
tions can, however, be adequately met by the concept of 
conditioning of patterns. It may well be that, as a result 
of hereditary or environmental influences, one or more of 
t; ese patterns associated with sensory stimuli may be- 
come associated closely with the sex pattern and thus take on a definitely sexual association, although it was 
164 PERSONALITY 
not originally sexual itself. This is normally the case 
with the stimulus to the mucous membrane of the mouth 
involved in kissing. This may go much further so that 
the whole sex pattern is modified and altered, so that an 
abnormal stimulus sets it off and a perversion results. 
Thus, suppose some sensory pattern Y, with stimulus X 
and activity Z, is brought into association with the sex 
pattern B, with normal stimulus A and activity C, the 









and A no longer activates any pattern, and the activity Z 
is no longer produced by any stimulus. This of course 
represents the extreme degree of a perversion, as for 
example, when ordinary sexual stimuli (A) have no effect 
whatever, while cruelty stimuli (X) actually produce. 
orgasm (C) and do not in any degree produce the ordin- 
ary results (Z) ; but all intermediate processes occur, and 
are not uncommon. With regard to the conative ten- 
dencies mentioned above, there seems no particular reason 
to describe them as essentially sexual. In fact to do so 
would seem to be the result of arguing from the wrong 
end. No one will deny that sadism and masochism, ex- 
hibitionism, prying, and the like, as seen in adults are 
associated with sex, but the reason for this is that the 
very nature of the sex act demands that the sex pattern 
shall incorporate certain of these patterns as part of its 
complex whole. The sexual act being painful on the first 
occasion, it is necessary that a certain degree of active 
cruelty and submission to cruelty should be exhibited, and 
in certain cases the normal sex pattern may be profoundly 
modified and even totally submerged by the sadistic or 
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masochistic pattern, if these are strongly developed. This 
will lead to perversions, but it is nothing but another 
example of conditioning. For instance, the small boy 
who pulls the wings off flies is not doing anything sexual, 
but later on his sex pattern may be conditioned by this 
pattern, which subserves cruel behaviour, so that he be- 
comes a sexual sadist. At first sight exhibitionism and 
prying, seem to be more definitely sexual even in infancy, 
but it must be remembered that these types of behaviour 
are closely associated with curiosity, and that in conse- 
quence they will be concerned not with the obvious, but 
with those things which custom keeps hid. Young children 
will often exhibit or "pry into" their sexual organs, but 
equally often they will concern themselves with micturition 
or defecation, which cannot reasonably be regarded as 
sexual acts, but they have this in common that they are 
all usually hidden from observation. To sum up this 
argument, it would appear that the Freudians, who derive 
all sorts of manifestations from sexuality, are making the 
same mistake as those earlier critics of Darwinism who 
pointed to the monkey in the zoo as their friends' great - 
grandfather, oblivious of the fact that Darwin postulated 
a common ancestry to monkey and man ; so it would 
appear that sexual experience is only one form of primary 
sensory experience, and the sexual " wish " is only one 
form of the primary infantile wishes, and that the per- 
versions are not primary, but develop secondarily through 
conditioning. It is necessary also, to realize the develop- 
ment of the sexual impulse. Based on the impulse to 
physical satisfaction, the pattern soon gets involved with 
other impulses whose end in view is not physical satis- 
faction at all. Freud's explanation that love is made up 
of impulses which are not inhibited, comprising sensual 
love, and similar impulses which are inhibited, comprising 
spiritual love or tenderness, hardly seems to meet the 
case. Freud would derive all the components of the love 
sentiment from the physical impulse, which is the original 
"instinct" of sex in the predisposition, using the word 
instinct in McDougall's sense. The latter is right in pro- 
testing against the practice of the Freudians in mixing 
up parental instinct and sex instinct, as if they were one 
and the same thing, at the level of the predisposition ; but 
there can be no doubt that with the advance of life, they 
do become integrated together, and condition each other, 
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so that it becomes difficult to separate them. It is 
always difficult to analyse such a complex sentiment as 
love, but in his treatment of this sentiment McDougall 
lays stress on the grouping of emotional reactions in 
relation to the object, and exemplifies this by describing 
the anger when the object is attacked, fear when she is in 
danger, and so forth. Yet there is more in love than this, 
and it is suggested that there is an aspect of love with 
which McDougall does not deal and which the Freudians 
make use of, but without any exact definition or analysis. 
Roughly we may define love as an attraction between two 
people ; what then are the elements of attraction between 
these two ? This attraction can best be understood if 
three factors are distinguished. Firstly, physical appetite; 
secondly, possession, an impulse to take ; and thirdly the 
parental feeling, the desire to protect, the impulse to give. 
These are combined in the way which we suggest all 
biological units are combined, that is, so as to give rise to 
a new emergent having an identity of its own, and quite 
distinguishable from its components. The first needs no 
description here. The second is the basis of jealousy if 
carried too far, and is characterized by the wish that the 
object shall belong exclusively to the subject, that he or 
she shall minister to the needs and desires of the subject, 
and sacrifice himself and herself for the sake of the subject. 
This is the attitude which too often becomes dominant 
after marriage. Like other affective reactions, up to a 
certain intensity, it is desirable and attractive ; but if 
excessive, it is undesirable and repulsive. The third factor, 
that of the parental impulse, involves a sacrifice of self, a 
giving out in the interests of the object. It is entirely 
antithetical to the last and frequently comes into conflict 
with it. It is perhaps most marked in the woman, but it is 
noticeable that, at any rate so far as courtship is concerned, 
the woman in whom this self -denying factor is dominant 
is by no means the most attractive to the opposite sex. 
If we now consider the various attractions which exist 
between human beings we can recognize how these three 
factors are represented, and we may illustrate what is 
meant to greater advantage. Between lovers of the 
opposite sex, all three should be so integrated that they 
assume a true fusion without conflict. Ideally, the first 
will enter into the attraction without obtruding itself, the 
second will be present in each, to such an extent as to satisfy 
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the third impulse in the other, and the third will similarly 
be reciprocal to the demands of the second in the partner. 
If the first is too strong in one, or too weak in the other, 
to be reciprocal to the requirements of each other, there 
will be friction ; and it is obvious that the second and third, 
being the antithesis of each other, must be reciprocal. 
Even the third will do harm if in excess, though at first 
sight it seems so desirable; for no man, or woman either, 
likes to be fussed over more than a certain amount. These 
second and third factors are not of course inversely propor- 
tionate, for a man may have an almost unlimited capacity 
for receiving from his mate and yet be capable of giving 
much himself. Results of incompatibility of the three factors 
are so obvious that discussion is unnecessary, but incom- 
pleteness or completeness of the love sentiment is clearly 
an important factor in the development of personality. 
In the attraction between parent and child, the third 
factor should be the dominant one, and while the child is 
young it usually is so, corresponding to the unlimited 
capacity for taking, on the part of the child. But very soon 
the child himself begins to develop this third impulse . and 
may play upon the second in the parent, so that by the 
time the child is grown up the relative positions may be 
reversed. If the parental impulse is ideal, the giving 
must be for the ultimate good of the object, and if carried 
on too long may subtly change to the second impulse of 
taking. The cat, who after a time turns her kittens out 
and refuses them further protection and care, is not a hard- 
hearted mother, but is acting. wisely for the future of her 
offspring ; we may thus describe for a moment what is 
an irrational instinctive action, as if it were conscious in 
the human sense. But the human mother, who ties her 
children to her apron- strings in the belief that she is a 
perfect mother, and while protecting them from harm, is 
really indulging her possessive impulse, is taking and not 
giving. In spite of what many Freudians say it is im- 
probable that the first factor is of any significance in the 
average relationship of parent and child, though to contend 
that it never occurred, would be untrue. But the tragedies 
that occur as a result of disproportion between the second 
and third factors are legion. 
In the relationship of friends, the first factor is un- 
important or non -existent, though in many so- called 
friendships this is not so entirely absent as the subjects 
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would like to believe. The third factor should be dominant, 
and the second present in slight degree, but too often the 
latter becomes obtrusive and results in jealousies and 
discord. We may conclude, then, that the Freudian use 
of the term sex is too indiscriminated, and leads to too 
great a simplification of the springs of behaviour, even 
between normal lovers. 
We have complained above, that Freud paid too little 
attention to the self -preservation impulses, and, indeed, in 
his earlier works Freud was somewhat vague about the 
ego complex, and grouped the instincts which specially 
subserved self -preservation under this head, without analys- 
ing them particularly. He regarded these tendencies as 
chiefly concerned in conflicting with sex, and along with 
the reality principle, repressing and censoring the sexual 
tendencies, so as to constitute defences and reactions 
against the activities of the latter. Later, however, he and 
his followers describe a state of development of the sex 
" libido " which is directed to the ego itself, which they 
term Narcissism. This stage may be recognized in early 
infancy in the normal individual, and may persist as a 
fixation in the abnormal. In this case there is no striving 
outwards towards an object, since the subject itself has 
become the object. More recently still, Freud has taken 
up the study of the ego complex itself, and he insists that 
the effort of seeking the object is the reaction with the 
environment which involves life, and therefore the group 
of instincts which set the individual towards this may be 
termed life instincts. These he identifies with his sex 
complex. On the other hand, there are a group of in- 
stincts which set the individual away from the object in 
the environment, whose purpose is to shelter him from 
contact with the environment, to the maintenance and 
encouragement of which the whole effort of the individual 
is directed in the narcissistic stage. This withdrawal from 
the object, in Freud's view, involves a retirai from life and 
a constant tendency to revert to the simplest and least 
exacting contact with the environment, i.e., to a Nirvana 
state, with its logical outcome in non -existence, or death. 
This group of instincts he therefore terms the death 
instincts, and identifies them with the ego complex. This 
will naturally be in conflict with the sex or life instincts, 
and may therefore lead to fixations and repressions. In 
Freud's view, the narcissistic phase is not a true expression 
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of these instincts, and does not lead to death, because there 
is even in this, a striving outwards for an object, i.e. 
towards life, but the object is identified with the ego. 
That the ego is objective and not subjective, is shown by 
the fact, that there may be a well- marked division between 
the ego and the ego ideal, between what the individual is 
and what he would like to be, and to this he is striving. 
When this division is sharp and deep, the individual feels 
depressed and melancholic, whereas when the difference is 
slight, there is self -satisfaction, culminating in the extreme 
" pleasure" characteristic of mania when the ego and ego 
ideal fuse. 
The true ego complex, according to Freud's presenta- 
tion, may be defined as that group of impulses which tend 
to foster the interests and satisfactions of the self, as 
opposed to those of any object outside the self. It will 
tend to be in opposition to any effort to find contact for 
any purpose or in any way, with an object in the environ- 
ment. As the outcome of this tendency must be towards 
Nirvana or non -existence, these tendencies never can find 
complete satisfaction during life, and so will manifest 
themselves rather as negative restricting influences than 
positive influences achieving any definite activity of them- 
selves. Such in the main is Freud's view, but it is 
questionable whether the ego may not be more positive 
in its activities than this attitude represents. The ego 
cannot remain detached and as development proceeds, 
more and more of the environment is merged in the ego 
and a better presentation of the ego development would 
seem to be the self -regarding sentiment, as described by 
McDougall, and referred to in Chapter VII. 
Those activities of an individual which involve contact 
with an object outside of himself for any purpose what- 
ever, are katabolic ; while those which protect him from 
this contact, are anabolic. If then, the sex complex in 
Freud's sense comprises the tendencies which make for 
contact with the environment, they may be based on 
the various katabolic agencies of the body, sympathetic 
nervous system, thyroid, pituitary, adrenal group of en- 
docrine organs, and so forth. On the other hand, if the 
ego complex comprises the tendencies which make for 
avoidance of contact with the object, they may be based 
on the anabolic agencies, the autonomic nervous system, 
the pancreatic endocrine group, and so on. But anabolism 
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is not merely a negative process of avoidance of katabolism, 
but a positive process in itself. Hence it would seem 
probable that there is a definite ego "libido" in addition 
to the sex " libido " or, as we should prefer to express it, 
the ego complex may be just as much a definite engraphic 
pattern, capable of being activated, as is the sex complex. 
Therefore, the former may be modified by the reality 
principle, and such modification may result in conflict with 
the environment, just as much as may the latter. If we 
are to accept this rough analogy of anabolic and katabolic 
tendencies, it is clear that they are antithetic to each other 
and are continually in a state of conflict. Such conflict 
may be resolved by compromise or one or other may be 
temporarily suppressed, one or other may be conscious or 
unconscious, and the engrams which subserve these com- 
plexes will vary from time to time in their constitution, 
and their relatedness will differ, so that they may or may 
not achieve consciousness. It follows then that the related- 
ness which involves consciousness is a property of the con- 
stellation or complex, rather than that a constellation is 
the property of consciousness, as Freudians sometimes 
appear to infer. Some critics seem tempted to ask whether 
this conception does not involve the premise that once any 
mental process has been integrated on the level of con- 
sciousness, it must always remain there ; whereas the 
Freudian psychologists, if they are right, have shown that 
many things, which have been conscious at one time cease 
to be so. But this contention would not be held by the 
philosophers of emergent evolution at all on the other 
hand, they would be ready to admit that the integration 
at the conscious level is a much less stable affair than, for 
example, integration at the level of life. When we rise 
to the level of consciousness we have to do with the 
series of integrations which are essentially unstable, and 
which do not necessarily persist for any length of time. 
Not only may constellations become unconscious, but, at 
the level of consciousness, their complexity and related- 
ness may vary considerably. As Professor Janet` has so 
well shown, the individual is constantly running up and 
down the scale of integrations on these higher levels. He 
points out that individuals vary to an enormous extent in 
the energy which they have at their command for carry- 
ing out their actions ; and that the same individual varies 
in the amount of energy he has at his disposal from day 
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to day, and hour to hour. But if we are considering 
behaviour, we are at once struck by two different aspects 
of any action carried out -the amount of energy which is 
put into it, and its efficiency in relation to the environ- 
ment. As Hughlings Jackson pointed out, an epileptic 
fit is no more than a manifestation of low grade motor 
activity released from higher control, and if we compare 
the behaviour of a man in an epileptic fit with that of a 
man going for a walk, we may possibly give the prize 
for energy to the man in the fit, though we shall certainly 
give the prize for efficiency to the man going for a walk. 
Janet expresses this phenomenon as follows : -At lower 
levels, energy is expended at once, whereas, at higher 
levels, it may be capitalized and put into reserve. This 
capitalization allows the individual, not only to modify 
his immediate environment in time and space, but to 
extend that influence through time and space. Simple 
minds can carry on their work from day to day and are, 
at the most, capable of preparing their nourishment for 
to- morrow, but the superior man can integrate his actions 
so as to modify human life for many years. Founding 
his argument on this basis, he attempts to describe a 
hierarchy of according to the exten- 
siveness of their power of action in time and space. As 
we ascend this hierarchy of levels, behaviour becomes 
much more complex in reality, though at first sight it 
may seem simple enough. Directly behaviour reaches the 
actively conscious level the influence of self- consciousness 
comes in. Directly it reaches the level of social behaviour, 
the influence of consciousness of other people comes in, 
and the more remote these people are, and the more be- 
haviour is directed, with regard, not only to the opinion 
of contemporaries but to that of future generations, the 
more complex the reactions become. The more recent 
tendencies and the more complicated and higher levels of 
behaviour, are the least stable in any individual ; and it 
is in this respect that the study of the neurasthenic be- 
comes so useful for normal psychology, because in him we 
can see the effect of the absence of the higher levels of 
integration; just as at lower levels, we can study the 
effect of absence of motor and sensory cortical control, 
by examining patients with lesions of the sensory and 
motor cortex. From this we can see, therefore, that there 
is no objection to the concept of the interplay of life and 
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death impulses, of sex and ego, as described by Freud, 
one assuming the ascendancy at one time, and the other 
at another, under the influence of successive inhibitions 
and facilitations. But we must realize that the conscious- 
ness or unconsciousness of these impulses is a func- 
tion of themselves, and that they are not extruded from 
consciousness or erupted from the unconscious state, by 
some mysterious force which breaks through the " censor." 
This being so, another criticism of Freudian terminology 
follows. Just as they talk of consciousness doing things, .- so they talk of the censorship doing things. So long as 
the censor is simply regarded as a concept, and used 
for the purpose of describing a series of more or less 
complicated physio -psychological processes of inhibition, 
there may be no harm in this, if we are anxious to 
dramatize the presentation of our concepts. But again 
to quote Dr Douglas Bryan who says : " This barrier is 
a repressing force, which is constantly exerting itself, to 
prevent the contents of the true unconscious from reaching 
consciousness, their contents striving as they do, in order 
to obtain an outlet through consciousness, to discharge 
the energy with which they are invested." When we 
come across a sentence like this, we begin to ask ourselves 
what this censor is, and we may be tempted to enquire 
where we are going to find it in our anatomical and 
physiological studies. It may be all right for the 
accomplished Freudian, who knows exactly how the con- 
cept of the censorship was arrived at, but the article from 
which this sentence is quoted is supposed to be for the 
young beginner, and such a neophyte would surely think 
from this that the censor was some definite entity, related 
somehow or other to some brain structure. As we have 
seen, the censor is only a highly speculative term used 
to describe the effects of the inhibition of activation, 
comparable to such physiological manifestations as are 
exemplified by the inhibition of the antagonist muscles 
by the agonists, in the movement of a limb, the suppres- 
sion of the mass spinal reflex by higher level activity, and 
the fusion of motor activity controlled by the prespinal arc 
with that controlled by the pyramidal system. To sum up, 
there does not seem any inherent difference between such 
mutual incompatibility and mutual repressions of agonists 
and antagonists, or the mutually inhibitive action of the 
sphincter and compressor muscles of a hollow viscus and 
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the mutually repressive action of sex and ego complexes. 
Again, the repression of the mass reflex, which is only 
revealed when all higher controlling influences are re- 
moved, is comparable to certain archaic racial dispositions 
only showing themselves in extreme cases of regression, 
which represent a marked state of devolution of the higher 
forms of relatedness. The suppression of certain move- 
ments useful at one stage of life, such as the active sucking 
of the lips on contact, is of the same nature as the repres- 
sion of early experiences which, as life advances, become 
painful or regressive in their influence. Again, it is not 
uncommon for us to repress wittingly childish habits of 
movement in walking or other motions, and this is com- 
parable to the repression of painful incidents, distinguished 
by Rivers. Finally, the fusion of prespinal and pyramidal 
motor activity, so that the perfect motility of the healthy 
animal may emerge, would seem to be comparable to the 
fusion of various dispositions to constitute a sentiment, 
such as love, as has been described above. Such are a 
few of the criticisms and amendments which might be 
advanced in connexion with Freud's work, but there can 
be no question that he has made a contribution to the 
study of personality of the utmost value. Though no 
doubt much has still to be worked out, and many of his 
original contentions may require modification, his insist- 
ence on the importance of conflict and repression at 
psychological levels, and his study of their results, will 
one day be found to be in strict correlation with the work 
done on conflicts and repressions at physiological levels, 
and even in his apparently more contentious concepts, 
loose terminology is apparently the chief difficulty we 
have to contend with, and it may be that if an adequate 
translation into scientific terms can be obtained, these will 
not seem so far -fetched as they frequently do at present. 
CHAPTER X 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF JUNG TO THE 
STUDY OF PERSONALITY 
FROM the purely psychological standpoint we find that 
the line of thought adopted in this book is in sympathy 
with the attitude of Jung,1 when he broke away from the 
strict Freudian school. In the first place, he recognized 
that the general set of man's life was directed to an achieve- 
ment of something higher, to something creative, to Deity 
in Alexander's sense. Jung saw that the aim was not 
merely the achievement of sexual desire, or even of love, 
or of individual expression, as Freud and Adler, re- 
spectively, would have us believe. However, as was said in 
Chapter VIII, all these theories are complementary rather 
than mutually destructive. As to the means whereby 
this end is achieved, however, we would find ourselves at 
variance with Jung as he, like Freud, postulates a libido 
comparable to the élan vital of Bergson, coming from 
somewhere outside, and being of a different order to the 
ordinary processes of physiology. 
Secondly, we find ourselves in sympathy with Jung's 
treatment of the word sex. While we have found it 
necessary to criticize the application of the term sex to 
much in infantile behaviour, Jung criticizes the too free 
use of the term in later developments. He maintains 
that, though many processes in the behaviour of mankind 
may have developed from sexual conations, nevertheless, 
in their fully established state, they ought not to be 
described as sexual, since they are permanently changed. 
In other words, an emergence from sexual and other 
conations in combination is no longer sexual, but some- 
thing new and distinctive in virtue of its emergence. 
To turn to the actual contribution of Jung to the study 
of personality, it is not within the scope of this work to 
consider the whole of his teaching as it relates to the 
practice of psychotherapy, but there are certain aspects 
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of his philosophy which are of the greatest importance to 
our particular study. 
The two outstanding features of Jung's contribution -- 
are his concept of a collective unconscious, and his scheme 
of differentiation into types. Jung approached the study 
of human personality from the same avenue as did Freud, 
namely through the symptoms of the abnormal mind, and 
only later was he led to the study of the behaviour of the 
normal individual. Neither of these observers interested 
himself primarily, as did the American school, with the 
physiological applications of this approach, but confined 
themselves entirely to the psychological aspect of the 
problem. Nevertheless, as Jung himself has pointed out, 
the objects of their investigation and the interpretation 
of their findings were divergent from the outset, and 
must have been so, because they belong to different types, 
who could not see the problem from the same standpoint 
It is necessary to examine these differences further, before 
we proceed. Freud, the extrovert, was interested in the 
object, in what he could successively find, and describe as 
objective facts, by deeper and deeper analysis. Thus, he 
observed psychic traumata on the one hand, and the 
behaviour of his patient on the other, and inferred that the 
former had a causal relation to the latter. Jung, the 
introvert, was interested in how all these discoveries 
applied to the subject from the standpoint, not of the 
observer, but of the subject himself. This led him to 
suspect some of the inferences of Freud, and to formulate 
different causal relationships to explain behaviour. Any 
situation must be regarded as a complex from which we 
have no right to detach, either the contribution of the 
object, or that of the subject, and we must investigate it 
from both points of view before we can grasp the situation 
as a whole. Take a simple example. I am hit by a falling 
rock which breaks my arm. The extravert, in examining 
this situation, would be concerned with an empirical 
investigation of the facts. He would first treat the rock 
as an object, he would observe that it became detached 
from the mountain, that it fell through a certain space, 
that it struck my arm and bounded off to drop at my feet. 
Then he would observe me, and describe how my arm was 
struck, how I uttered a cry, and how my arm fell useless. 
From this, he would infer inductively, that I felt pain, and 
that my arm was broken, because experience of similar 
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objective observances told him that this explanation was 
most likely. The attitude which the introvert would take 
is more difficult to describe, because our language does 
not lend itself so easily to this type of thought. This 
introvert attitude is not readily appreciated or accepted 
by the Anglo -Saxon mind, or indeed, by the Western 
mind at all, for introversion is much more general in the 
Oriental. Such an observer would tend to identify himself 
with the situation as subject. He would consider how I 
felt, and to do this, must to a certain extent put himself 
in my place. He would be interested in how I, as a 
subject, reacted to the event ; what contribution I, as 
subject, made to the complex situation. He would not 
necessarily conclude that I suffered pain, and that my arm 
was broken because, as the extravert would say, " It was 
perfectly obvious that it was." He might consider the 
possibility that I had an ansthetic arm, and so might 
not have had any pain, and that the cry was evoked by 
surprise at the noise of the stone falling. He might 
weigh the possibility that my arm fell to my side, not 
because it was broken, but only because it was bruised ; 
he would be less interested the facts than 
explanations. Though he might, and probably would 
come to the same general conclusion as the extravert, he 
would only arrive at it after considering and rejecting 
other possibilities. Similarly, if he considered the stone 
as subject, he would identify himself, so far as possible, 
with it, and be interested less in the fact that it fell than 
in the laws which determined its fall. Carried to extremes, 
this attitude is prone to anthropomorphize objects, in the 
manner of the primitive man ; and such would attribute 
to the stone, for instance, a feeling and cognition of falling, 
almost a consciousness of situation in time and space 
which, to the extravert mind, is a reductio ad absurdum. 
I have purposely given a somewhat crude and exaggerated 
example, but I wish to make clear that in a given complex 
situation, the extravert is concerned with the contribution 
to the situation of the objects, as objects -of- observation, 
while the introvert is interested in the subject and his 
subjective experiences, quite apart from what happens to 
him. So in the study of behaviour, Freud was concerned 
with what happened to the individual who was being 
studied, and what his reaction was, in strict relationship to 
this happening. He therefore took notice of the psychic 
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traumata experienced by the individual, he saw the 
reactions induced by these, and formulated his contribution, 
which is described elsewhere, laying stress on behaviour as 
a function of the stimulus, though admitting the influence 
of disposition. 
Jung, on the other hand, saw what the individual 
contributed of himself and from himself, laying stress on 
behaviour as a function of the disposition, though not 
denying the influence of stimuli. From this standpoint 
he came to the conclusion that there was, in each indi- 
vidual mind, a store of potential reactions to stimuli, which 
have no fundamental relation to his own experience or 
to environment, though they may be modified by these. 
He suggests that they are in fact the expressions of 
primitive race experience, which give the individual an 
inner set towards meeting a situation in the way the race 
has been accustomed to meet it. Such a set is analogous 
to the behaviour of the heart, which, in virtue of its 
structural and functional organization, has a set towards 
responding to the needs of the body to be nourished by 
circulating blood. Further, he suggests, quite apart from 
any experience or influence from the environment, that in 
accordance with the variations in these dispositions and 
their interrelations, there is a tendency for individuals to 
respond to the situations met with in life, in certain 
different ways. These he has distinguished in his eight 
types. 
To get a complete understanding of his concepts it is 
necessary to have recourse to his own works, and those of 
his apologists, and it must suffice here to indicate briefly 
how they contribute to the study of personality. 
First of all, we may study his conception of the collec- 
tive unconscious. Jung defines the unconscious as an 
exclusively psychological concept. For him, the term 
covers all those psychic contents, or processes, which are 
not conscious, i.e., not related to the ego in a perceptible 
way. He justifies the concept of the existence of such 
contents on the evidence of psychopathological and other 
experience. Take, for instance, a case of hysterical amnesia; 
at any given moment, the ego knows nothing of the exist- 
ence of certain complicated psychological complexes, and 
yet, in the next moment, a simple hypnotic procedure is 
enough to bring the lost contents to complete reproduction 
in consciousness. He holds that it is quite impossible to 
M 
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specify what contents the unconscious embraces ; only 
experience can decide such questions. We may form 
general impressions, but cannot expect them to hold good 
in individual instances. Firstly the disappearance of a 
great variety of complexes which were once conscious in the 
process of forgetting, involves their presence as unconscious 
content, as is shown by their reappearance, sooner or 
later, by virtue of some new relatedness. Secondly, he 
considers that certain sense perceptions may, by reason 
of their slight intensity or because of the deviation of 
attention, scarcely reach that special relatedness which 
involves full consciousness, yet become unconscious psychic 
contents. Again, the existence of such contents may be 
demonstrated, inasmuch as they may be revealed under 
hypnosis. Finally, experience also teaches us that there 
exist unconscious psychic patterns -for instance, mytho- 
logical images -which have never been in, or near con- 
sciousness during the individual's lifetime, and hence must 
have been engraphically determined, entirely at the level 
of unconscious activity. Thus, Jung would divide the 
content into two divisions of unconscious levels. Firstly, 
a personal unconscious, including that which has been 
forgotten and repressed, and that which represents sub- 
liminal impressions : in other words, all those patterns 
resulting from the interaction of the disposition with the 
environment which have failed to reach, or ceased to 
enjoy, that relatedness, which involves consciousness. 
Secondly, he describes the collective unconscious whose 
contents do not originate in personal acquisitions, but in 
the inherited potentiality of psychic function which is 
subserved by the inherited brain structure. This collec- 
tive unconscious material consists of the mythological 
primordial images - those motives and images, which 
apparently can spring anew in every age and clime, with- 
out historic tradition or personal migration. There are 
many examples, especially in the history of symbols, which 
seem to bear this out ; for example, the universality of the 
serpent and fish symbols for fertility, and the attitude of 
primitives to the four elementals, earth, air, fire and water. 
Again, in art, there are many similarities in the work of 
artists of different periods, which are difficult to explain 
on the basis of culture contact, though, in most cases this 
cannot be absolutely excluded. Examples might be 
quoted, such as that of the three -dimensional feeling of 
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the negroid art, which has recently been to the fore in 
artistic circles, compared to the same feeling in Greek art. 
Again, compare certain recently discovered examples of 
Minoan art from Crete, with Masaccio's " Expulsion from 
the garden of Eden " in the Carmine chapel in Florence, 
and that, in turn, with the modern work of Degas. Or in 
poetry, the analytical but hyperbolic verse of Donne in 
England, with that of his contemporary Gongora, in Spain. 
All these may serve to show that in the absence of obvious 
common environmental influences, similar behaviour pat- 
terns emerge, as if from a common source. Just as conscious 
content is integrated and combined to produce behaviour 
in the form of conscious actions and thought, so unconscious 
content is integrated and combined on a different level of 
relatedness, to produce overt behaviour in the form of 
unconscious actions and thought processes, such as appear 
in dreams or phantasies. This does not imply that any 
content which at times enjoys the special relatedness 
which involves consciousness takes no part in such actions 
and dreams ; but rather, that their set and pattern depend 
chiefly on that content which does not enjoy such related- 
ness, so to 
activities and thoughts, which Jung would place in that 
division of unconscious mental activity which he calls the 
collective unconscious, for most of the content of the indi- 
vidual unconscious mind has, at one time or another, en- 
joyed the relatedness which involves consciousness. 
Jung further regards the unconscious content as com- 
pensatory ; that is to say, when there is a gap in the 
stream of proper conscious content which would enable 
the subject to deal adequately with a situation, this gap 
is filled by unconscious content. But, inasmuch as this 
latter content has failed to achieve that higher relatedness 
which we call consciousness, its adaptation to environment 
is primitive and incomplete, and therefore more or less 
unsatisfactory. It follows from this that the more one - 
sided is the conscious content, the more obviously com- 
pensatory will be the unconscious content, a factor which 
will be noticed further when dealing with the dissociated 
personality, and conscious and unconscious behaviour will 
be complementary to each other. Thus, in relation to the 
types of introvert and extravert already discussed ; if an 
individual is a marked extravert in his conscious behaviour, 
his unconscious behaviour will tend to be of the introverted 
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type, and vice versa. Hence, in dealing with neurotics, 
whose behaviour is largely of the poorly integrated and 
discriminated unconscious type, their real category is 
frequently mistaken, since their most obvious behaviour is 
really compensatory and not genuine. 
So far as this view of the unconscious content is con- 
cerned, there is no difficulty in accepting most of it from 
the physiological point of view, so long as we remember 
that the content of the collective unconscious can only be 
described as existing in certain relationships. There has 
been far too much talk on the part of some writers, about the 
collective unconscious doing this and that ; a confusion of 
thought which cannot be too much deprecated. As has 
been said above, the most original part is the concept that 
the collective unconscious is the basis of a purely subjective 
contribution to a situation which has nothing to do with 
objective experience. The crucial points in this theory of 
the existence of race memories in the individual psychic 
content are as follows : firstly, we must admit the possi- 
bility of transmission of particular patterns of behaviour 
which we recognize as the common actions of our ances- 
tors, at some time or other, speaking of such as correlates 
of special patterns of neural structure ; secondly, if such 
patterns are transmitted, we must explain how they may 
be available for use under a certain concatenation of 
circumstances. 
We have accepted Semon's 2 theory of the Mneme, 
as a useful concept which seems to explain the facts 
and is, moreover, reasonably likely to approximate to the 
truth. This theory emphatically allows for the trans- 
mission of just such characters as Jung suggests. An 
engram is an arrangement of neurones, conditioned in 
such a way that their subsequent activation produces a 
pattern of behaviour which resembles, but is not identical 
with the previous resultant behaviour. Such engrams are 
evolved out of inherited dispositions, by the modification 
necessitated by the environment. It would seem that in 
this process of the evolution of engrams, two factors must 
be taken into account. The neural patterns or engrams 
are not only an imprint on a malleable material induced 
by the environment, as a crest is imprinted on soft wax by 
a signet -ring, but there is in that relatedness, which involves 
life, a tendency to achieve adaptation ; and so, in respect 
of this, an engram will take on a certain form which sub- 
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serves greater adaptability. In other words, it is not only 
a function of the environment, but also of that relatedness 
which involves life. This concept does not involve any 
special vital energy, but simply that the relatedness follows 
certain laws, and these laws imply behaviour which, if 
followed, will lead to adaptation rather than away from it. 
Recent experiments have shown that such engrams which 
are determined in the nervous system, and which become 
progressively adaptive in the individual animal, also by 
some modification of the germ cell are represented in the 
next generation, not in their original form, but in their 
later form of greater adaptability. Thus, it has been 
found that not only will an individual animal, learning by 
experience, require fewer and fewer trials and errors in 
finding its way out of a maze, but its offspring will learn 
more quickly than did the parent, and the diminution of 
trials and errors, necessary in the learning progress, will be 
transmitted through several generations. If this be so,_._ 
then it may be admitted that engrams representing primi- 
tive patterns of thought and feeling, acquired during the 
life -time of various individuals, may be transmitted in 
their modified form to future generations. 
On the analogy of motor activity, it is to be expected 
that such primitive patterns, which are transmitted, will 
be unconscious and not conscious. Thus Rivers 8 has 
pointed out how many functions, which are no longer 
necessary to the individual, may be either totally sup- 
pressed, or suppressed and fused. For example, it is 
certain that the type of locomotion which is represented 
in the central nervous system by the prespinal arc, was 
the actively functioning pattern of behaviour in a remote 
ancestor. In human beings it is suppressed below the 
level of consciousness, and below the level at which it can 
function independently; yet it is still an essential part of 
our motor organization ; for if interfered with by disease 
or injury, or if allowed undue prominence by the cessation 
of the normal control exercised by the cortical motor 
system, locomotion is at once interfered with by the 
alteration of muscular tonus. So with these patterns of 
thought and feeling, described by Jung as the collective 
unconscious. They have been suppressed below the level 
of conscious relatedness, and only achieve activation when, 
in sleep or neurosis, the controlling and inhibitory influ- 
ence of conscious mentality is in abeyance. This libera- 
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tion from conscious control which allows these unconscious 
engrams to be activated, explains how they find expression 
at certain times, and therefore elucidates the second problem 
which we submitted for solution. To support this, it is 
noticeable that when these engrams are activated and 
achieve anything like dominance, the influence on the 
individual is usually a disturbing one. For all we know, 
however, their presence, though unconscious, may have a 
considerable influence on normal behaviour ; in other 
words, they may be fused and not suppressed. This 
question cannot be fully determined till psychologists 
know a great deal more about subconscious mental pro- 
cesses. There seems no reason, then, to reject the con- 
tention of Jung, that our personality includes these 
primitive patterns of mental activity which can, under 
certain circumstances, be reactivated according to the 
Mnemic laws. Usually, however, like other superseded 
activities, they are suppressed below the level of con- 
sciousness. So they are not influenced by those constant 
modifications and changes which are impressed on our 
more conscious patterns by the reciprocal relationship of 
individual and environment. For this reason, their occa- 
sional manifestations will bear a close resemblance,- even 
in individuals of very different types, and will likewise 
reproduce with considerable fidelity the habitual patterns 
of thought and feeling of primitive man. In other words, 
behaviour, depending on collective unconscious processes, 
is archaic and badly adapted. 
When we come to consider Jung's other contribution 
to the study of the personality, viz., his differentiation of 
types, we must distinguish between his earlier and later 
work. Originally, he chose two types, the introvert and 
the extravert, which corresponded as he then described 
them, to the introverted thinking type and the extraverted 
feeling type of his new classification. The more elaborate 
classification of his later work is a distinct advance and 
removes several difficulties. In the first place, it relieves 
us from the necessity of postulating two definite types of 
introvert and extravert. He now defines introversion and 
extraversion as attitudes. The four types he relates to 
the four mental functions of thinking, feeling, intuition 
and sensation. Whichever of these functions is predomi- 
nant in an individual determines his type, and this type 
will be introverted or extraverted according to his pre- 
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valent attitude towards his environment, which may vary 
from time to time ; so that, although we may say that a 
person is an introvert, he may be extraverted towards 
certain objects, and at certain times. Thus a man may 
be introverted towards his religion, but extraverted towards 
his garden, while another may be extraverted in health, 
but become introverted during illness. Indeed, there are 
some extraverts who maintain that introversion is always 
pathological, and there is a good deal to be said in favour 
of such a view. None the less, there is no doubt that we 
can recognize in most people a dominant attitude and a 
recessive attitude, that is to say that most of the time 
the dominant attitude, either extravert or introvert pre- 
vails, and only under certain circumstances does the 
recessive attitude manifest itself. An attempt has already 
been made to indicate the contrast between extravert and 
introvert, and for fuller details reference should be made 
to Jung's own works. Similarly in respect of the types, 
it is impossible to do more than indicate their nature 
here. One fact, however, may be referred to. This is 
that the intuitive and sensation types, which Jung calls 
the irrational types but which would be better called the 
empirical types as Van der Hoop 4 has suggested, would 
seem to represent a lower stage in the development of the 
personality than the thinking and feeling types. Follow- 
ing the strictly correlationist standpoint adopted in this 
study, we recognize that the functions of the cortex are 
the highest development so far attained by the brain of 
man. We have seen that the chief of these are integra- 
tion, discrimination and control. The principal difference 
between the rational and empirical types is that the latter 
are content to accept the facts of life, or the impulses 
they feel within themselves, as they come. They have 
no desire to discriminate these, or integrate them into 
systems, or control them so that they come within the 
scope of rational laws, as do the former ; and it is just 
these functions which are characteristic of full cortical 
development, and therefore are higher in the scale. For 
this reason I would not regard the functions of thinking 
and feeling, in the empirical types, as recessive, in the 
sense that sensation and intuition are recessive in the 
rational types. In the rational type, sensation and in- 
tuition have been superseded for general purposes but 
by no means suppressed, so that in certain situations 
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intuition or sensation is the function that is called upon. 
On the other hand, in the empirical types, the functions 
of thinking and feeling have not yet come to full fruition, 
and so are only made use of tentatively and occasionally. 
By the function of sensation, we mean that the normal 
sensations acquire a sufficient degree of relatedness to 
achieve consciousness, and form perceptions, but are not 
further integrated into abstract concepts or complicated 
emotional relationships. Under the term sensation we 
must include all sensations, whether the result of stimuli 
coming from the environment or from within the body. I 
retain the term sensation type because it has been used 
by Jung, and a multiplication of terms, referring to the 
same thing, is undesirable ; but it seems to be a little 
unfortunate to use a term which has a perfectly definite 
meaning on one level, to express something indubitably 
dependent on what is expressed by the original term, but 
which has acquired a new relatedness, and has emerged at a 
higher level. For what the sensation type experiences are 
not pure sensations, but an organization of such, so that 
they emerge as perceptions. These perceptions might be 
described in our daily press, by the favourite adjective 
" sensational ", for people of this type are apt to live at a 
high tension, passing from one "sensation" in the journal- 
istic sense, to another. The contribution of their inherent 
impulses, irrespective of response to psychic traumata, is 
recessive, and only makes itself felt under exceptional 
circumstances. That is to say, they require something to 
which they can respond, before action is initiated. When 
their inherent impulses do initiate action, by breaking 
away from the usual channels of responses, such action is 
undiscriminated and uncontrolled, as it has not achieved 
that degree of relatedness which corresponds to full 
cortical or conscious control. That these people do behave, 
in response to accidents of the environment, in the way that 
Freud would have us believe, is practically universal ; and 
their sex impulse, for instance, is either poorly controlled, or 
repressed by some stronger stimulus from the environment. 
If the sensation type is extraverted, a man is specially 
sensitive to, and interested in stimuli from without. 
Such individuals often achieve considerable powers of dis- 
crimination in respect of these, and many artists are of 
this type, excelling in virtue of this sensory discrimination. 
As a rule, this type are of the class met with in scores at 
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English country houses, interested chiefly in sensuous 
pleasures in the broadest sense, which include the pleasures 
of muscular exercise and simple visual, auditory and gusta- 
tory stimuli, but they are restrained by tradition, which 
divides conduct into things which are "done ", and the 
things which are " not done ". This results in a very 
definite ethical code, arranged according to the dictates of 
this tradition, which does not always correspond to the 
Decalogue. Moreover, conduct is frequently dominated 
by that eleventh commandment, " Thou shalt not be found 
out." The thinking of these people is superficial, and the 
only realities for them are facts, and what they call 
"common sense ". Abstractions and metaphysics are quite 
meaningless and simply a waste of time. Their feeling 
also tends to be superficial, they have hosts of acquaint- 
ances but do not readily make close friends. They say 
they are deeply moved by events, but alter their lives very 
little as the result of these " moving experiences ", for 
their own emotions are not deeply fixed and are poorly 
organized, nor are they capable of real and lasting 
sympathy. Their chief recessive characteristic is the 
behaviour dictated by . their own " wishes ", which is 
characteristic of the intuitive type. Of this they are 
desperately afraid, because it usually cuts across the 
tradition by which they are guided, and leads to a state 
of confusion from which they see no outlet, owing to the 
poverty of their capacity for thought. Being a recessive 
character, the type of reaction is poorly discriminated and 
controlled, and tends too much to an " all or none " reaction. 
Hence they are liable at times to violent swings from 
one extreme to the other, between strictly conventional 
behaviour and that dictated by their primitive unconscious 
impulses, - behaviour which used to be described as 
" Mafeking ". 
If the sensation type is introverted, a man will be 
interested chiefly in the impressions he receives from within 
himself, and will react, even to outside stimuli, from this 
point of view, so that the resultant perception is dominated 
chiefly by the influence of the individual's store of images 
rather than by pure sense impressions. Much modern art 
is the product of this type. The only law that governs 
it is the expression of how the artist sees a thing. The 
resultant picture may be, and generally is very different 
from the photographic impression which the extravert of 
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the same type would experience. Indeed, it may be that 
any other person would perceive the original as something 
entirely different, but this does not in any way disturb the 
artist, for how other people see, or feel, or think, concerns 
him not at all. In their ordinary life these people, being 
concerned with their own inner sensations, tend to be 
reserved and withdrawn from life ; they are irresponsive 
and apathetic. If they have poor self -assertion, they recog- 
nize that they are different from others, since they cannot 
go out to meet life and enjoy it. Further, they are not 
well organized and integrated, and therefore sufficient unto 
themselves. For these reasons, they are apt to develop a 
sense of inferiority, and fall into a neurosis in consequence. 
If self -assertion is strong, they may break out into fits of 
rebellion and aggressiveness, which may take a serious 
asocial direction. Of such stuff the sufferers from Dementia 
Pr cox are made. In these cases the world of phantasy is 
of the highest importance. Here, all inner sensations have 
free play to work themselves out and gain full satisfaction, 
so that this false world becomes more important than the 
world of reality. Even at the best, however, the introverted 
sensation type have great difficulty in expressing them- 
selves, and are usually solitary and morose, too often 
unhappy in their lives, envying the fortunate lot of the 
easy -going sensational extravert. 
The second type, termed by Jung " intuitive," is in 
some sense the antithesis of the sensation type. The latter 
is susceptible to impressions, and depends on that part of 
the complex pattern determining behaviour which arrives 
so to speak from outside the nervous system, by way of 
the receptors ; the former, on the other hand, depends on 
that part of the complex, which, it may be said, is within the 
nervous system in the form of disposition. In other words, 
intuition is the spontaneous expression of the individual's 
dispositions or " instincts," using the word in McDougall's 
sense. As in the sensation type, the discrimination and 
integrative functions of thought and feeling are poorly 
developed. They do not control the spontaneous out- 
pouring of the impulses, and this type tends to react in the 
" all or none " way, glorying in freedom from restraining 
logical thought. Nor are their feelings in better way, for 
feeling, organized into sentiments, is also inimical to intui- 
tive expression. 
The intuitive is always trying to find an outlet for his 
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impulses, and the extravert of this type seizes upon objects 
in the outside world as means to this end. He often 
perceives association between events which, to others, seem 
to have little or no connexion, and the future sometimes 
proves him surprisingly right, but also this same faculty 
may lead to disaster. The reason for this is, that he 
approaches these events or objects from a different stand- 
point from that of any other type. For him, the objects 
have no value in themselves, but are only important in so 
far as they can serve the purpose of the development of 
his own inner impulsion. This gives a quite different 
associative link from that employed by the sensation type, 
and so a different outlook results. Once he has used the 
object, he tends to drop it entirely, since it has no intrinsic 
value, though at the time he may have regarded it with 
the greatest enthusiasm. This applies to persons as well 
as things, and so he appears changeable and fickle. As a 
rule, he is not a very dependable person, and prefers to 
wait until the event arrives rather than bind himself by 
any plans made beforehand. If the inner impulse, which 
is seeking expression, is in harmony with the needs of 
the community, he will, in virtue of his new and single 
approach, see ways out of difficulties which fill the admiring 
multitude with awe and rapture. But if this impulse runs 
contrary to the community's needs, then he will appear to 
throw over his friends or his nation, and almost deliber- 
ately lead them astray. Moreover, impulses of value and 
impulses with no value may succeed one another with 
bewildering rapidity, and in truth these civic virtues and 
vices are only incidental, for all that is of importance to 
the individual is the practical satisfaction of his own inner 
requirements. 
If the intuitive is introverted, he will not be concerned 
with practical results. He is more interested in how that 
which comes from within himself, the product of his own 
engrams, works, and what it leads to, irrespective of 
outside objects and events. Most of his activity will be 
in phantasy, and he will be credited with what is called 
inspiration. The artist, the poet, the prophet, and the 
mystic are of this class, and, as was the case in the 
extraverted intuitive, their value depends on whether 
their inner impulse is in harmony with other needs. If 
so, then their poetry and their prophecy is hailed as 
heaven -sent, but if not, then their effusions are regarded 
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as the vague vapourings of an impractical dreamer. As 
a matter of fact, inasmuch as the engraphic patterns on 
which the mental activity of this type depends, are the 
product of long ancestral experience, much of value may 
be forthcoming, and original points of view may be pro- 
duced, since their archaic nature is little influenced by 
consideration of contemporary events. So vivid are the 
inspirations which arise, that the individual does not 
always recognize them as products of his own mind. 
This gives rise not only to hallucinations proper, but to 
impressions that someone else has told him what to say. 
This is exemplified by many of the prophets of old, who 
believed that the voice of God whispered His message 
in their ear. 
Since these four types are the basis of the remaining 
types, and the latter are no more than higher develop- 
ments of the same fundamental material, an illustration 
of how they would be expected to react to a given 
situation may make for greater clarity. Suppose A is 
of the extraverted sensation type, B of the introverted 
sensation type, C of the extraverted intuitional, and D 
of the introverted intuitional types, how would 
react to an event which must affect them all, such as the 
announcement of the armistice in November 1918 ? 
A would receive this astounding news, and immedi- 
ately forget everything else in the overwhelming joy and 
relief of the moment. If he went out into the crowd, 
contact with his fellows would lower his general control, 
and the excess of his feelings would lead him into 
extravagant and perhaps foolish actions. Of such was 
Mafeking night. 
B would tend to go away by himself and be glad ; 
he might permit himself a private carouse. He would 
be annoyed by the noisy crowd of A, and retire further 
afield to be left in peace to think of this new situation, 
and how it affected him. And then doubt, his old enemy, 
might creep in. He would ask if it was such a good 
thing after all ? The war was over, with all its opportunities 
-no more chance of promotion, no possibility now of an 
M.C. or a D.S.O. If only he had volunteered for that raid, 
it might have been so different. And so he may work 
himself up into a very miserable state of mind. 
C does not go into the ecstasies of A. To him this 
presents a new situation. How is he going to use it to 
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his advantage, to the advantage of his inner ambitions, 
be they towards riches and power, or towards rest and 
laziness ? In either case he applies the event to himself ; 
he must get demobilized at once, and be free ; he must 
buy certain stock, which is sure to go up ; whatever it may 
be, he gets on with the job, in the effort to achieve his end. 
D finds this event a new inspiration, his thoughts and 
feelings may express themselves in a poem of merit, or 
a mere personal day -dream ; unless it be through art, he 
will not achieve anything practical as a result of the new 
stimulus, since it has no value either for its own sake, or 
as an outlet for his impulses, but these may get from 
it a new turn, so that an original picture or poem is the 
outcome. 
The remaining types described by Jung, which involve 
the functions of feeling and thinking, represent the attain- 
ment of a higher level than those just referred to and, as 
has been pointed out above, their behaviour corresponds 
to functions associated with the highest cortical develop- 
ment. Two of these functions are discrimination and 
integration, and Jung's function of thinking is concerned 
with discrimination, and that of feeling with integration, 
at a level at which a considerable measure of syntheses 
of the lower forms of mental reaction has already been 
achieved. In either type, the lower levels of sensation 
or intuition may be recognized as dominant or recessive. 
In other words, the subject may react chiefly to external 
impressions, or to inner impulses ; but as a rule, these 
are synthesized into a more or less organized whole. In 
this way activity depends, not on isolated activations of 
disparate parts of the total personality, but there is a 
greater tendency for the whole individual to find expres- 
sion as a unity. Such synthesis having been achieved, 
the function of thinking is concerned with discriminating 
the best method of action, while that of feeling is con- 
cerned with organizing the sentiments towards carrying 
out the required activity. Both of these functions will 
certainly operate in any individual's mind, for organized 
activity is impossible without the operation of both the 
functions of thought and feeling. Yet we say that some 
people are more addicted to discrimination and thought, 
and others to integration and feeling leading to action. 
The feeling type are those who organize their reactions 
with external stimuli, or with their inner impulses, as the case 
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may be, so that their personality is dominated by strong 
emotions, or, if the feeling involved is more prolonged, by 
moods. These emotions tend to lead to definite actions, 
carried out to their logical conclusions. A man of this 
type will feel the need of a great variety of these emotional 
patterns which enable him to react to the various situa- 
tions of his life, and he will put great value on these. So 
much are these feeling reactions important to him, that he 
will only value those things which are consonant with his 
feelings, and will reject everything else, but, if his adapta- 
tion is good, his feelings will show such great variety and 
plasticity that there will be few situations which he is 
not prepared to meet. This is specially so when his attitude 
is extraverted, for in virtue of this he will be at special 
pains to adapt himself to outside things and events. He 
will hedge himself round with organized reactions, which 
can be called out to meet every conceivable event, and will 
get on all right until he comes up against the inconceiv- 
able event. Then he is at a loss, for having no organiza- 
tion wherewith to meet it, his power of discrimination is 
recessive and inadequate, and so it is difficult to think 
out a line of action quickly, to meet the emergency. He 
will also have a considerable degree of control and under- 
standing, both of his own feelings and those of others. He 
is never at a loss to recognize what sort of feeling he is 
experiencing, and will readily discriminate the degree of 
feeling appropriate to the occasion. He will be able to 
get into close sympathy with others, and his power of 
suggestion will be considerable. However, he will neces- 
sarily prefer pleasurable feelings to unpleasurable, and may 
be led from this to try to find things as he wants them to 
be, and thereby neglect the stern truth and be satisfied 
with the semblance of things in the form of wish fulfil - 
ments. This makes him somewhat unreliable as a scien- 
tific observer, for he is apt to twist his facts to fit a priori 
hypotheses. 
As the extravert feeling type wishes to get into har- 
mony with the outside world, so the introvert wishes to 
get into harmony with himself. He is inwardly sure of 
himself, but not well adapted to the outside world, and is 
therefore critical towards it and apt to be criticized by it. 
This leads to being misunderstood, and to a difficulty of 
expressing his feeling to others in ordinary social inter- 
course. Nevertheless, the harmonious integration of his 
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impulses and perceptions may find expression through 
poetry and art, in the most delicate way, and this type is 
often deeply religious, having achieved an inner harmony 
of emotional reactions, organized round a central belief, 
which becomes all the stronger because the individual is 
not concerned with, or influenced by the opinions of the 
outer world, like the extravert of the same type. The 
best of this type is the real strong silent man who knows 
what he wants and achieves complete organization of his 
whole personality towards that end. 
If we suppose our hypothetical individuals A, B, C, and 
D, are organized up to the higher level of the feeling type, 
we find A receiving and reacting to the joyful news, but 
never led into the excessive disturbances of " Mafeking " 
because he can discriminate and control his feelings, both 
as to their nature and extent. Hence he is never tempted 
to make a fool of himself, so long as he does not regress 
from this level, though he may be tolerant and sympathetic 
to those who do. B is less tolerant of excesses, but is no 
longer tormented with doubts. He knows and recognizes 
his own inner feelings, and if, on the whole, he is glad of 
the cessation of the war, he is filled with an inner content 
and harmony which he does not trouble to communicate 
to others. If on the other hand he is disappointed, his 
very organization of unpleasure may lead him to sink far 
into melancholy from which it is hard to rouse him. 
C, the man of affairs, is still more active and persistent 
in seizing the opportunity presented, and will probably 
turn the event to his own great advantage, and if this is in 
accordance with the requirements of his country, he may 
be hailed, rather undeservedly, as a great public servant. 
D, similarly, has gained strength and sureness by his 
higher organization, and will be less inclined to lose him- 
self in pure phantasy, and more inclined to rise to a high 
degree of inspiration in poetry or art. It must be remem- 
bered, however, that under the stress of a great emotional 
stimulus, all may easily regress to the behaviour of the 
lower types. 
As has been said above, the function of thinking is 
concerned with that of discrimination, knowledge is its 
province, and classification its business. However, facts 
are not the only material which serve as the subject of 
this discrimination; impulses and sensations also come 
within its purview. The man of the thinking type is 
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concerned with differences, with right and wrong, with 
this and that, and so has ethics, metaphysics, and much of 
philosophy for his special field. 
The extravert of this type is concerned in his scheme 
of classification with the objects of outside experience, 
which he calls facts. Further, he will tend to classify 
them according to the accepted standards of the com- 
munity. He will tend to collect an enormous quantity 
of facts, and cram them into the pigeon -holes already 
provided for him. When these facts do not quite fit into 
these pigeon -holes, he is apt to become extremely dog- 
matic about them, asserting, with no little heat, that they 
do fit, because they ought to fit ! This is so when the type 
is evolved from a basis of the function of sensation. The 
chief activity will be directed towards amassing experi- 
ences, and these people are good scientific observers, 
though they may require the corrective of an introvert 
attitude in properly arranging the facts. If the basis is 
the function of intuition, the extravert thinker will be 
interested in the classification of the feelings and im- 
pulses of other people, and he will find his interest in 
history and criticism. He may also achieve eminence in 
co- ordinating the work of others, as a business organizer. 
If the extravert thinker is possessed of a narrow outlook, 
his tendency to force facts into certain accepted categories 
makes him bitterly hostile to everything which comes 
outside the limits of these categories, and so he becomes 
intolerant and bigoted. He is dry, and dull as his feelings 
are recessive, and, as he cannot pass the bounds of the 
class in which he places himself, he tends to be a con- 
servative of the die -hard type. The recessive feelings may 
at times find expression, and if so, they will be uncontrolled 
and ill- adapted, giving rise to violent outbreaks of temper 
or other emotional reaction. This is especially liable to 
be called out in these people if someone does not agree 
with them, and their rigidity tends to make them carry 
their theories beyond their legitimate boundaries, so that 
they insist on a universal applicability ; as for example, 
the ultra -Freudian, who derives every activity from in- 
fantile sexuality because he has become impressed with 
the importance of this latter in certain relationships. 
The introvert thinking type moulds the scheme of 
classification according to lines worked out by himself. 
If such an individual is of high grade mentality, this is 
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valuable, because the scheme of classification he adopts 
will be elastic and adaptable. If evolved from a basis of 
sensation, he will test his observed facts against his scheme, 
and . his scheme against the facts, so that they become 
adapted to each other. If, however, his mental capacity 
is less adapted, the scheme of classification he works out 
may be of little value, and may lead him into the most 
egregious errors. 
If he deals with intuitions, he classifies and criticizes 
his inner impulses, and in so doing may destroy his use- 
fulness; for he is always considering how and why he 
does things, and never gets them done. This type of 
thinker is eminently introspective, and by virtue of the 
classification of the subjective aspect of experience is 
more interested in the abstract than the concrete. He 
more readily understands and sympathizes with other 
people's faults and difficulties, for he does not classify 
them according to accepted principles, but recognizes 
them as subject to the same variations of impulses as 
he knows so well in himself. For themselves, these indi- 
viduals are reserved and shy, and do not readily express 
their opinions. If they do so, they will appear to the 
extravert, as caring too little for those of others. . The 
opinions of others, indeed, are objective phenomena for 
which men of the introvert type do not care, but the 
feelings of others are- of much greater subjective interest, 
and so come more within their purview. Their shyness 
and reserve make them awkward in company, and the 
lack of control of their recessive feelings makes their 
emotional reactions inconsistent and unpredictable. The 
rules which their subjective function of thought lays down 
for them lead, however, to the formation of ideals which 
they often fail to live up to. This induces a feeling of 
inferiority which they try to compensate by phantasy 
formation. If this is applied to the ideal of their own 
character and behaviour, an ever - widening gulf may be 
formed between reality and phantasy, with disastrous 
mental conflicts and subsequent neuroses. In any case, 
this is the type of man who plans before he acts, and 
who may fail altogether if his plans miscarry, so that 
in future he never gets beyond the planning stage, lest he 
should subject himself again to the indignity of failure. 
However, if his plans succeed, he will often carry out his 
actions with remarkable persistence and success. 
N 
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To turn to our cases again, this time organized to 
exercise the function of thought. A does not join in the 
crowds of yelling " Mafekers ", but he enjoys the fun, 
stores up all the impressions, and describes them next 
day with a wealth of enthusiastic detail. He is the 
journalist actual or potential, with an infinite capacity for 
receiving and storing impressions, and serving them out 
again, red -hot from his pen. 
B, on the other hand, is interested in the ultimate 
meaning of all this, the subjective philosophic import. 
This he may keep to himself, standing aloof, with a some- 
what superior air, like Marcus Aurelius, and reflecting on 
the end of war as a fact and as an ideal. These reflections 
may or may not be given to the world, according to the 
degree of introversion, but often they are put down for his 
private consumption, and the posthumous publication of 
them by some well- meaning friend must make him turn in 
his grave. 
C is still a man of affairs, but less a man of action than 
a director of it. He sees how the event may be turned to 
advantage, but he gets others to carry it out ; he is the 
organizer of the big business, who does not waste himself 
on details, yet has his finger in every pie. He is helped 
in this by his capacity for sizing up the impulses and 
thoughts of others -by his critical and historical capacities, 
referred to above. 
D, as a thinker, is apt to fall into doubt and hesitation 
again. Discrimination and deliberation play havoc with 
inspiration ; his own impulses are checked by self -criticism, 
and may die without action being achieved. Still, if his 
impulses are strong and well organized, he may formulate 
an ideal and announce to the world his fourteen points. 
These represent what his own impulses would make of the 
opportunity, but it is seldom that the acid test of reality 
permits this dream to come true. This may be fortunate 
or unfortunate, according as the ideals are noble or fatuous, 
but he would have to be indeed a superman to achieve a 
personal ideal of such a sort as to heal all the ills of 
humanity. 
In order to conform with the general scheme of this 
book, it is necessary to endeavour to examine the physio- 
logical implications of this division into types. First of 
all, from the study of imagery, it is evident that in the 
case of any individual, activations resulting from certain 
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types of stimulus have more engraphic effect than activa- 
tions derived from others ; or, to put it more colloquially, 
certain things make a more lasting impression than others. 
Moreover, amongst the more complex sensory impressions 
emanating from an object, activation of certain neurones 
associated with a given sense will be facilitated, as com- 
pared to those associated with other senses. For example, 
let us take as our object " cat ", which presents among other 
patterns of stimuli, cat -picture, cat -sound, cat -smell : and 
let us take three individuals, A, whose dominant imagery 
is visual ; B, whose dominant imagery is auditory ; and C, 
whose dominant imagery is olfactory. In the case of A, 
the sight of a cat will immediately bring a visual per- 
ception of cat (i.e., attachment of meaning to the sensory 
impression by association with visual images of similar 
cats). The sound of a purr, will more slowly bring about 
perception, and the smell of a cat, perhaps only with 
difficulty, will imply " cat ". Moreover, both purr and 
smell will induce a visual image of cat, since the engram 
is so conditioned that there is facilitation of activation of 
the visual neurones, and relative inhibition of the auditory 
and olfactory neurones. In an analogous way, B and C 
will react with greatest ease to auditory and smell stimuli 
respectively, and will reproduce auditory and olfactory 
images, with suppression of the other types of imagery. 
That a dominant imagery involves suppression of other 
types of imagery and not a complete absence of the latter, 
is proved by observations, such as those of Rivers who, 
though entirely deficient in visual imagery in waking 
life, enjoyed vivid visual images in his dreams. His 
suggestion that visual imagery is therefore an inferior 
function, does not seem justified, for the relative facilita- 
tion of certain neurones within an engram does not 
necessarily imply that those which are relatively inhibited 
are inferior. We see, therefore, that we may divide in- 
dividuals into various types, according to the nature of 
their imagery, which in turn depends on the phenomena 
of facilitation, inhibition and engraphic patterns. 
In an analogous way, we can describe the difference 
between the various types. The extravert, as a whole, is 
responsive to stimuli coming from without, and this may 
be due to a relative facilitation of his exteroceptors and 
their connexions, i.e., the sense organs on the surface of 
the body, whose function it is to respond to the environ- 
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ment. The introvert, on the other hand, is more responsive 
to stimuli from within, which may be due to a relative 
facilitation of his enteroceptors, and their connexions, 
which, as Sherrington has pointed out, are only secondarily 
related to the environment. But there is more than this 
response to specific stimuli in engram activity. We have 
defined the engram as a pattern of neurones, determined 
as a more or less definite unit by the mnemic effect of 
previous activation. Certain engrams are better defined and 
more specific than others, and the higher the level at which 
they are integrated, the more complicated is their related- 
ness, and the less specific they become. Under the circum- 
stances of higher integration, these well -defined engrams 
are responsive to afferent stimuli from the neurones of 
another engram as readily, if not more readily than to 
afferent stimuli from sense organs. Even at low levels, 
this can be shown to be the case. For example, the 
desire to micturate and the correlated act, under ordinary 
circumstances, are induced by a certain degree of tension 
on the musculature of the bladder, induced by pressure 
of the urine, and the action is a specific response to 
this stimulus. However, when the engram which sub - 
serves the emotion of intense fear is thrown into activity, 
the activation may spread to these neurones concerned 
with the bladder reflex, and produce a similar result to 
that consequent upon tension of urine on the bladder wall, 
though this latter normal stimulus may be proved to be 
absent by clinical observation. Similarly, at higher levels, 
activation may pass from one engram to another without 
the intervention of any sensory receptors, whether extero- 
ceptors or enteroceptors, and without obvious glandular 
or muscular response. It would seem that this activation 
from one engram to another is more facilitated in the 
intuitive types than in the sensation types ; in other 
words, in the case of the former the engrams are less 
specific. So much for the afferent processes. In the 
activation of the efferent paths there are also differences. 
In the extravert, activation tends to pass to the neurones 
of the vegetative system and the motor systems, so that 
their activity is chiefly in the form of feeling and overt 
action. In the introvert, the activation tends to pass to 
those parts of the cortex, such as the frontal lobes and 
other "silent" areas, which presumably subserve activities 
less objectively obvious, such as thought. Moreover, other 
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things_ being equal, direct muscular action will be more 
commonly observed in either of the empirical types than 
in the rational types. 
The sensation type comprises those in whom the en- 
grams tend to be specifically activated from their receptors, 
whether exteroceptors or enteroceptors. In the case of 
the extravert, the response is directly to the environment 
through the exteroceptors; but in the introvert only in- 
directly so, through the enteroceptors. Thus Sherrington 
has described how an exteroceptor receives a stimulus, say 
of heat, and induces a contraction of a muscle A, but that 
muscular contraction A stimulates an enteroceptor, which 
may induce further muscular contracture B. A is a direct 
response to the environment, but B is a secondary response. 
This secondary response is characteristic of the introvert, 
sensation type. For example, transfer this process to a 
higher level, with the necessary complication of the whole 
reaction, and consider a work of art produced by the 
extravert and introvert sensation types. Given the recep- 
tion of the stimulus pattern of a landscape, the first will 
reproduce a more or less photographic likeness, according 
to his capacity -a direct response to the environment. 
The latter may produce a cubist picture, which is his own 
secondary response to the primary perception. 
In the intuitive type, the activation of engrams comes 
chiefly from a spread from other engrams already estab- 
lished within the nervous system as " instinctive" disposi- 
tions, and the distinction between introvert and extravert 
depends more on the efferent than the afferent phase of 
the reaction. In the latter, the activity is expressed 
through feeling and motor activity, i.e., direct motor 
response ; while in the former, it is through thought and 
phantasy that conation is achieved, that is, by activation 
of further neurone patterns. 
As has been said, the two remaining types involve an 
organization at a higher level altogether. The function of 
feeling is concerned with organization, and that of thinking 
with discrimination. In the feeling type, engrams whose 
stimulus is derived from the receptors, and others whose 
stimulus is derived from a spreading of activation from 
the dispositional engrams, are organized together so as 
to make for harmony. In the extravert, the engram is 
so constituted that activations from other engrams are 
subordinated and fused, so that the responses depending 
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on them are brought into harmony with reactions depend- 
ing on activation from the receptors. This brings the 
inner impulses and the total personality into harmony 
with the outside world. In these cases the major part 
of the response is dependent on vegetative and motor 
neurone activity. In the introvert, on the other hand, 
the complex engram is so organized that the responses, 
dependent on activation from the receptors are subordinated 
and fused with the responses dependent on activation 
resulting from a spread from the dispositional engrams. 
This results in a harmony of outside impressions and the 
total personality with the inner impulses. In these the 
efferent response is mainly through the vegetative and 
the "silent" areas, and results in emotional religious 
reflection and artistic expression. 
In all the engrams subserving the function of feeling, 
a large proportion of vegetative neurones are involved, 
whose activation results in an affective response. In the 
function of thinking, the engrams involved contain a much 
smaller proportion of vegetative neurones, and the more 
abstract the thought that results, the less is the vegetative 
affective intervention. We know that the cortex possesses 
the two functions of organization and discrimination, but 
so far we have no idea by virtue of which neurones these 
functions are subserved. Therefore, any description of the 
physiological basis of the two higher functional types must 
be extremely sketchy at best. For this reason, no more 
precise indication of the physiological basis of the thinking 
type can be given than of the feeling type, for the data 
are the same activation from the receptors in the extravert, 
and spread from other engrams in the introvert. The 
difference being, as has already been said, that in the feel- 
ing type the function of organization is exercised, while 
in the thinking type that of discrimination is brought to 
bear. 
In the case of all these types, descriptions have been 
given of a problematical typical case, but as has been said 
above, such pure cases are rare, and the recessive or super- 
seded functions will manifest themselves under certain 
circumstances and on certain occasions. Such alternation 
of response may lead to considerable general disorganizing 
and dissociation of the personality, and consequent neur- 
osis. This may be just as true of the higher types as of 
the lower, for the organization of engrams described by no 
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means involves complete harmony of the mind, though of 
course it does not preclude an organization of the whole 
personality, without which mental health is impossible. In 
the determination and development of the engrams which 
subserve the various types, the influence of temperament in 
general, and the relative secretory activity of the endocrine 
glands in particular, is of the greatest importance and 
must not be forgotten ; but our knowledge of these factors 
is so imperfect that no definite suggestions as to their iíi- 
fluence can be made, beyond those referred to in Chapter V. 
It is obvious that this classification into types is not 
the only one possible, and others have been attempted 
by other philosophers ; but there is a value and clarity 
about Jung's work, which certainly commends itself to 
those who work among the extremes of these types, 
whose very departure from the norm, makes it harder 
for them to adapt to life, and so more liable to fall 
into neurosis. A follower of Jung, Dr Beatrice Hinkle,6 
worked out a scheme of classification, contemporaneously 
with the former, which is in many ways similar, but less 
satisfying. She defines objective, simple, and subjective 
or bisexual types, of both extravert and introvert attitude, 
but the choice of the terms objective and subjective are 
unfortunate, and tend to confuse the issue. However, her 
treatment of the bisexual type is full of interest and, more- 
over of great importance, for the recognition of masculine 
and feminine psychic traits in individuals, irrespective of 
sex, is a matter of some value, and the conflict between 
them, in the same individual, merits attention. This 
matter will, however, be dealt with when Adler's contri- 
bution to the study of Personality comes to be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER XI 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF ADLER TO THE 
STUDY OF PERSONALITY 
ADLER was the first of Freud's followers who definitely 
broke away from the school which was founded by the 
latter. The reason for his defection is obvious, when one 
comes to consider the divergent philosophic bent of the 
two men already pointed out in Chapter VIII. The 
essence of Freud's teaching, as to the "go" of human 
behaviour, was that the sexual libido drove on the indi- 
vidual by its vis- a- tei -go, like a leaf before the wind. To 
this attitude Jung assented to a certain extent, differing 
on the exact definition of libido, and insisting on the pros- 
pective function of man's existence to express something 
higher. Adler,' on the other hand, thought of the end in 
view of the individual, to gain power and ascendancy over 
his environment, as the determining factor in moulding 
human development and behaviour. This prospective view 
is to a certain extent in accordance with the position 
adopted in this book, which is based on Alexander's 
scheme of emergent evolution, with the quality of Deity at 
the top, the whole cosmos evolving according to certain 
laws towards this end. It must at once be admitted, how- 
ever, that the term "end in view" ought not to be used in 
connexion with an evolutionary scheme, as it may be 
criticized immediately by asking "end in view of whom 
or what "? Still, although this term is inaccurate, it is 
perhaps more permissible, if we accept Lloyd Morgan's 2 
concept of Causality -the Deity, who is the immanent 
law according to which the process of evolution gets itself 
evolved.* The term end in view is used here however, 
because it is desired to establish the analogy with Adler's 
* Cf. Adler's "Durch das grosse Sein das uns umgibt and weit in uns 
hineinreicht, zicht sich ein grosses Werden das dem vollendeten Sein zustrebt" 
(" Through the great Being which surrounds and penetrates us there is a great 
becoming, which strives toward a completed being "). 
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contention, that in human conduct there is a positing of a 
final purpose, which determines conduct. So far as this 
involves the relatedness which we call consciousness, with 
its characteristic function of prevision, the term " end in 
view" is not amiss, but the process may go on at levels 
lower than those which involves consciousness, and con- 
sequently it must be used with caution. Adler also dis- 
agrees with Freud in the latter's contention that the sex 
impulse is the basis of all neurotic, and much of normal 
behaviour. For Adler, sexual aberrations, both in reality 
and phantasy, are but symbolic manifestations of the 
striving of the ego to reach the final goal of complete 
masculinity, which involves sexual dominance, and which, 
at any rate in the neurotic, is the goal, which is always 
desired and never reached, This concept of the striving ----_ 
towards the complete man is very similar to the will to 
power of Nietzsche, and involves a heightening of the ego 
ideal and the ego consciousness. Adler's work is of course 
based on a study of the neuroses, but the behaviour of the 
neurotic is a crude and sometimes debased caricature of 
that of the normal man, and so is of service in the study of 
personality as a whole, as has been said before. Moreover 
Adler's original approach to the study of the neurotic 
constitution was from the organic and temperamental 
standpoint. This approach is all too rare, and for this 
reason, if for no other, his work demands Consideration. 
He started from a conception of what he calls organ 
inferiorities and their compensations. Thus, it is a com- 
monplace of pathology that if one organ such as the 
kidney is congenitally deficient, it is found that the 
other shows compensatory hypertrophy. Similarly, in the 
endocrine system, deficiencies of one gland are often met 
by a compensatory hypertrophy of other glands of the 
same group. Such are examples of physical compensa- 
tions for physical deficiencies. Nor does this compen- 
satory activity always result harmoniously for the indi- 
vidual, for many cases of hyperthyroidism seem to depend 
on this attempt at compensation for deficiency in other 
glands. Adler contends that correlated with the physical 
inferiority, there is at the same time a psychic inferiority, 
and pari passu a psychic compensatory activity. This 
compensatory activity he calls the will to power. There 
is a certain difference between the ways in which this will 
to power is manifested, and this will depend, amongst 
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other things, on the organ which is, or which is thought to 
be inferior. But Adler holds that in almost all cases of 
inferiority of bodily organs there is an inferiority of the 
sexual apparatus. This accounts for the frequency of the 
sexual element in the psychic compensation. That inferi- 
orities in the sexual apparatus are apt to accompany 
inferiorities elsewhere, is borne out by Mott's 3 work on 
Dementia Pracox. He found out that, along with 
degenerative changes in the Betz cells of the cortex, i.e., 
the highest type of nerve cell, there were changes in the 
testicular cells. Neither of these degenerations were the 
cause or effect of the other, but simply coincident 
phenomena. 
The compensation may or may not be successful. The 
classical example of successful compensation is Demos- 
thenes the stammerer, who became the greatest orator of 
Greece, his particular career being probably determined 
by the specially inferior organ. If we can accept the 
evidence that Julius Casar and Napoleon were epileptics, 
they may also be taken as successful psychic compensations 
of organ inferiority, along the lines of the Will to Power, 
though the typical egocentric ruthless mentality of the 
epileptic also contributed to their characters. Adler does 
not infer that complete Masculinity or the Nietzschen 
Superman is the goal of every individual, but only of 
those whose psychic appreciation of inferiority leads to a 
constant comparison between themselves and those around 
them, generally to the detriment of themselves. Such 
comparisons restrict the attention to the opposition of the 
ego to the environment, instead of to the harmony of the 
ego with the environment. The result is the dominance 
of a narrow self -regarding sentiment, which may result in 
the overriding of all opposition and the material success 
of the individual. If, however, this sentiment is not well 
organized, and is in opposition to the environment, the 
compensation will be inadequate, and neurosis or other 
abnormal behaviour will result almost inevitably. It 
would appear, therefore, that Adler's contributions to 
psychology are only applicable in full to those whose 
self -regarding sentiment has, in Janet's phrase, a small 
radius of action. Yet, there is probably no one in whom 
the sense of inferiority is absent, and who does not indulge 
in the correlated attempts at compensation which lead to 
an aggressiveness merely masking the former. In other 
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words, there is no one who has achieved perfect harmony 
with the environment, and who does not find himself in 
opposition to his surroundings, from time to time. In 
passing, this throws additional doubt on the correctness 
of McDougall's treatment of self -assertion and self- abase- 
ment as primary instinctive dispositions, without more 
careful discrimination of their incidence. May they 
not be secondary reactions to organ inferiorities, which 
are definitely established as the result of experience 
and contact with the environment ? Those individuals 
who succeed in achieving, even approximately, full com- 
pensation for their inferiorities are few. We cannot all 
attain the level of Demosthenes or Napoleon, and, on 
the whole, it is probably a good thing for the world, 
that we cannot. As has been said, many people have a 
self -regarding sentiment, of narrow radius, but of close 
organization. The neurone pattern which subserves this 
sentiment is so engraphically conditioned that spread of 
activation from engrams, subserving behaviour opposed to 
the function of this sentiment, is inhibited ; while activation 
from those subserving behaviour in accordance with its 
object is facilitated. In the majority of people there is a 
certain degree of failure in the effort of compensation, and 
this necessarily leads to a want of coincidence, between 
ideals and achievement. This divergence is apt to become 
progressively wider. The more the individual realizes his 
incapacity for action, the higher is he apt to put his ideals. 
He is constantly saying to himself, " If only I could do 
this, how splendid it would be ! " and as he does not get 
it done, he raises the ideal to the highest possible level, 
so as to excuse himself for his failure. For if he does 
this, he can always satisfy himself that the task which 
is set him is too difficult, and at the same time reassure 
himself by the reflection that if he could only accomplish 
it, he would be so very superior to his fellows. This how- 
ever, reacts to his detriment ; for with every failure he 
gets still more discouraged, and so the gulf continues to 
widen. Such a state of affairs leads to all sorts of con- 
sequences in conduct. The individual tends to do less 
and less, and leaves undone many things which are well 
within his capacity. The more he feels his incapacity, 
the less he does, and so he starts to put things off, to 
excuse himself and to shirk. Carried to extremes, this 
shirking amounts to a deadly sin. It results in a search 
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for means to avoid doing those things which are the in- 
dividual's chief duty, and the logical consequence is that 
he strives to find a situation in which others shall take 
on all responsibility, or where all his own duties shall 
cease. The former may lead to an enslavement of some 
unfortunate relative, parent, child, husband or wife, as the 
case may be, who shall decide everything, and ultimately 
do everything, while the neurotic -for at this level he is 
assuredly a neurotic -sits and whines about what he 
would like to be doing if only he were not so afflicted. 
Or his desire to place his responsibilities on others may 
take a more general form, and he may play with the 
idea of insanity. For this means that he will no 
longer be held responsible for his actions, and will be 
cared for by others. The phantasy of going insane then 
becomes a wish fulfilment. However, the idea of life in 
an asylum is not in harmony with many of his other 
sentiments, and, as it gives rise to alfeeling of dread, there 
is a conditioning of the wish to be protected and cared 
for in an institution, with the fear of what it involves. 
The patient feels that a frank wish for insanity is 
not in accordance with his ego -ideal, and so this idea 
never appears in consciousness as a wish, but always 
as a fear, the conditioned feeling being dominant. To 
wish for insanity is a disgrace, but to fear insanity is 
reputable, and therefore possible. Similarly, the wish 
that responsibility should end altogether has its logical 
outcome in the idea of suicide. Again, there is a con- 
ditioning with fear which is usually so strong that there 
is not the slightest chance of suicide being actually carried 
out. The unfortunate individual merely plays with these 
ideas, which are really temptations analogous to that 
of taking money, or any such criminal offence ; and it 
frequently happens that if the subject can be got to 
recognize this, their true significance, he has taken the 
first step towards recovery. So much for the attitude of 
the individual with the sense of inferiority towards him- 
self. With regard to others, he will first envy those who 
can do better than he can. From this he will protect 
himself with the idea that he is specially unfortunate, 
whether in his social position, in his upbringing, and more 
particularly, in his state of health. Later he will begin to 
disparage the character and work of his neighbour, which 
is merely another way of defending himself from the 
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consciousness of his own inferiority. Next, there will be 
a tendency to try to get the better of his rivals by foul 
means, if not by fair. This reaction is an extremely 
common one in determining the delinquencies of children, 
as will be seen in Chapter XIV. It is not suggested that 
there is no other explanation of selfish and evil behaviour 
than that of organ inferiority and its psychic compensa- 
tion, for dispositional and environmental conditions play 
their part. However, there is no doubt that this tempera- 
mental factor in the determining of behaviour is im- 
portant and that the sense of inferiority and the will to 
power, are very common, and have a great deal to do with 
such types of behaviour. A concrete example may serve 
to illustrate, how these reactions may affect a person's life. 
A girl had a curvature of the spine, of which she became 
extremely conscious at an early age. She very soon got 
a definite sense of inferiority in relation to her school 
fellows, and from this developed an intense will to power. 
At first, it manifested itself in the practice of running down 
to school, so that she arrived before other children living 
in the same district as herself. She thus proved to herself 
that she was quite as good, if not better than the others, 
so far as fleetness of foot was concerned. It then spread 
to games, and she strove to excel in all sorts of ways 
which were really beyond her strength. If anybody beat 
her, she felt intensely jealous, and did not rest until she 
had overcome her rival in some direction or other, to 
make up for her defeat. With her work it was the same 
thing. This went on until she really overtaxed her 
strength, and became ill. An unfortunate diagnosis of 
heart disease gave her an excuse which she used all 
through life. Whenever she was called upon to do any- 
thing which was beyond her strength, or rather her own 
estimation of her strength, she had an attack of palpita- 
tion which was really induced by the auto -suggestion 
that it would be convenient to have palpitation, and a fear 
lest her inferiority should prevent her accomplishing the 
task. A love affair, which turned out badly, completed 
her sense of inferiority. From this time she became really 
inefficient and neurotic. Her heart was always bothering 
her. Yet she was unwilling to admit that anybody could 
manage things in her home, but herself. She would have 
spurts of energy in which she would do a tremendous lot, 
at a great pace, only to collapse in the middle, and leave 
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others to clear up the mess. Such behaviour was always 
put down to her unfortunate illness; and the short inter- 
vals of energy went to prove her tremendous keenness to 
work hard, if she only could. This explanation gave con- 
siderable satisfaction to herself, though it was not received 
at quite the same valuation by her relatives. Needless to 
say, she herself was not happy, she felt misunderstood, no 
doctor ever realized "how ill" she was, or could cure her 
complaint. When eventually an attempt was made to 
show her the real truth, she resented this intensely, and 
went off elsewhere, preferring to keep up the fiction of 
physical disease, rather than face the difficulties of life. 
She still kept up the childish habit of trying to walk 
faster than others, and was on the lookout as to how 
she could get the better of other people in small things. 
She was inclined to envy and malice, but held it as a 
decided grievance, that she was not popular. This in- 
creased her feeling of being misunderstood, and with it 
her self -pity, and so things went on from bad to worse. 
As has been said, Adler holds that the final goal of 
both sexes is complete masculinity, and the inference is 
that this is never attained. to masculinity 
is femininity, and it can never be too strongly insisted 
that in any individual there is an admixture of both 
these characteristics. Psychically, at any rate, man is 
bisexual, and this is borne out in the field of physical 
structure by anatomical modifications ; for in the most 
normal males there is a vestige of the female genital 
organs, in the prostatic utricle ; and similarly in the 
female, the clitoris is the analogue of the penis. Nor is 
it by any means uncommon to find more marked abnor- 
malities, in the form of female sex characteristics occurring 
in the male, and vice versa. This anomaly occasionally 
reaches the stage of true hermaphroditism, where the deter- 
mination of sex becomes a matter of difficulty. In relation 
to the question of psychic correlations, it is held by many 
authorities that the true homosexual of either sex has 
always a considerable degree of over- development of the 
physical characters of the opposite sex. That this is not 
universally true of obvious sex characters is certain, but 
it would be of interest to know whether a microscopical 
examination of testis or ovary, as the case might be, 
would reveal tissue properly belonging to the opposite 
sex. However, such anatomical researches have not been 
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carried out on a sufficiently large scale to give reliable 
evidence. Nevertheless, recent experiments have shown 
the interchangeability of sex characteristics, both physical 
and psychical. Crews described how a hen took on 
certain physical and behaviouristic characters of the cock, 
after destruction of the ovaries by tubercular disease. 
Tolman' has described experiments in which ovarian 
tissue was grafted into castrated rats, with the result that 
the quondam male took on the functions of nest building, 
and mothering the young. Conversely, testicular tissue 
was grafted into ovariectomized rats, with the result that 
the quondam female went through all the copulatory move- 
ments characteristic of the male. These facts prove that 
there is, even on the physical side, no such hard and fast 
differentiation into the male and the female as at first 
sight seems probable, and it is certain that on the psychi- 
cal side this is even more evident. That this is so may 
be judged by the difficulties which beset us when we try 
to formulate the typical psychical characteristics of male 
and female. Adler holds that complete masculinity is 
the goal, not only of the male but also of the female, 
and there is a good deal to be said for it in the neurotic, 
but it is not so in the normal individual. As Hinkle 6 
has pointed out, woman has a very definite function, and 
there is no justification in supposing that the normal 
woman desires any other development than that of her 
own biological function. On the other hand, she does 
have certain masculine traits within r.er, and recent social 
developments have permitted these more free development. 
Hence we find that some apparently normal women, who 
have fulfilled their normal biological function, do break 
down, because these masculine ego impulses have found 
no outlet. 
One of the characteristic features of the human race, 
as opposed to the animals, is that the former have to a 
certain extent translated the sexual impulse so that it no 
longer serves a strictly biological function but serves the 
pleasure of the ego. This is in accordance with the conti- 
nuity of the period of active desire in man, as compared 
to the oestral cycle in animals. Although this applies to 
both sexes, there is little doubt that women have retained 
a much closer touch to the biological creative impulse, 
which was the original function of the sex pattern. Man 
on the other hand, although he may owe such tendency 
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to create, as he possesses, to the feminine attributes in his 
make -up, translates his creation to the sphere of thought 
or manipulation, thereby becoming an artist, and no man 
is without any artistic capabilities. In both the artist and 
the woman, the tendency is to sacrifice the self- preserva- 
tion, or ego impulses, to the created being, be it child or 
work of art, whereas the more normal man tends to 
sacrifice his sexual and creative impulses to his ego, and 
to his individual purposes. The identification of the artist 
and the woman in their creative orientation is, to a certain 
extent, borne out by the other features of their personality, 
for not only are many artists feminine in type, but even 
those who are masculine show a consciousness of a delicacy 
and sensitiveness which is more characteristic of the woman 
than of the man. For example Maeder7 describes, how the 
Swiss artist Hodler, who was of the dominant masculine 
type, bewailed the fact that no one would recognize and 
give him credit for the woman that was in him. For 
women therefore, these creative impulses are essentially 
biological, real, and practical, hence her tendency to be 
interested chiefly in people and things. For man the 
creative impulses are no longer biological, and can be 
translated to phantasy and theory. Hence he is free to 
experiment, and to enquire into the whys and wherefores, 
to seek to propound the laws which govern himself and 
nature. If we refer back to the fundamental impulses of 
self -preservation and race -preservation, it would appear 
that, on the whole, the man's emotional dispositions tend 
to be integrated in relation to the former, while the 
woman's are integrated in relation to the latter. For 
example, the emotion of anger is felt more strongly by 
the man in relation to himself, his career, and his own 
concerns with the environment, whereas the woman feels 
this emotion more strongly in relation to her sexual life 
and her offspring. The same is true of curiosity, and to a 
certain extent of fear. This leads to the development of 
the ego in relation to the environment being the dominant 
interest in the average man, so that his career and his own 
progress through life become of the first importance. 
Such a result is only partially due to biological factors, 
for the demands of social life and civilization have done 
much to promote this orientation. With the woman, on 
the other hand, the dominant interest is with the sexual 
life in the broadest sense of the term, with home, husband 
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and children, as her chief concern. Moreover, she is 
essentially biologically creative and this creation is the 
centre of her emotional life. Bloch 8 declares that man 
is more aggressive, progressive, and variable, while woman 
is more submissive, receptive, and suggestible. Adler 
attributes to the masculine ideal certainty, superiority and 
self -esteem, i.e. a place in the sun, but this seems a one - 
sided view, vitiated by the fact that he is discussing 
neurotics who, according to him, always aim at a masculine 
ideal, turning altogether aside from any possible feminine 
ideal. Attempts at exact definition as to what constitutes 
the psychic constitution of the woman as opposed to the 
man have been unsatisfactory, since it was first attempted 
by Havelock Ellis 9 in his Men and Women, which 
enumerated a mass of statistical variations between the 
sexes, without arriving at any composite picture that 
seemed to fit the individual man or woman. That this is 
so, is undoubtedly due to the fact that as in the physical 
sphere, so in the psychic sphere, there are always recessive 
vestiges of the opposite sex which confuse the analysis 
of the personality, and when there is any considerable 
prominence of the recessive characters, a state of conflict 
is readily induced. In this respect there is a lot of sense 
in the remark of the Theosophist lady, in Nicholson's 
Marriage Craft, who described the ideal of harmonious 
marriage as the wedding of the masculine and feminine 
traits in one individual. Hinckle has discussed these con- 
trasting characteristics in relation to her classification into 
types, referred to in the last chapter. She describes the 
masculine and feminine symbols respectively as follows :- 
" The father" (the male symbol) " stands for the demand 
of reality to face the world and to take one's place in the 
outer life of effort and struggle. It is the dominant ag- 
gressive factor in phantasy, the symbol of power, of 
domination and authority, of practical life in the world, 
and signifies the individual and ego side of the person- 
ality." " The mother " (the female symbol), " on the other 
hand, is the typical symbol of love, of understanding, of 
care, of compassion and tenderness, the mediation between 
the child and the world, or the father ; the original spring, 
out of which altruism has developed. She is the one who 
softens the path, on whom the child can depend and rely 
in need, and represents the protecting, collecting and 
feeling side of human personality." The conflict between 
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these two orientations in any individual unquestionably 
gives rise to trouble, and in many women there is an 
effort to attain to the masculine orientation, which only 
occasionally meets with success, and when it fails, neurosis 
is apt to ensue. It is suggested, that in certain men there 
is a tendency to seek the feminine orientation, but the 
success of this attainment of the opposite, is even less 
probable in man than in woman. For it is more against 
all social convention that a man should be feminine, 
than that a woman should be masculine, especially 
during the last 25 years. Hence, in the case of the 
effeminate man, there is apt to be a secondary superficial 
swing in the opposite direction, with what Adler calls an 
exaggerated masculine protest, which may disguise the 
deeper impulse towards femininity. As has been said, it 
is not known to what extent these divergencies towards the 
opposite sex depend on physical temperamental influences; 
but experiments, such as those quoted of Crew and Tol- 
man, make it seem probable that anomalies in sex gland 
differentiation may play an important part. The bisexual 
manifestations may exhibit themselves in various ways. 
In the man, there may be a definite tendency to homo- 
sexuality, the rôle in such cases being as a rule passive, 
though the complication induced by the reaction of the 
masculine protest may determine an active rôle, though 
maintaining the homosexual object. Similarly, there may 
be masochistic manifestations, with secondary sadistic ten- 
dencies, dependent on the protest reaction. Or there may 
be normal orientation of sexual desire ; but in his emo- 
tional reactions to both sexes, the man may show a sub- 
missive, clinging, rather sentimental attitude, which is more 
characteristic of a woman than of a man. He may be of 
the " domestic " type, who is continually concerning himself 
with details of the home and children, the type women 
are apt to find meddlesome and in the way, and from 
whom they would gladly welcome a little wholesome 
neglect. In the intellectual sphere, it is more difficult to 
describe the characteristics, for the difference between man 
and woman is more obscure, but the feminine man will 
be concerned to a greater extent than usual with facts of 
immediate interest, which he may accumulate in his 
memory without much concern for their relative signifi- 
cance, or practical utility, since he is not really in such 
fundamentally close touch with things as they really are, 
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as is the woman. Similarly, in the woman of this reversed 
type there may be a secondary reversion to the feminine 
ideal, often induced by the dictates of society, but as a 
rule this is not so strong as in the case of the man, and 
the conflict is usually between genuine feminine charac- 
teristics, and genuine masculine traits, so that her conduct 
may at one time appear as being almost aggressively 
feminine, while at another she exhibits behaviour which 
would be more natural in a man. Like her counterpart 
of the other sex, she may show actual homosexual ten- 
dencies, and as a rule the tendency will be to adopt the 
active rôle. Similarly, she may show sadistic impulses, 
in accordance with her general aggressiveness. The 
orientation of her sexual desire may be normal, however, 
but in the emotional sphere she may tend to be aggressive 
and independent. Such a woman wishes to go out in 
the world and carve out .a career for herself; she often 
chooses for her husband a man of the type described above, 
and becomes the dominant partner in the ménage, and 
moreover, given sufficient general capacity, runs the estab- 
lishment remarkably well. In the intellectual sphere, she 
is interested in more abstract questions than is usually the 
case with women. She will be concerned with the hows 
and whys, and readily discriminates the relative values of 
her experience. Types` such as have been described are, 
of course, somewhat extreme, but the tendency to make 
for the opposite ideal is never absent and the " complete 
man" and the "complete woman" do not really exist. 
In dealing with the psychological differences between 
the sexes, in addition to the influence of the secretions of 
the gonads, the tertiary psychic factors arising from a 
consciousness of belonging to one or other sex must be 
remembered. Evidence has already been adduced to show 
that secondary female characteristics are grafted, on to the 
more primary male characters, rather than the other way 
about. Studies of children and certain psycho -analytical 
investigations have further shown that modesty and pas- 
sivity which are essentially characteristic of the female, 
are not primarily given in the female child, but that 
they are induced through a somewhat prolonged course 
of development, under the dictates of environmental and 
bodily influences, from a primary aggressive active attitude, 
comparable to that of the male. 
The passivity which is characteristic of the female is of 
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considerable interest, for as Brierley 10 points out, the 
ego impulse of all individuals, both male and female, is 
active and katabolic. In the male, the sex impulse is also 
active and katabolic, so that there is no special conflict 
between sex and ego, and they may continue on parallel 
courses. In the female, however, the sex impulse is more 
passive and anabolic, so that it is in opposition to the ego, 
and somehow or other they have to find a compromise. 
This compromise is afforded by marriage and maternity 
in many cases, and a relative stability is established by 
the biological creativity of the rearing of children, but 
in certain married women, whose ego impulse dominates 
the sex impulse, and in unmarried women in whom the 
compromise has not been achieved, there is apt to be a 
marked instability, which tends to neurosis. Even in these 
women whose ego is so dominant that they succeed in 
repressing sex, and establish successful careers for them- 
selves, it too often happens that the repression is only 
successful for a time, and that later in life they break 
down and become neurotic. In those women in whom 
the compromise has been successful, however, there is 
necessarily a firm organization of the ego and sex impulses 
to one end, and this organization limits the variation in 
type of women, as compared to man, so that they do tend 
to conform to an average. 
In all the attempts to differentiate intellectual differ- 
ences between the sexes, it is shown that there is no one 
point in which males as males excel, or females as females 
excel ; but what does come out in these studies is that 
there is much more individual variation in boys than there 
is in girls. This closer approximation to the average in 
the case of the female is noticeable in many aspects of life. 
She tends to be rather more conventional -to pay more 
attention to fashions and public opinion. In the male, the 
ego impulse and the sex impulse run parallel, but are not 
necessarily organized together, so that a man may keep his 
career perfectly distinct from his home life, in a way that 
a woman finds hard to understand. Similarly, the various 
components of his sentiment of love are less closely or- 
ganized, so that he can more readily separate the physical 
component from the rest, without a complete disorganiza- 
tion of the sentiment, or transference of its object, than 
is the case in the majority of women. Obviously, such 
remarks only apply to general tendencies, and there will 
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be plenty of individual exceptions. How far the recent 
" emancipation " of women has tended to obliterate these 
differences is an interesting study, though out of place -here, 
but the suggestion conveyed by modern manners is that 
" feminine " behaviour is more due to the influence of the 
community than to inherent differences, which is in accord- 
ance with Crew's biological finding, that when femininity 
decays masculine characteristics become unmasked. 
To sum up these observations, every individual is a 
combination of masculine and feminine characteristics, one 
or other of which preponderates, usually, but not always in 
accordance with the manifest sex. Masculinity is associ- 
ated with the self -preservation group in the disposition and 
the aggrandizement of the ego, and is manifested by physical 
strength and emotional self -assertion,while intellectually the 
interest is given to generalizations and principles of action. 
Femininity is associated with the race -preservation group 
in the disposition, and the creation of something outside 
the self. It is manifested physically, by grace and delicacy 
of manipulation, emotionally by submissiveness, which may 
rise to self - sacrifice, and intellectually the interest is 
focused on objects and actual action. The normal man 
pursues the ideal of masculinity with a greater or less 
degree of success. The normal woman pursues the ideal 
of femininity with a more or less happy issue. The male 
may be so constituted as to pursue a feminine ideal, in 
which case he is artistic in some way or other, and gener- 
ally unbalanced and even neurotic. Similarly the female 
may (Adler would say does) pursue a masculine ideal, in 
which case she will usually, sooner or later, develop 
neurosis. 
In the study of Personality, the contribution of Adler .< 
merits careful attention, especially in respect of his tempera- 
mental approach to the problem. His concept of corn: 
pensations for inferiorities, both in the physical and psychical 
fields, are of almost universal application, and although 
the goal of complete masculinity does not seem to hold 
good in every case, it throws much light on the difficult 
question of psychical sex differentiation. In the latter case 
the " drive to the opposite " does not seem to be a com- 
pensation for inferiority, unless it be an inferiority to 
harbour germ plasm, properly belonging to the other sex, 
but rather a reaction determined by temperamental factors, 
which run counter to the general " go " of the bodily 
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influences. In other words, in spite of a general "end in 
view" it seems reasonable to agree with Freud, that it is 
the inherent constitution which is responsible for develop- 
ment, whether in respect of bodily structure or of behaviour 
But whether the will to power be considered as a striving 
towards such an end, or an effort to overcome inherent 
obstacles, there can be no denying its existence in every 
individual. Moreover, the greater the inherent sense of 
inferiority, the greater may be the will to power ; indeed, 
without this conflicting duality the sum of human achieve- 
ment would be vastly lessened. But every man has his 
Achilles heel somewhere, and to Adler must be given the 
credit for working this out scientifically. We know as a 
result of this work, that the strong ambitious man has some- 
where or other a weak spot in his armour, an inferiority 
which is often hidden even from himself. He may get 
through life without discovery, but it is remarkable how 
often the arrows of fate find and wound the " heel," 
wherever it may be. 
CHAPTER XII 
THE CONTRIBUTION' OF KEMPF TO THE 
STUDY OF PERSONALITY 
THE work of Kempf' throws an interesting sidelight on 
psycho -analytic theory in relation to Personality. An 
ardent behaviourist, and a convinced believer in Freud's 
doctrines, he attempts to find a physiological basis for his 
conclusions. He advances the thesis, that all overt be- 
haviour is the direct result of the alterations in tension 
of autonomic segments. . Under the term autonomic seg- 
ments, he includes all the vegetative systems of the body, 
circulatory, respiratory, digestive, urinary, and genital ; 
all the endocrine glands, and the vegetative- nervous 
system, both sympathetic and autonomic. The various 
" segments," digestive, circulatory, genital and the like, 
are subject to " affective cravings," involving changes in 
the postural tensions of their musculature. By the postural 
tension, or tone of a muscle, is meant the degree of static 
contraction of that muscle, which is necessary, in con- 
junction with other muscles in a similar state . of static 
contraction, to maintain the limb or the organ in its 
ordinary position of rest. Thus, the hand at rest usually 
maintains a position with the fingers semi -flexed. To 
retain this posture, both flexors and extensors must 
maintain a certain degree of contraction. This static con- 
traction is the postural tone. Sherrington 2 demonstrated 
the existence of the postural tone of muscles, both striped 
and unstriped, and this varies with the variation in affective 
states. Thus, it is known that in the case of the stomach, 
hunger is accompanied by changes in the postural tension, 
amounting to definite contractions. Kempf maintains that 
these contractions are the direct cause of hunger, or in 
other words, that hunger is the perception of kinesthetic 
impulses arising from the change in postural tone of the 
stomach. Such changes of tension in the various auto- 
nomic segments represent a demand for satisfaction of the 
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biological needs of an animal, for the maintenance of the 
life of the individual on the one hand, and continuance of 
the race on the other. But, with the advance of com- 
plexity in the animal organism, it became necessary, if 
these needs were to be fulfilled, for the animal to shift 
itself about in the environment, in order to find the means 
of satisfaction. Hence, in the course of biological evolu- 
tion it became requisite for the continuance of animal 
species that a "projicient system" should be developed. 
This consists of the central nervous system and muscular 
apparatus. To refer once more to the illustration afforded 
by the alterations of postural tone in the stomach which 
are accompanied by hunger, we have here a demand for 
satisfaction of an organic need. This demand corresponds 
to the Freudian " wish." The " wish " or state of tension 
has an unpleasant affective value. According to the 
" pleasure principle," this tension must be relieved, and 
the organism must find means to do so. These means 
can only be attained by interaction of organism with the 
environment, and by the establishment of two new apparati. 
Firstly, there must be established appropriate receptor 
patterns to respond to the stimuli representative of the 
wish for satisfaction, that is to say, in the case of hunger - 
suitable food. This receptor pattern, will be composed of 
an associated complex of sensory nerve endings, comprised 
in the various exteroceptive sense organs, whereby the ap- 
propriate food can be smelt, tasted, touched, seen, etc. 
Secondly, a correlated mechanism must be evolved where- 
by the food, from which these stimuli originate, may be 
approached and ingested. In addition, for the better 
furtherance of this object, it may be necessary to move 
the animal about in space so that the receptor pattern 
may be brought in contact with the suitable stimuli, and 
not merely left to respond if the said stimuli arrive in the 
neighbourhood. This may involve an active voluntary 
search for edibles, in the case of hunger, or for a mate, in 
the case of sexual cravings. An example may illustrate 
the sequence of events as follows. Certain alterations 
in postural tone of the stomach arise in response to 
metabolic requirements of certain fluids and solids. As 
the result of the kinesthetic impulses so aroused, hunger 
is experienced. The "affective craving" hunger facilitates 
certain receptors and their connexions, which respond to 
the various properties, colour, shape and odour of the 
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orange which is lying on a neighbouring table. This 
combined with memory images of taste, and the general 
mass of experience relating to orange, leads to the percep- 
tion- orange, and further perhaps to the judgment -good 
to eat. Or the process may become more complicated 
if there is no orange or other food handy, and it becomes 
necessary to take some money from a drawer, go out of 
the house, and proceed to a shop and buy one. Once the 
orange has been acquired, certain muscular movements are 
brought into play, whereby the orange is seized, peeled 
and conveyed to the mouth, and so reaching the stomach, 
allays the hypertension. Thus the cycle is completed, 
the wish is fulfilled, pleasure is attained, and a state of 
quiescence ensues. Similar cycles may be traced from 
conditions of hypertension (appetitive), or hypotension 
(aversive), in the other autonomic segments, and do not 
require further elaboration. As may naturally be expected 
from a psycho -analytic enthusiast, the hypertension and 
hypotensions of the genital segment are held to influence 
behaviour in an overwhelming proportion of cases. The 
study of pathological personalities bears this out to a very 
great extent, and there can be no question that the same 
applies to more of the behaviour of normal individuals 
than many are willing to admit, for the tensions in the 
complicated patterns associated with sex do vary both 
frequently and violently. But the sex impulses become 
so commingled with other impulses in the composition of 
the personality, and in so doing there emerge such totally 
different and distinct qualities, that to analyse these 
behaviours and qualities to the level where the sex impulse 
entered into their composition, no more explains them, 
than hydrogen and oxygen explain water. We may, if we 
like, say that a diamond is nothing but carbon, and we 
may say that chivalry is nothing but an attempt to satisfy 
the affective craving of the genital segment, but such 
statements explain neither the one nor the other, for with 
a new relatedness, a new quality emerges. Kempf indeed 
gets over the difficulty of the modification of his primary 
affective cravings, by reference to the process of condition- 
ing. Basing his arguments on this well -known process in 
physiology, demonstrated by Pawlow and others, he shows 
how the primary affective cravings are constantly met with 
resistances from the environment. The struggle between 
these resistances and the affective cravings leads to 
218 PERSONALITY 
increasing efforts to control the environment. This neces- 
sitates the increase in skill, self -knowledge and self -control, 
and pari passu, the increase in complexity of the projicient 
system. At first the affective cravings demand response 
to specific stimuli directly ministering to their needs, but 
in view of the conflicting interests, and demands of the 
different autonomic segments, and to the resistances 
opposed by the environment, they soon begin to seek quite 
a different set of stimuli, in response to which they more 
or less succeed in achieving mutual satisfaction. The 
conditioning process, therefore, leads to the development 
of new receptor patterns and new behaviour patterns, so 
that the apparent end in view may be very different from 
that which would subserve the direct satisfaction of the 
original affective craving. This leads to the process of 
sublimation, whereby the various needs of the individual 
are modified so as not to oppose each other, or the 
demands of the community. Where the process of con- 
ditioning does not proceed smoothly, the processes of 
repression, suppression, regression and the rest, arise. He 
lays particular stress on the influence of the family in 
conditioning the affective cravings of the young child. In 
Kempf's work, the conflict between the youth striving for 
emancipation, and age striving to maintain authority, is 
exemplified by a wealth of detail, both from mythology 
and literature and real life. In fact, from this point, 
Kempf follows the general trend of psycho- analytic 
doctrine, and reference to this does not need to be 
repeated here. In discussing the personality, Kempf 
insists on the conception of a unity which, in the light of 
the concept of emergence, is insisted on here. The develop- 
ment of such personality involves the sublimation of 
affective cravings and the correlation of projicient re- 
actions. " From birth the autonomic apparatus, having 
been forced to abandon its parasitical attachment to the 
mother, begins its struggle of co- ordinating its projicient 
apparatus into an efficient instrument, with progressive 
refinements of self -control and skill of adaptation, in order 
to keep up with the standards of its rivals and the race. 
Upon the nature of the skilful co- ordination, and the con- 
ditioning of the cravings, depends the existence of the 
biological potency (of social influence and fitness, com- 
mercial and sexual prowess, and sexual potency) ". The 
object of this sublimation and correlation, he describes as 
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the pursuit of goodness and happiness, which can only 
be obtained by a free outlet, whereby the demands of 
autonomic cravings can be met, when suitably modified to 
avoid friction with the requirements of the environment. 
To achieve this goal, it is necessary that the individual 
should at once be adaptable and correlated, and that the 
requirements of the environment should not be too insis- 
tent and hard to surmount. There can be no question 
that in modern civilized society there is a tendency for 
the requirements of the environment to present too great 
an obstacle for all but the best and strongest personalities. 
If the personality is going to succeed in reacting to the 
environment, it must act as a unity. All the segmental 
affective cravings must react in a correlated way, otherwise 
dissociation takes place, and the possibility of adaptation 
ceases. If the dictates of society repress the proper 
development of any one of these affective cravings, then 
the whole personality becomes lop -sided, and a neurosis of 
some sort is apt to occur. The most common mental 
conflict in the individual is that between the demands of 
these affective cravings, and the effort to retain the 
approval and esteem of the family, or of society -in general. 
In the normal healthy individual a working compromise is 
reached ; in the neurotic, the affective craving is repressed, 
and an effort is made to retain the esteem of society and 
the self, at the expense of a craving which will not be 
denied. This leads to the inner dissociation, which brings 
the individual up against himself; the state of mind so 
characteristic of the neurotic. When the desire to retain 
social esteem is repressed, then the affective cravings are 
allowed full play, and a conflict arises between the ego 
and the community. For the ego, this means asocial 
delinquency ; for the community, an enemy who must be 
suppressed. 
This brief exposition may give some conception of the 
thesis advanced by Kempf, and there is no doubt that it 
is one which is attractive from its very simplicity. He 
admits, that although the autonomic segments are the 
prime movers in determining behaviour, with the develop- 
ment of the projicient apparatus, they are in turn con- 
trolled and modified by the more elaborate system. There 
can be no question that these affective cravings determine 
much in behaviour, and that many reactions are the resul- 
tants of kinesthetic and other stimuli arising within our 
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bodily organs. Indeed, there seems a risk of neglecting 
the enormous importance of these inner stimuli as initia- 
tors of behaviour, to which the work of Kempf is a whole- 
some corrective. But to suggest that all behaviour, which 
is a sequel of the stimuli arriving from outside of the body, 
is only so in virtue of pre- existing autonomic cravings, 
seems carrying matters too far. Further, it would imply 
that the vegetative nervous system is phylogenetically and 
ontogenetically older than the projicient nervous system, 
since, according to Kempf, the latter is only evolved to 
meet the demands of the former. For this there does not 
seem to be sufficient evidence. Embryological studies 
show that the cells of the vegetative nervous system are 
derived from the neural crest, and in part, from the neural 
tube, and are not, as was at one time supposed, of separate 
mesoblastic origin. It is definitely stated in the last 
edition of Cunningham's Anatomy, that " The sympathetic 
nervous system is essentially dependent on, and subser- 
vient to, the central nervous system, from which it can 
be no more separated sharply, either anatomically or 
developmentally, than can the rest of the peripheral 
nervous system." Similarly, zoological findings show 
that there is no particular reason to differentiate the very 
primitive nervous system of the Coelenterates, as either 
vegetative or projicient ; while in the Vermes, the zoologist 
already distinguishes certain ganglia as sympathetic, which 
are clearly developed from the skeletal segmental or cen- 
tral ganglia .8 On these grounds, it seems difficult to see 
why the central nervous system should be supposed to 
have developed as a response to the demands of the 
autonomic cravings for satisfaction. Such a doctrine 
would suggest that animal life was evolved from plant 
life, whereas they are separate evolutionary developments, 
arising with the emergence of life. 
Again, the acceptance of the doctrine of Kempf as the 
complete explanation of all behaviour, involves the whole- 
hearted acceptance of the James -Lange theory of emotion, 
that the emotions, as felt, are nothing but the kinesthetic 
impressions, originating from the alteration of postural 
tensions in unstriped muscle. As McDougall4 points out, 
this implies that before an emotion is felt these bodily 
changes in tension must take place, but this is as mani- 
festly untrue as to say that to experience the image of an 
orange, the retina and the taste buds must be stimulated. 
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Imagery of the sensations which go to make up emotion, 
is as possible as images of sight and taste. A more im- 
portant objection however, pointed out by McDougall, is 
that this theory leaves out of account the conative impulse 
to act which is inherent in the organization of the patterns 
of nerve cells that are activated in response to stimuli, 
and which is an essential part of an emotion. Kempf does 
not of course deny this conative impulse, but does not give 
it a place inherent in the organization of an emotional 
pattern, and postulates the intervention of the bodily 
tensions before it can be activated. It would seem that 
emotion is an emergent from a much more complex 
pattern than these views would suggest. Mosso,' in his 
experiments on the contracting bladder, has shown the 
influence of the sympathetic nervous system in relation 
to emotional expression, but he does not prove that the 
muscular activity resulting from sympathetic activity, 
precedes the psychic response to the stimulus. Cannons 
has shown how the internal secretions play a part ; how 
for instance, even in isolated organs, the administration 
of the secretion of the adrenal glands, produces changes 
characteristic of the expression of fear. Sherrington' has 
shown how in dogs, who have been subjected to high 
division of the spinal cord, so that all the viscera are 
dissociated so far as nervous influence is concerned, the 
perception of the adequate stimuli induce all the expres- 
sions of fear, anger, etc. It would seem, therefore, that 
an emotion, as this term is commonly understood, is the 
psychic aspect of an activation induced by certain stimuli 
which spreads through both central and vegetative 
neurones, and influences the secretions of the endocrine 
glands ; and that none of the resulting activities precede, 
or have a causal relationship to, the rest. The real point 
to note is that the pattern of stimuli may be in the en- 
vironment, and start off the activation of the complex 
pattern through the exteroceptors ; or it may be within 
the body, starting off the activation through the entero- 
ceptors. This allows for emotion, and the accompanying 
behaviour, arising both through alterations in postural 
tonus, as described by Kempf, and also in response to en- 
vironmental stimuli. It is clear that the combinations in 
such a complex pattern, as is involved in central and 
autonomic neurones and endocrine glands, may be legion, 
and hence the varieties and shades of emotion may be 
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legion. James very much objects to the long catalogues 
of emotions drawn out by certain German psychologists, 
and yet there is a good deal to support their contention, 
that there are a very large number of distinct emotional 
entities which can be discriminated one from the other. 
The doctrine of emergence accounts for this, for each 
different combination will emerge with a quality of its 
own, according to the special relatedness enjoyed. It 
may be, as James suggests, dry -as -dust reading to wade 
through lists of these ; so it would be to go through the 
list of possible combinations from the distillation of coal 
tar, and for descriptive purposes it is useful to classify 
them more roughly into groups, yet this does not alter the 
fact that these differences do exist. It may be that in the 
field of emotions it is only the feeling type who can 
properly discriminate the different shades and varieties of 
affect, yet descriptions and enumeration of them may not 
be without use. To sum up, there can be no doubt that 
Kempf's contribution to the study of Personality is a very 
important one, though we cannot accept his contention 
that all behaviour is determined solely by the affective 
cravings of autonomic segments. However, it is remark- 
able how in the study of normal persons, their life works 
out in accordance with their own bent, often in spite of 
the environment. How often do people say that fate or 
luck worked out in such a way, that they have been 
enabled to follow out some line of work, or they may 
attribute their fortune to a beneficent personal intervention 
of the Deity. If these persons' lives are dispassionately 
criticized, in the vast majority of cases it may be seen 
that it is they themselves, who consciously, or more often 
unconsciously strive towards the end they eventually 
attain, and if this striving is not that of the simple 
autonomic segments, it is that of the emergence from their 
combination. Many writers have recognized this inherent 
guidance of the individual's own life. For example, 
Maeterlinck says, " Let us not look to the Gods for an 
explanation of these phenomena. Until these Gods shall 
have clearly explained themselves, there is nothing that 
they can explain for us. And destiny, which is merely 
the God of which we know least, has less right than any of 
the others to intervene and cry to us, as it does from the 
depths of its inscrutable night : ` It is I who so willed it!' 
Nor let us invoke the illimitable laws of the universe, the 
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intentions of history, the will of the worlds, the justice of 
the stars. These powers exist: we submit to them, as we 
submit to the might of the sun. But they act without 
knowing us; and within the wide circle of their influence, 
a liberty remains to us still, that is probably immense. 
They have better work on hand, than to be for ever 
bending over us, to lift a blade of grass or drop a leaf in 
the little paths of our anthill: Since we ourselves are here 
the parties concerned, it is, I imagine, within ourselves 
that the key of the mystery shall be found ; for it is prob- 
able that every creature carries within him the best 
solution of the problem that he presents. Within us, 
underlying the conscious existence that our reason and 
will control, is a profounder existence, one side of which 
connects with a past beyond the record of history, the 
other with a future, that thousands of years cannot ex- 
haust. We may safely conceive, that all the Gods lie 
hidden within it ; that those wherewith we have peopled 
the earth and the planets will emerge one by one, in order 
to give it a name and a form, that our imagination may 
understand. And as man's vision grows clearer, as he 
shows less desire for image and symbol, so will the number 
of these names, the number of these forms, tend to 
diminish. He will slowly arrive at the stage, when there 
shall be one only that he will proclaim or reserve ; when it 
shall be revealed to him that this last form, this last name, 
is truly no more, than the last image of a power whose 
throne was always within him. Then will the Gods that 
had gone forth from us, be found again in ourselves ; and 
it is there that we will question them to- day." 
The spectacle of the square peg in the round hole is all 
too familiar, and in such a case we have the person whose 
affective cravings are not strong enough, or insufficiently 
organized, to overcome the force of the environment, and 
so he struggles vainly and unhappily against his evil 
fortune. But the man who is the "right man in the right 
place" is he, whose cravings are all co- ordinated and 
integrated in such a way that he goes out to seek and find 
his proper environment, as certainly and directly as the 
hungry man, under the impulse of a simple and primitive 
affective craving, goes out to find a meal. The importance 
of helping each individual to work out his own salvation 
is being increasingly recognized by educationists, and the 
schemes for vocational guidance are the direct outcome 
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of the recognition of the principles underlying behaviour, 
which Kempf has so admirably enunciated. Moreover, 
it must be remembered, that although it may be convenient 
to discuss such questions from the psychological aspect, 
this is a matter of convenience and nothing more, for a 
complete description can only be given when the bodily 
changes, as well as their mental correlates, are determined. 
To this end Kempf has contributed, and it is probable 
that the future will acclaim his theses, not as antithetic, 
but as complementary to the various psychological ex- 
planations of behaviour which have been put forward. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
THE INSTABLE PERSONALITY 
The Neurotic 
A GOOD deal has been said in the last four chapters about 
neurosis, since the work of the psycho -analytic schools is 
chiefly concerned with this ; and, as has been said, it seems 
justifiable to consider the instable person while dealing 
with the subject of personality as a whole, because although 
the fully developed neurotic and delinquent may justly be 
regarded as pathological, nevertheless in many respects, a 
study of such persons' behaviour illustrates tendencies and 
reactions present in the normal, albeit exhibited in a more 
crude and exaggerated form. The study of a group of 
these instable personalities is like studying a series of 
cartoons. They may be distorted and inartistic, but they 
do represent many salient features which the orthodox 
portrait leave unnoticed. There has been a tendency 
amongst psychologists in the past to paint a picture of 
the ideal norm, to which none of us attain, and from which 
the majority of mankind is very far removed. The 
organization of personality as it should proceed, and 
would, if it could, has been sketched out in the preceding 
chapters, and a survey of the failures, and the way they 
fail, may be instructive, and may explain why all our 
acquaintances do not emerge on the level of Deity in 
Alexander's sense. It may be asked, why not proceed 
a little further, and discuss the insane, who may also 
illustrate points in the personality of the normal ? This 
argument is apposite to a certain extent, yet there is a 
marked difference between the normal and the instable 
on the one hand, and the insane on the other. Apart from 
structural defects and disease of the brain, the insane 
person is characterized by the fact that he is not making 
the least attempt to adapt himself to life, or to aspire to 




as the case may be, but makes no effort to change it, nor 
does he believe that any real change is in any way pos- 
sible. This is not the natural reaction of the normal 
personality, nor of the neurotic, both of whom are always 
striving to find some sort of compromise with their en- 
vironment which may raise them higher, though the result 
may not be very satisfactory. The normal person may 
more or less succeed, and, in so far as he is normal, he is 
progressive and willing to modify himself as his environ- 
ment changes. The general law and rhythm, according to 
7 which his life proceeds, corresponds to the law and rhythm 
of universal progress. The behaviour of the insane defi- 
nitely runs counter to this law and rhythm. The neurotic ' strives to find this working compromise and fails, either 
because he is not progressive and tries to fit an old re- 
action on to a new demand, or because he strives to find 
a compromise on wrong lines. It is often thought that 
a neurotic is not trying, and is making no effort. As a 
rule, this judgment is quite unjust ; he is trying very hard, 
but with so little understanding, and in such wrong direc- 
tions, that his achievements are almost negligible. The 
neurotic frequently blames his environment for his lack 
of success, but in this he deceives himself, for the confusion 
and conflict which stand in his way lie within himself. 
His immediate difficulty may be in respect of some inci- 
dent in his environment, but it is because he is not suffi- 
ciently in tune with himself that he cannot adjust himself 
to it. This may not be directly obvious, even to the 
onlooker, and still less frequently to the patient himself, 
yet in practically every case there is too great a dis- 
crepancy between what the patient can do, and what he 
had set before himself as the minimum that he ought to 
do, and between what he is, and what he would like to be. 
The patient may try to cover up this discrepancy by 
persuading himself that he is all that he would like to 
think. This leads to a self- satisfaction and assertion, 
which is decidedly objectionable to others, and is not 
wholly satisfactory to himself, since a doubt of the reality 
of his estimate is always liable to creep in. Such are the 
people who are always declaring that their conscience is 
clear, that they are pure in thought, and not like others, 
who have nasty minds. In fact it may be that we ought 
not to dislike that Pharisee, who prayed in the temple 
and thanked God he was not as other men, but rather to 
THE NEUROTIC 227 
pity him, as at least a potential neurotic, who was striving 
to cover his knowledge of his own inferiority by a will to 
power. Still, there probably are people who have suc- 
ceeded in completely deceiving themselves, and into whose 
minds doubt never does creep in ; on those we need waste 
no pity. They are within their limits, well organized and 
adapted to life, at any rate as it appears to them. 
Some of the means whereby the neurotic strives to hide 
from himself his inferiority are of considerable interest, 
and are recognizable in the behaviour of every one at times. 
There is a great tendency tp project his own qualities on -- 
to others so as to detract his own critical attention from 
himself. To illustrate this projection, an example may 
be useful. A confidential clerk was once tempted to take 
some money which did not belong to him. Although he 
did not actually succumb to the temptation, the recogni- 
tion of such a possibility in himself was so much at 
variance with the ideal he had set before himself that it 
caused him the most acute distress ; but he adjusted him- 
self to the situation in the following way. Whereas, before, 
he had been considerate to his subordinates, and trusted 
them to do their work in their own way, he became ex- 
acting and so suspicious of the honesty and accuracy of 
the junior clerks that life in the office became perfectly 
impossible. This tendency to project one's own faults and 
shortcomings on to Others is very common in everyday 
life, and if we are to be honest with ourselves, we must be 
very chary when we find that we are judging others, lest 
we be projecting ourselves in this way. For example, the 
unprepossessing old maid may honestly think she is striv- 
ing for the cause of morality when she condemns the 
flighty ways of her more attractive sisters, but the world 
at large is apt to suspect the intervention of a slight 
degree of jealousy. It will be noticed that projection 
concerns the bad qualities and shortcomings which the 
neurotic recognizes as positive factors in his make -up. 
Complementary to this is the phenomenon known as 
identification, which involves the factors which he recog- 
nizes ás negative or missing from his make -up. This 
would seem to involve, as its primary end, the unconscious 
effort of the neurotic to persuade himself that he is the 
equal of someone whom he really regards as his superior. 
The phenomenon manifests itself in all sorts of habits of 
action, postures, eccentricities of speech and dress, and so 
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on, in which he becomes identical with his ideal. These 
unconscious minor actions serve as symbols of the major 
qualities he desires for himself. In ordinary life, this may 
be exemplified in all sorts of ways, but a good example 
may be quoted in the following of fashions. If a royalty 
or person prominent for looks, birth, or other distinction, 
adopts some style of dress, there is a tendency for others 
-themselves not leaders of fashion -to identify them- 
selves, by a more or less slavish imitation. Though this 
process of identification is undoubtedly based on the 
tendency to imitate, which is inherent in all of us and 
which has been dealt with above, it represents an emergence 
at a higher level of organization, in which there is more 
appreciation of the character as a whole of the person 
imitated, and an impulse to get into closer personal touch 
with the latter. The phenomena of true identification un- 
questionably involve a consciousness of self which is 
certainly not necessarily involved in imitation. Reactions 
of identification may be met with, apart from any marked 
feeling of inferiority in respect of the person with whom 
identification is achieved. For example, if two friends 
are discussing a difficult psychological problem, which they 
are both trying to grasp more clearly, they often find they 
have adopted identical postures in their chairs, frequently 
the reverse of comfortable. It is difficult to say which is 
the imitator and which the imitated, and neither of them 
are aware of any feeling of inferiority towards the other. 
These identical postures would seem to be induced rather 
from an effort to get into more close mental touch with 
each other, and to achieve a result by an amalgamation of 
their thoughts, and not by the subjugation of one to another. 
At the same time, it must be admitted that they both feel a 
sense of inadequacy, in as much as they are unable to solve 
the problem by their unaided effort. This phenomenon of 
identification is closely allied to, and may be well part of 
that of transference ; but this latter term has a definite con- 
notation in relation to the therapeutic process of psycho- 
analysis, and describes the relationship of patient to 
physician, so that its discussion here is somewhat out of 
place, since our aim is to illustrate the personalities of 
average individuals, rather than to discuss the neurotic 
for his own sake. 
Another refuge is what may be called the plea of "if 
only." The neurotic may hide behind an illness, real or 
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imaginary, though the word imaginary is probably not 
really justified. The pains of unpleasant sensations of the 
neurotic do have a basis in organic changes, which in the 
normal person would pass unnoticed, or be accepted philo- 
sophically as the minor ills to which the flesh is heir. 
To the sensitive neurotic however, they are felt as major 
distresses, and their importance is not diminished if these 
symptoms serve the purpose of excusing them in their own 
eyes from a task they dare not face. But having estab- 
lished their illness, they are never tired of narrating what 
they would do if only they were not ill. As a somewhat 
extreme example of this reaction, we may quote the case 
of a neurotic girl who had not the courage to enter into 
the married state, though she was fond enough of her 
fiancé, and was not averse to the idea of marriage so long 
as it remained in the distance. One day, however, when 
trying on her wedding- dress, she fell off her chair, and hurt 
her leg. She magnified this into a full -dress hysterical 
illness, and for over forty years never stirred more than 
a few steps from her bed. But she never ceased from 
relating to those who would listen, how happy she would 
have been, and what a wonderful life she would have led, 
if only she had not been ill. But perhaps she had a cross 
to bear, for she was forced to live with . a younger sister,, 
who wore a monocle,, and divided her interest between 
bridge and horse -racing. From her the patient got scant 
sympathy. Again the "if only" pleads used in respect of 
social or financial position, and is the origin of much 
envious feeling. In this way, the neurotic continually tries 
to banish from his mind the knowledge that his illness and 
distress depend on faults within himself. If only he had 
been born rich, if only his mother had not been delicate, if 
only he had been brought up in a true religious belief, none 
of these ills would have come upon him. For all that, 
from time to time he has uncomfortable flashes of insight 
in which he sees himself as he really is. To the observer 
such flashes of insight appear as attacks of deep, and some- 
times unreasonable depression. This reaction of flight from 
self -revelation is one from which few so- called normal 
people are exempt. 
In his struggles to adapt his achievement to his ideal, 
the neurotic almost inevitably gets discouraged, and with 
this discouragement his achievements fall below the 
standard of his real capacity, so that in successful treat- 
230 PERSONALITY 
ment, not only must the ideal be brought down till it is 
more in accordance with possibilities, but his achievements 
must be raised, partly by the gain of greater power and 
capacity, and partly by the removal of the restricting 
influence of depression. 
In general, however, not only are the achievements 
lowered by depression, but the whole personality sinks 
back to a lower plane by the process of regression. This 
regression is not uncommon as a temporary phenomenon 
in everyday life. The husband or the wife who is not 
getting his or her way, becomes the spoilt child, is petulant 
and querulous, or drops back to baby language and even 
baby tricks. So with the neurotic, for much of his be- 
haviour is that of the spoilt egotistic child. An extreme 
case of such regression was an ex- sergeant, who came to 
hospital, unable to articulate a single word, quite ignorant 
of his identity, his place of abode, his parentage, or whether 
he was married or not. He could make sounds, so that 
at first he was thought to be an extreme case of aphasia. 
But then it was found that in his dreams he could talk 
quite well ; indeed, he used to shout out military orders in 
such a stentorian voice that some of the other patients, 
believing themselves back at the front, indulged in the 
emotional outburst which we describe as a hysterical fit. 
It was then recognized that he was a case of extreme 
regression, and that this was due to an overwhelming 
feeling of inadequacy and failure to meet the situation. 
As he recovered, he began to talk, much as a baby talks, 
to cry, when he was disappointed about anything, and to 
react in a way which was suitable for an infant. However, 
with the return of his memory he gradually grew up again 
until he became almost a man. An even more interesting 
feature of regression is the return along the line of racial, 
rather than individual history. In this case the behaviour 
of the patient resembles that of primitive man. His loves 
and hates and panic fears are not the organized, finely 
graded emotions of the civilized man, but rather the ill - 
co-ordinated outbursts of the savage. In his intel- 
lectual life, he tends to express himself in symbols, he 
indulges in elaborate rituals, and transfers his emotional 
reactions from the big things of life to the lesser things. 
A good example of this latter tendency is afforded by a 
spinster lady of early middle life, who constantly got 
herself entangled with male acquaintances so that she 
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compromised herself and her family, not a little. She 
refused however to regard herself in any way in the wrong, 
but made herself almost seriously ill by constantly worry- 
ing over trivial things, such as whether she had paid back 
sixpence lent her by her landlady, or whether she returned 
a book to a library, or kept it on her own shelves. She 
transferred her fear of the larger consequences to the 
small matters, for which she could be visited by no real 
retribution, just as the primitive transferred his fear of his 
ancestors and his Gods to his Totem animal, which he 
could, and sometimes did, kill easily. 
The rituals of the primitive who goes through the most 
complicated rites to appease the hostile Gods, and ward 
off from himself the consequences of his evil deeds, have 
their analogue in the washing and other rituals of the 
neurotic. A woman felt she must wash her hands if ever 
they touched her body, or even her clothes, which in their 
turn had come in contact with her body, or she would 
contaminate any person or thing she touched. Her body 
was unclean because of a vaginal discharge. This was 
innocent enough, and had been acquired in an innocent 
way, but it was associated in her mind with certain in- 
cidents in youth which were less in accordance with her 
moral ideals, and her ritual aimed at purification for the 
moral sin and the appeasement of the angry Gods. So with 
Lady Macbeth, "Look how she rubs her hands." "It is 
an accustomed action with her, to be seen thus washing 
her hands ; I have known her continue in this for a quarter 
of an hour." Such regressions to rituals and superstitious 
practices are not uncommon in everyday life when things 
get too difficult. To illustrate this tendency, we have only 
to consider the commercial success of quack remedies, and 
the persuasive powers of such advertisements as that of the 
rising sun, of a new era of health, and so on. Symbolism 
is the secret of advertising, and a suggestion of magic, 
whereby man may attain to the old Eden where he lived 
in ease and luxury and not by the sweat of his brow, is 
certain of success. 
Many of the physical hysterical symptoms are found to 
be symbolic in nature, but this is by no means always the 
case, and an effort to attribute symbolic interpretations to 
all these symptoms will sometimes lead the investigator 
very far from the truth. In perhaps the great majority of 
war cases, for example, these symptoms were the result of 
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suggestion, and were readily curable by counter -suggestion, 
but they tended to be fixed by the fact that they afforded 
a means of solution of the problem of how to avoid further 
service without loss of self -respect. The same is true of 
many cases in civil life, though in some it is found that 
there is a symbolic meaning attached to the symptom, 
which must be resolved before the latter can be removed. 
Often this symbolism has relation to a previous ex- 
perience, of a character analogous to the present difficulty. 
For example, a lady had set before herself a programme 
of social work which was quite beyond her capacity, and 
after a time she was rather suddenly smitten with extreme 
physical prostration. Rather naturally she was regarded 
as overworked, and put to bed to rest. Instead of im- 
proving, her weakness got so pronounced that she could 
not sit up in bed. Suggestive methods were tried next, 
with little or no effect. It was then found that she was ex- 
periencing vivid memory pictures of previous experiences 
with her drunken husband, who had ill- treated her, and 
whom it had been her chief ambition to reform. Only 
with difficulty, however, did she remember that on a few 
occasions she had been prostrated for the whole day after 
a scene, so that she felt that she could not possibly go on. 
But once the memory was revived, she could be got to 
realize the analogy to her present condition, and the 
symbolic nature of her weakness. She had identified the 
difficulty of her social work, which could be modified, with 
the difficulty of reforming her husband, which could not be 
modified, and had come to regard the achievement of the 
former as hopeless as the latter. With this realization of 
this mistaken identification, however, she became quite 
willing to reduce the demands of her ideal, and from that 
moment she sat up in bed and steadily regained her 
strength. 
These physical maladies often constitute a compromise 
which brings momentary satisfaction to the neurotic, so 
that for the time being the patient seems well content 
with his condition, but such satisfaction never lasts for 
long, for the inconvenience of the disability soon gives rise 
to a desire to be quit of it. Then a new conflict starts, 
between this desire to recover from the obvious symptom, 
and the half -conscious fear lest, if he lose his hold on the 
compromise which has been established, worse may befall 
him, and he therefore seems to be quite unprepared to 
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give up his disability. These reactions naturally give rise 
to misunderstandings, and the patient is often looked upon 
as a malingerer and fraud. This is not the case, and it is 
only by understanding the true inwardness of the problem 
that assistance can be rendered and the patient cured. 
Although these crude regressive symptoms and unsatis- 
factory compromises may not be met with in the normal 
person, yet many apparently irrational fears and unex- 
plained impulses are of this nature. Then, too, who is not 
prone to aches and pains and petty illnesses not to be 
explained on physical grounds, which may in a small way 
be used to mitigate the force of circumstances, or excuse 
the full performance of a duty which seems too hard ? 
Certain factors in relation to the neuroses require to 
be considered in somewhat more detail. The first of these 
is the influence of amnesia, or forgetfulness. McDougall 1 
maintains that there can be no neuroses without some 
degree of amnesia. This is certainly true, but it does not 
of course explain the whole mechanism of the production 
of neuroses. For example, it may be true to say that the 
man with hysterical paralysis of his legs has forgotten how 
to use them ; but this is not the whole story, and the 
process of recollection may be far from easy. The process 
of forgetting may be a perfectly conscious act, and for 
this type Rivers 2 would reserve the term repression, and 
use suppression to express amnesia which may be induced 
without the patient being aware of the process. This 
question of forgetting is dealt with in greater detail in 
Chapter IX, and need not be referred to again here. 
Suffice to say, if there is a portion of the personality . 
which has been forgotten, it is not properly associated 
with the rest, and this dissociation is of the utmost import- 
ance in the production of neurotic symptoms and abnormal 
behaviour. It is probable that amnesic " patches" in the 
individual make -up are of greater frequency and import- 
ance than is generally recognized in normal psychology. 
From the point of view of the normal personality, a 
second factor, namely suggestion and suggestibility is of . 
the utmost importance. The particular nature of the 
neurotic symptom is determined by suggestion, and many 
patterns of behaviour in the normal, though they are 
not neurotic symptoms, are determined in the same way. 
The acceptance of a suggestion depends on suggestibility. 
What then do we mean by suggestibility ? McDougall 
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defines suggestion as " a process of communication, 
resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the com- 
municated proposition, in the absence of logically adequate 
grounds for its acceptance." Following this, we might 
define suggestibility as a readiness to accept propositions, 
with a conviction which is not justified by logic and 
reason. 
Formerly, suggestibility was regarded as an abnormal 
manifestation, but McDougall and others have properly 
shown that every individual is possessed of this, to a 
greater or less extent. It is, in fact, an innate tendency of 
mankind, every individual being born with a capacity to 
accept suggestion. Like all other innate tendencies, it is 
greatly modified during the mental growth of the indi- 
vidual, and in the process of the formation of character. 
Dreyer 3 has pointed out that suggestibility is very closely 
bound up with the innate tendency of self- abasement; if 
indeed, it is not a special manifestation of it. It is quite 
obvious that the man with a marked degree of the opposite 
tendency, that of self -assertion, will not readily be sugges- 
tible, and later we shall see how this operates in the 
incidence of suggestibility. We have, then, in each child, 
a certain tendency to suggestibility, which is modified by 
the relative preponderance of the disposition of self - 
abasement and self -assertion. Compared with adults, 
children are markedly suggestible, but this suggestibility 
of the child, which is a factor of great utility in his educa- 
tion, is gradually modified till the normal adult reaches 
his condition of low suggestibility. The young child is 
extremely dependent on others for all his physical require- 
ments, more particularly, for nutrition and protection from 
violence. In order that he may gain this advantage, the 
instinct of self -assertion must be in abeyance, and that of 
self- abasement in the ascendancy, but as his physical 
powers increase the child finds that he can do things 
himself, and that he need no longer depend on others so 
much, and his self -reliance is developed. Such self - 
reliance is a complex sentiment, but its basal factor is the 
disposition of self -assertion, and so with its growth, sug- 
gestibility decreases. Again, as suggestibility consists in 
readiness to accept propositions with a conviction, which 
is not justified by logic or reason, it follows that the 
stronger the reasoning powers, and the more readily they 
can be brought to bear on a new situation, the less will be 
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the suggestibility of an individual. But in order to reason 
about a subject we must have knowledge about it, and 
the knowledge must be well organized and well arranged 
in our minds, if we are to apply it to the new situation. 
In other words, function must be integrated at a high 
cortical level, as was seen in Chapter VII. This function 
only comes into evidence as the child grows into the man. 
It is next necessary to consider certain factors which 
modify a man's suggestibility. Firstly, the subjective 
factors inherent in man and constituting an individual 
disposition favourable to suggestion, are youth, inex- 
perience, lack of knowledge of the topic in connexion 
with which the suggestion is given, and general lack of 
organized knowledge and settled convictions. Secondly, 
the subjective factors, originating from external causes, are 
the low vitality induced by fatigue and sickness, the 
disturbance produced by the action of the emotions, and 
the influence of the herd in framing the individual con- 
victions. Thirdly, the objective factors are conditions 
depending on the source from which the suggestion is 
given, conditions depending on the manner in which it is 
given, and conditions depending on the circumstances 
under which it is given. The second and third groups 
require further consideration. 
The low vitality produced by fatigue and illness is a 
potent factor in increasing the power of suggestion, and 
falls within the experience of every one. The reason of 
this is, that when our vitality is low we feel physically 
feeble and incapable of acting for ourselves, and so our 
self -reliance is diminished, and our self- abasement 
gains ascendancy over our self -assertion. In addition, 
when fatigued we find we have not our usual power of 
marshalling the elements of our knowledge. We do not 
actually lose anything out of our store of known facts, but 
we cannot recall the requisite data quickly, and so our 
power of reasoning, and of making quick decisions, is 
lessened. This interferes with our power of criticizing 
outside suggestions which are likely to be followed as the 
line of least resistance. This depends on the diminution 
in efficient cortical function under the influence of fatigue, 
which is described below. 
In states of extreme emotional disturbances suggesti- 
bility is increased, and the more intense the emotional 
feeling, the greater is the suggestibility. As Dreyer has 
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pointed out, the intensity of emotional feeling increases 
with the resistance to the realization of the normal activity, 
which the individual should exhibit, as a result of the 
emotion. Hence a man who is in a situation in which a 
powerful emotion, such as fear or anger, is aroused, but 
where the normal activities of flight or attack are pre- 
vented, tends to be very highly suggestible. The reason 
for this is that an intense emotion dominates the whole 
consciousness, crowding out principles, reason, logic, and 
all higher thought activities, so that a suggestion coming 
from the outside finds no resistance to its activities and 
has a clear field to work upon. As has been seen, this 
crude emotional activity depends on activation at thalamic 
levels, the normal cortical control and inhibition being in 
abeyance. In addition, there is considerable endocrine 
disturbance, which may inhibit cortical function. If a 
suggestion can be brought to bear on the subconscious 
fields of the mind without due intervention of full 
consciousness, it will be much more potent, because no 
reason is brought to bear upon it. This is most obvious 
in the potency of suggestions given to a patient under 
hypnosis, when the appeal is entirely to processes on the 
subconscious level. It is also seen in the condition just 
referred to, for the emotion occupies the whole field of 
consciousness. 
The influence of the herd has a great power of increas- 
ing the suggestibility of the individual. Man is a gregarious 
animal, and in all his ideas and actions is influenced by 
the dictates of the herd. People hold convictions and 
regulate their behaviour to a great extent because their 
" set" think and act like that, and to think or act differently 
is " not the thing." Even in the case of social rebels, who 
would appear to be exceptions to this rule, they are found 
to be members of a small clique within the greater herd, 
and adhere even more closely to the dictates of this small 
coterie than do the members of the larger herd to their 
code of social ethics. There can be no doubt that the 
very fact of being suggestible to the dictates of a com- 
munity renders the individual less suggestible to influences 
coming from outside the herd, but this does not alter the 
fact that the more closely an individual is bound up in a 
community, the more suggestible he becomes. The factor 
underlying this suggestibility is the feeling of self- abase- 
ment of the individual in face of the composite force of 
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the whole community, and . the fact that he is frequently 
forced to accept situations in which his individual reason- 
ing powers are not allowed to act. In other words, 
his cortical function of discrimination is not allowed full 
development, and so, subcortical function is permitted to 
influence his action. This suggestibility is well seen in the 
behaviour of crowds, more particularly when it is increased 
by the presence of intense emotion. Hence an orator is 
able to sway a crowd to his will, if he first arouses the 
emotions of its members, and then instils suggestion. It 
is to be noted, however, that he must be, or pretend to be 
in sympathy with the general opinion of the crowd to begin 
with, so that he appears to be speaking from within the 
herd, otherwise he will tend to arouse opposition rather 
than compliance. 
It would seem that hysterical symptoms, as well as 
much of the suggested behaviour of normal persons, may 
be produced as a result S of six sets of circumstances, and 
in each of these it is necessary to define the psychical in- 
fluence which increases the suggestibility, and the physical 
influence which determines the nature of the symptom or 
behaviour. Probably in all cases, both factors operate to 
a certain extent, but their relative preponderance varies 
enormously, for in some cases the psychical factor, by 
markedly increasing the suggestibility of the patient, allows 
a relatively slight physical suggestion to be perpetuated as a 
hysterical symptom, or to materially alter the individual's be- 
haviour in life while in other cases, the physical suggestion 
is so strong that the symptom will be impressed on a person 
of relatively low suggestibility. It is convenient to arrange 
the groups of hysterical symptoms in such an order as 
will represent descending grades of psychical suggestibility. 
The first group is found in those people, who have 
acquired a sense of inferiority, either in respect of -their 
whole body, or of one or more limbs or organs. In such 
persons, who are almost hypochondriacal in their expecta- 
tion of illness, the slightest physical accident, or passing 
ache or pain, is sufficient to determine a hysterical symptom, 
either affecting the whole body, or a -particular limb or 
organ, which is believed to be weak. The treatment has 
not been completed when the hysterical symptom has 
been removed, or the particular reaction of behaviour 
altered, for the suggestibility is in this case pathological, 
and the mental derangement, which has determined this, 
238 PERSONALITY 
must be put right. Here the suggestibility depends on 
the abnormal preponderance of the tendency to self- abase- 
ment which makes these patients consider themselves 
inferior to others. The mental processes of such people are 
extremely complex, for the two reactions of self -abasement 
and self -assertion are by no means mutually exclusive, and 
we may find the patient displaying extreme self- abasement 
in one direction, but considerable self -assertion in another 
as is discussed above, in dealing with the will to power. 
Another factor which increases the suggestibility in these 
persons is that their lack of mental integration prevents 
them using their reasoning and critical powers to full 
advantage, and so they are unable to examine the value 
of the physical cause of their hysterical symptoms. Further, 
as their condition progresses they get really ill, and their 
vitality is lowered so that they become more suggestible, 
while the emotion of self -pity, which is aroused, works still 
further in the same direction. In such cases the hysterical 
symptom may be of any variety, as the slightest physical 
stimulus will be responded to. 
In the next group, the hysterical symptoms are sequela: 
of commotion. Here some actual physical trauma, such as 
a blow on the head, has, without necessarily causing com- 
plete loss of consciousness, led to general confusion of the 
patient's mind. This may lead to a very temporary inability 
to hear, or see, or remember. Under such circumstances 
the patient's suggestibility is increased by the complete 
abolition of the power of reasoning and criticizing. The 
full conscious state is temporarily unattainable, and 
impressions are made only on his subconscious mind, 
which is always more amenable to suggestion. Under 
such circumstances, the fact that he cannot hear, see, or 
remember, suggests to him that he must be deaf, blind or 
have lost his memory. Having received this suggestion, 
he ceases to listen, to look, or to try to remember, so that 
until he is treated, he is hysterically deaf, blind or amnesic. 
These three hysterical symptoms have been quoted be- 
cause they are the most characteristic of this group, but 
paralysis, dumbness, and other hysterical manifestations, 
may result under the same circumstances. These two 
groups apply more particularly to pathological states, but 
they may serve to complete the illustration of the way in 
which suggestions act on the normal individual. 
In the third group, the symptoms are produced under 
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stress of great emotion. In such cases, as the natural 
outlet of the emotion is blocked, the intensity of the 
emotional feeling increases with the flow of activity 
through vegetative neurones. With this, the physical ex- 
pressions of emotion, which are useful in their incipient 
stages, become useless if they are intensified by the con- 
centration of activation in visceral patterns, so that the 
muscular activity, which ought to be used in the performance 
of the normal active sequel of the emotion, is wasted in 
secondary expressions of emotion. On the pathological 
side, such symptoms are dumbness and stammering, 
rigidity, tremor, and collapse of the legs, and excessive 
purposeless movements ; these physical phenomena are 
perpetuated as hysterical mutism, stammering, tremor and 
paraplegia, and in the case of the purposeless movements, 
as hysterical tics or fits. The increased suggestibility is 
determined by the complete domination of the emotion, 
and the consequent loss of reasoning powers and cortical 
function generally. In the case of fear, under the stress 
of which hysterical symptoms are specially prone to 
develop, there is definite self -abasement in the presence of 
some overwhelming situation. In the case of panics or 
mob anger, the suggestibility may also be increased by 
the influence of the herd, as was discussed above, but this 
would be in a general rather than in a particular way. 
In the next group, the symptoms are produced by 
hetero- suggestion. Such may be illustrated as follows : 
In hysterical cases, fresh disabilities are sometimes pro- 
duced as the result of some unwise remark or action on 
the part of the physician or nurse, which conveys to the 
patient the suggestion that he has some physical disability. 
Several psychical factors come into play. Firstly, there is 
the relative self -abasement which the patient feels in the 
presence of the physician, especially in respect of his 
knowledge of the subject. Secondly, his own lack of 
organized knowledge will itself prevent proper criticism of 
the suggestion. Then, we have objective factors, such as the 
prestige of the physician, the manner in which he makes 
the remark, and the circumstances under which it is 
made. For example, if a distinguished doctor remarks 
in the presence of an assembly of other physicians, all 
apparently agreeing, that the patient may have a disease 
which will result in paralysis of both legs, the sugges- 
tion may be accepted, and paraplegia will develop. Or 
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again, if a physician, very carefully and with considerable 
ceremony, examines for anæsthesia, asking if the patient 
feels this and that, the patient thinks he is expected to 
have anæsthesia, and will readily develop it. How this 
hetero- suggestion acts in altering the behaviour of the 
normal individual is too familiar to require discussion. 
We have only to consider the power of the press, and the 
stump orator, and how the reaction is made use of in 
ordinary education to realize its importance. 
In the fifth group, we have to deal with behaviour 
acquired by imitation from another person. The physical 
stimulus is here more defined, and symptoms such as stam- 
mering, abnormal movement, and various gaits, seen in 
other patients are acquired. The psychical stimulus in 
this case is due to self -abasement felt by the imitator in 
face of another person whom he regards as very wonderful 
or very extraordinary, and a certain interference with the 
critical powers, induced by the emotion of curiosity and 
the influence of the herd. Here, however, the psychical 
element is of much less importance, for the tendency to 
imitate is strong in us all, and it does not require much 
extra suggestibility to determine the perpetuation of the 
imitative symptom, which quickly becomes a habit. The 
acquisition of accents, tricks of speech and behaviour is 
very familiar in normal persons, and has already been 
discussed in relation to identification. 
In the last group are comprised symptoms which are 
habit continuations of definite, but temporary organic dis- 
abilities, and as such, are more or less confined to patho- 
logical cases. Such symptoms may range from blindness 
and deafness, through vomiting and urinary troubles, to 
paralysis, contractures and ansthesias. Here the physical 
stimulus is enormously strong, for it is actually present in 
the patient's own body. The psychical factor of increased 
suggestibility is present to a slight degree, and may be 
induced by low vitality, owing to the illness, and to a 
failure of a unification of all the wishes of the personality 
towards recovery. This applies not only to these major 
disabilities, but also to the minor aches and pains which 
are of such everyday occurrence as to be almost included 
within the limits of normal experience. 
To sum up, suggestibility is a factor of enormous im- 
portance in determining the nature and reactions of the 
personality. It essentially depends on a temporary or 
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permanent failure of integration, and of what we have 
come to regard as high level cortical activity. Further- 
more, under the influence of suggestion, the individual will 
tend to react more and more at low levels and will exercise 
his functions of discrimination and control to a less and 
less extent. 
It will be clear from the above, that acceptance of 
suggestions, not only is induced by, but also leads to a 
condition of dissociation in the patient's mind. This state 
of dissociation is regarded by Janet4 as the essential factor 
in the neurosis, and this coincides with the initial contention 
of this chapter, that it was a dissociation in the personality, 
between the ideal and the reality. This state of dissocia- 
tion is fully discussed in Chapter XV. In any case, the 
failure of proper association and organization of the per- 
sonality marks a failure of function of the highest levels 
of the cortex. This is perpetuated by the establishment 
of a vicious circle, through the influence of fatigue, and 
reference to this may serve to illustrate once more our 
contention that the neuroses and psychoses, in Huxley's 
sense, are different aspects of the same essential process. 
There can be no question that many of the symptoms 
of neurotics, and some of the atypical behaviour of normal 
people, are the direct result of fatigue. Such fatigue may 
be produced by physical overwork, though this is rare, or 
by mental overwork on the conscious or at the unconscious 
level. Fatigue, however, as has been shown, is not an ex- 
planation of the neurotic state in itself. This is why the 
old- fashioned rest cure, in cases of neuroses, is frequently 
inadequate. So long as the fatigue is due to friction be- 
tween the personality as a whole and the outside world, 
then the removal of the friction by isolation of the ego 
allows for the necessary recuperation, and recovery results. 
When, on the other hand, the fatigue is the result of friction 
within the ego, then mere rest is not enough, for the friction 
still persists, and cure does not ensue. It is a truism in 
neurology, that the higher structures are more readily 
fatigued than those of lower levels ; naturally therefore 
the functions of the highest level structures suffer first and 
most severely, from any process of fatigue. As we have 
seen in Chapter IV, the highest grade of structure in man 
is the cerebral cortex, and the functions of this aggregation 
of cells are upset by the processes of fatigue, earlier and 
more markedly than are the other functions of the body. 
Q 
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The conceptions of these functions have changed not a 
little in recent years. With the tremendous impetus given 
to anatomical and histological study, by the improvements 
in optical and electrical methods which took place in the 
last half of the nineteenth century, it seemed possible that 
the researches of such workers as Ferrier and Wernicke 
would lead to a mapping out of the whole cortex into geo- 
graphical areas, each of which would be found to correspond 
to a definite function connected with definite parts of the 
body. More recent work, however, has turned attention 
in other directions. Exact anatomical correspondence 
can no longer be regarded as part of the business of the 
cortex, though it is of course quite clear that certain areas 
have to do with certain major functions of the body, such 
as motion, sensation and the work of the distance receptors 
involving vision and hearing and so on. In these relations 
the functions to which cortical structure is essential are 
control, integration, discrimination and reference in time 
and space, as we have seen. 
It is remarkable that the behaviour of neurotics is 
mainly characterized by deficiency in what we have learnt 
to regard as the chief functions of the cortex. To take a 
few examples. In hysterical paralysis, it is movements 
that are impeded, not individual muscular action. It is 
characteristic of hysterical pain that the reaction, in some 
ways, resembles that seen in the thalamic syndrome, in 
which cortical control is absent. The behaviour of 
neurotics always tends to be of the " all or none " variety. 
This is especially true of their emotional reactions, which 
closely resemble those of Bianchi's monkeys.5 Their un- 
discriminated anxieties and fears are primitive affective 
reactions, in no way co- ordinated into properly organized 
emotions and sentiments, and the resolution of these by 
the processes of psycho- therapy essentially involves their 
proper discrimination and correlation. In the case of the 
obsessions, the salient feature is the want of accurate 
reference in time and space. So much is this so, that it 
is only by restoring the proper time -space relationship of 
these symptoms that they can be removed. 
This may serve to indicate that the immediate precursor 
of neurotic symptoms is the abrogation of cortical function, 
and that this failure of function is to a certain extent due 
to the action of fatigue products. This conception does 
not run counter to other explanations of neurotic symptoms 
THE NEUROTIC 243 
such as dissociation, for the most marked forms of dissocia- 
tion of function are those produced when the associative 
function of the cortex is in abeyance. Indeed, it is clear 
that a properly associated personality is only possible when 
the cortex is intact. It is, of course, the duty of the physi- 
cian not to be content with this explanation of symptom, 
but to strive to discover the true cause of the fatigue; by 
this means only will he cure the disease and not merely 
remove the symptom. None the less the recognition that 
fatigue of the cortex is an important factor in this con- 
nexion is salutary, since it will tend to broaden the out- 
look of the physician, and prevent his applying only one 
method of treatment to all cases of neuroses. He will 
remember that fatigue may be induced by mental conflict, 
by a prolonged toxmmia, by endocrine disturbance, and by 
overwork, and so he is less likely to miss his view of the 
wood by too great concentration on individual trees. 
So with the normal' personality, fatigue may often be 
the direct precursor of variation from what is regarded as 
normal behaviour, but this fatigue is not always produced 
simply from overwork, and the student must look further 
than this to understand why certain people show signs 
of fatigue more readily than others. It is probably true 
that hard work alone seldom did anyone much harm, in 
absence of worry and conflict. In any case, the point to 
be noted is that interference with the proper function of 
cortical cells by the poisons of fatigue does produce all 
sorts of mental abnormalities of the most complicated 
character. - 
While discussing the neurotic, certain remarks on the 
"artistic temperament," or more accurately, the "artistic 
personality" are not out of place. Artists are not gener- 
ally regarded as pathological, but are essentially instable 
in Trotter's a sense, and only too frequently neurotic. 
There is the same want of stability, the same want of 
full conscious control,- the same abnormal integrations, 
which are activated, and which form new emergents, as 
the thoughts and actions of genius. These new emergents 
are not predictable, and may show the most banal futilities, 
or the most transcendently original conceptions. 
Indeed, many of the finest achievements of thought 
have their origin below the level of consciousness. That 
is to say that they are not integrated and built up in 
accordance with reason and logic and full cortical function. 
} 
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William James' has shown this in the case of religious 
experience, Jung in the case of a great generalization in 
physics -namely Mayer's theory of the Conservation of 
Energy -and according to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, 
this is the case even with philosophy. " Academic " 
psychologists, such as Souriau and Paulham, admit this 
by implication, while the psycho -analytic studies of Maeder8 
and Pfister 9 have assigned to unconscious processes a great 
influence in artistic creation. In addition we find more 
idealistic thinkers, like Dr Geley,10 who boldly says of 
artist or savant that he "ne dirige pas l'inspiration ; il la 
subit." 
Pfister cites the example of a savant achieving his 
results by inspiration, in the person of Kékulé, who dis- 
covered the benzol ring in chemical combinations. While 
working at the elucidation of the benzol theory, Kékulé found 
himself in difficulties, and describes how one day he fell 
into a dreamy state on the top of an omnibus when, sud- 
denly, the solution appeared before him in a sort of 
picture in which snake -like movements played a large 
part, which was in reality a regression towards an infantile 
form of thinking, strictly comparable to the pseudo - 
hallucination of neurotics. 
Nor do mathematical discoveries form an exception, as 
Dwelshauvers 11 shows by quoting Henri Poincaré, the 
French mathematician. The latter attributed the solution 
of many of his particular problems to unconscious action 
and to " sensibilité " rather than to reason. Apropros of this 
" étát affectif," Dwelshauvers adds, " La démonstration qui 
s'élabore inconsciémment, est celle, qui a la plus d'affinité 
avec notre sentiment esthétique. C'est donc la vie des 
sentiments, qui est ici déterminante. Seules les combin- 
aisons, qui nous émeuvent s'imposent a la conscience et 
fixent l'attention. Or, il arrive que ce, qui plaît au sens 
esthétique, apporte en même temps un aide efficace a 
l'esprit. La solution la plus belle est aussi la plus harmon- 
ieuse, et son harmonie est d'un grand secours pour la 
pensée. L'inconscient est donc ici le processus d'affinité 
entre notre sensibilité et l'invention." This feeling of 
appropriateness is a common feature with mathematicians. 
" Les combinaisons utiles, ces sont precisément les plus 
belles, je veux dire celles qui peuvent le mieux charmer 
cette sensibilité speciale, que tous les mathematiciens 
connaissent" writes Poincaré. 
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So it is not surprising, that poets and painters also 
should have felt intuitively the source of their ideas to be 
outside consciousness, and to have felt inspiration surge up 
mysteriously. 
For example, Goethe, in writing to von Humboldt, 
speaks of great thought in one's power, but due to a 
superior force to which a man yields unconsciously ; also 
elsewhere " Alles ist als wie geschenkt." Schiller (quoted 
by Pfister) says : " the unconscious with discretion makes 
the poetic artist." De Musset writes : " On ne travaille 
pas, on écoute, on attende. C'est comme un inconnu qui 
vous parle a l'oreille." In similar strain Charlotte Brontë 
in the preface to her sister Emily's Wuthering Heights, 
says, " But this I know ; the writer who possesses the 
creative gift, owns something of which he is not always 
master - something that, at times, strangely wills and 
works itself... . 
".. . As for you -the nominal artist -your share in it 
has been to work passively under dictates, you neither 
delivered, nor could question -that would not be uttered 
at your prayer, nor suppressed nor changed at your caprice. 
If the result be attractive, the world will praise you, who 
little deserves praise ; if it be repulsive, the same world 
will blame you, who almost as little deserve blame." 
Amongst painters, we find intuitive use of subconscious 
activities when Leonardo bids his pupils obtain suggestions 
from stains on walls, which, like Blake's gazing into the 
fire, is a method of allowing the ever active unconscious 
processes to be perceived by consciousness, and no painter 
more frankly turns to the stirrings of his unconscious mind 
for inspiration, than did Blake. 
Passing by the methods adopted by artists such as 
Titian and Corot (and a hundred others) -where they 
turned pictures to the wall when for the moment there is 
no more to say, but reverted later to the work, as sugges- 
tions from the unconscious mind came to their help in 
the process of building up the composition -one may quote 
a modern painter of great influence and personality, namely 
Gauguin, who vividly describes his experience inf painting 
his great picture " D'où venons nous ? Que sommes nous ? 
Oú allons nous ? " He says " Oú commence l'execution 
d'un tableau, où finit elle? Au moment où des sentiments 
extremes sont en fusion au plus profond de l'être, au 
moment oú ils éclatent, et que toute la pensée sort comme 
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la lave d'un volcan, n'y a -t -il pas lá une éclosion de l'oeuvre 
soudainement créée, brutale si l'on veut, mais grande et 
d'apparence surhumaine? Les froids calcules de la raison 
n'ont pas presidé a cette éclosion, mais, qui sait, quand au 
fond de l'être l'oeuvre a été commencée? inconsciente peut- 
étre ?" Whistler put this tersely when he said, " Art just 
happens." 
From the foregoing it is clear that many artists have 
realized that their achievements are not the result of 
rational laboured thought processes, of which they are 
aware, but that they sprang from some source, as to whose 
nature and limitations they had but a hazy idea ; and 
in such processes, we have a close analogy to neurotic 
symptoms, in the absence of higher cortical functions. 
How then can we differentiate between the futilities of 
the psychasthenic and the glorious achievement of a 
Titian and a Leonardo? Two factors seem to be of im- 
portance in this respect. In the first place, if we take the 
full appearance of cortical function as the highest level in 
our hierarchy, we may recognize several levels of be- 
haviour before we reach this stage of complete absence of 
cortical function. This may be explained by the fact that 
not only is the cortex in man enormously enlarged and 
complicated, in respect of its area, when compared to that 
of animals, but also there is the further differentiation to 
be taken into account of the increase in the layers of 
cells. There is considerable evidence to show that the 
more superficial layers subserve the higher functions. 
Hence, this allows for many degrees of devolution from 
the highest levels of control, and the process of artistic 
emergence may well be derived from a level considerably 
higher than are the emergents which represent neurotic 
behaviour. In the second place, although artistic ex- 
pression may arise from subconscious levels, if it is to be 
of value it must be subjected to considerable modifications 
by fully conscious function, whereas, in the case of neurotic 
behaviour, the discipline of this function may not be en- 
joyed. Indeed, in the genius we may observe a temporary 
dissociation of cortical function, as if the lower levels could 
first be freed from its restricting influence, and then the 
resulting products rigidly subjected to it. For example, 
this distinction occurs amongst artists, for the greatest 
geniuses always subject their creations to the most loving 
care and attention until they are satisfied that their work 
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is perfect in their own eyes. This leads us to the definition 
of genius as an infinite capacity for taking pains, which, at 
first sight, seems contradictory to the conception of genius 
as the flair for seeing things differently from the ordinary 
mortal. If we consider those artists who work while the 
inspiration is upon them but immediately after this is 
over take no more pains or interest in their creation, we 
find that they may produce original work, but never work 
of the, highest merit. The artist must be essentially sub- 
jective, and at least in certain of his attitudes, introvert. 
If he were completely extravert and objective, then he 
would merely copy and he would not be a true artist, who 
must infuse into his work something of himself. It does 
not follow that he is preponderantly introvert, for many of 
the greatest artists, such às Goethe and Shakespeare, 
were unquestionably extraverts, but, as has been said, 
extraversion and introversion are only attitudes, and though 
extravert in his attitude to objects, the artist must add 
something of his own creative effort to the impressions he 
obtains from the external world. This creative effort may 
be expressed, from the psycho -physical standpoint, by 
saying that the engrains which subserve his behaviour 
are so formed that emergents arise, which are not exactly 
adapted to the world as it is, but constitute a new and 
fresh orientation. In this connexion, it should be noticed 
that we are apt to regard perfect adaptation to the en- 
vironment as it is, as the highest level of function, thus 
laying stress on the cortical functions of integration and 
control and, perhaps, not giving enough attention to dis- 
crimination. If this function of complete adaptation were 
really achieved, progress would be impossible, and that is 
why the artist and the genius, instable though they may 
be, are essential to society. Further, if we regard adapta- 
tion to the environment as it is, as the summit of achieve- 
ment, we are presuming that the environment has reached 
a stabilized perfection. This is obviously untrue, and our 
own failures in adaptation may be the chief means of 
progress, inasmuch as they make for a change in the 
environment. By all the laws of evolution both we and 
our environment are engaged on the march of progress, 
and the instability of the genius and the neurotic is due 
to their being out of step with the environment ; the 
former half a pace in advance, while the latter is half a 
pace behind. None the less, an accident is always liable 
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to happen whereby they change places, for this progress 
is not as it were, in one dimension only, but in several. 
Thus, even the average man may be in step in several 
dimensions but half a pace behind in one, and half a pace 
in front in another. It will depend, therefore, on what 
dimension is significant for the moment, whether he is 
normal, neurotic, or a genius. 
Such a brief exposition naturally cannot cover the 
whole ground, but may serve to indicate how it is that 
" genius is akin to madness," and why it is that the artist 
is so frequently ill -fitted to meet the world. Moreover, it 
may show that though a personality is instable, he is not 
necessarily useless, and that many neurotic personalities 
might have been, and may, under favourable circumstances, 
still be honoured members of society, instead of being 
despised, both by the world and by themselves. 
CHAPTER XIV 
THE INSTABLE PERSONALITY 
The Delinquent 
IN our study of the instable personality, as exemplified by 
the neurotic, we have suggested that his inability to cope 
with life is due to an intrinsic conflict, which may be 
partly inherent and partly the product of circumstances. 
In the case of the delinquent, he may or may not be 
neurotic, but the main stress of conflict is not so much 
within the ego, as between the ego and the environment. 
We must ask first, however, what justification there is for 
supposing that there is a special type of personality who 
tends to be delinquent ? Lombroso 1 and others have in- 
sisted that it is possible to recognize a criminal type, even 
from the physical aspect of anthropology. Goring,2 on the 
other hand, in his elaborate empirical study of the English 
convict, has refuted this claim ; he says, " both with regard 
to measurements and the presence of physical anomalies 
in criminals, our statistics present a startling conformity 
with similar statistics of the law- abiding classes. This 
final conclusion we are bound to accept, until further evi- 
dence, in the train of long series of statistics, may compel 
us to reject or to modify an apparent certainty- indeed 
our inevitable conclusion must be, that there is no such 
thing as a physical criminal type." Although there may 
be no definite stigmata, however, he notes that, " taken as 
a whole, all English criminals, with the exception of those 
technically convicted of fraud, are markedly differentiated 
from the general population, in stature and body weight ; 
while offenders convicted of violence to the person are 
characterized by a degree of strength, and of constitu- 
tional soundness, considerably above the average of other 
criminals and of the law- abiding community. Thieves and 
burglars (who constitute, it must be borne in mind, 90 
per cent. of all criminals) and also incendiaries, as well as 
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being inferior in stature and weight, are also, relatively to 
other criminals and the population at large, puny in their 
general bodily habit. These are the facts ; and, according 
to the results of our statistical enquiry, they are the sole 
facts, at the basis of criminal anthropology ; they are 
the only elements of truth, out of which have been con- 
structed the elaborate, extravagant and ludicrously un- 
critical criminological doctrines of the great protagonist of 
the criminal type theory." 
He concludes further, that various physical diseases are 
not correlated with crime, but that there is a high degree 
of relationship between criminality and insanity, alcoholism 
and venereal disease. These three, we may note, are the 
products of instability. " The one significant physical 
association with criminality is a general defective physique. 
The one vital mental constitutional factor, in the etiology 
of crime, is defective intelligence." The first offence of a 
criminal is almost always theft, and this, with sex offence, 
are the crimes characteristic of youth. He notes the im- 
portance of the incipient appearances of crime in the young, 
and remarks, "crime makes its appearance in childhood, 
just as intellectual capacities, etc., appear at this time; 
so do many diseases, such as measles, appear in child- 
hood." He lays great stress on inheritance, and on the 
origin of crime in the constitution of the malefactor, and 
especially in his mental defective constitution. He states, 
" criminal diathesis is inherited at much the same rate as 
are other physical and mental qualities and pathological 
conditions in man. The influence of parental contagion is 
inconsiderable, relatively to the influence of inheritance and 
of mental defectiveness." It must be remembered how- 
ever, that Goring wrote at a time when heredity was very 
much in vogue, and when the importance of early environ- 
mental influences were little understood. More stress 
would be laid nowadays on the effect of this early en- 
vironment in moulding for good or ill the mind of the 
young child. More recent writers such as Healey 3 are 
emphatic, that " born criminals" is a misleading term. 
" Mental defectives and epileptics, and others, especially 
if brought up in bad environment, may be regarded as 
having secondary criminal dispositions, but calling them 
born criminals tells us nothing of worth concerning them. 
As Devon says, the criminal is just as much, or just as 
little, born and made, as the policeman is born and made. 
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These authorities are agreed that there is no one causative 
factor for delinquency, but rather that we must look for 
the interaction of several influences. These influences will 
not be found exclusively in the heredity, nor yet ex- 
clusively in the environment ; and, if they are to be 
understood and in any way modified, they must be studied 
in the child.: What leads to criminality would seem to be 
a difficulty in the adaptation to circumstances, which con- 
stitutes the highest function of man's mind, and which 
gives him so much more control over his medium than is 
enjoyed by the rest of the animal world. Although the 
general social environment is of great importance, it is 
the particular subtle action of the environment on a given 
individual, that is really influential. Such general in- 
fluences as bad housing, insanitary surroundings, and so 
on, may or may not be important, but are only so in 
respect to the particular individual who may be the 
subject of our study. We have to solve the question as 
to why one child, out of several in a community or a 
family, fails to adapt himself and to grow_ up .a normal 
law -abiding citizen. The variation must . be in the child, . 
since the other factor is nearly constant, and this variation 
may b`e-iñhé nt, or may be ihduced by disease, or faulty . 
influences brought to bear on him in his home during the 
impressionable years. before he went to school. In the 
normal child, the personality is integrated, so that a more 
or less simple facet is presented to the environment and 
a minimum of friction results. In the delinquent child, 
this facet is not smooth, but complex and unequal, and 
therefore friction is at a maximum. Integration is poor, 
and therefore adaptation is hindered. As we have said, 
in the neurotic the instability would, seem to lie within the 
ego, and secondarily between himself and the environ- 
ment, while in the delinquent, the instability is chiefly, 
if not primarily, between himself and the environment. 
This failure of integration may be due to many causes, 
and we must attempt to enunciate and exemplify these, in 
order to throw light on our first problem as to why the 
delinquent child is delinquent ; but even this study will 
only solve the question incompletely, for it may be possible 
to quote case for case, in which the so- called causative 
factors are apparently identical and yet no delinquent 
behaviour results. Nevertheless this is analogous with the 
observations noted above in Chapter III, where it was 
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pointed out, that causative factors were not the only 
determinants of resultant emergents, but that the special 
relatedness of these factors was of primary importance. 
The exact nature of this relatedness at the levels of life 
and consciousness is still beyond our ken, so that we cannot 
yet wholly determine what makes a criminal and what 
makes an honest man. Adequate integration depends on 
perfect cortical function at its highest levels, and such 
perfect functioning is only possible if there is perfect 
structural development. When this is not achieved as 
the result of arrest of development, we are faced with the 
problem of mental deficiency. The extreme degrees of 
this condition are not important in relation to delinquency, 
for such cases are easily recognized, and are, in accord- 
ance with legal requirements, put into an environment 
which is more or less suitable, and which is largely 
made to fit their needs, since it is recognized that they 
cannot be expected to adapt themselves to ordinary 
school or social life. Thus, amongst convicted delinquents, 
Burt' and others have shown that not more than 7 per 
cent. come within the limits of certifiable feeble- minded- 
ness. However, when we have to deal with children who 
are merely backward, we find such a condition a fruitful 
source of delinquency. The backward child is a poorly 
integrated personality, and he is therefore suggestible, and 
likely to respond to any influence which is operative at 
the moment. Moreover, he is not fitted to adapt himself 
to his environment, however hard he may try. This means 
that his work at school is done by fits and starts, unless a 
master of specially strong character achieves an influence 
over him and induces him to resist other suggestions to 
take the easier path and avoid work. It may be, however, 
that the strong influence which rules him, is for evil and 
not for good, and this may lead him to join a gang who 
frequently put the dirty work of their nefarious schemes on 
to their victim. Such children frequently appear in the 
juvenile courts, accused of crimes to which they have been 
instigated by their more wicked, but more astute confeder- 
ates. Unless dominated by a strong personality, however, 
the backward child will tend to drift, never concentrating 
long on one thing, achieving little and becoming easily 
discouraged. If self- assertive, there will be a constant 
effort to persuade himself that he is as good as his neigh- 
bour, and if he cannot achieve success in one way, he will 
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do so in another. However, his frequent failure will lead 
to a deep sense of inferiority, and the development of a 
compensatory will to power. Apart from mental defect 
this sense of inferiority is of enormous importance. It 
may be induced by a real or fancied mental inferiority, 
by physical weakness, or a failure to excel in particular 
games, or by a real or fancied moral defect. Thus, many 
boys are found to have a sense of inferiority because they 
fancy that the fact that they have practised masturbation 
has set them apart from all other boys, has branded them 
as degenerates, and so on. This sense of inferiority, what- 
ever its origin, saps the whole of a child's ambition and so 
renders his achievement far less than it might have been, 
if his performance had reached the limit of his capacity. 
Everything seems useless, so why try ? Again, as has 
been shown by Adler, various physical inferiorities, 
whether of the whole body, or of particular organs, lead to 
similar self- depreciation and, amongst better -class children, 
the importance attached to games in the public schools 
leads to an inferiority feeling if there is marked deficiency 
in this respect, quite apart from general physical prowess. 
Such deficiency may be due to poor muscular co- ordination 
and control, to bad sight or hearing, and so, these defects 
may have a secondary influence in determining an effort to 
excel somehow or other, and the only way may be by 
crime. This tendency is often reinforced by the fact that 
these handicapped children, like all other children, are 
given to hero -worship, and the formation of ideals. The 
choice of this ideal may not be overwise, and even if it is 
commendable, the personality may be so different from his 
own, that any degree of identification with the ideal is 
impossible, and the failure to achieve this only leads to 
more self -depreciation. Naturally, the child often takes 
his father for his ideal, and in this case, it is hard for him 
to emulate the adult, for their circumstances and oppor- 
tunities are so utterly different. This discrepancy between 
subject and ideal is especially marked if the latter has 
died when the former was young. For example, 
a boy made an absolute ideal of his father, and this 
idealism was intensified since his mother had died in his 
infancy. To his ten -year -old eyes, this father, a fine type 
of soldier, of a religious frame of mind, was all that a man 
could possibly be, strong, brave, holy and honourable. 
Then the father was killed in the first year of the war. 
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As the boy grew older and went through school, every 
time he was not perfectly brave, perfectly honourable, and 
perfectly strong, he felt he had failed without hope of 
redemption and, because he could not take a serious 
interest in religion, he felt he must be an abandoned soul. 
It mattered not that his companions were as weak as he. 
The real standard for him was the exaggerated picture of 
his father, who was as much above him and beyond him 
at eighteen, as he had been at ten. Under more normal 
circumstances, as the son gets older, the discrepancy 
between himself and his father gets less and less, and it 
may not be an unmixed curse that the godlike parent is 
discovered to have feet of clay. The sense of inferiority 
once established, may remain like a millstone round his 
neck, dragging the child back, so that he fails to expand 
his personality to meet the more complicated demands of 
advancing years. Thus, as he becomes less and less 
adapted to his surroundings, he becomes more and more 
difficult and, with a chance association with bad environ- 
ment, he may easily be precipitated into a life of crime. 
As has been said, if he is of a self -assertive type he may 
try to compensate for his inferiority by the development 
of a will to power. By this is meant a striving to excel in 
some way, whether in reality or phantasy. If success is 
striven for in reality, and this is denied him in work and 
games, the child may seek other means of satisfaction. 
Such means are often sexual, whether by the spreading 
of undesirable information, or by more active practices. 
The former is exemplified by a backward girl, who had to 
be removed from more than one school because she per- 
sisted in surrounding herself with an admiring and 
respectful audience to whom she related sexual details, 
gleaned from a not less backward elder sister. The latter 
type may be exemplified by an unpopular boy, who 
became head of his school- house, but who had to be 
expelled because he was found sexually abusing other 
boys, by which means he sought to curry favour, and at 
the same time achieve for himself a sense of superiority. 
That this will to power, secondary to a sense of inferiority, 
is responsible for much bullying, goes without saying. 
Sometimes, the will to power is achieved in phantasy, 
rather than in reality. For example, a boy got an order 
for a shirt, signed by his house -master, but rubbed out the 
word "shirt," and substituted a whole first eleven kit. These 
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garments he could never wear, but presumably he wished to 
gloat over them and think of what might have been. Mrs 
Delafield has given the world an interesting and able 
study of this sort of case in her book Reversion to Type. 
Sometimes such backward children, who go wrong, are 
called moral imbeciles, but this term, though it may be 
convenient, should not be retained in a scientific vocabulary. 
There is no special faculty of morality which is deficient 
in these children, but there is either a general backward- 
ness, leading to lack of integration, or some form of 
imbalance, such as is described below, which will result in 
the same deficiency. The inefficient child is, therefore, 
liable to become delinquent, not so much because of his 
backwardness per se, but because he is compelled to live in 
school, or in work, where it is impossible for him to adapt 
himself. Take such a child early enough, before the 
success of his delinquent behaviour has induced too great 
facilitation of this pattern, and put him in an environment 
to which he can adapt himself and he does not grow into 
a criminal. 
Passing from the mental deficient, the proper develop- 
ment of cortical function may be interfered with by disease. 
Epilepsy is important in this respect, for in this condition, 
apart from the fits, there is an increasing failure of higher 
mental integration and adaptation, a progressive narrowing 
of the field of personality, so that the subject becomes more 
and more egocentric, more and more difficult. Though 
this characteristic may be more marked as life advances, 
yet the epileptic child presents such a problem, that quite 
apart from the disturbance created by his fits, he cannot 
readily be kept in the ordinary school or workshop. He 
soon becomes a social rebel, since the demands of self - 
sacrifice made by society interfere with his characteristic 
egocentricity. From this it is a short step to the mental 
state in which the idea of vengeance on society becomes 
dominant, and from this such crimes as theft and arson 
often originate, if the impulse does not lead further to 
crimes of violence against fancied enemies. In such cases, 
too, we have at times to deal with automatisms, phases 
during which all conscious control is in abeyance, and the 
subject may perform acts dictated by his lower level 
impulses, which may often lead him into a social and even 
criminal behaviour. It must be remembered that the fit 
is only a symptom of epilepsy, and one which may be 
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absent or of slight importance in any given case. For this 
reason many individuals who are epileptic are not recog- 
nized as such, and the true cause of the delinquency which 
may develop, is overlooked. As an example of the epileptic 
delinquent, we may cite the case of a boy of fifteen, who 
got into trouble for staying out at night, and finally getting 
into a railway waggon and being carried off a hundred 
miles from his home. His mother had died when he was 
eight, his father had enlisted, and he had been sent to live 
with his grandmother. He had had some fits as a small child, 
but not since, though he was undoubtedly of the epileptic 
type. He really cared for no one but himself, and just 
did things he wanted to, coming and going just as he 
liked. During the year which had elapsed since leaving 
school, he had been in no less than six different jobs. He 
had gone to each with considerable enthusiasm, but had 
quickly tired of them after a week or two, and had just 
left his work undone. At the time he was seen, nothing 
would satisfy him but that he should join a regimental 
band and go out to India. The suggestion that he might 
be sorry to leave his relations or his brothers and sisters, 
seemed to fill him with considerable surprise, such a thing 
had never occurred to him. 
Congenital syphilis may produce mental deficiency in 
all its degrees, but statistics show that it is not such a 
fruitful source of this as some think. However, apart 
from this, the interference with function of the more 
superficial layers of cortex may produce a cross -grained 
character, who may perpetrate the most bizarre acts and 
even dreadful crimes. For example, a child of three took 
pleasure in placing the kitten on the fire, and finally tried 
to grill his baby brother. This latter exploit persuaded 
the parents that it was time to seek medical advice, and 
in this case, treatment seems to have eradicated this cruel 
streak, and the child shows promise of growing up to be a 
decent citizen. 
Encephalitis lethargica has been proved to have a con- 
siderable influence in changing the character of previously 
normal children. One child, after this disease, became 
sexually uncontrolled and quite without modesty. She 
insisted in disrobing in the middle of the street, and in 
making improper advances to any man she met. Another 
would brook no interference with his own desires and if 
any boy in the school crossed him he would fly at him, 
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and fasten his teeth on any exposed part of his person. 
This boy had been backward before, but never vicious, the 
illness completed the mischief and the lower egocentric 
impulses became completely uncontrolled. There was an 
interesting development in this case, as some three years 
after the illness, when his conduct was becoming insup- 
portable, it was found that he had never been punished. 
When this was suggested, the boy was most surprised 
and said " You can't punish me, I have had encephalitis 
lethargica." In spite of this ingenuous protest he was 
chastised, and fora, time the effect was magical. Soon, 
however, it became obvious that the appeal was purely 
hedonistic, for the old impulses overcame his dread of 
pain, and the vicious behaviour re- established itself. 
Shrubshall5 has described a series of such cases, and 
showed that the character defects were similar to those 
associated with epilepsy- egocentricity and antisocial be- 
haviour. Most people are agreed that the incidence of 
this disease is likely to result in a serious social problem 
in the future, a problem, indeed, with which we are all too 
unready to cope. 
In order that a personality shall be integrated and 
controlled, the units of which the personality is composed 
must be present in certain proportions. If one or more 
of these are out of proportion to the rest, proper integra- 
tion is impossible to achieve. Further, it would seem that 
these units must be arranged in certain ways and accord - 
ing to certain laws, so that they enter into these definite 
combinations which go to make up the normal personality. 
McDougall and Shand 7 have shown what are the units 
from which the character is built, and how they are in- 
tegrated together to form the sentiments, which are the 
major constituents of the human personality; and this 
integration, as it should proceed, has been sketched out. 
Difficulty may arise, because certain of the units are out 
of proportion to the rest, and also because the units com- 
bine in such a way that unusual emergents of behaviour 
result. In the first case, we may find that fear, anger, sex, 
self -assertion, or any of the other units predominate to 
such an extent, that they come to overshadow the whole 
reaction of the child. The case in which almost every 
stimulus calls out fear, is not unfamiliar, and all efforts to 
teach the child to control this fear are largely unavailing, 
he remains the frightened, cowering, helpless being, from 
R 
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start to finish. The aggressive, quarrelsome child is also 
familiar and, though if physically strong he may hector 
his way through life more or less successfully from his 
own point of view, he is certainly difficult, if not delinquent. 
If he is physically weak, then he becomes spiteful and 
suspicious, seeks underhand ways of getting even -with his 
real or fancied opponents, and may well drift into delin- 
quency along this path. The child with too strongly 
developed sex is specially liable to come to grief, for 
society opposes to him little else than a string of nega- 
tives, and a series of bogeys. As a schoolmaster said of 
a set of school rules, there is no good in presenting to 
boys 15o "don'ts "; the weak boys are left with nothing to 
do, and the aggressive boys are merely instigated to do 
the things that are forbidden. One boy was asked what 
he thought of the rules of a school. He evidently had a 
poor opinion of them all, but he positively disliked rule 
28, which forbade a boy to enter or leave the school by 
aeroplane, as he asked, what was the good of that ? He 
couldn't even break it. Positive guidance is essential in 
the formation of character, and in respect of sex, this is 
conspicuously lacking in most systems of education. 
In this connexion may be considered the precocious 
child, who becomes delinquent. This precocity may be 
intellectual or manipulative. In either case, the precocious 
ability will demand satisfaction and employment. If this 
is not obtained in the ordinary routine of school work, 
then some other scope must be found. If the precocity 
is intellectual, then it tends to express itself in phantasy, 
and if much of the child's intellectual activity is exercised 
in this phantasy, it may become very real and acquire a 
value little short of that felt for his normal surroundings. 
Such phantasy may find scope in early literary achieve- 
ment, but is apt to expand itself merely on the dreaming 
of dreams. In any case, such activities are not likely to 
be very popular with the other children in the school, so 
that the youngster in question becomes more and more 
solitary, and often gets depressed and discouraged. Under 
these circumstances he finds refuge in his phantasies from 
the rebuffs of an unsympathetic world. Of such stuff are 
many truants made, and the truancy may vary from a 
deliberate avoidance of uncongenial surroundings, to a 
true fugue, in which the subject loses all touch with time 
and space, and is quite unaware afterwards where he has 
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been or what he has done. The child in whom precocity is 
manifested in manipulation, is in better case under present 
conditions of school life, as he will usually find an outlet 
for his manual dexterity in some sort of game. In lower 
levels of society, however, this may not hold, and a child 
may only be able to find an outlet for his manipulative 
precocity in delinquency. For instance, the eight -year- 
old son of a law .clerk noted for the excellence of his 
calligraphy :inherited a considerable degree of this manual 
dexterity. So precocious was he in this respect, that he 
soon achieved a reputation as the most expert pick -pocket 
in the Borough. 
In the instances sketched above, stress has been laid 
on various causative influences which have been beyond 
conscious control, and have determined delinquencies, in 
spite of, rather than because of deliberate choice." Many 
people will consider this one -sided, and think that a large 
proportion of delinquents deliberately choose this career 
for themselves, in the same way as another person would 
become a lawyer, a parson or a plumber. It is first 
necessary to define what is meant by deliberate choice. 
In this connexion Healey has defined the term as, 
"A choice made by those who possess mental powers 
sufficient for self -determination of the direction of their 
careers, in whom there are not -perforce of overpowering 
physical and mental characteristics -such internal ten- 
dencies as well might be calculated to develop criminalism, 
and in whom there is no overwhelming push from environ- 
mental sources." Distinction must then be drawn in the 
study of the delinquent personality, between the criminal 
who chooses crime on the first occasion, and the boy who 
becomes a habitual and professional criminal because social 
conditions have prevented him taking up any desirable 
occupation. He is a criminal of necessity, and not of 
choice, if we remember that the feebleness of his own char- 
acter prevents him succeeding along legitimate lines, and 
so may constitute a large part of the necessity. As Healey 
says, " I should insist, that if deliberate choice is to be in- 
voked by way of explanation of an antisocial career, there 
must have been plenty of opportunity, and even invitation, 
to take advantage of occupational or recreational interests, 
which would have proved enticing enough to cause others 
to choose refraining from misdeeds. Narrowed down in 
this way, it would seem, that the adoption of criminality 
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as a career from deliberate choice is exceedingly rare." 
To quote Healey again, " Making up our minds at many 
different times, and often in consultation with experienced 
people and with the great amount of material which often 
has been collected on a case, it is significant that we find 
justification for applying the phrase ' deliberate choice' as a 
cause, in less than half a dozen instances, in more than 
i000 cases of repeated offenders." A study of these six 
cases, however, shows an abnormal personality, lacking 
balance between the hereditary disposition, or a more than 
usual capacity for being influenced by a hostile environ- 
ment. It may be concluded, therefore, that in the same 
way as with so many other types of human behaviour, 
crime is determined by the influence of affectively toned 
"wishes "; but that where the level of consciousness is 
reached at which organization is sufficient to allow for 
discrimination and control, deliberate antisocial behaviour 
is unusual. 
These considerations may to some extent serve to 
answer the question : why is the child like this ? To 
answer the question as to what we must do with the child, 
the answer is that we must do one of two things or both, 
we must alter the child, or we must alter the environment. 
One thing must be made quite clear. The apologists for 
the delinquent child must have no desire to dictate to 
schoolmasters or justices, or suggest for a moment that 
they should change the methods which their experience 
has shown to work well. The duty of the schoolmaster 
and the judge is to the majority, that is to the normal 
child and to society as a whole, and if the delinquent child 
is a misfit, he may have to be removed, and it may be to 
his advantage to be removed. Schools are being started 
here and there, which specialize in taking misfits. If these 
are run by the right people and are kept small, they may 
be a great success and should be multiplied. Where 
circumstances permit, individual tuition may be very desir- 
able for a time, for by this means the real capacity of the 
child can be determined. He may require greater intel- 
lectual outlet, or he may require greater manipulative 
opportunity. The development of more experimental work 
in the schools is undoubtedly useful. The more a child 
can work out and do for himself, the better it gives him 
confidence and a sense of power over his environment 
which is essentially healthy. In the lower walks of life, 
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the industrial school or the training ship are the usual goal 
of the delinquent child. In these institutions the discipline 
and opportunity of achievement, work wonders for the 
majority, but it must be recognized that a few never fit 
in, while others drift back as soon as they are once more 
put on their own resources. This only means, that like 
other human institutions, these methods are not perfect ; 
and by greater knowledge and fuller understanding, efforts 
must be made to improve them further. 
The other approach to the problem is to change the 
child, and to do this we must change his outlook on life. 
Before this can be accomplished we must discover what 
this outlook is, and if we are to understand this, we must 
put aside all "sensible" adult preconceptions. The mind of 
the child is very different from that of the adult, and his out- 
look is often extraordinarily disproportionate and limited. 
He must be made to understand the real truth, be en- 
couraged to present his difficulties, which must be dealt 
with calmly and unemotionally. If we are to help him, we 
must never show ourselves shocked, or surprised, or amused, 
however extravagant his ideas, or perverted his actions. 
In dealing with children who have started on a life of 
crime, it is striking how uniform is the delinquency but 
how diverse the personality. As R. C. Cabot remarks, 
" How diverse the virtues ! how similar the crimes ! Is 
it not amazing, -the smooth uniformity of nail - biting, 
bunking out, truancy, obscenity and theft ? In these 
elements the stories are so much alike that one almost 
forgets which is which, -until the child himself speaks 
up.... Perhaps each sin, as the sinner and God see it, 
is as unique as any part of his personality. But certain 
it is that the records of delinquency, as the world's coarse 
thumb and finger sort them out in piles, obscure the clear 
outlines of the children till they look unnaturally, untruly 
alike." Every delinquent is an individual, a new emergent 
owing something to heredity, something to environment, 
and something to the adaptation between these, but always 
a new personality, for which none of these alone can be 
said to be responsible 
Moreover the more complete the investigation, the 
more complicated is the record of potential or actual 
delinquencies, a child is seldom found to be only a thief, 
or only a truant, or what not; other abnormalities are 
revealed, and all are due to the lack of balance and 
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control in the personality. For instance, many of the 
cases of theft in children are a great puzzle. Occasionally 
such thefts may be merely the result of uncontrolled 
acquisitive instinct, but often this is only uncontrolled 
because it is reinforced by some other impulses. For 
example, a girl who was the daughter of a vain pleasure - 
loving woman, was adopted by a virtuous but severe 
spinster who denied her all personal adornments. When 
the child went to school, she began to steal small sums 
of money, which were all spent on cheap jewelry and 
ribbons. With these she adorned herself in secret, to her 
great gratification. This problem was never investigated, 
but it is not improbable that had she been permitted some 
personal decoration, and been taught to keep this within 
reasonable limits rather than to repress it altogether, 
there might have been no theft. Again, a girl stole 
money from the mistresses but spent it all on sweets 
which she gave to other girls. The feeling of inferiority 
and desire to please her class -mates which underlay this 
delinquency, is obvious. Cases of stealing from the parents 
are frequent in the juvenile courts, and in many of these it 
is clear that the theft is instigated by a desire to get even 
with the parent, or often with a step -parent, for some real 
or fancied grievance. A strong feeling of protest against, 
society is often the basis of a career of crime, and if a 
child's lot in the home, or in society could be alleviated, 
much that is criminal might be avoided. So we must 
conclude that the delinquent personality is an unbalanced 
personality, and like all unbalanced persons, requires in- 
dividual study, for without this we can never know what 
particular factor is responsible for the deviation from the 
mean which determines his failure in adaptation. More- 
over, these studies contribute to our general store of know- 
ledge of personality, for which of us is not tempted to 
gratify our own wishes in ways contrary to the decalogue? 
Though we may rejoice when the wicked are punished, 
if we be truly honest, we must murmur to ourselves, as 
the prisoner is removed to his cell, " there, but for the 
grace of God, go I." Indeed, those who attempt to do 
social work amongst the criminal classes will never be 
truly successful, unless they are brave enough, to admit 
this truth fully. 
CHAPTER XV 
THE DISSOCIATED PERSONALITY 
IN the study of the psychological integration of the per- 
sonality, attention was drawn to the constitution of the 
sentiments, with the self - regarding sentiment as the 
dominant and controlling influence. These sentiments 
may, or may not be permanent, and may wax and wane, 
according to changed circumstances in the environment. 
A sentiment has been defined as the organization of a - 
series of dispositions in relation to an object, and the 
best examples of sentiments are those of love and hate. 
The organization in the case of love is so constituted that 
the object of the sentiment is continually benefited by 
the resulting behaviour. On the other hand, in the case 
of hate all behaviour is to the detriment of the object. 
From the teleological standpoint, therefore, these two 
sentiments are diametrically opposed. Yet, according to 
the principle of ambivalence of the emotions, enunciated 
by Freud and referred to in Chapter IX, the same object 
may be loved and hated alternately; indeed, it would 
seem that in some cases the two sentiments were in 
operation almost coincidently. Again it is a familiar 
observation that the object of a sentiment of love or 
hate may change with bewildering rapidity with some 
people, so that they are on with the new love almost 
before they are off with the old. Thus it is evident, 
that not only may the group of emotional dispositions, 
organized in relation to an object, rapidly change, but 
also the object may change in relation to the emotional 
disposition. The dissociated personality exemplifies this 
mutability of the sentiments in an exaggerated degree, 
but a study of such personalities serves to illustrate an 
important feature in the normal. For example, consider 
the possibilities of dissociation within the self -regarding 
sentiment, which is the organization of the emotional 
dispositions in relation to the ego and its reactions with 
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the environment. This sentiment is a late development 
as McDougall1 points out, for "the conception of a self 
must have reference to other selves "; it is only by com- 
parison with other beings that the ego can be appreciated 
as a unity different from the rest. Consequently, like all 
recently acquired functions, it tends to be instable and 
easily modified. Further this self - regarding sentiment 
largely depends for its constitution on the experiences 
which have been enjoyed in the past, as Prince 2 has 
pointed out, both in respect to their influence in moulding 
the ego, and in so far as the ego makes reflective judg- 
ments on these experiences. 
Amongst the other emotional dispositions organized 
in this sentiment, those of self -abasement and self -assertion 
are of great importance. One or other of these will always 
be dominant and the degree of success in the adaptation 
of the individual to the environment will determine, at 
any given moment, which of these is the ascendant. If 
adaptation is successful, then self -assertion will tend to be 
prominent, while if the reverse be the case, self -abasement 
will govern the nature of the sentiment. It is clear that 
the success of adaptation of any individual varies from 
time to time according to the nature of the environment 
in which he finds himself, and this variation is accompanied 
by modification in his self - regarding sentiment. Such 
variations may be more or less persistent and may be 
classed as moods. They are exemplified by the alternat- 
ing states of exultation and depression, or of interest and 
apathy, which are met with in their extreme form in 
psychopathic personalities, and in less regular forms in 
the normal. The recovering neurotic shows this alterna- 
tion very clearly. On his good days, when he has achieved 
adaptation, he is confident that he can do anything, that 
he is quite well and will never be ill any more. Perhaps 
the next day he feels bad, something has happened to 
upset his adaptation and his attitude is entirely differ- 
ent, he can do nothing, he is more ill than anyone has 
ever been before, and he will never get well. There is 
more here than a mere change of mood, or variation 
in temperament ; the same man on the two consecutive 
days is a totally different personality, and were it not for 
his bodily features remaining the same, he might be 
regarded as two separate individuals. To a lesser degree, 
this change in the self -regarding sentiment, with its accom- 
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panying change in personality, occurs in day dream's and 
dreams proper. In the dream, dispositions take on a new 
organization within the ego, perhaps to such an extent, 
that, as Plato says, the good man dreams what the bad 
man does. In the dream, the normally good man becomes 
a had man, the coward becomes a hero, or the reverse 
may happen and the normally brave man becomes a 
coward. Such dreams may either be prospective or 
retrospective. In his studies of dream analysis Jung s 
has laid stress on the former type, while Freud ° has 
concentrated on the latter. In the former case, such as 
the dream in which the coward becomes a hero, there is a 
fulfilment in phantasy of the aspirations of the individual 
towards something higher than himself, to which he is 
struggling in his life and which he has not yet, and perhaps 
never will reach. In the latter type there is a fulfilment 
of wishes belonging to the primitive instincts, and in the 
phantasy they escape from the fetters of higher controls and 
integrations active in waking life. Such low level impulses 
are the normal directive agents of the bad man's character, 
and hence the truth of Plato's aphorism. Dissociations 
between phantasy and real behaviour are common in the 
experience of the ordinary man. Indeed, if we consider 
it from this point of view, we are all liable to become 
multiple personalities when the higher integration and 
control are in abeyance during sleep. Our self -regarding 
sentiment becomes dominated, now by self -assertion, now 
by self -abasement, now by fear, now by anger and so on, 
and with each dream- variant we assume a new rôle in 
life's drama. As a general rule, such dreams only involve 
ideational and affective activity, and no overt action takes 
place, but in some cases complex activity may be observed, 
In these cases so- called somnambulistic states arise, and 
actions of a complicated nature may be performed. Such 
activities are the result of a change of attitude of the ego 
to the environment, and the dominance of the self - 
regarding sentiment, not by a simple emotion, but by a 
subsidiary sentiment. Frequently this change is of the 
nature of a regression, so that the individual is attempting 
an adjustment to an experience or an environment which 
has long since passed away. This will be accompanied by 
a special arrangement of emotional dispositions, suitable 
to the past experience, but unsuited to the present, which 
may take the form of a mood of excitement, elation or 
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depression, by a series of images and ideas relating to the 
experience which has passed, and by a series of actions 
which are illustrative or symbolic of this experience. For 
example, on returning from the war a man developed 
" attacks " during which he lost all touch with his sur- 
roundings. If they occurred during the day -time, he 
would be unaware what he was doing or where he was 
going. Yet all the time he would walk along without 
stumbling. In other words, his habitual automatic actions 
were performed adequately, but his attention was directed 
elsewhere. During the attack he experienced fear and 
anxiety, and " expressed " these feelings in his general 
appearance. At the same time, he performed various 
gestures which were inexplicable, both to himself and to 
his corn panions. Later, it was possible to discover 
that during these "attacks" he was paying attention 
to a series of images which were accompanied by 
emotional experience and certain gestures appropriate 
to them. These images represented himself and his 
mother serving a company in a menial capacity. The 
host and hostess of this company were a banker and 
his daughter. To this daughter he had at one time 
been much attached, but monetary losses had resulted 
in a change in his social sphere which made marriage 
impossible. As a rule, this set of ideas was seldom, if 
ever, in his mind, since he had done his best to repress it 
and dissociate it. That is to say, the group of emotional 
dispositions organized round his conception of himself in 
relation to his environment did not usually include this 
other subsidiary sentiment of love for the banker's daughter. 
But with a change in the orientation of the self -regarding 
sentiment, this love sentiment became dominant, to the 
exclusion of every other subsidiary sentiment. To put the 
state of affairs in another way, as a rule the general 
organization of his mental activities was towards his 
present recovery from the effects of the war, and his future 
means of livelihood. Suddenly, he would regress to a 
former state, in which the organization of his mental 
activities was towards marriage with the banker's daughter. 
Yet this regression was not complete for, in the phantasy, 
he and his mother appeared in a menial capacity, and not 
as equals, and the fulfilment of his wish seemed impossible. 
A similar state is met with in the person who falls into a 
" brown study," but in this case there is little or no amnesia 
THE DISSOCIATED PERSONALITY 267 
as to the sentiment dominant during the phase. In the 
case quoted above there was no vivid recollection of the 
mental content of the attack, until revived by special 
psychotherapeutic measures. The state of affairs in the 
"brown study" clearly depends on inhibition. Just as 
the action of the extensor muscles is inhibited while a 
limb is being flexed, just as the whole emotional disposi- 
tion of fear may be inhibited while a cat goes to the 
rescue of her kittens who are in danger, so, at a higher 
level, one group of subordinate sentiments in the self- 
regarding sentiment, are inhibited during the dominance 
of another group. Under other circumstances, the latter 
group may be inhibited and the former dominant. This 
inhibition may be purely transient, as in the case of a 
mood, when affect is chiefly involved in the inhibited and 
dominant pattern, or again in the "brown study." Or 
the inhibition may be permanent, in the case of somnam- 
bulisms, which usually chiefly involve ideational patterns, 
or in states of depression or exultation, when affective 
patterns are involved. This alternating inhibition is what 
is known as dissociation, and the importance of the patterns 
dissociated, within the self -regarding sentiment, vary con- 
siderably. In the case quoted above, the dissociated 
pattern involving the sentiment of love for the banker's 
daughter was not an essential part of the patient's present 
make -up, and its temporary dominance did not involve 
any marked change in the patient's life and general 
behaviour. In other cases, however, the degree of im- 
portance of dissociated patterns is of great variety. Janet5 
has described these cases with great detail and lucidity. 
The simple cases, such as the one quoted, he calls mono- 
ideistic somnambulisms. These involve the dominance of 
a pattern relating to one scene, event, or object, though in 
themselves, such patterns may be very complex. " One of 
the characteristics of these somnambulisms is that they 
repeat themselves indefinitely. Not only are the different 
attacks always exactly alike, repeating the same move- 
ments, expressions and words, but in the course of the 
same attack, when it has lasted a certain time, the same 
scene may be repeated again in exactly the same way, 
five or ten times. At last, the agitation seems to wear 
out, the dream grows less clear, and gradually or suddenly 
according to the case, the patient comes back to her normal 
consciousness, takes up her ordinary business, quite, un- 
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disturbed by what has happened." In other words, the rest 
of the sentiments and patterns inhibited during the attack, 
again become dominant, and the previously dominant 
pattern becomes inhibited. If these changes are sudden, 
they are sometimes accompanied by a severe pain in the 
head. What physical change this corresponds to is not 
certain, but there must be a profound change in the 
synaptial junctions to induce the sudden inhibitions of 
large engraphic patterns. Such biochemical changes may 
well be accompanied by vascular or other modifications, 
such as might induce severe pain. In the case of the 
monoideistic somnambulisms, the whole proceeding is apt 
to be carried out with great intensity and vehemence. 
This is characteristic of those patterns of behaviour of a 
relatively simple nature, uncontrolled by the other patterns, 
which make up the total mental constituents. 
In the next group of cases, described by Janet as 
polyideistic somnambulisms, or fugues, there is no real 
difference, but the dissociated pattern is much more com- 
plex and comprehensive. Here the temporarily dominant 
abnormal pattern governs the conduct of the individual for 
days or months together, and may lead to a wandering 
away, so that he finds himself far from his home, without 
any conception as to how he got there. For example, a 
lady became very depressed and convinced of her own 
inadequacy, both to manage her own household and to 
attend to her religious duties. While she was in this 
mood, she suddenly lost touch with her surroundings and 
started to walk away. She had only a few pence in her 
pocket, and these she spent on some buns in a baker's 
shop. Finally she " came to herself" in a village ten 
miles from home, in a very fatigued and foot -sore con- 
dition. She had no knowlege of how she got there nor 
what she had done in the interval, and it was only after- 
wards, that the story of her walk and of the purchase of 
the buns was elicited. Such is a very simple fugue, 
but many of those described in literature are of great 
complexity and duration. They differ from the simpler 
somnabulisms, not only in their greater complexity, but 
also in the fact that the behaviour involved is of less 
intensity and violence. This is due to the fact that 
the pattern which becomes dominant is more complex 
and fully integrated, and so the activation of more 
numerous neurones belonging to a higher level is in- 
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volved.. The more neurones involved in the production 
of any pattern of behaviour, the less intense and violent 
will be that behaviour. It has already been pointed out, 
that the explanation of this lies in the resistance offered at 
the synaptial junctions to the spread of activation. ' It may 
be, that in these complicated alternations of character it 
would be better to express the change as one of orienta- 
tion of the various affective and conative' combinations 
within the self -regarding sentiment, rather than the 
dominance of an entirely separate pattern, which would 
suppose the activation of a quite separate group of neurones. 
Hence the change might be more adequately expressed, 
by supposing the activation to flow over a different course 
amongst the neurones, and thus produce a new engram, 
though many of the actual neurones involved in the pro- 
duction of the rival patterns are the same. This is specially 
so with the next group of cases, those of double personality. 
in these, the individual alternately presents two or more 
states, in which the personality differs profoundly. It 
sometimes happens that there is a complete amnesia for 
one state when the person is in the other ; but often the 
condition, to which Morton Prince has given the name 
co- consciousness, is met with. In this there is complete 
awareness of the other state, through which the individual 
has passed. Discussion of such cases is out of place here, 
since they are very rare, and good accounts of the classical 
examples may be found in literature, while Dr Morton 
Prince's description of Miss Beauchamp, in his Dis- 
sociation of.a Personality;' is now familiar to most people 
interested in the subject. 
The reference to the subject of dissociated personality 
serves to correct the impression that there is a complete and 
perfect integration of sentiment in the normal individual, 
and to show how, not only may one or more sentiments 
be divorced from the rest without losing their power of 
influencing behaviour, or waning altogether, but also, that 
new orientations may arise within the more complex 
sentiments, so that the whole attitude and adaptation of 
the individual becomes profoundly altered.? This alteration 
of attitude may be described as another example of insta- 
bility, and this is certainly the case, but there can be no 
harm in insisting on the fact that at the present stage of 
evolution, stability of integration is not characteristic of 
the average personality, and that it is in this direction of 
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fuller integration, that we may look for further advance 
and the emergence of that quality of deity, promised to 
us by Alexander.8 
It is probable that the change of orientation within the 
sentiment is, at any rate partly, a product of endocrine 
activity influencing the biochemical balance at the syn- 
aptial junctions. Such activities may be induced through 
the blood stream, by what would be termed physical 
influences, such as fatigue products, poisons, etc., or may 
be induced by way of the central and sympathetic nervous 
systems, by what may be termed psychic influences, such 
as perceptions and images. The great difficulty in any such 
theory of action is of course to explain why an endocrine 
change, which presumably reaches all the synapses by way 
of the blood and cerebro- spinal fluid, should cause inhibi- 
tion of one group and facilitation of another. Our only 
answer can be that we do not know. Yet it is quite 
clearly established in physiology that selective inhibition 
and facilitation do occur, as for instance in the simultaneous 
contractions of the body, and relaxation of the neck of 
hollow viscera. Also Pharmacology teaches us that such 
drugs as curare, strychnine, etc., have a very specific action 
on certain very limited structures in the nervous system, 
and the analogy which we seek to draw does not seem 
impossibly far -fetched. 
It is clear that such alterations as orientation within 
the sentiments are absolutely necessary in everyday life, 
in order that we may adapt ourselves to the ever varying 
circumstances of our environment ; and it seems quite 
possible that the pathological examples, such as have been 
quoted, represent that little more, which nature so often 
displays, and which makes the difference between health 
and disease. 
CHAPTER XVI 
THE RETARDED PERSONALITY 
MENTION has already been made of the difficulty in 
estimating the stages of evolutionary development lead- 
ing up to the emergence of consciousness, with the de- 
velopment of complete cortical function. In the normal 
child, the stages are passed through so quickly, and at 
a time when so little corroboration can be obtained from 
the object of our study, that little help can be got in 
establishing a clear picture of the process. In the retarded 
personality, however, it is possible to obtain a little more 
indication. In this case, mental growth takes place to a 
certain point and then stops, as the development of the 
cortex is arrested, so that some sort of picture is presented, 
which may be 'studied at leisure. Even so, however, the 
problem is not so simple as it might at first sight appear, 
since cortical function is so complex that the retardation 
is not necessarily universal in its incidence ; as, for ex- 
ample, in those cases referred to in Chapter XIV, in 
whom intellectual development and control is good, but 
the control of the affective reactions is deficient. Further 
bodily development, so far as it comprises structures out- 
side the central nervous system, may proceed normally, 
and we have already seen the effect of bodily, and especi- 
ally endocrine activity on mental process. Hence it is 
obvious that we must not regard the mental reactions of 
a cortex which has stopped development at the stage of 
a child of five, when it is under the influence of adult 
thyroid and sex gland function, as identical with the normal 
condition of a child of this age, when the cortical function 
should be under the influence of thymus and juvenile 
thyroid function. 
Necessarily, retardation òf personality implies some 
degree of mental deficiency, but for the purposes of the 
present discussion it is not desirable to regard the retarded 
personality and the mental deficient as exactly synony- 
m 
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mous terms, otherwise some confusion might ensue. 
Tredgold 1 has classified mentally deficient children into 
two groups, of Primary Amentia and Secondary Amentia. 
The first, which comprises eighty per cent. of such cases, 
are the true retarded personalities, whose deficiency is due 
to some inherent defect, as a result of which full develop- 
ment of the personality is impossible. The second group 
comprises those who are defective as the result of in- 
flammatory or degenerative processes, due to external 
causes. With these it is not proposed to deal at all, as 
the incidence of defect is liable to be much more com- 
plicated and irregular. 
In order to establish the fact that there is some degree 
of retardation of the personality, it is necessary to have a 
standard whereby a normal may be established. Such a 
standard is not easy to come by, for it is abundantly clear 
that there must be great differences between personalities, 
and that while one may excel in one direction, he may 
lamentably fail in another. Spearman' and his followers 
have attempted to establish the existence of general 
intelligence factors which may be determined for any 
individual and compared with those of his neighbour, but 
their results have not been altogether convincing, and there 
are many who doubt the utility of estimating any such 
factor. However, some such standardization has been 
made possible by the work of Binet,3 Simon, Terman,` 
Yerkes and others, who have elaborated a scale of tests 
whereby the mental age of any individual may be deter- 
mined. By the term mental age is meant that the 
child tested reaches a standard commensurate with the 
general mental capacity of a normal child of such and such 
an age. Thus, a child of sixteen may only be able to 
respond accurately to tests suitable to a normal child of 
ten. We express this by saying that the child of actual 
age sixteen, has a mental age of ten. These tests are 
formulated with the idea of estimating the general inherent 
mental capacity, rather than the store of acquired know- 
ledge. The acquisition of knowledge is quite a different 
thing from the power of application. This is shown very 
clearly in the case of certain Orientals. For example, in 
medical examinations it is frequently found that these 
people can do wonderfully well in the written papers, 
where they have an opportunity of presenting their ac- 
quired knowledge. When, however, they are taken to 
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the wards and put before the case of a disease which 
they have discussed with the greatest glibness in the 
written papers, they are utterly at a loss and cannot 
apply their knowledge to practical issues. This practical 
application and ability to adapt to new requirements is 
essential to successful work in any sphere of life, hence 
it is clear that the tests must be directed to estimate these 
latter factors, and not mere general knowledge, if we are 
to assess the intellectual capacity of the subject. On 
these criteria, Terman stated that the mental age of twenty, 
is the upper limit of intelligence, and that the average in- 
telligence corresponds to the mental age sixteen. The 
wholesale tests carried out on the American army showed, 
however, that there are many people who do not reach 
the mental age of sixteen, but who are reasonably suc- 
cessful in adapting themselves to life ; and it is usual 
to regard as definitely retarded, only those below the 
mental age of twelve. This is found to be the limit, 
below which it is impossible for the individual to maintain 
himself in the world and carry on his existence as an 
independent person, at a reasonable standard. It is the 
high grade mentally deficient mother who makes the slum 
out of even decent houses, and if we are to remove slums, 
we must provide better opportunities in the shape of 
enough houses first ; but, unless we can improve the 
general mental capacity of the lower strata of society, our 
housing schemes will be largely unavailing. 
At the lowest levels are those who, as James says, are 
nonplussed by all but the very simplest situations. These 
may never be capable of walking, talking or controlling 
their functions : and such cases who fall below the standard 
expected of the normal child of two are technically termed 
idiots. Those whose mental age is between three and 
seven are termed imbeciles, and in America those between 
seven and eleven are termed morons, a useful term which 
is finding considerable acceptance in this country. Ac- 
cording to the English Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 : 
An Idiot is a person so deeply defective in mind as 
to be unable to guard himself against common physical 
dangers. 
An Imbecile is a person in whose case there exists a 
mental 'defectiveness not amounting to idiocy : yet it is 
so pronounced that he is incapable of managing or being 
taught to manage himself or his affairs. 
s 
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A Feeble- minded person is one in whom the mental 
defectiveness is so pronounced that he requires care, 
supervision and control, for his own protection or that of 
others ; or, in the case of a child, that he, by reason of such 
defectiveness, appears to be permanently incapable of 
receiving proper benefit from the instruction in ordinary 
schools. 
The classification of retarded personalities is not an 
altogether simple matter, and in certain respects, the 
above -mentioned tests are misleading. In any given test, 
the achievement of the child may fall far short of his 
capacity, and in testing a suspected defective, consideration 
should always be given to various factors. Firstly, the 
child should be physically well, for apart from the malaise 
induced by physical disease, the sensations of discomfort, 
derived from the enteroceptors in the various organs 
absorb a considerable proportion of the child's attention 
and, if full attention cannot be given to the tests he 
cannot acquit himself as he should. Similarly, the test 
should be undertaken in a quiet place, free from outer 
distractions, so that the attention be not absorbed by 
extraneous sensations received through the exteroceptors. 
Thirdly, the full confidence of the child should be obtained, 
for nervousness and shyness will prevent his answering iii 
accordance with his real capacity. Fourthly, if, as the 
result of the test, he fails to reach his proper age standard, 
care must be exercised to discover whether this apparent 
deficiency is due to a true general retardation, or to some 
repression and instability, such as is described in relation 
to the neurotic personality. Fifthly, one examination of 
a child does not determine the degree of deficiency, for 
retardation is by no means a sudden process, and there is 
generally a more or less gradual slowing down of normal 
development. Thus, a child may be apparently normal 
up to the age of five, then gradually fall behind his 
contemporaries, until he comes to a complete stop at the 
mental age of ten. To estimate this gradual retardation, 
it is clear that at least two tests, and preferably a series of 
tests spread over a period of time, are necessary. 
Retardation of personality is associated and commen- 
surate with a failure of complete development of the 
central nervous system, and especially of the cortex. 
However, even low grade imbeciles and idiots may present 
a brain, which in naked eye appearances differs little from 
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that of the normal man. It is in the microscopic characters, 
and possibly in the biochemical composition of the cells 
and synapses, that marked changes are to be met with, 
and these defects show special incidence on the frontal 
region, and in the parietal association areas -the latest 
evolutionary developments. The characteristic differences 
of behaviour and capacity in the retarded personality: corre- 
spond largely to the failure of proper functions which are 
associated with complete cortical development, namely 
integration, control, discrimination and localization. Even 
in the realm of motor activity these failures of control and 
integration are frequently noticeable, for many defectives 
exhibit purposeless involuntary movements of the limbs, 
and facial grimaces which are characteristic of uncontrolled 
subcortical motor activity. Such movements are more or 
less normal in the young infant, in whom the full control 
of the motor cortex has not yet been established ; and 
indeed, it is only gradually and at different intervals, 
that the full control of the various functions is arrived at. 
The development of this control can be studied in the 
growing child, but there is such constant development and 
change that the study is one of great difficulty ; but the 
static condition of the retarded personality gives us a 
series of pictures which may be compared to the slow 
motion pictures in the cinematograph, allowing us to study 
complicated movements in greater detail. 
Since we are dealing with personality as met with in the 
so- called normal, the lower forms of mental defect, such as 
idiocy and imbecility, have much less interest for us as 
a whole. Yet they do illustrate arrests at levels which 
represent infantile behaviour. The idiot often . shows 
marked sensory defects, deafness and blindness being not 
uncommon accompaniments. Skin anæsthesias are also 
relatively common, some idiots being able to tolerate 
transfixion of the skin with pins, without experiencing 
pain. Apart from the actual presence of the sensation, 
perception is markedly deficient or totally absent, the 
idiot sees but does not look, hears but does not listen, and 
feels touch and pain but does not refer them in space 
and time. 
The emotional dispositions are not developed, and 
the idiot does not rise much above the more complex 
reflexes, such as crying when hurt. There is no voluntary 
control, of the bladder and bowel, and these organs empty 
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reflexly. Similarly food is masticated and swallowed if 
placed in the mouth, but there is no effort to seek for food 
and if not fed, the idiot would starve. Like very young 
children, he often sleeps a great deal, but may be restless 
and fretful. 
The imbecile takes an intermediate position between 
the almost entirely reflex idiot, and the feeble- minded, 
about to be described, and reacts largely on the basis of 
his emotional dispositions. 
Among the feeble -minded we have illustrations of arrests 
at levels to which many so- called normals may sink under 
the influences of sickness, or other adversities, and from 
which some do not raise themselves very far. It is worth 
while, therefore, to survey briefly the nature of various 
mental functions in such cases. It will be remembered 
that the engraphic patterns in the nervous system are 
primarily inherent, that is definitely "set" at birth, so 
that specific stimuli are followed by specific actions. These 
may retain their primary arrangements more or less 
throughout life, or the " set " of the pattern is markedly 
modified by contact with the environment, and this contact 
establishes new combinations of neurones to form new 
patterns. These patterns of neu ones, when thrown into 
activity, have for their mental aspect various mental 
processes and patterns of behaviour. As would be ex- 
pected from the concept of retardation, the inherent 
patterns show little modification, but the feeble- minded 
are deficient in acquired modifications. This is because 
their nervous system is relatively poor in neurones, and 
is therefore incapable of responding to the innumerable 
fresh stimuli which crowd in upon the child after birth, 
and increase in number and variety with every month of 
life. At the same time, and for the same reason, the 
modes of action are restricted, and so activity in these 
people tends to be stereotyped and lacking in agility and 
adaptation. The moron's greatest difficulty is in meeting 
new situations, and while the same task may be performed 
over and over again, so long as there is no change in the 
circumstances, yet, if a new situation arises, no new adapta- 
tion follows. Similarly with speech, a few stock phrases 
suffice for most purposes, and there is no possibility of 
adorning a tale, or explaining a situation, by a varied flow 
of language. It is a well - known fact that the feeble- 
minded sometimes have an amazingly retentive memory, 
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so that they can reproduce whole pages by rote. Varen- 
donck 5 has distinguished between what he calls redupli- 
cative memory and synthetical memory. By the first 
he means a recall of a series of associated ideas and 
sensations, in their exact chronological and spatial order, 
without discrimination or selection. By the latter he 
means the selective recall of certain significant units out 
of a series of associations, from which arises perception 
and the attachment of meaning. The feeble- minded excel 
in the former type of memory, and Varendonck has shown 
how this reduplicative memory may be quite independent 
of consciousness. It would appear that this type of 
memory depends on a series of stimuli producing an 
engraphic effect on a comparatively simple series of 
neurones, without that widespread activation which in- 
volves the cortical function of discrimination and selection. 
The reactivation of the engram resulting from stimuli, is 
therefore followed by an exact reproduction, which is so 
characteristic of the more feeble -minded even in ordinary 
life, as, for example, two garrulous old women gossiping 
on their door -step. 
This also explains why interruption by an ill -timed 
question in the middle of the discourse, often necessitates 
recommencement from the beginning. For there is no 
power of discrimination, and very often, little appreciation 
of the meaning of what is being said. Persons of low 
grade intelligence frequently find employment as guides 
in historic buildings, and reel off again and again, to 
successive parties, long discourses involving a wealth of 
historical detail, with appropriate dates and names. This 
sometimes gives the impression of deep erudition, until the 
guide is asked intelligent questions, when he gazes with 
blank amazement at his interlocutor, and is unable to 
appreciate even what the question means. 
Similarly, when we study the powers of association in 
the feeble- minded, we find that they have considerable 
facility for association by contiguity, when a series of 
stimuli directly impress a series of neurone patterns so as 
to form a simple engram. Association by similarity how- 
ever, is poor, for in such cases a much wider range of 
experience is required, with the consequent great complica- 
tion of the engrams. A further light on this is to be 
found with reference to the " Gestalt " theory. Perception 
is not merely a summation of sensations associated with 
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images, but is a new emergent, or, as the Gestalt theory 
would express it, a structural totality, which must exist 
before meaning can arise and consciousness of the object 
exist. Köhler,6 in his experiments on the anthropoid, has 
shown that apes are capable of experiencing such totalities, 
but that these are relatively limited and simple. Similarly, 
the feeble- minded can only experience limited and simple 
" Gestalten." As a result of the limitation of these higher 
emergents, their perceptions are limited, and, owing to 
dearth of material, their power of discriminatil - and com- 
paring is poor. It follows, therefore, that associations by 
similarity are deficient, for the simplicity of the "Gestalten" 
is in accordance with association by contiguity. This 
brings us back to our starting point, that the higher cortical 
function is deficient. 
For the same reason, the power of integrating and 
organizing the various perceptions is lacking, and so, no 
well organized complex engrams easily emerge. On the 
contrary, a series of simple disconnected engrams are con- 
stantly being activated, with the result that the controlled 
organized activation which involves attention is not 
attained easily. Hence, the feeble- minded are found to 
have difficulty in fixing and holding their attention on one 
definite object ; they flit from one thing to another, as 
activation passes from one engram to another. This 
deficiency in the more comprehensive structural patterns, 
and in the power of fixing attention, necessarily results 
in difficulty of smooth adaptation to new surroundings 
or events. For, in order to achieve this smooth adapta- 
tion, a definite connexion between the events must be 
appreciated. 
Failure of adaptation applies equally to the physical 
and mental processes, so that just as retarded persons 
cannot adapt their bodily movements to new occupations, 
so they cannot adapt their minds to new situations. They 
show, therefore, a marked deficiency in the power of creative 
imagination. By this is meant, the power of perceiving 
new relationships, so that a new mental emergent results. 
They cannot invent or improvise. Since wit and humour 
depend, to a large extent, on creative imagination, their 
attempts at humour are of the silliest type, and their 
appreciation of it is of the most crude and elementary 
description. 
On the affective side of mental life, the moron experi- 
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ences the primary emotions in the normal way ; indeed, in 
view of the general want of control, he may react more 
violently than does the normal person. This may easily 
be seen in the case of fear or anger. He is specially prone 
to panics and rages. At the same time, there is a want 
of discrimination and modification both of stimuli and 
reactions. Thus, in the case of fear, any danger, whether 
remote or imminent, is likely to produce much the same 
degree of emotional reaction, and there is little power of 
learning by experience to neglect certain stimuli which 
appear frightening but are in reality harmless ; or con- 
versely, to avoid stimuli which appear harmless but are 
in reality noxious. Similarly with the reaction to the 
stimulus. The normal person learns to adopt a reaction 
which is most suitable to the particular stimulus pattern 
of the moment. The feeble -minded will not modify his 
reaction, but always tends to follow the same behaviour. 
For example, a boy of low intelligence had been in the 
habit of hiding his head in response to noises which 
frightened him. In coúrse of time he was enlisted, and 
had to go to the war. One day, he was in a building 
which was struck by a shell. After the confusion had 
subsided, he his in the bread sack ! 
The same habitual reaction was to him the right one, 
whatever the danger. The organization of these primitive 
simple emotions into the more complex emotional re- 
actions is always poor and the defective never experiences 
the more complex emotions such as awe or reverence. 
McDougall 7 has described awe as an integration of fear, 
self -abasement and curiosity ; and it is certainly the case 
that the feeble- minded child does not develop awe for any- 
thing. Yet, he is certainly not without the three primary 
emotions which comprise it. Nor are these entirely with- 
out integration. For example, in one case who came 
under observation because she got into difficulties, it was 
found that the abnormal behaviour depended very largely 
on the three above -mentioned primary emotions. In her 
case, her attitude towards events was a sort of sly approach, 
which cannot be expressed by any one term. This involved 
a certain integration of fear, curiosity and self -abasement. 
The emergent, however, was of a decidedly lower quality 
than awe, because the relatedness was different, and of a 
less high order. For the same reason, and to a greater 
degree, the feeble- minded are deficient in the highly organ- 
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ized sentiments, and except for routine habitual action, are 
never able to stick at one thing long if it involves any 
effort of adaptation. For example, they may love, but 
there is little discrimination in their love, and they either 
love every one, or hate every one ; nor is the love par- 
ticularly selfless, but depends rather on benefits received. 
It is in wisely directed habit formation that the 
salvation of the retarded personality lies, for habit involves 
simple neurone patterns. It must be remembered, how- 
ever, that, as James 8 points out, habits are of two kinds. 
The impulsive habit is a direct expression of an unimpeded 
impulse, such as that cited above of the boy who always 
hid his head at the threat of danger. As these are not as 
a rule adapted to the requirements of varying circum- 
stances, and are usually egocentric, they are almost always 
bad habits. The moron is very liable to such habits, 
owing to the lack of discrimination and control which 
characterizes all his behaviour, and in training these people 
such habit formation has to be avoided most carefully. 
The so- called voluntary habit is, however, a different 
matter, and consists of a mode of behaviour which has 
been founded on foresight and discrimination. Although 
the feeble- minded is incapable of exercising that foresight 
and discrimination for himself, there is no reason why 
others should not do it for him ; and indeed, these habits 
are easily established. It stands to reason that the 
foresight may be directed towards evil ends as well as 
good ; and that is why it is so important to protect the 
retarded personality from those who would use him for 
their own purposes. 
It is unnecessary to elaborate the fact that the feeble- 
minded is incapable of the higher intellectual processes of 
judgment and reasoning, since these require the dis- 
crimination between well -organized patterns, in which he 
is conspicuously lacking. Similarly, he is always weak 
willed. Voluntary action involves decision between two 
opposing possibilities. This decision depends on a rapid 
and concise organization of all the stimuli, both exterocep- 
tive and proprioceptive, pertaining to one possibility, with 
the images involving previous related experiences, so that 
this " outweighs " the other possibility, and appropriate 
muscular activation ensues accordingly. Such prompt and 
definite integration is impossible for the moron, so that he 
is vacillating and uncertain, constantly pulled this way and 
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that, as one ill- organized pattern momentarily gains 
ascendancy. 
Such are the reactions of the retarded personality, an 
all too familiar member of our community. Call to mind 
Millet's picture of the " Man with the Hoe," and Mark - 
ham's words : 
" Bowed by the weight of centuries he leans, 
Upon his hoe, and gazes on the ground, 
The emptiness of ages in his face 
And on his back, the burden of the world. 
Who made him dead to rapture and despair, 
A thing that grieves not and that never hopes, 
Stolid and stunned, a brother to the ox? 
Who loosened and let down that brutal jaw ? " 
For our purpose of understanding personality, the 
study of the feeble- minded affords us several data. As 
has been said, we can study in a more or less static form 
various phases in the development of the normal adult. 
We can appreciate what is the result from the psychical 
aspect of a failure of complete development of brain 
structure. We can recognize how the consequent failure 
of psychical elaboration and integration determines and 
restricts behaviour. Finally, we can realize how this 
limitation in potential reaction with the environment 
impoverishes the total personality. 
CHAPTER XVII 
THE SPIRITUAL ASPECT OF PERSONALITY 
MANY people regard the physiological approach to the 
study of Personality with distaste, because to them it 
seems that it is entirely materialistic, and forbids any 
looking forward or any purpose in life. It would seem 
quite certain that some sort of spiritual outlook is essen- 
tially a human characteristic, and is inevitable, once self - 
consciousness and reflective thought have emerged as new 
entities in the march of evolution. Moreover, some sort 
of philosophy of life is absolutely necessary, if the person- 
ality is to be properly organized and enabled to get 
through life. One of the most characteristic features of 
the maladapted neurotic is that he is not provided, in 
many cases, with an adequate philosophy of life. The 
phrase philosophy of life is used in preference to religion, 
because a religion may be professed by certain people, 
without their acquiring thereby any adequate working 
scheme to afford them an explanation of their true 
relationship with the environment and with the universe 
as a whole. This is not to say that religion in its various 
forms does not serve many personalities as a perfectly 
adequate, and indeed, for them, the only possible phil- 
osophy. The purpose of this chapter must be therefore to 
inquire whether the personality, as sketched out, can have 
a spiritual aspect, and whether, from a psycho -physical 
standpoint, an adequate philosophy of life is conceivable. 
It must be understood that such a function of the persona- 
lity is only possible at the highest level of evolution so 
far reached. Clearly, one of the chief functions which 
characterizes advance in mental power, is that of distin- 
guishing the self from the environment. The development 
of this function can be observed in the young infant, who, 
at first, has no consciousness beyond the satisfaction of his 
various organic needs, and cannot distinguish his hands or 
feet from the objects around him. However, he gradually 
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learns, as the result of his early experiences, that cértain 
objects which he sees and feels are part of himself. From 
this gradually grows the realization that his own ego, both 
in respect of body and mind, is distinct from other egos 
and from the universe around him. Some have declared 
that this consciousness of self is a characteristic of human 
mentality ; but, so far as self -consciousness in relation to 
the various parts of the body is concerned, it is possible to 
observe the development of this function in animals. The 
kitten does not realize for some time that its tail is part of 
itself, just as the infant is not aware of his relation to his 
own toe ; yet the lesson is eventually learnt by both. 
It is obvious that this development of awareness of self 
as an individual is an early event in the history of man- 
kind, and one which has gone on developing through the 
ages. This resulted in a differentiation between the ego 
and the environment, and yet it was necessary to postulate 
some sort of connexion or intermediary. Thus arose the 
concept of the soul. Inevitably, at that stage of intel- 
lectual development when abstract thought was im- 
possible, this concept was materialistic. If the self could 
recognize the hand as part of itself, then there must be 
two selves, independent of each other, and indistinguishable 
from each other, and so the differentiation arose between 
the self as knower and the self as known. This distinction 
gradually developed into an antagonism between soul and 
body, which was the basis of much religious controversy. 
What was this soul, this alter ego, was the question which 
occupied every one of the earlier thinkers. In early times 
it was envisaged as a shade, which interpenetrated the 
substance of the body, and which, when the body decayed, 
lived on in some other world. Professor Tylor 1 quotes a 
definition held by our ancestors as follows : " It is a thin 
unsubstantial human image, in its nature a sort of vapour, 
film or shadow, the cause of life and thought in the in- 
dividual it animates ; independently possessing the per- 
sonal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, 
past or present ; capable of leaving the body far behind, 
to flash swiftly from place to place ; mostly impalpable 
and invisible, yet also manifesting physical power, and 
especially appearing to men, waking or asleep, as a 
phantasm, separate from the body, of which it bears the 
likeness,: continuing to exist and appear to man after the 
death of that body, able to enter into, possess and act in 
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the bodies of other men, of animals, and even of things." 
Such was the conception of those who could not think, 
except in terms of matter -matter which might be very 
tenuous and vague, but which had a definite substance as 
well as being. 
And so the concept grew, fostered by the overwhelming 
impulse of self -expression and self -exaltation. The normal 
human being was naturally dissatisfied with the limitations 
and failures of this life, and demanded a better chance in 
another existence. So, he argued, it must be true that 
his soul lived on after him. A recent expression of this 
wish for immortality -the father of the thought -was that 
of a distinguished professor who considered that this belief 
was eminently satisfactory, because those who held it, 
could later meet the sceptics, and point out to them their 
errors ; whereas, if survival was not true, there was no 
chance of a sceptic exulting over the credulous folly of 
the believer. Thus, the efforts of the later philosophers 
were mainly directed towards explaining the nature of 
the soul in such a way as to make its already accepted 
quality of immortality acceptable. This conception is 
modified in its turn by the envy, hatred, and malice felt 
towards the other members of the community. It was all 
very well for one's own soul to go on developing from 
height to height and to enjoy the fruits of Paradise, but 
surely such joys cannot be allowed to the man who 
robbed one's orchard or killed one's cow ! Thus came the 
trials and punishments of after life. With the greater 
development of self -consciousness came the origin of the 
ego ideal, and with it, the realization that this was not 
reached. So there developed self -criticism which, under 
the influence of the early fear of the Gods, resulted in the 
application of future punishment to the self. Such ideas 
in relation to the soul were fostered by the teachings of 
the priests, who thereby achieved power over their neigh- 
bours and gain to themselves. 
The concept of the vaguely material interpenetrating 
shade worked well, so long as the structure of the body 
was a matter of conjecture, but when anatomy became a 
relatively popular science, this did not fit in with the newly 
observed facts. From this a tendency arose to provide 
the soul with a more definite structure. Hence came the 
effort to find the site of the soul. Driven from pillar to 
post, from heart to liver, from liver to brain, the unfortunate 
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homunculus found rest for a time in the pineal -gland, 
which was supposed to be the centre of the brain and the 
point to which all afferent impulses came, and from which 
all efferent impulses flowed. But even this last refuge was 
denied, and the only conclusion that could be entertained 
by the materialistic anatomist was, that the soul is non - 
existant, that immortality is a myth, and that there is 
nothing but the body. This body is composed of a collec- 
tion of cells which eventually decompose, when, except for 
the energy liberated by the said decomposition, everything 
connected with the individual is lost to the universe. But 
in this analytic effort to find the soul, man was failing to 
see the wood for trees. As was so often the case, in this 
phase of the progress of knowledge man turned his whole 
attention to analysis and failed to understand the synthesis. 
In the effort to dispense with the soul, the strict materialist 
was depriving the majority of mankind of a necessity of 
life. 
Naturally, the Church has always attempted to insist on 
the existence of a soul, as it is an essential feature of its 
teaching and its power. As usually expressed,however, even 
this conception is definitely materialistic, and the majority 
of people do not make much attempt to avoid Deification 
of the spiritual side of the personality, since all thinking 
tends to be in terms of objective things, except in the 
extreme introvert type. In the Middle Ages the concept 
was wholly materialistic, as witness the saying of St. Jerome: 
" If the dead be not raised with flesh and bones, how can 
the damned after judgment gnash their teeth in hell?" 
This is not to say that the Church is not perfectly justified 
in this teaching, for it must teach in the language that its 
disciples understand, but if thinking is to be really clarified, 
we must get rid of the material dress of true immaterial 
spiritualities. 
With the existence of a soul, and its adventures after 
the death of the body, we have no direct concern, but this 
question of the philosophy of life and the immaterial aspect 
of personality is of some moment. If a spiritual relation- 
ship is sought, then it is clear that the physical aspects of 
our study need not concern us, and it is to the psychical 
aspect that we must direct our attention. It has been 
said that the study of personality is not complete unless 
the relationship of the whole with the environment has 
been taken into account, and it is in this relationship, 
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looked at from the psychical aspect, that the spiritual sig- 
nificance of the personality lies. A person's cognition and 
affection are largely individual matters, but the influence 
he exerts outside himself is brought about by conation. 
Moreover, the tendency in modern psychology is to regard 
conation as the significant part of mental processes. In 
considering this conation or behaviour, it must be realized 
that the personality finds touch with his environment, in 
virtue of his organization as a whole. To put it in another 
way, the individual reacts with his environment by his be- 
haviour all through life. The various patterns of behaviour 
throughout the life of an individual are not a mere con- 
glomeration, but emerge, as a definite unified entity. This 
emergence, like every other emergence, depends on, and 
involves its component parts. Moreover, all the factors 
which have been successively studied as components of 
personality, modify and are essential to the total organized 
pattern of behaviour. 
Let us recapitulate. A man's behaviour certainly 
depends on, and is modified by the organization of his 
bodily function. Disease and injury alter the whole aspect 
of a man's relation to his environment. Inherent under- 
development or over -development of any given organ, or 
part of the body, makes a difference to his reactions. This 
is specially the case with the nervous system. The late 
war has shown us how utterly different men are, before and 
after a head wound ; indeed, if this is at all severe, the 
character is entirely changed, and can never resume its 
former nature. So behaviour is altered by the tempera- 
mental factor, especially in relation to the endocrine glands. 
The change in the individual who suffers from under or 
over function of the thyroid has been described already. 
Similarly, the cessation of function of the sex glands pro- 
duce such marked modifications that it is referred to in 
popular speech as the change of life. The organization 
of mental function makes still more difference to this 
emergent. The proportion of his inherent dispositions, 
the organization or want of organization, into sentiments 
and beliefs, the value of these sentiments and beliefs, play 
the most important parts. Similarly, the question as to 
how the mind is orientated in relation to the sex impulses 
or in accordance with the ego impulse, or the creative im- 
pulse, determines the individual's behaviour. The general 
pattern of autonomic tensions has also been seen to have 
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an influence. Again, in estimating this pattern of behaviour, 
we have to ask, Is the personality instable within itself, or 
towards 'the environment, is it dissociated or is it retarded ? 
And only when we have considered all these factors in 
themselves and in their special relatedness to each other, 
can we understand and estimate this new emergent, the 
complex pattern of behaviour. This pattern further must 
be considered as a whole in virtue of its organization, 
which alone gives its significance. Indeed, as Holt 2 has 
pointed out, it is only in virtue of its organization as a 
whole, and considered as a going concern, that anything 
has a significance. A printing - press is a meaningless 
collection of rollers and wheels, of nuts and screws, unless 
these are organized in relation to their general function. 
So, individual patterns of behaviour, selected at random, 
are of no significance, but the whole emergent pattern of 
behaviour is of enormous significance, and once treated as 
a whole, it becomes evident that no one part can, or ought 
to be, considered by itself, since every part is interdepen- 
dent and only -has a significant meaning, when thought of 
in relation to the rest. 
This emergent pattern of behaviour is what the indi- 
viduality has achieved, and the impress made by him on 
the environment. This, which involves and depends on 
the whole material personality,. is itself immaterial ; it is 
a spiritual entity, but inseparable from a material entity, 
and is what may be described as the spiritual aspect of 
personality. This - impress on the environment is the 
function of the personality, and gives the personality its 
significance in the general scheme of the universe. With- 
out function, structure has little or no significance, once 
life has emerged. No doubt the structure of a crystal is 
its chief significance, but the structure of the heart, within 
the body, is of no significance compared with its function, 
yet the latter is of the most essential importance to the 
body. 
It remains to consider what is the exact significance 
of this spiritual emergent.- It is suggested that it has far 
more significance and importance than any other aspect 
of our subject. The materialistic bias of the last century 
has tended to confine the law of cause and effect to 
material influences, which can be appreciated by the 
senses. But it is quite clear that this view is too limited. 
The whole behaviour of -a- man has an enormous influence 
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on his environment, not only in the present, but in the 
future. The universe is not a rigid structure, but a fluid 
process, if such a term be allowed, exquisitely sensitive to 
every influence, however small its amplitude. Thus, the 
emergent pattern of behaviour of any individual does 
mould the whole of existence. This influence, in the 
case of man, is made of infinitely greater significance 
than that of the animals, by his highly organized power 
of discriminative action, by the manipulative capacity of 
his hands, by the power of reflective thought, and above 
everything, by language. Without these, the influence he 
exerts is infinitesimal. Even the tiger can only influence 
his mate, his offspring and his prey, but the least of men 
has a radius of action immeasurably greater. The almost 
limitless possibilities of such influence may be grasped 
when we consider such men as Homer, Aristotle, Plato, 
Cæsar, Leonardo, Shakespeare, Goethe, Napoleon and, to 
descend to lesser lights, William Hohenzollern. This 
immaterial aspect of personality, which is not only the 
essential and fundamentally important emergent for the 
present, extends on into the future, continuing as an 
active, living influence, according to the greatness or little- 
ness, the significance or insignificance of its organization. 
Nor is it possible, as has been said before, to detach units 
from this emergent entity. For example, it might be said, 
that we may take a play of Shakespeare, and admit that 
Hamlet survives and goes on exerting its influence down 
the ages ; but without the whole personality of Shake- 
speare, Hamlet could not have been. Hamlet involved 
and depended on Shakespeare's bodily organization, his 
endocrine glands, his mental organization and the rest, and 
it is Shakespeare and not Hamlet that lives, that gives us 
pleasure and pain, modifies and rearranges our thoughts, 
and even may influence our daily actions. 
Our next question must be, what relation has our spiritual 
personality, or our emergent pattern of behaviour, to our 
philosophy of life ? In our study of the scheme on which 
personality is evolved we postulated an intervenient deity, as 
well as the quality of deity, to which end evolution proceeds. 
The quality of deity involves an emergent of the widest 
radius of activity which it is possible to conceive, so that the 
highest degree of harmony may exist in the universe. In 
this way we may expect that the lower selfish impulses, 
which limit man's altruistic behaviour, will all be sublimated 
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on to the highest level of beauty, goodness and truth. 
Further, we may expect and hope, that this is the goal to 
which humanity is proceeding. By intervenient deity, we 
mean that this process of evolution is not going on in a 
purely haphazard way, without guidance or direction, but 
that all through the process, every component part is 
subject to a definite law, according to which evolution 
proceeds. Whether we are content to think of this law as 
an abstract conception, or whether we deify it, so that it 
becomes the command of a personal anthropomorphic 
God, or a more vague principle of nature, is of little 
importance, so long as we concede that humanity is 
progressing to a state of greater harmony, that is, of 
greatér beauty, truth and goodness, and that it is pro- 
ceeding thus according to definite laws, which we may 
strive to understand as best we may. 
The philosophy of life of the majority is, therefore, 
that so far as possible, our emergent pattern of behaviour 
should be organized so that it accords with the law of 
intervenient deity and aims at emergence of the quality of 
deity. The question may at this point be raised, can we 
ourselves do anything to so organize our spiritual person- 
ality at all? This involves the vexed question of "freedom 
of will which, as Lòcke said long ago " is not proper 
whether the will be free, but whether the man be free." 
For metaphysics, this may be of the greatest importance, 
but for psychology it is of much less moment. One point 
which generally confuses the issue must be ruled out at 
once. Freedom has no relation to responsibility. With 
the latter we are not concerned at all. Next, freedom, as 
Ward 8 has pointed out, may be external or internal. Man 
is essentially externally free, and indeed life itself, to a 
large extent, involves this external freedom. By this term 
is meant that the animal, by virtue of its organization, is 
no longer the sport of circumstances, as is the inanimate 
object, swept about by all that comes in contact with it, 
without power of response or choice. This choice is of 
course more objective than subjective. For instance, when 
a man takes a certain part, writes a book, or commits a 
crime, the observer says that he did this, though he 
might have done the opposite ; yet the man's behaviour 
depends on the pattern of stimuli presented to him, on the 
organization of his mental and bodily function, and the 
resultant pattern of behaviour. When Martin Luther 
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took his decision at the Diet of Worms, the observer and 
the historian think that he might have remained in the 
body of the church, and yet Luther himself said, " Ich 
kann nicht anders." Again, Luther might have recanted, 
like Galileo, but he didn't ; he was not built that way. In 
virtue of his organization, then, man is externally free : is 
he in any way internally free ? This is a more difficult 
question, and internal freedom involves a higher emerg- 
ence, that of reflective thought. It is certain that those 
animals whose bodily organization knows no higher level 
than the thalamencephalon or basal ganglia and whose 
behaviour is consequently on the level of pure instinct 
have no internal freedom. They are bound by their 
organization to perfectly definite and determined lines of 
conduct. In man, however, there has evolved a cortex, 
and with the cortex the function of discrimination, re- 
flective thought, and self -consciousness, all of which con- 
stitute what is known asconscience. As Ward says: 
"`It is true of Brutes that they 
Can like, but not distinguish too, 
Nor their own liking by reflection know.' 
But it is not true of man as a rational being. Raised to 
the trans -subjective standpoint, through intercourse with 
his fellows, he has within his reach the gift to see himself 
as others see him. He has in consequence, a standard 
by which to estimate even himself ; he can by taking 
thought, add to his mental, and still more to his moral 
stature; he may now have an ideal, and he can determine 
proprio motu to strive to realize it." It will be remembered, 
that even at the reflex level every pattern of behaviour 
served as a stimulus pattern which starts another cycle; 
and that, at the conscious level, this was so organized, 
that consciousness could never be truly regarded as static, 
but always as a process, each event in consciousness bend- 
ing back to the past and leaning forward to the future, 
as successive engrams became activated. With the advent 
of the power of discrimination, of reflective thought, and 
self -consciousness, this law becomes of enormous import- 
ance, and every thought and every action is a stimulus 
pattern, which inevitably moulds and changes character. 
In virtue of this organisation lies man's internal freedom 
which " is not only negative but positive, not mere free- 
dom from constraint, but freedom to initiate, to turn cir- 
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cumstances to account, even -thanks to the wog o rw that 
reason affords -so to deal with oneself." - So, it is possible 
for man to mould the spiritual aspect of his personality 
in accordance with the philosophy of life he has adopted, 
and thereby gain that organization of sentiment and belief 
with relation to the universe, which alone permits the 
personality to be efficient, complete and content. 
In virtue of this freedom, therefore, man has some 
power to mould and influence his emergent pattern of 
behaviour -his spiritual life, and therefore his responsi- 
bility to the future. It is in respect of this emergent 
pattern that he survives. It is in respect of this, that he 
helps or hinders God -the intervenient deity. It is in 
respect of this, that he approaches or recedes from the 
quality of deity -that he attains Godhead. It is this 
function of the synthesized complete personality that 
gives him significance. It is possible that here we may 
discover the secret of the soul, the secret of immortality, 
and the secret of communion with God. The answers to 
these riddles. may be found, not in the realm of structure, 
but in that of function. May it be that the soul is not 
a part of the structure of the body, as the ancients be- 
lieved, nor a function of that body, but the function of 
the total emergent personality which goes on exerting its 
influence through the ages, just in so far as its activities 
have altered the form of the universe. In some cases this 
influence is widespread, in others it is extremely local, 
but no one can live in the world without making some 
impression on the form of the universal whole. 
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his predecessors. In our judgment he has made a distinct advance in 
the study of laughter ; and his remarks on wit, humour, and comedy, 
are most discriminating. The writer's own vivacity of style suits his 
subject admirably." Journal of Education. 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC. By William Pole, F.R.S., 
Mus. Doc. Edited with an Introduction by Edward J. Dent 
and a Supplementary Essay by Dr Hamilton Hartridge. 
Second edition. to /6 net. 
" This is an excellent book and its re -issue should be welcomed by all 
who take more than a superficial interest in music. Especially should it 
appeal to those of a musical or scientific frame of mind who may have 
pondered upon the why and the how of things musical. Dr Pole possessed 
not only a wide knowledge of these matters, but also an attractive style, 
and this combination has enabled him to set forth clearly and sufficiently 
completely to give the general reader a fair all -round grasp of his 
subject. " -Discovery. 
INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY : its Theory and Practice. By 
Allred Adler. Translation by Dr Paul Radin. 
t8 /- net. 
" Dr Adler is the leader of one of the more important schisms from the 
original Freudian school. He makes a valuable contribution to psychology. 
His thesis is extremely simple and comprehensive : mental phenomena 
when correctly understood may be regarded as leading up to an end 
which consists in establishing the subject's superiority. " -Discovery. 
" Suggestive and stimulating. " -Morning Post. 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ' AS IF '. By Hans Vaihinger. 
Translated by C. K. Ogden. M.A. 
25/- net. 
" The most important contribution to philosophical literature in a 
quarter of a century. Briefly, Vaihinger amasses evidence to prove that 
reality and thought are out of key. Reason was never an instrument, 
he holds, for the understanding of life. We can arrive at theories which 
work pretty well by ' consciously false assumptions.' We know that 
these fictions in no way reflect reality, but we treat them as if they 
did. Among such fictions are : -the average man, freedom, God, empty 
space, point, matter, the atom, infinity, the absolute. All abstracts, 
classifications, comparisons, general ideas, are fictions. All the sciences 
and arts depend upon fictions. " -Spectator. 
THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE : a Biological 
Interpretation of Mind. By L. L. Thurstone, Professor of 
Psychology in the University of Chicago. 
to /6 net. 
" Prof. Thurstone distinguishes three views of the nature of intelligence 
He names the first Academic ; the second the Psycho- analytic ; the 
third the Behaviourist. Against these three views, though not in 
opposition to them, Prof. Thurstone expounds his thesis that conscious- 
ness is unfinished action. He contends that it is not inconsistent with 
any of the three views, while in a sense it interprets each of them. His 
book is of the first importance. All who make use of mental tests will do 
well to come to terms with his theory." -Times Literary Supplement. 
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THE GROWTH OF THE MIND : an Introdúction to Child 
Psychology. By Professor K. Koffka of the University of 
Giessen. Translated by Professor R. M. Ogden. 
Second edition. 55 /- net. 
His book is extremely interesting, and it is to be hoped that it will be 
widely read." -Times Literary Supplement. Leonard Woolf, reviewing this 
book and the following one in a Nation Leading Article, writes :. " Every 
serious ,student of psychology ought to read it [The Apes], and he should 
supplement it by reading The Growth of the Mind, for Professor Koffka 
joins up the results of Köhler's observations with the results of the study 
of child -psychology." 
THE MENTALITY OF APES, with an Appendix on the 
Psychology of Chimpanzees. By Professor W. Koehler, of 
Berlin University. 
With 9 plates and 59 figures, 16 /- net. 
" May fairly be said to mark a turning -point in the history of psychology. 
The book is both in substance and form an altogether admirable piece 
of work. It is of absorbing interest to the psychologist, and hardly less 
to the layman -especially the lover of animals. His work will always 
be regarded as a classic in its kind and a model for future studies." 
-Times Literary Supplement. 
TELEPATHY AND CLAIRVOYANCE. By Rudolf Tischner. 
Preface by E. J. Dingwall. 
With 20 illustrations, 10/6 net. 
" Such investigations may now expect to receive the grave attention of 
modern readers. They will find the material here collected of great value 
and interest. The chief interest of the book lies in the experiments it 
records, and we think that these will persuade any reader free from 
violent prepossessions that the present state of the evidence necessitates 
at least an open mind regarding their possibility." -Times Literary 
Supplement. 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS MYSTICISM. By 
Professor James H. Lettba, author of ' A Psychological Study 
of Religion,' etc. 
15 /- net. 
" The book is fascinating and stimulating even to those who do not agree 
with it, and it is scholarly as well as scientific. " - Review of Reviews. An 
extension and development of the views outlined in James's Varieties of 
Religious Experience with much new material. A section is devoted to 
mystical experiences produced by drugs. 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A MUSICAL PRODIGY. By 
G. Revesz, Director of the Psychological Laboratory, 
Amsterdam. 
With many musical illustrations, so /6 net. 
" For the first time we have a scientific report on the development of a 
musical genius. Instead of being dependent on the vaguely marvellous 
report of adoring relatives, we enter the more satisfying atmosphere of 
precise tests. That Erwin is a musical genius, nobody who reads this 
book will doubt.":-Times Literary Supplement. 
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THE PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM. By I. A. 
Richards, Lecturer at Magdalene College, Cambridge. 
to /6 net. 
" A mine of really suggestive ideas. It has real originality. " -Dail9 News. 
" An important contribution to the rehabilitation of English criticism - 
perhaps, because of its sustained scientific nature, the most important 
contribution yet made. Mr. Richards begins with an account of the 
present chaos of critical theories and follows with an analysis of the 
fallacy in modern aesthetics. The principles enunciated are pursued with 
clear zest and consequent elucidation. Parallel applications to the 
arts of painting, sculpture, and music form the subject of three chapters." 
-Criterion. 
THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE, 
with special reference to Man's Relation to Nature. By 
Edwin A. Burtt, Ph.D. 
14/- net. 
" This book deals with a profoundly interesting subject : - the uncritical 
assumptions which were made by the founders of modern physics, and 
through them became part of the unquestioned apparatus of ordinary 
thought. The critical portion of this book is admirable . 
Bertrand Russell, in Nation. " He has given us a history of the origin 
and development of what was, until recently, the metaphysic generally 
associated with the scientific outlook. This is what Professor Burtt 
has quite admirably done." -Times Literary Supplement. 
PHYSIQUE AND CHARACTER. By E. Kretschmer. 
Willi 31 plates,15 /- net. 
" This volume of the steadily growing Library will bear comparison 
with any of its predecessors in interest and importance. It gives 
scientific validity to much ancient doctrine and folk -psychology. It 
professes to be merely a beginning but, even so, the author has estab- 
lished certain conclusions beyond reasonable doubt, conclusions of great 
significance and pregnant with possibilities of almost infinite extension." 
-Weekly Westminster. " His notable work (on) the relation between 
human form and human character. " -British Medical Journal. 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION : Morbid and Normal. 
By John T. MacCurdy, M.D. 
25/- net. 
" There are two reasons in particular for welcoming this book. First, 
it is by a psychiatrist who takes general psychology seriously. Secondly, 
the author presents his evidence as well as his conclusions. This is 
listinctly a book which should be read by all interested in modern 
psychology. Its subject is important and its author's treatment inter- 
esting."-Manchester Guardian. " A record of painstaking and original 
work in a direction that promises to illuminate some of the fundamental 
problems of psychiatry. " -Lancet. 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. By Mary Sturt, M.A. 
7/6 net. 
An interesting book, typical of the work of the younger psychologists 
of to -day. The first chapter gives a clear summary of metaphysical 
views of time ; later chapters describe practical experiments ; while 
the last chapter sets forth the writer's view that time is a concept con- 
structed by each individual.. The clear, concise style of writing adds 
greatly to the pleasure of the. reader."-Journal of Education. 
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PROBLEMS OF PERSONALITY : a Volume of Essays in 
honour of Morton Prince. Edited by Dr. A. A. Roback. 
r8 /- net. 
" Here we have collected together samples of the Work of a great many 
of the leading thinkers on the, subjects which may be expected to throw 
light-on the problem of Personality. Some such survey is always a tre- 
mendous help in the study of any subject. Taken all together, the 
.book is full of interest. " -New Statesman. Contributors include 
G. Elliot Smith, Bernard Hart, Ernest Jones, C. S. Myers, C. G. Jung, 
Pierre Janet, W. McDougall, William Brown, T. W. Mitchell, and 
numerous others. 
THE MIND AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE. $y C. D. Broad, 
Litt. D., Lecturer in Philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge. 
i6/- net. 
After a discussion of the apparent differences bet een living and non- 
living matter, the author discusses the traditional views of Mechanism 
and Vitalism and the Relation of Mind and Body ; then the sources of 
our knowledge of Matter and of our own and other Minds ; Mnemic 
Phenomena and the " Unconscious" ; arguments for and against 
human survival of bodily death ; and in conclusion the internal unity 
of the Mind and its position iii Nature. 
COLOUR- BLINDNESS with a Comparison of different Methods 
of Testing Colour- Vision By . Mary Collins, M.A., Ph. D. 
Introduction by Dr James Dreyer. 
With a coloured plate, 12 /6 net. 
" Her book is worthy of high praise as a painstaking, honest, well - 
written endeavour, based upon extensive reading and close, original 
investigation, to deal with colour vision, mainly from the point of view 
of the psychologist. We believe that the book will commend itself to 
every one interested in the subject." -Times Literary Supplement. 
THE HISTORY OF MATERIALISM. By F. A. Lange. 
New edition in one volume, with an introduction by 
Bertrand Russell; F.R.S. 
15/- net. 
" An immense and valuable work. " -Spectator. "A monumental work, 
of the highest value to all who wish to know what has been said by 
advocates of Materialism, and why philosophers have in the main 
remained unconvinced, Lange, while very sympathetic to materialism 
in its struggles with older systems, was himself by no means a materialist. 
His book is divided into two parts, one dealing with the times before 
Kant, the other with Kant and his successors. " -From the introduction. 
PSYCHE : the Cult of Souls and the Belief in Immortality 
among the Greeks. By Erwin Rohde. 
25/- net. 
This standard work, long esteemed by scholars, philologists, philosophers 
and all interested in the history of religion or mysticism, is at last made 
available to the English- speaking public. Part One deals with Beliefs 
about the Soul (Homeric Poems, Islands of the Blest, Cave Deities, 
Heroes, Eleusinian Mysteries, the Future Life, etc.) ; Part Two with 
The Belief in Immortality (Dionysiac Religion, The Orphics, The 
Philosophers, The Poets, Plato, etc.). 
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READY SHORTLY 
EMOTION AND INSANITY. By S. Thalbilzer, Chief of the 
Medical Staff, Copenhagen Asylum. Preface by Professor 
H. Htiding. 
About 7/6 net. 
" In two respects in particular the author has, I feel, made important 
contributions .to psychology. He shows that manic -depressive psychosis 
contains every kind of feeling, even the most complicated. Secondly, 
there is his description and analysis of ` mixed forms ', of those mental 
states in which different feeling -elements are in operation simultaneously 
and with opposite effects." -From the Pre /ace. 
PERSONALITY. By R. G. Gordon, M.D. 
About 12 /6 net. 
An examination of personality from the standpoint of the practising 
physician who, it is now recognized, must treat each patient as an 
individual case, and as a composite whole of mind and body. Chapters 
include Body and Mind, Principle of Emergence, Bodily Function, 
Temperamental Factor, Mental Function, Variations in Personality, 
Contribution of Freud, of Jung, of Adler, of Kempf, the Neurotic, the 
Delinquent, Dissociated Personality, Retarded Personality, and Spiritual 
Aspect: 
BIOLOGICAL MEMORY. By Eugenio Rignano, Professor of 
Philosophy in the University of Padua. Translated, with an 
Introduction, by Professor E. W. MdcBride, F.R.S. 
About to /6 net. 
" We regard his theory as an astoundingly successful effort to analyze 
vital phenomena. It may be divided into two parts, biological and 
psychological. We cannot refrain from remarking that we consider 
Professor Rignano's analysis of mental functions extraordinarily 
interesting and suggestive. In the - biological portion he discovers the 
.essential difference between living and non -living things to be that 
dead matter does not remember." -From the Introduction. 
COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY. By P. Masson- Oursel. 
Introduction by F. G. Crookshank, M.D., F.R.C.P. 
About 8/6 vet. 
" IIe has undoubtedly succeeded in writing a book that cannot fail 
to excite interest, to attract attention, and to provoke discussion. 
This study appears to present us with a method of investigation, a mode 
of thought, that may well become useful, if not indispensable, to those 
who would pursue - Science."-From the Introduction. 
EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY ; its Problems and-Methods. 
By Charles Fox, M.A., Lecturer on Education in the Uni- 
versity of Cambridge. 
About to /6 net. 
A consideration of the contribution made by experimental psychology 
to the study of educational problems during the last quarter of a century. 
Chapters include Mental Development, Vision and Hearing, Observation, 
Mental Imagery, Habit Formation, Memory, Training, Suggestion, 
Psycho -Analysis, Aesthetic Appreciation, Mental Tests, Mental Fatigue. 
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IN PREPARATION 
THE LAWS OF FEELING by F. PAULHAN 
CONVERSION . by S. DE SANCTIS 
THOUGHT AND THE BRAIN by H. PIERON 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WHOLE . by K. KOFFKA 
LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT IN THE CHILD by J. PIAGET 
PSYCHOLOGY OF KINSHIP . by B. MALINOWSKI, D.Sc. 
REPRESSION IN SAVAGE SOCIETIES by B. MALINOWSKI, D.Sc. 
THE ANALYSIS OF MATTER by BERTRAND RUSSELL, F.R.S. 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS by F. P. RAMSEY 
PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY by W. H. R. RIVERS, F.R.S. 
SOCIAL LIFE IN THE ANIMAL WORLD . by F. ALVERDES 
EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION IN BIRDS . by F. B. KIRKMAN 
STATISTICAL METHOD IN ECONOMICS . by P. S. FLORENCE 
THE PRIMITIVE MIND by P. RADIN, Ph.D. 
COLOUR -HARMONY .. by JAMES WOOD 
THE THEORY OF HEARING . . by H. HARTRIDGE, D.Sc. 
SUPERNORMAL PHYSICAL PHENOMENA by E. J. DINGWALL 
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY . by J. VON UEXKULL 
INTEGRATIVE ACTION OF THE MIND by E. MILLER, M.D. 
PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE by F. M. CORNFORD 
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY by Wm. BROWN, M.D.,D.Sc. 
THEORY OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS by F. G. CROOKSHANK, M.D. 
LANGUAGE AS SYMBOL AND AS EXPRESSION by E. SAPIR 
A HISTORY OF ETHICAL THEORY by M. GINSBERG, D.Lit. 
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY . by M. GINSBERG, D.Lit. 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW . .. by A. L. GOODHART 
PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSICAL GENIUS` by G. REVESZ 
MODERN THEORIES OF PERCEPTION . by W. J. H. SPROTT 
THE BEHAVIOURIST MOVEMENT . . by A. A. ROBACK 
SCOPE AND VALUE OF ECONOMICS by BARABRA WOOTTON 
MATHEMATICS FOR PHILQSOPHERS by G. H. HARDY, F.R.S. 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS by E. VON HARTMANN 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MYTHS by G. ELLIOT SMITH, F.R.S. 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC . . by EDWARD J. DENT 
PSYCHOLOÇY OF PRIMITIVE PEOPLES by B. MALINOWSKI,D.Sc. 
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE THOUGHT by LIANG CHE CHIAO 
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